Modeling Micro-Macro Relationships: Problems and Solutions

Abstract

This article discusses several problems of the micro-macro model, as it is depicted in its simplest form as the Coleman scheme. There is a macroproposition, its independent variables have causal effects on independent variables of a micro-theory, and the dependent variable of the micro-theory has a causal impact on the dependent variable of the macroproposition. This scheme is used to identify the basic possible problems of micro-macro modeling which are then discussed. Strengths and possible weaknesses of a wide version of the theory of rational action are analyzed. The article further provides a detailed analysis of the relationships between the micro- and macro-level.

Keywords:

• collective dynamics
• methodology
• rational choice

Notes

¹This article presupposes some knowledge about the philosophy of science, in particular about explanation and concept formation. See, for example, Little (1991) and the classical work by Hempel (1952, 1965). A useful general introduction is Ladyman (2002).

²Some critics of RCT argue that the theory is not testable at all. The most straightforward way of testing RCT is by comparative statics (see, e.g., Lichbach, 2003, pp. 33–41; Lovett, 2006, p. 250), which is typically applied in economics: assume the model predicts a certain outcome (e.g., a decrease in voter turnout) if some parameter changes (e.g., an increase in the costs of participation in an election). The respective model is only confirmed if the changes are in the direction the model predicts. The references regarding the anomalies clearly show as well that RCT is testable; otherwise, it could not be regarded as wrong.

³For a characterization and detailed discussion of these versions, see Opp (1999); advocates of a wide version are, for example, Boudon (e.g., 1996), Esser (e.g., 1999), Hedström (2005), and Simon (e.g., 1983).

⁴Lazarsfeld (1955) would speak of an “interpretation” in the sense that a relation between variables X and Y is “explained” by showing that X leads to another variable Z which, in turn, affects Y.

⁵We are referring here to the Hempel-Oppenheim scheme. As everything in the social sciences and the philosophy of science, this scheme is controversial. One objection is that an adequate explanation does not need a theory. It is not possible to discuss the vast literature about the logic of explanation in this article. The basic defense of using theories in an explanation is that without theories it is not clear how to get valid information about the explanatory factors for an explanandum. Only theories provide information about how to select the relevant causal factors from the multitude of phenomena that co-exist with an explanandum or precede it in time. The critique of the Hempel-Oppenheim scheme does not provide a satisfactory alternative. It can further be argued that there is no reason to dispense with the application of theories because the rational choice approach disposes of propositions that, to be cautious, come close to theories.

⁶This lack of clarity about the macro-to-micro and micro-to-macro relationships is also found in the other examples by Coleman (1990). The distinction between empirical and analytical bridge assumptions was already made at the beginning of the 1970s (see Hummell and Opp, 1971, p. 17, where the concept of “coordination rule” was used). See further Lindenberg (1977) and Raub and Voss (1981). This discussion has been forgotten, and there has not been a similar discussion in the English or American literature.

⁷To illustrate, Boudon (1981) analyzes numerous interesting examples showing how individual action brings about macro-effects. Similar analyses also can be found in Raub and Voss (1981) and Esser (1993, pp. 85–140). However, a general methodology of aggregation is missing. This diagnosis is in line with the discussion of “[t]he explanation of collective effects” by Diekmann and Voss (2004, pp. 21–22), who summarize the state of the arts.

⁸For example, Opp (2009) has demonstrated with numerous quotations that the major authors of the macro-approaches in the social movement literature clearly suggest micro-macro explanations without ever formulating them explicitly.

*I am indebted to Heiko Rauhut, Viktor Vanberg, Jacob T. N. Young, and the reviewers of The Journal of Mathematical Sociology, including the editors of this special issue, for valuable suggestions to a previous version of the article.