The Promotion and Evolution of Cooperation Through Projection: Implications for Social Dilemmas and Trust

Abstract

It is rational for individuals to defect in social dilemmas. However, sometimes individuals display cooperative behaviors. This article focuses on one psychological mechanism proposed by some researchers as a promoter of cooperation—projection. Projection is a psychological mechanism that leads an individual to expect others to behave as he or she behaves. I model the emergence of cooperation in society through agent-based simulations. Results of the simulations suggest that projection evolves and promotes cooperation in a society where both structural embeddedness and opportunity costs are high, or where structural embeddedness is moderate and opportunity costs are low. I discuss the implication of the simulation results for studies of social dilemmas and trust.

Keywords:

• agent-based simulation
• cooperation
• prisoner's dilemma game
• projection
• social dilemmas
• trust

This research was supported by the Center for the Study of Social Stratification and Inequality at Tohoku University under the 21st Century COE Program.

Notes

¹Sato (2006) assumes that each of the players possesses different goods, and he operationalizes the opportunity costs in terms of the variance in value of goods among the players.

²I do not assume that players seek a new partner in their own group if they choose not to play with the same partner. This is because the value of goods are the same in their own group and the players do not have the incentive to play with the same group members if they decide not to play with the same partner, who is a member of the same group.

Note. ∗∗∗:p < .001

Note. O_C = optimistic cooperators.

P_C = pessimistic cooperators.

O_D = optimistic defectors.

P_D = pessimistic defectors.