Hydropower Hegemony: Examining Civil Society Opposition to Dams in Cambodia

Abstract

As the urgency of addressing the climate crisis gathers pace, the role of hydropower is likely to attract increased interest for its claimed sustainability, despite fragmenting fragile river systems and evidence of significant emissions when constructed in tropical contexts. Building upon existing post-development, political ecology and civil society literature, this paper examines civil society opposition to hydropower projects in Cambodia. The paper introduces the term ‘hydropower hegemony,’ as an analytical tool for examining not just the tactical dimensions of civil society opposition to hydropower, but also the importance of ideological contestation. This analysis is applied to two case studies, Lower Sesan 2 and the Areng Valley in Cambodia, but with relevance for populations in peripheral areas and countries facing the expansion of hydropower projects. The case studies illustrate a spectrum of approaches to contestation, from reform to confrontation, and their intersections with the rapacious Cambodian state. The analysis also challenges reductionist characterizations of civil society in Cambodia. Despite the presence and success of confrontation with the state, we suggest that civil society’s increasingly reformist approaches are ultimately reinforcing hegemony, hydropower and otherwise, rather than challenging it, by inadvertently taming and domesticating burgeoning opposition to dispossession.

Keywords:

• Cambodia
• Sesan
• Areng
• sustainability
• post development

1. Introduction

Hydropower projects are often major sites of tension, where political, economic, ecological and social issues coalesce, from debates over development agendas to aggravation of geopolitical tensions. This paper introduces the term ‘hydropower hegemony’ as an analytical framing for examining both the ideological and tactical dimensions of civil society opposition to such projects. We define hydropower hegemony as a comprehensive process of asserting power through primarily ideological means grounded in modernist, materialist thinking that marginalizes broader social and ecological considerations. The rising urgency of climate crisis mitigation has the potential to further incorporate sustainability to strengthen its hegemonic power, where, as Baird and Green (2020) highlight, emission reductions can take precedence over sustainability to justify environmentally damaging hydropower projects. Ideologically backed by the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and major funding from development banks and China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), hydropower hegemony disregards the economically irreducible value of free flowing river systems for those reliant on them. Riverine communities throughout the world find themselves interlocked with the ‘sustainable development’ agenda, an ideological framing that has also attracted many non-government organizations (NGOs). This dynamic is acutely present in Southeast Asia, where a lack of state accountability means dams are still only loosely justified in sustainability terms and instead primarily framed as inevitable and desirable for materialist notions of development.

Building upon Zeitoun and Warner’s (2006) concept of hydro hegemony that provides a framework for understanding transboundary water conflicts, we argue that hydropower hegemony has been a powerful force in not simply justifying hydropower projects, but also shaping and de-politicizing opposition to dams. This force is evident in NGO-centered opposition movements opting for predominantly technocratic, or what we term reformist, approaches to mitigate the negative impacts of hydropower dams. Such approaches focus on improving resettlement practices and compensation, for example, but generally struggle to pose a deeper ideological challenge to hydropower hegemony. This contrasts with actors we call confrontationists. They tend to be characterized by their informality, willingness to take confrontational approaches and framing of nature as transcendent of economic reductionism. Through such tactics and ideology, the confrontationists present a far deeper challenge to hydropower hegemony, yet we find they are in the minority. Although this paper focuses primarily on these two broadly defined groups, a spectrum of actors populates civil society opposing hydropower projects, all of which must navigate and are constrained by the authoritarian political realities of Cambodia.

Focusing on opposition to the Lower Sesan 2 (LS2) and Areng Valley hydropower projects in Cambodia, this paper examines how domestic and international civil society contest hydropower hegemony. These case studies allow us to contribute to a diversity of civil society literature, such as understanding civil society as a space of ideological contestation (Alagappa, 2004), but also the mechanics of opposition, such as literature on new social movements (NSMs) and transnational activist networks (TANs). Our analysis also builds upon and seeks to challenge dominant analyses that characterize Cambodian civil society as highly ‘NGOised’, technocratic and driven by international development trends. This paper will argue that despite the prevalence and limitations of NGOs, confrontationist and community-led movements have also emerged and proven far more successful at opposing hydropower hegemony than formalized civil society, particularly reformist NGOs. These confrontationist movements demonstrate agency and dynamism that is far less evident when analyzing NGOs, which attract the bulk of analysis related to civil society in Cambodia. We recognize that this is also due to confrontationists being in the minority and an exception rather than the norm, although other significant examples exist such as Boueng Kak and Prey Lang (see Wells-Dang, 2013). However, we argue that the dominance of reformist approaches is being fortified through an increasing pursuit of corporate and international accountability mechanisms. Although successful campaigns require a multitude of approaches, we suggest that an expansion of reformist approaches will ultimately reinforce, rather than challenge, hydropower hegemony, by further disincentivising confrontation and engagement in ideological contestation.

2. Data and methods

This paper is primarily based upon field visits to LS2 and the Areng Valley in early 2021 for interviews and focus group discussions, alongside other interviews with Cambodian civil society and international aid actors in 2020 and 2021. A mix of systematic and snowball sampling was utilized to ensure a spectrum of views, from reformist to confrontationist. Fourteen interviews and three focus group discussions were conducted with people displaced by LS2 (nine interviews and one focus group) and living in the Areng Valley (five interviews and two focus groups). Non-activist villagers, activists and leaders were interviewed. Forty percent of interviewees were women. In addition, six interviews were conducted with Khmer civil society actors and six with international civil society actors, all directly engaged in hydropower issues. The authors knew some interviewees beforehand, which facilitated candid discussion. Bias was mitigated through the systematic sample selection to ensure diversity of inputs from reformists and confrontationists. The paper also draws upon both researchers’ historical experience with civil society in Cambodia and activism in relation to the case studies. This approach aligns with activism scholarship to contribute to an activist agenda (Baird & Green, 2020). Both authors are men. One author is Cambodian and the other Australian, with interviews conducted in Khmer and/or English. Both researchers have been involved in activism for more than a decade in Cambodia, alongside previously working with Cambodian and international civil society organizations. Both the interviews and this historical embeddedness contribute to the overall analysis presented throughout the paper as it seeks situated knowledge that is cognizant of time, place and circumstance. This includes belief in theory from below and a commitment ‘to the validity and significance of local knowledge’ (Rudolph, 2005, p. 12). Interviewees are anonymized due to the sensitive political context and to facilitate open discussion.

3. Intersectional theoretical framing

This paper employs an intersectional theoretical framing, based on three key pillars, to examine the contestation of hydropower hegemony in Cambodia. The first pillar is political ecology, which seeks to illuminate and examine the interrelations between political, economic, social and environmental issues (Forsyth, 2008). Although the term political ecology is somewhat divided between Marxist, materialist and post-structuralist forms (Tetreault, 2017), it is used here in the broadest sense, both in terms of integrating ecological concerns with broader political economy analysis, and to also deconstruct discourse, particularly surrounding ‘sustainable development’. Whereas a political economy lens can reduce complexities and marginalize alternate epistemologies, political ecology accommodates a broader, interconnected theoretical landscape. As will be shown in this paper, the dominance of political economy analysis related to hydropower is itself a form of hegemonic control and its reductionism is ill-suited for understanding contestations of hydropower hegemony.

The second theoretical pillar draws upon Gramsci’s theory of hegemony and the role of civil society. At its core, hegemony is conceptualised as a process by which the dominant classes seek social control through ideology and culture rather than physical enforcement (Gramsci, 1999). Ideology is central to the construction of hegemony, as it establishes a set of ideas and rules that shapes social order (Pauly, De Rynk, & Verschuere, 2016). For Gramsci, power is a matter of both coercion (physical enforcement) and consent, where the latter indicates hegemonic ascendancy (Cox, 1983). Hydropower hegemony thus refers to the ideological architecture for asserting control over affected populations. The fluidity of hegemony’s emphasis on the process of (ideological) contestation will be drawn on throughout this paper, as it prompts questioning of how consent is achieved, but also challenged, including social movements’ potential to make hegemony from below (Whitehead, 2015). In this regard, we draw upon Alagappa’s (2004) neo-Gramscian definition of civil society as a space of ideological contestation and thus intrinsically linked to reinforcing and challenging hegemony. Viewing civil society as more than a solution, virtue or problem encourages a focus on ‘the discourses, values and interactions of civil society’ (Alagappa, 2004, p. 32), which will be a central analytical strand throughout this paper. It also encourages looking beyond formalized civil society structures like NGOs and their opposition tactics, and re-emphasizes the importance of ideology.

The final theoretical pillar, which is a logical extension of the first two, is post-development theory, which seeks to deconstruct and thus challenges development hegemony. This paper draws specifically on Escobar’s emphasis on seeking to understand how the development sector’s ‘system of relations establishes a discursive practice that sets the rules of the game’ (Escobar, 1995, p. 41) and how ‘capitalism and modernity relied on a politics of poverty’ (Escobar, 1995, p. 23). The hegemonic worldview of development ‘permeates and transforms the economic, social and cultural fabric of Third World cities and villages’ (Escobar, 1995, pp. 17–18). Such deconstruction is necessary to decolonize our imaginary, where post-development seeks a break from materialist, economic-centered development, both ideologically and in practice (Rist, 2019). Beyond deconstruction, our analytical framework also draws particularly on the work of Shiva (2013), which is propositional in advocating for the importance of re-centering Indigenous knowledge and worldviews to counter capitalist expansion. A theoretical framing incorporating political ecology, hegemony and post-development theory helps to not just illuminate the complex inter-related dynamics of hydropower hegemony, but also how it is contested by civil society.

4. Hydropower hegemony in Cambodia

The concept of hydropower hegemony is connected to, but distinctly different from, the analytical framework of hydro hegemony. The term hydro hegemony has been used to describe hegemony within a river basin, primarily understood at an international level (Zeitoun & Warner, 2006) and thus utilized as a way for understanding water-related geopolitics through a political economy lens. Hydro hegemony focuses on how states, power and power asymmetries influence transboundary water politics (Menga, 2016). It draws attention to ideology, but is focused on politics and international relations, rather than interrogating the desirability of materialist notions of development. For example, Han (2017) examines China as the hegemon over the Mekong, due its location upstream and outsized influence compared to downstream countries. Han suggests China is opting for collaboration over imposition in dealing with downstream Mekong countries, but doesn’t question the underlying materialist and modernist hegemony driving the expansion of hydropower. Hensengerth (2015a) suggests that hydro hegemony focuses excessively on state-based power to the neglect of understanding complex local contestations, including the role of civil society. Hensengerth’s analysis primarily focuses on tactics in opposing specific projects and spheres of authority, rather than interrogation of development ideology. While use of the term hydro hegemony has extensive utility for analyzing the political economy and geopolitics of transboundary river systems, we use the term hydropower hegemony to refer specifically to hydropower dams and the broader ideological foundations in which ‘development’ and increasingly ‘sustainable development’ discourses justify their construction.

We introduce and define the term hydropower hegemony as a comprehensive process of asserting power through primarily ideological means grounded in modernist, materialist thinking. In Cambodia and the region, it is characterized by a logic that commodification of the commons is justified for improving aggregate material wellbeing, even if evidence suggests otherwise (see International Rivers, 2014). A dominant framing is that hydropower is critical for economic growth and thus poverty reduction (Hensengerth, 2017). The majority Japanese and United States-backed Asian Development Bank (ADB) has traditionally been one of the strongest proponents of hydropower, particularly the 1992-launched Greater Mekong Subregion strategy for regional integration, including a regional energy network. The ADB considers hydropower as clean energy and ‘in the interest of climate change, has found renewed arguments for a further expansion of financing hydropower infrastructure’ (BothEnds, 2011, p. 3). Non-capitalist, ecologically harmonious livelihoods are rendered expendable, not just through displacement with inadequate compensation, but also by overlooking the vast non-commodified value riverine communities gain from free-flowing rivers (Eyler, 2019). Hydropower, on the other hand, is portrayed as directly contributing to gross domestic product (GDP) and export earnings through the sale of electricity, while also electrifying Cambodia’s rural areas to further stimulate GDP growth. Such framing also draws upon a historical regional paradigm of state-led modernization and technological progress (Blake & Barney, 2018). The role of the state is central, where it extends control over the commons, which can also occur under the guise of conservation, not just modernization (see Woods, 2019).

Hydropower hegemony is also supported by China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Through providing financial and political capital, BRI contributes to the sense of hydropower’s inevitability throughout Cambodia and a strengthening of the economic development imperative. This is also evident in other countries, such as Myanmar (Myitsone) and Uganda (Karuma), where BRI funds hydropower projects as desirable for development. Hydropower in peripheral areas reflects what Murray Li (2007) has termed the ‘will to improve’ that problematizes a seeming lack of development to then justify the imposition of technical and expert knowledge. BRI also seeks to assure recipient countries that China’s regional ambitions will bring mutual benefits through development (Eyler, 2019). Globally and in neighboring Laos, the World Bank has historically been a major proponent of hydropower (Blake & Barney, 2018), but along with the ADB, it is increasingly less significant than BRI in the Mekong region for financing new dams. Although BRI is consistently understood as a comprehensive effort from the Chinese state to methodically expand its influence, a major driver of BRI is the reallocation of capital and expertise that is no longer required within China. As an expert on BRI and hydropower in Southeast Asia explained in an interview:

When we talk about China’s intentions, it’s always the intentions of many actors. The most prominent drivers are the needs of these giant state-owned hydro companies looking for more business abroad… It’s very much due to the needs of the companies and it’s worth mentioning that ideologically and conceptually, hydropower is something that is very accepted in Chinese society and culture. If you can tame the water, it’s a symbol that you’re a good government… When civil society in other countries fights against or opposes hydropower projects, there is a conceptual gap between the two because in China, they fundamentally feel it’s a good thing. (personal communication, 25 November, 2021)

The final key element to hydropower hegemony is the sustainability agenda. The Kyoto Protocol’s creation of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is one such example, where hydropower projects can receive carbon credits for their claimed emissions reductions. Although well intentioned, the CDM reinforces the desirability of hydropower and can make marginal, problematic projects financially viable. Baird and Green (2020) have illustrated how such a blinkered focus on emissions can fail to consider broader ecological impacts, such as on fisheries, which have been severely impacted in the Mekong region. Fearnside (2015) has also shown that the CDM can end up funding dams that were already going to be built, thus wasting limited CDM finances and not even achieve emission reductions. It is also calculated that dams in tropical areas (such as Cambodia) end up producing more emissions than fossil fuel alternatives because of the methane released from biomatter in the reservoir, yet such findings appear to not have influenced decision making related to approving dams (Fearnside, 2016). This latter point arguably reflects the influence of hydropower hegemony for justifying dams.

Rather than question the desirability of introducing the development apparatus to riverine communities, the sustainability agenda can simplify and reinforce the green credentials and necessity of hydropower. In Cambodia, the state selectively utilizes global sustainability norms to justify hydropower development, while presenting environmental protection as antithetical (Hensengerth, 2015b). Conservation initiatives, such as REDD+ (a carbon credit scheme that seeks to monetize reductions in deforestation), are also identified in Cambodia as being susceptible to corruption that erodes alleged environmental benefits (Williams & Dupuy, 2019), constrained by measurement techniques (Ehara, Saito, Michinaka, Hirata, Leng, Matsumoto, & Riano, 2021) and mired in complex institutional arrangements (Nhem, Lee, & Phin, 2017). Despite the existence of REDD + in Cambodia, industrial-scale deforestation persists (Nathan & Pasgaard, 2017). Milne and Mahanty (2019) argue that the dominance of green economy thinking within environmental governance has also given rise to what they term bureaucratic violence in Cambodia. This occurs through technocratic rules to marginalize opposition and deny justice, which they illustrate through carbon credit schemes that dispossess forest dwelling populations. Such cases reflect how the sustainability agenda can easily be leveraged to distort and simplify complex realities, where supposed green credentials marginalize deeper ideological questioning. Deconstruction of environmental narratives has shown they are often imperialist, biased and possess pro-corporate characteristics, not just in the SDGs, but also earlier iterations, such as the Global Environmental Program (Tetreault, 2017). Whereas Ferguson (1994) details how politics are taken out of development, hydropower hegemony is a distinctly political project that helps justify what Springer (2015) calls the Cambodian state’s ‘violent neoliberal’ regime of dispossession.

Taking all these aspects together, hydropower hegemony is a powerful force in Cambodia, underpinned by global narratives and capital, despite dams causing widespread negative impacts. The alleged green benefits of hydropower are utilized more by international backers rather than the Cambodian government, which lacking accountability and transparency, focuses on the narrative of modernity, poverty alleviation and national development, as articulated in various National Development Plans (see Royal Government of Cambodia, 2019). This creates a powerful tool for asserting social control, where to question hydropower is to oppose the benefits development brings, regardless of whether the majority of electricity is exported (Burgos & Ear, 2010). Hydropower often brings scant benefit to directly affected populations, who are resettled and lose access to their former wealth of riverine and forest resources (World Commission on Dams, 2000). Meanwhile, by blocking fish migration, dams are devastating Cambodia’s fish stocks (Human Rights Watch, 2021), the number one source of protein for Cambodians and foundation of livelihoods for millions (Vilain, Baran, Gallego, & Samadee, 2016).

Hydropower hegemony marginalizes opposition to dam’s commodification of the commons and alternative epistemologies that place irreducible cultural and ecological value on the affected riverine systems. Hence the importance of a political ecology, rather than political economy lens, to understand the nuances of contestation. Hydropower hegemony also detracts from the bountiful opportunities for elite enrichment that dams offer, not just through opaque tendering and contracting processes, but also the highly lucrative logging of reservoir areas. The rest of this paper will focus on how Cambodian and international civil society actors have contested hydropower hegemony in Cambodia, specifically in relation to the LS2 and Areng Valley dam projects.

5. Situating civil society in Cambodia

Before looking at the case studies of LS2 and Areng Valley, it is important to contextualize civil society in Cambodia. The dominant strand of civil society critique focuses on the arrival of international aid actors along with the United Nations peacekeeping force in the early 1990s and their role in creating a donor-centered, heavily NGOised civil society. An early example is Hughes’ analysis arguing that international organizations undermine broader emancipatory collective movements. This is seen to occur through the imposition of international agendas and approaches that ‘headed off from a wider confrontation with the corrupt and exploitative Cambodian state’ (Hughes, 2007, p. 847). In a widely cited critique, Henke similarly argues that Cambodian civil society is dominated by donor-oriented NGOs, resulting in the ‘commodification of activism’ (Henke, 2011). The result is that NGOs ultimately pose a barrier to social movements. Norman (2014) puts forth an equally stinging analysis, arguing that Cambodian civil society shifted from ‘shouting’ (agitating for justice) to ‘counting’ (measuring change to ensure accountability to donors). This is viewed as a result of donors’ New Policy Agenda that funded NGOs to provide a social safety net (scaled back by earlier neoliberal structural adjustment programs) and contribute towards good governance through holding government to account (Mayhew, 2005). Ou and Sedara (2013) contend that NGOs in Cambodia merely provide the illusion of civil society, while Springer (2010) laments civil society as being legalistic, technocratic and hierarchical.

This paper seeks to build upon a contrasting view of civil society in Cambodia that emphasizes the historical and political factors that have shaped civil society. Such a view does not seek to dismiss the core of the aforementioned analyses, but highlights how the Cambodian state actively sought to cultivate NGOs as a non-threatening form of civil society. The prevalence of NGOs in Cambodia is thus not solely attributable to international donor agendas, while NGOs can also be adept at resisting international influence (Barter & Sumlut, 2022). This position also suggests that disproportionately focusing on NGOs when seeking to understand civil society contestations overlooks the significant instances of informal, grassroots mobilization and activism. It also reduces analysis of the intersections between NGOs and informal, grassroots civil society actors. The two case studies featuring in this paper seek to illustrate some of these nuances that can be lost when giving primacy to foreign donors and NGOs. A growing body of work on NSMs seeks to highlight these dynamics, such as their lack of organizational structure (Abdelrahman, 2013), while also emphasizing the greater fluidity of NSMs compared to class-based politics and their focus on the negative impacts of modernization (Young, 2016). Similarly, studies on TANs look at the mechanics and importance of connecting localized struggles to globalized networks for advocacy (Ford, 2013). These analytical lenses are important for understanding civil society agency and provide valuable insights on the mechanics of opposition. While drawing on such theory, this paper foregrounds the significance of ideological contestation, rather than activist networks.

In recent years, scholarly attention has increasingly sought to understand how civil society in Cambodia has engaged in defending communities’ natural resources against a predatory state and private sector. As the Cambodian state has embarked on a process labelled ‘violent neoliberalism’ (Springer, 2015) that epitomizes accumulation through dispossession that readily deploys violence and coercion (Loughlin & Milne, 2021), it has also pursued a strategic closing of civil and political space. Increasingly constrained civil society actors have pivoted towards different tactics to challenge Cambodia’s rapacious development apparatus. According to Joshi (2020), this has led to the rise of ‘forum shopping,’ where dispossessed communities are encouraged to pursue international legal recourse considering the corrupt state of Cambodia’s judiciary. Although providing space for airing grievances and achieving some limited success, Joshi argues that bypassing the state and local judiciary is no panacea for systemic resolution of rampant dispossession in Cambodia. Young has produced a substantive body of analysis looking at the mechanics of resistance to land dispossession. One example looks at the shift from institutional tactics that when unable to yield results shifted to violent protest, which ultimately secured some concessions for Indigenous communities that were dispossessed of their land (Young, 2016). Other work looks at how civil society resistance targets different actors to pursue accountability for dispossession, namely the government in the case of a dam and a company in the case of a sugarcane plantation (Young, 2019). Elsewhere, Young ultimately concludes that ‘patron-client networks of neo-patrimonial politics shape the degrees of success or failure of social movements’ (Young, 2020, p. 918).

The analysis we present in the following sections builds upon this body of civil society literature, but with significant divergence in approach. Focusing on two case studies, opposition to the LS2 and Areng Valley hydropower projects, our analysis does explore the mechanics of opposition, but gives greater attention to ideological contestation, specifically engagement with hydropower hegemony. This analytical focus is intended to go beyond understanding the pragmatic choices activists make, as illuminated by Joshi, Young and others, to examine more specifically the ways in which the depths of state (hydro) hegemony are reinforced, but also countered. Whereas many analyses have highlighted the rational tactics of opposition to dispossession, such as engaging safeguard mechanisms or international courts, we view these tactics as demonstrations of the state maintaining hegemony through outsourcing accountability to the private sector, whether through domestic or international recourse. A self-regulating private sector reflects a neoliberal utopia, as the Cambodian state recedes into the background, all the while profiteering from the system. By focusing on the ideological realm, namely the contestation of hydropower hegemony, we question Young’s reduction of complexity to patron-client networks and neo-patrimonial networks to explain variations in the success or failure of resistance. Instead, we illuminate the ideological tussle relating to natural resource governance in Cambodia and what this might mean for future opposition movements. The effectiveness of resistance should be understood in its capacity to challenge hegemony, rather than just cases of individual dispute resolution. Finally, our analysis challenges what we believe is the over-simplification of civil society in Cambodia as solely NGOised and beholden to international agenda. We instead illustrate the existence of informal, grassroots activism, alongside its intersections with more formalized national and international civil society, such as NGOs. In this regard, we build upon Baird’s (2016) analysis of LS2 and draw on Baird’s (2017) concept of contingent contestations that proposes modalities and outcomes of contestation are contingent on various conditions, such as histories, identities/ethnicities, politics and geography. This is particularly evident when comparing the two case studies.

6. Lower Sesan 2: a spectrum of civil society

This section provides an overview and analysis of opposition to LS2 in northeast Cambodia, a dam that reflects the intricacies of hydropower hegemony. As far back as 1999, the ADB funded a pre-feasibility study that determined the proposed dam was financially unviable. A new feasibility study was conducted from 2007 to 2009, which despite widespread criticism for downplaying negative impacts, would be utilized by the Cambodian Government to later grant approval for dam construction. In 2008, the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) identified the proposed dam as a priority in its hydropower master plan for Cambodia (Baird, 2009, pp. 16–19). Japan’s technical support complemented eventual BRI funding to demonstrate global capital was committed to the project. Ultimately, it would be a coalition of one of Cambodia’s largest conglomerates, Royal Group, Chinese, state-backed dam developer, Hydro Lancang International Energy, and Vietnamese state-backed investment that would deliver the dam, following Cambodian Government approval in 2012 (International Rivers, 2014). National and global capital matched with the Cambodian Government’s materialist development agenda typified hydropower hegemony. This didn’t just set the scene for a protracted battle with affected communities and civil society, but the development logic also set the agenda for contestation, namely in political economy terms. Ecological concerns could be mitigated and populations compensated. Social control through hegemonic framing, later complemented by bureaucratic violence.

Dozens of local, national and international civil society actors coalesced in opposition to LS2, bringing a spectrum of strategies and approaches. At one end and in the majority were reformists with a minority of confrontationists at the other end, while many actors took fluid positions in between. Central to the reformists’ position was a framing of how the dam would severely impact fish stocks, displace thousands of people and cause more economic damage than benefit. This position evolved to engaging the coalition delivering the project to minimize negative impacts through technical solutions, such as resettlement practices and improved consultation (see NGO Forum, 2012). Such a position went against community preferences for cancellation of the dam. As Baird (2016) explains, the Culture and Preservation Association (CEPA) encouraged communities to accept resettlement and compensation, while the Rivers Coalition of Cambodia (RCC) ultimately adopted a reformist approach. The NGO Forum would later follow suit, as government pressure escalated. Although the reformists’ efforts attracted media attention, the largely technical framing failed to cultivate widespread solidarity and action in other parts of Cambodia. The reformists also included an array of other less visible NGOs, such as the Indigenous communities-focused Highlanders Association. In an interview for this paper, it was evident the Highlanders Association felt the dam was inevitable and the focus should be on securing the best possible deal for affected populations, as seeking cancellation was futile. The reformists reflect the critiques of Henke (2011) and others that NGOs have shifted ‘from shouting to counting’.

At the other end of spectrum, the confrontationists, even if in the minority, reflected a different approach often not captured in civil society literature on Cambodia. They sought to prevent the project via direct action resistance and demanded recognition for the non-materialist significance, spiritual and cultural, of the affected area. The confrontationists were a mix of NGOs and networks that were more experienced in advocacy and campaigning rather than community development. 3SPN and Mother Nature were key protagonists. Whereas prominent human rights organizations have been outspoken about rights’ abuses in Cambodia for decades, the confrontationists went further by also committing to or supporting direct action. This would pose a more fluid and unpredictable opposition, which is exactly what the government has sought to minimize in favor of cultivating reformist civil society. As Shiva (2013) argues, when the state becomes a corporate state prioritizing privatization, as is the case of Cambodia’s pursuit of violent neoliberalism, any effort to defend the commons is seen as a threat.

Many civil society actors also occupied different spaces and moved between reform and confrontation. Cambodian human rights organizations provided legal and other support for both ends of the spectrum, while International Rivers and Human Rights Watch were and remain vocal about problems with LS2 (see Human Rights Watch, 2021), aided by neither organization having an operational presence in Cambodia. Oxfam demonstrated commitment to dam cancellation and funded Cambodian NGOs accordingly, but over time their stance yielded to intensifying government pressure, owing to the perceived risk towards their significant development initiatives across the country. Civil society was not simply a case of reformists and confrontationists, but this paper focuses on these two ends of the spectrum, as they best illustrate divergence and tensions related to the contestation of hydropower hegemony.

As dam construction gathered pace, the reformist focus shifted from highlighting the negative impacts of the dam to ensuring the best possible deal for communities that were to be resettled. The 2009 report Best Practices in Compensation and Resettlement for Large Dams makes it very clear that affected populations unanimously and strongly oppose the construction of LS2 and want it cancelled (Baird, 2009). However, the NGOs funding and overseeing the report pursued a focus on compensation and resettlement, captured in Baird’s (2016) analysis that there was a clear disjuncture between community preferences and NGO actions. Disagreements on approaches also arose and would persist amongst members of the RCC. This resulted in a 2012 report that while reiterating community opposition to LS2, also went to great lengths emphasizing the importance of development, as expressed in part of the conclusion as follows: ‘They [affected communities] know that development is important, and as Cambodians, they have to participate in the process’ (The NGO Forum on Cambodia, 2012, p. 81). Considering the release of the 2012 report was before any substantive dam construction, it had significant agenda setting potential, but rather than challenge the ideological dimensions of hydropower hegemony, it framed problems with LS2 as technical issues that could be resolved and ultimately reinforced the materialist ideology underpinning hydropower hegemony. This echoes Escobar’s critique that development’s technocratic discourse doesn’t just depoliticize, but also helps justify, development interventions.

A 2014 report Starving the Mekong (International Rivers, 2014) adopted a similarly technical position, questioning the feasibility of the dam and highlighting the negative impacts on fisheries and displaced populations. Grounded in this logic, there was success in bringing concern over LS2 to regional fora, while individual organizations and alliances also embarked on dialogue and forums with government and the dam constructors, plus press conferences, workshops, petitions and statements. International Rivers adopted a confrontational position that opposed dam construction and these approaches serve a purpose and can inform discussions, but they also channel dissent into more easily controllable forms, thus alleviating potential for more distinctly counter hegemonic actions. Although the impact on Indigenous communities and their ancestral lands were included in the discourse, reformists largely opted to frame their opposition in political economy terms. Their approach is indicative of Hughes (2007) criticism that (international) NGOs can undermine the representation of collective interests and thus avoid deeper, necessary confrontation with the highly oppressive Cambodian state. During an interview, a Cambodian activist formerly associated with Mother Nature echoed such a sentiment:

The NGOs (like CEPA) acted like a bridge for the government. They educated the local communities to accept compensation and negotiated with the government to pay good compensation. (personal communication, January 11, 2021)

In contrast to the reformists and distinguished from the many civil society actors in the middle, a small cohort adopted more confrontational strategies. This group of civil society actors, who we call the confrontationists, focused on community empowerment, mobilization and direct action. The confrontationists supported communities to conduct protests against the dam, such as marches. Approximately one third of residents from two villages, Sre Kor and Kabal Romeas, with predominantly ethnic minority and Indigenous populations, were at the forefront of protests. Their opposition continued up until their houses were flooded following closure of the dam gates. They refused to relocate their homes, painted the message ‘we won’t leave our ancestral lands’ on their houses and continued protesting as their houses flooded. Most civil society actors were conspicuously silent during this final act of defiance, as political sensitivity was acute. Interviewed reformists expressed that within organizations there was a willingness to be more vocal, but mitigation of institutional risk won out against taking a stronger position. Baird (2016) has also illustrated how reformist NGOs, particularly CEPA, stunted broader mobilization through promoting resettlement and compensation, while also discouraging protest. Severe government crackdowns and threats also diminished mobilization. The houses of Sre Kor and Kabal Romeas now stand half submerged as an enduring protest against the dam and also a symbol of a more dynamic civil society than portrayed in most literature. Although most residents succumbed to government and other pressures, approximately one third of Sre Kor and Kabal Romeas residents never stopped ‘shouting’.

The confrontationists framed opposition less as a technical issue, nor reducible to economic rationalism. They highlighted how the dam would flood ancestral lands and spiritual forests that were beyond any economic value that formed the basis of the government and private sector’s justification for the dam, namely that rural electrification, modernization and electricity exports warranted dispossession. The confrontationists consistently emphasized their cultural and spiritual connection to the land and water, similar to what Whitehead (2015) describes as making hegemony from below. Political ecology informed their analysis, while they foregrounded non-materialist concerns in discourse, which posed a more distinct challenge to hydropower hegemony than conforming to framing issues in economic terms. Only a small number of NGOs, such as 3SPN, actively supported this approach, with most NGOs acquiescing to government pressure. This pressure included both intimidation, such as the threat of arrest and prosecution, but also enticements to pursue reform, such as dialogue relating to improving compensation. These tactics also demonstrate the government’s agency in shaping civil society that is often overlooked in the many critiques that prefer to focus on international influence. The strength of community resistance and support from a minority of civil society actors also reflects a level of dynamism that is regularly overlooked or disregarded in most analyses.

As the opposition persisted, conflict intensified. Provincial police and military erected a roadblock to deny NGOs access to the villages and the government cut off public services, such as health and education, various forms of bureaucratic violence, to pressure the communities to accept resettlement. Provincial authorities also filed criminal charges against some community leaders. The few remaining confrontationist NGOs receded under the varying forms of pressure, amplified by the new Law on Associations and NGOs that the government had carefully crafted ‘to increase control and intimidation by invoking adherence to the “rule of law”’ (Curley, 2018, p. 247). Institutional survival for civil society actors was now far more tenuous, as the government could easily dissolve dissident actors. The direct-action environmental group, Mother Nature, was an outlier, staying embedded with communities and supporting their continued protest. Their support and influence were largely concentrated in the reservoir area, particularly Kabal Romeas and Sre Kor. Green and Baird (2020) highlight the problem of activists focusing primarily on the reservoir area, but it must also be noted that Mother Nature operated with scant resources and was concurrently occupied with opposition to the proposed Areng Valley dam. Faced with the necessity of prioritization, a focus on the reservoir appears a logical choice. Kabal Romeas and Sre Kor residents were also more willing to protest than other villages, again suggesting a significant degree of pragmatism with limited resources. 3SPN also remained actively engaged with affected populations, but through a strategy of community empowerment rather than direct action. Their access to villages was increasingly constrained by authorities. As Baird (2016) indicates, politics amongst NGOs also restricted 3SPN’s ability to operate in Stung Treng province, where LS2 is located, as 3SPN are based in the neighboring and upstream Ratanikiri province.

Interviewees from the affected villages explained how Mother Nature’s acts of solidarity motivated them to continue their struggle, even as other NGOs left. As police regularly scoured the area, Mother Nature activists repeatedly hid in the nearby forest and then returned to be side-by-side with the communities. This continued solidarity was in stark contrast to the approaches of the reformists, although the continued resistance did bring greater pressure and strain on the people protesting. This meant significant risk and insecurity. However, as one Kabal Romeas resident explained in an interview:

When people (Mother Nature activists) came from outside and stayed in the village, we were not afraid and were more confident… They encouraged us to have community-led advocacy by ourselves. If there was no support from Mother Nature, there would be no village here and we would have moved already (accepted resettlement). (personal communication, February 7, 2021)

The divergence in civil society approaches also resulted in significantly different outcomes for communities. For those focused on reform, they did achieve improved resettlement and compensation for displaced communities, while raising national and regional awareness related to the negative impacts of hydropower. They also likely contributed to the Cambodian Government declaring a moratorium on Mekong mainstream dams (Thul, 2020). However, their continued focus on the technical and legal aspects of hydropower and resettlement demonstrated a reductionist, materialist framing of the issues at hand that aligned with rather than challenged hydropower hegemony. As Ferguson (1994) writes, when political questions of resources become framed as technical problems, this effectively squashes political challenge to the system. Economic-centricity also failed to mobilize significant national opposition and lost potency when the dam developers improved resettlement practices and compensation. Just as critically, the results for resettled communities have proven to be substantially worse than for the Sre Kor and Kabal Romeas residents who persisted with confrontation.

In every interview conducted with resettled community members, they highlighted the hardship of resettlement, such as low fertility land, lack of water, isolation from markets and jobs, and scarce access to resources that were abundant in previously nearby forests and the river. Many felt they had been thrust into a capitalist system, yet lacked the skills and resources to adjust. Travelling through the resettlement villages, activity is clearly subdued, while communities live under the close watch of authorities. The sole road leading to villages resettled near the dam (some villages were resettled much further away) involves multiple checkpoints that although not particularly strict, form part of the surveillance apparatus designed to prevent any renewed opposition. It was reported that the road access would soon be replaced by a ferry operated by the dam developers. This would further isolate the resettled villages and force residents to pay ferry tolls to leave and return to their villages. The persistence of this isolation reduces attention on the legacy of dispossession, which often becomes accepted when the causes are presented as a modern alternative (Shiva, 2013). Perhaps most poignantly, some resettled interviewees wished they had been more resolute in opposing resettlement and expressed admiration for the Sre Kor and Kabal Romeas residents that held out.

The confrontationists posed a more significant challenge to hydropower hegemony that although not preventing dam construction, yielded superior results for the approximately one third of Sre Kor and Kabal Romeas residents that refused resettlement. Whereas resettled villages were moved far away from their former village locations, the remaining Sre Kor and Kabal Romeas residents moved to slightly higher ground nearby, as their previous villages flooded. They did so without government or company approval, while continually emphasizing the importance of their ancestral and spiritual lands. Despite their resistance, residents are increasingly under pressure as development projects, especially plantations, extend and solidify state authority. The confrontationists’ ideological stance matched with direct action and defiance represented a distinct challenge not just to hydropower hegemony, but also the Cambodian state’s violent neoliberal model of development that has negatively impacted millions of people across the country (Springer, 2015). The resulting severe crackdown by authorities reflects the perception of threat it posed, where authorities have historically sought to channel civic action into the form of NGOs and reformist approaches.

Despite the punishment of authorities, such as cutting off public services and arrests, the remaining Sre Kor and Kabal Romeas residents now appear significantly better off than the resettled villages. They still have relatively easy access to the river/reservoir and their ancestral lands, spiritual forests and rice fields that were not flooded by the reservoir, although fish stocks have decreased substantially. Having dealt with the hardship of losing their former houses without compensation, interviewees were proud of their defiance and far more optimistic about their future compared to resettled villages (although recognizing they have an interest in portraying such a narrative). They could still access many of the non-monetary resources that were the foundation of their livelihoods for generations. During site visits and interviews, the contrast with the downcast resettled villages was striking. Some resettled villages had improved access to electricity, roads and government services, but were distinctly pessimistic about the future.

A multitude of other factors also influenced the divergent outcomes between communities impacted by LS2 and ultimately the inability to prevent the dam. As Alagappa (2004) suggests, analyzing civil society requires engagement with discourses, values and interactions, all of which influenced outcomes. Interviewed residents from Kabal Romeas and Sre Kor consistently highlighted the importance of community leadership as influential in whether communities resisted or acquiesced. They also felt that the communities accepting resettlement tended to have been in the area for a shorter period and had less connection to the surrounding environment. They believed that the degree of commitment to opposition also depended somewhat on the quantity and quality of residents’ land. Kabal Romeas and Sre Kor residents reported having better land and were more directly impacted than other more remote villages, such as Khsach Thmei and Ta Lat, and thus had more to lose (much of which they still lost due to flooding from the reservoir). It also meant they had greater resources to maintain their resistance. For many others, the offer of five hectares of (poor quality, low fertility) land and a house was more appealing (even if subsequently regretted). Government coercion can also not be understated; residents from all villages wanted dam cancellation rather than resettlement (Baird, 2009), but ultimately only the small minority in Kabal Romeas and Sre Kor maintained vocal opposition. Interviewing resettled communities, it was evident many spoke Lao and were significantly less confident to engage or challenge authorities. Amongst all villages, there was agreement that substantive opposition to the dam began too late, as once it had government approval and preliminary construction began, LS2 was a fait accompli. These various dimensions, plus the divergent tactics between reformists and confrontationists indicate that the success or failure of social movements is more complex than Young’s (2020) suggestion that patron-client networks are the determining factor of success or failure. As Baird (2016) also highlights, tensions amongst NGOs also influenced outcomes related to LS2.

The opposition to LS2 also illustrates the existence of civil society dynamics beyond the dominant characterizations in much literature. Although most international and Cambodian NGOs avoided significant confrontation with the state through opting for reform, some adopted a confrontationist approach, most notably Mother Nature, but also the Cambodian Youth Network and 3SPN. The community-based confrontational activism demonstrated the existence and potential of grassroots activism in Cambodia that is often overlooked in favor of analyzing NGOs (Henke, 2011 for example). Although the dominance of pursuing reform reflects Hughes’ (2007) suggestion that civil society has been depoliticized, the broader civil society landscape is far more complex and nuanced. Whereas many analyses focus on the NGOisation and de-politicization of civil society in Cambodia, perhaps the more critical issue is the lack of efficacy and ill-suited tactics in contesting hydropower hegemony. Persisting with predominantly economic rationalist arguments not only reflected the dominance of hydropower hegemony, but also failed to capture mass public support. We believe analysis on ideological contestation also yields different insights than a focus on TANs that tend to instead foreground the mechanics of opposition, or hydro hegemony that focuses on geopolitics.

7. Areng Valley: the potential of confrontation

Opposition to the Areng Valley dam provides a striking contrast to that of LS2 in terms of contesting hydropower hegemony, albeit with multiple intersections between the two movements. The proposed Areng Valley dam was to be constructed in a biodiversity hotspot in southwest Cambodia. The reservoir would extend into the Cardamon National Park, displace over 1,500 Indigenous and Khmer people, and put 31 globally threatened species at heightened risk (Rainforest Information Centre, 2007). In contrast to LS2, the negative impacts would be comparatively localized, as the river is smaller and not a major Mekong tributary. The fact that far fewer people would be directly and indirectly impacted makes the opposition movement’s ability to mobilize national interest even more remarkable. Like many development projects in Cambodia, the plans for the dam were highly secretive, and backed by significant foreign capital – in this case, Sinohydro, a Chinese state-owned proponent of BRI. The proposed dam was not deemed a priority according to JICA’s 2009 hydropower masterplan, due to environmental impacts and not being value for money (JICA, 2009). Two companies pulled out of the project following assessments, with SinoHydro stepping in later (Titthara & Pye, 2014). This lack of viability heightened the sense that the project was more about logging interests and global capital than electricity production (Mother Nature Cambodia, 2022). As was the case with LS2, Chinese hydropower companies are intent on deploying excess capacity towards overseas projects. LS2 also attracted major logging interests prior to construction and allegedly even after the reservoir was full (Human Rights Watch, 2021). It was 2012 when opposition to the Areng Valley dam started to crystallize.

The campaign to save the Areng Valley became an epicenter of opposition to Cambodia’s violent neoliberalism, from discrete beginnings to a distinctly confrontationist campaign. The origins of the campaign were initially reformist in nature, where Spaniard, Alex Gonzalez-Davidson established an eco-tourism project with the belief that increasing public exposure to the natural beauty of the valley would garner allies in seeking its protection. The murder of high-profile environmental activist, Chut Wutthy, in April 2012, triggered a pivot in approach, as Gonzalez-Davidson recognized eco-tourism was insufficient. Along with two Cambodian Buddhist monks, they expanded their community awareness efforts, while also ordaining trees with Buddhist robes, symbolic acts of protection in a deeply Buddhist country. Following the hotly contested and controversial national election of 2013, Gonzalez-Davidson sought to mobilize youth from the capital, Phnom Penh, to begin a larger-scale campaign. The activist group, Mother Nature, was born. The campaign escalated to grab sustained nation-wide attention, drawing many lessons from what was happening with LS2 and the related struggles, points raised by Areng Valley communities and involved activists during interviews.

There are a few central aspects of the campaign that distinguish it from the dominant civil society approaches to LS2. Conceptually, the campaign always centered on the economically irreducible value and natural heritage of the Areng Valley, framing it as a common good for all Cambodians (Mother Nature Cambodia, 2022). Focusing on the valley and surrounding Cardamon mountains arguably addressed limitations in anti-dam activism that commonly focus just on the reservoir area, which as Green and Baird (2020) demonstrate, can be favorable to dam proponents. The JICA assessment, highlighting the dam’s unviability, is referenced, but the campaign did not embark on extensive research or technical messaging about environmental and socioeconomic impacts, as many actors did for LS2. As Cox (1983) explains, a hegemonic social order is achieved through creating certain modes of behavior. The Cambodian state and elite interests had nurtured rational, technical behavior, rather than the emotive and passionate messaging that would become central to the Areng Valley resistance. In this regard, the campaign was distinctly counter-hegemonic by emotively foregrounding non-reductionist ecology and cultural values over political economy angles. Compared to LS2, where Khmer language was typically not a first language for impacted populations, it was for people in the Areng Valley, which made it easier to engage national audiences. Tactically, the campaign made extensive, creative use of social media that led to widespread reach and attention across the country. It was a distinctly ideologically-centered approach that questioned the state’s hydropower hegemony.

Although local communities and Mother Nature pioneered the campaign and were the most outspoken, they were also highly effective at building an alliance of youth, youth organizations and some NGOs that provided varied support. These intersections between activists, NGOs and networks illustrates the more complex reality of civil society than most literature captures, along with the blurred lines between the spectrum from reform to confrontation. For example, the Cambodian Youth Network helped mobilize youth and educated people about human rights, while LICADHO provided legal aid. Individuals could be both informal activists and NGO workers. Although most actors were more risk adverse than Mother Nature, reformist approaches were not influential in opposition to the dam. However, significant divergence did exist, epitomized by the international NGO, Flora and Fauna International. It didn’t just eschew opposing the dam, but instead accepted a government contract to relocate critically endangered Siamese Crocodiles. Such government-aligned modes of operation that overlook the Cambodian state’s primary role in environmental destruction have led to international conservation organizations attracting fierce criticism (Milne & Mahanty, 2019). For Mother Nature, the crocodile relocation undermined the unique attributes of the area, a point of leverage to oppose the dam. ‘That made us realize we have to do something else,’ Gonzalez-Davidson explained in an interview for this paper (personal communication, January 11, 2021).

Opposition to the dam peaked with a roadblock that galvanized national attention and epitomized the confrontationist tactics of the movement. Although petitions, letter writing and attempted dialogue with government authorities and Sinohydro did occur, such tactics were not in favor of confrontation, of which the roadblock was the most critical. The location of the Areng Valley is such that there is only one road going in and out, while the rest of the surrounding area is mountainous and covered with dense forest. As it became apparent that Sinohydro were planning to visit the valley for feasibility and engineering studies, the affected communities and Mother Nature decided a roadblock was necessary to prevent even these precursory steps. This was a key lesson learnt from LS2, where numerous interviewees felt that opposition there had been too late to prevent the dam. Early action was deemed critical with the roadblock launched on 17 March 2014. As the government sought to direct resistance towards dialogue in what Gramsci refers to as transformismo, namely the assimilation of dangerous ideas into the policies of the dominant coalition (Cox, 1983), the roadblock represented a rejection of the state’s efforts to tame and domesticate resistance.

Strategically located at the crest of a hill, the roadblock offered an advantageous vantage point, access to a nearby village for supplies and mobile reception. The latter being essential for contacting media outlets during periods of heightened confrontation between protestors and the Sinohydro-government alliance. The media played an important role in amplifying messages that challenged the state’s hydropower hegemony. Approximately 150 villagers, plus outside activists, took turns occupying the roadblock and providing support, such as food and supplies. As the roadblock attracted national attention, authorities harassed and threatened violence against the villagers, while also allegedly trying to co-opt leaders with bribes. Strengthened by the presence of Mother Nature and rotations of urban youth activists, the roadblock continued for months until it was finally dismantled by military police and multiple leaders were arrested. The protest, along with others in Phnom Penh over land evictions (Boueng Kak and Borei Keila particularly), demonstrated a dynamism that although in the minority, defied the typical characterization of Cambodian civil society as passive and NGOised. The presence of human rights NGOs also provided important legal support and monitoring, suggesting the need to look beyond a bifurcation between NGOs and grassroots activism. By the time it was dismantled, the roadblock had succeeded in preventing the dam developers from entry and most importantly, garnered sustained national attention that led to widespread national opposition to the dam. It was now publicly viewed as a final bastion of Cambodia’s natural heritage. Prime Minister Hun Sen would later suspend the dam, a remarkable achievement for the campaign and validation of their confrontationist approach.

There is a diversity of other factors that also influenced the outcomes of activism in Areng Valley that are important to note. Perhaps most significantly was timing, in multiple respects. The campaign was launched in the leadup to the 2013 national election and became an election issue with the main opposition party, the Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP), supporting the campaign. Timing was also critical in that opposition preceded any advanced technical studies or construction, meaning there was less momentum behind the project, particularly in comparison to LS2. The direct action of Mother Nature was instrumental in the campaign, but this was also aided by strong community leaders and the activism of Buddhist monks that further legitimized the campaign. As the social media campaign attracted widespread interest, many celebrities amplified the messages, such as a male singer creating the song ‘Areng, a place of my love,’ which became very popular. Another female singer posted an image of herself wearing a shirt with a Siamese Crocodile, which went viral, further raising awareness of the campaign. These various factors all contributed to the campaign, but it was the grassroots, confrontationist approach and ecologically and culturally-centered hegemony from below that were the foundations for success in challenging hydropower hegemony and its government and private sector champions. The subsequent crackdown on Mother Nature, including deportation of Gonzalez-Davidson in 2015 and arrests of multiple activists, reflected the depth of government concern over this more confrontational and fluid style of activism. Such crackdowns also highlight the potential backlash for activists and communities when they challenge state authority. This heavy-handed government response was a harbinger of repression to come, as it was followed by banning of the CNRP, closure of independent media and quelling of any civil society dissent that fell outside the ruling party’s preference for NGO-centered, reformist approaches.

8. Contesting hydropower hegemony in a global context

Understanding the opposition to LS2 and Areng Valley dams through a political ecology lens of hegemonic contestation has significance and relevance beyond the Cambodian context. The literature on TANs seeks to make sense of such contestations with a focus on the importance of connectivity (Ford, 2013 for example), while literature on NSMs looks at how informality can be effective in mobilizing mass protests (Abdelrahman, 2013). Both approaches have utility, but a political ecology lens emphasizes the importance of ideological framing and relationships with nature. This is particularly relevant when seeking to navigate the dominance of economic rationalism, which coalesces with the sustainability agenda to increasingly justify a hydropower hegemony that has deleterious impacts globally on usually marginalized and remote communities. Understanding the mechanics of opposition networks through TAN and NSM critiques is important, but what must not be lost is the deeper questioning and deconstruction of the (sustainable) development agenda. The network focus can also overlook how transferring local issues to global accountability mechanisms can simply bypass underlying issues of a state’s rapacious development ideology and lack of domestic accountability. Joshi (2020) refers to these pursuits of international dispute resolution as forum shopping, while it also echoes Hughes (2007) criticism that NGOs can head off confrontation with the state. As civic space continues to close in many countries, these avenues of recourse increasingly appear pragmatic. However, as atomized forms of resistance, or reform, they deflect questioning of the deeper neoliberal and materialist underpinnings of development (and hydropower) hegemony.

For the Areng Valley, the campaign was successful not through appealing to technical arguments or pursuing international recourse, but rather the transcendent, collective and economically irreducible value of the Areng Valley. This was underpinned by confrontation that didn’t seek to validate the state’s authority over the area, but rather posed an outright rejection of that authority and accompanying hydropower hegemony. This was also the case for the one third of Kabal Romeas and Sre Kor residents that persisted with protest and refused resettlement. It was not a lack or abundance of NGOs, nor networks, engaged in LS2 that influenced outcomes, rather it was ideological framing and willingness to adopt confrontational approaches that were central. Actors pursuing reform may point to the outlawing of Mother Nature and jailing of its activists to justify their stance, but a focus on reform has had detrimental impacts on civil society in Cambodia (see Hughes, 2007 and Norman, 2014), although the potential for confrontation has also now been ameliorated in the face of severe government suppression. Nonetheless, as one interviewed Cambodian activist put it, ‘NGOs have been negotiating for twenty years with no outcome, but when we mobilize and confront, we see results’ or as Gonzalez-Davidson argues, ‘as soon as you’re not willing to get arrested for the cause, you’ve lost’ (personal communication, January 11, 2021). As the CPP’s stranglehold on politics and civic space in Cambodia intensifies, questions around which tactics are effective and what is possible are compounded, but the significance of ideological engagement remains prescient.

9. Conclusion

Contestations related to natural resource governance are set to increase in coming years, as the need to address the climate crisis becomes increasingly unavoidable. This can lead to the sustainable development agenda being wielded to expand hydropower projects in nationally and internationally peripheral territories, where many affected populations already face extensive pressures from extractive industries and development. As the cases of LS2 and Areng Valley demonstrate, modalities of contestation and ideological framing matter when contesting hydropower hegemony. Examining civil society as a realm of ideological contestation and looking beyond NGOs, yields further insights, where confrontationist approaches that pose a distinct ideological challenge have yielded far better results for affected populations than pursuing reform centered on technical arguments. As grassroots mobilization faces severe repression and tensions over natural resources intensify, NGOs’ adoption of reformist approaches is likely to expand, increasingly justified as innovation or at least pragmatism. This has the potential to contribute to forum shopping, such as the pursuit of international accountability mechanisms, which can inadvertently circumvent fundamental governance problems (Joshi, 2020). Pursuing corporate rather than state accountability can be a pragmatic choice (Young, 2019), but it also reflects the depth of neoliberalism’s scaling back of the state and championing of corporate self-regulation. This can render civil society’s expansion of non-confrontational, reformist methods of contestation as ultimately reinforcing hegemony, hydropower and otherwise, rather than challenging it, by inadvertently taming and domesticating burgeoning opposition to dispossession. Pursuing reform does not have to come at the expense of confrontation. As multiple interviewees suggested, it is possible to walk and chew. However, when dispossessed communities are struggling to keep their heads above water, it appears better to make sure the dam gates never close.

Ethics statement

The research obtained ethics approval from the Politics and International Studies Department, University of Cambridge. All interviewees provided free, prior and informed consent. Names are default anonymized, due to sensitivities, unless the interviewee expressed preference to be named.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to acknowledge and thank the communities in Cambodia that took the time to engage in this research and continue to fight for justice, along with the many activists, civil society actors and others who made this research possible. Thank you to both anonymous reviewers that provided prompt, considered, detailed and constructive feedback that have contributed to a much-improved paper. Thank you to Andrew Crawford, Donari Yahzid and Thomas McNamara for reviewing earlier versions.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Data availability statement

Anonymized interview transcripts/recordings are available upon request.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the University of Cambridge, John Monash Foundation and Cambridge Political Economy Society Trust.