Publication Cover
The Journal of Psychology
Interdisciplinary and Applied
Volume 122, 1988 - Issue 3
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Original Articles

Defensive Reactance of Psychologists to a Metaphysical Foundation for Integrating Different Psychologies

Pages 217-235 | Received 03 Dec 1987, Published online: 02 Jul 2010
 

Abstract

Psychology is fragmented and encumbered by an inordinate influence from the outdated positivistic tradition. Whereas many psychologists obdurately embrace positivism, others react strongly against it, thus producing the polarities of thinking that Kimble (1984) called the two cultures of psychology. Researchers have frequently called for more flexible epistemology, but these have not resulted in the incorporation of modernity into our science, nor have they led to metaphysical integration. This resistance on the part of many psychologists to change is attributed to cognitive defense mechanisms. The defense mechanisms are placed against feelings of inferiority. Low tolerance for ambiguity (Frenkel-Brunswik, 1949) about a subject matter that encompasses unexplainable variance in behaviors is a particular mechanism, in perceived contrast to the physical sciences. Therefore, many psychologists tend to adopt extreme views on such metaphysical issues as free will and determinism, a tendency that results in sharp divisions in the profession.

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