A dynamic semester-long social dilemma game for economic and interdisciplinary courses

Abstract

The authors present a semester-long game to teach the role of economics in natural resources management. The game is framed within a fisheries context: multiple student fisheries harvest fish to maximize yield/profit, which is measured using a piecewise linear function. There are prizes for both the student and the group with the highest semester-long catch, which brings forth the social dilemma associated with dynamic stock externalities in fisheries. The game can be played in large classes, is robust to student attrition, and requires 5–10 minutes per class period. Given its features, it can be used to teach behavioral economic principles in resource management, incentives versus command-and-control regulations, role of cheap talk, social preferences, punishment, and community management as well as solutions such as aquaculture.

Keywords:

• classroom game
• common pool resources
• economic education
• fisheries
• interdisciplinary environmental policy
• renewable resource management

JEL CODES:

• A22
• Q23
• Q57

Acknowledgment

The authors thank Sarah Jacobson for her insightful comments and all the students who have played the game with us for their participation and creativity.

Notes

1 A spreadsheet with calculations is also available upon request from the authors.

2 While interlinkages between fisheries is an important issue, we impose this restriction to keep the game simple. Depending upon the cohort level and progress during the semester, this restriction can be relaxed. In that case, the stock function would need to be modified to reflect these interdependencies. Since interlinkages are not germane to our implementation of this game, we do not provide a modified stock function and leave it to interested instructors/researchers to develop it. Note that the rivalry is still possible because fishers from one fishery can poach from another one.

3 Although realistic, we do not introduce fisher heterogeneity, in order to maintain control over the game setting. This choice, however, does not preclude a discussion on fisher heterogeneity in class or in a take-home problem set.

4 While we describe only one type of information environment, the instructor can implement other game versions by changing the information feedback settings during the course of the semester.

5 It is important to remember that tools such as Clickers, while streamlining the process of game implementation, may not lead to such creative in-class poaching activities.

6 In order for creative bottom-up solutions to manage the open-access fisheries to emerge, the instructor (who acts as both nature and the regulator) should remind the students that they are welcome to implement any new solution as long as it is somewhat realistic. The protocol we follow is that the solution has to be in writing, with the whole fishery signing off on it. This is another way to make the issue of collective action salient for the students.