The legacies of coercion and the challenges of contingency: Mozambican unions in difficult times

Abstract

Although insecure work may be found everywhere, the general lack of secure work in emerging economies is a particularly striking feature of the contemporary condition, undermining the continued viability of the labour movement in such countries. Yet, this topic is rarely tackled directly in African studies or business history journals. The two key questions addressed in this paper are, first, to what extent does the labour movement’s past define their present and future, and second, what are the challenges and opportunities affecting their ability to mobilise workers, influence government and effectively tackle employment security? This article details how in Mozambique, unions’ ability to mobilise has been affected by: the post-colonial, post-conflict and post-socialist historical context; the resulting legacies of regional and racial discrimination; international imperatives for liberalisation and privatisation; challenging relationships with the country’s African neighbours; and high levels of informal sector work. In order to remain viable, key imperatives include: effectively influencing national government, engaging internationally and working with organisations representing informal sector workers.

Keywords:

• Trade union
• employment security
• Mozambique

Although insecure work may be found everywhere, the general lack of secure work in emerging economies is a particularly striking feature of the contemporary condition. In the past 20 years, there has been a continuing high percentage of informal sector work and temporary contracts, matched by a decline in stable and secure jobs in manufacturing, mining and even agriculture, with controversies around the use of labour brokers and contingent work.¹ In developing countries, as well as in advanced countries, jobs have been lost as a direct or indirect result of neoliberal policies such as liberalisation and privatisation, often required under structural adjustment programmes.² Against this background, trade unions have struggled to define and redefine their roles, and have arguably faced a lack of credibility in countries within Africa given both their weak position, and inability to advance credible political alternatives.³ In many former colonised nations, unions played an important role in the struggle for national autonomy, but in doing so, ended up closely subordinated to political parties and governments.⁴ With the growing power of multinational corporations, and the apparent ability of these large corporations to move and outsource workers, at will, one option open to unions is to engage internationally. Such attempts have included working directly with unions in other countries, through bilateral engagement,⁵ affecting change through Global Union Federations,⁶ or through bodies such as SIGTUR within the Southern World.⁷

To consider trade unions in the light of their historical context while appreciating current (and new) challenges, this paper draws on sources covering the important periods of: colonialism, civil war, the move to independence and the forming of the new democratic government. The key questions addressed in this paper are, first, how does a national development trajectory and the labour movement’s past define their present and future; in other words, how does path dependence play out in a developing world context? The second is what are the challenges and opportunities affecting their ability to mobilise workers, influence government and effectively tackle employment security?

In countries within Southern Africa, trade unions have struggled to make their influence durable, despite periodic historical opportunities. This paper examines the case of Mozambique, where the labour movement has faced a combination of challenges. The first section reviews Mozambique’s broad African, post-colonial, post-conflict and post-socialist historical context, highlighting the long tradition of forced labour and lopsided development. Secondly, we review the relationship between Mozambique and its neighbours, and then the process of liberalisation and privatisation which has impacted upon the survival of indigenous firms and the pool of good jobs⁸; although growth has returned, existing regional distortions have persisted. We then move on to explore the impact of the country’s past on the political context in which unions operate and their relations with national government. Finally, we explore how the labour movement has attempted to mobilise the many potential members within the unprotected informal sector workforce.⁹

Colonialism and civil war in Mozambique

A growing body of literature highlights the durable effect of colonial experiences on future national development.¹⁰ However, in focusing on institutional forms and macroeconomic outcomes, there has been a tendency to neglect the long-term effects on workers. Yet, an abiding feature of Mozambique’s past has been of forced labour, which only declined in recent memory. In most African countries, the colonial period was relatively brief, and the process of modern institution building rapid, even if often incomplete, making for fragile and fluid conventions and practices.¹¹ Colonialism in Mozambique was of long duration. Aspects of Mozambique’s colonial experience predate the arrival of the Portuguese on the Mozambican coast in 1498. In ancient times, Arabs and Shirazis (from Persia and elsewhere in the Gulf) established trading stations on the East African coast, which were connected to a wider trading economy. The primary focus was on trade, slavery and the extraction of raw materials, with little attempt to permanently conquer and define territorial boundaries in the African interior.¹²

Mozambique was under Portuguese colonial rule from 1498 until 1975, and marked by the extraction of raw materials and forced labour.¹³ Of all the colonial powers, Portugal was in Africa the longest: it was the first European power to establish colonies in Africa, and among the last to leave.¹⁴ Although more people settled in Mozambique than in some other parts of Africa, and consequently there was more investment in the development of institutions,¹⁵ the indigenous population was often excluded from employment rights.¹⁶ Changes took place over time in the form of colonialism. On arrival, the Portuguese initially subsumed the coastal city states and merchant networks, motivated by access to resources and the use of Mozambique as a stopping place on the Indian trade route.¹⁷ However, colonial authority was not simply based on direct seizure and control. A feature of early Portuguese colonialism was the rise of private land holding, and the Zambezi valley was carved up into large prazos by independent conquistadors deploying large slave armies.¹⁸ Prazeros (those in command of prazos) were dependent on the colonial authorities to legitimise their claims,¹⁹ and the weak resource base and capabilities of the colonial government meant that it was heavily dependent on prazeros to carry out basic infrastructural projects and provide military backing.²⁰ In order to extract sufficient agricultural surpluses from peasants, prazos soon became very large, with clearly defined territorial boundaries.²¹ A 1760 law to limit their size appeared to have had little effect.²² By this stage, the prazeros had become largely independent players, able to defy the Portuguese state at will,²³ and employing labour coercion.²⁴ The last great prazero family, the da Sousas, was only defeated in 1892.²⁵

Following the defeat of the great prazero families, prazos were leased by the government to private companies or individuals on 30-year concessions.²⁶ These powerful colonial companies, such as the Companha da Moçambique (covering Manica and Sofala), Companhia do Niassa and Companhia da Zambézia, were responsible for administering approximately two-thirds of the country from 1892 to 1942. They engaged directly in agriculture,²⁷ used forced labour²⁸ and levied taxes.²⁹ One important legacy of colonialism is the degree of centralised and regionalised power within the country; another is the treatment of indigenous people and peasants, and the use of forced labour.³⁰ A further legacy is the high degree of autonomy enjoyed by corporations and other economic actors vis-à-vis the state (despite the periodic attempts in one or other form to subordinate the former).

The closing years of Portuguese rule were marked by a gradually escalating guerrilla insurgency, headed by Frelimo (the Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of Mozambique), centring on the far north, along with parallel wars of liberation in the colonies of Guinea-Bissau and Angola. The epicentres of resistance in Mozambique were the same areas where the peasant revolts had taken place from 1917 to 1918, with a strong focus being placed by the liberation movement on land reform and an abolition of forced labour.³¹

Following independence in 1975, Frelimo took power. The bulk of Portuguese settlers fled back to Portugal: an estimated 210,000 of a total settler population of 220,000 left the country.³² This exodus left important skills gaps.³³ In 1975, Mozambique’s literacy rate was less than six per cent and Portuguese was spoken by only 30% of the population,³⁴ while there was a very small (around 30,000 people) indigenous commercial class of small traders and shopkeepers.³⁵ There was an early attempt at workers soviets, but these were soon transformed into formally constituted unions and subordinated by the new incoming Frelimo Government, which sought to promote east European style state socialism. Frelimo focused on large industrial enterprises and state-owned plantations but neglected the peasant agricultural sector,³⁶ although around 92% of the population of 10 million people lived in rural areas.

Civil war ensued from 1976 to 1992, with the opposing sides being Frelimo and the Resistência Naçional Moçambicana (Renamo). Contributory factors to the outbreak of war included the rural resentment of centralised planning, and the destabilisation policies of the then Rhodesian Government, and, later, South Africa’s apartheid government.³⁷ A speech by President Samora Michel in 1984 provides a picture of the beleaguered country at that time:

In 1973, on the Tete front, we were confronted by Rhodesian regular forces, operating against our people, side by side with the colonial army and reinforced by South Africa units. Based on this experience we gradually became aware that Portuguese colonialism was only the main force of a much wider imperialist project of aggression against our country.³⁸

In desperation, the forced cultivation of crops, including cotton, was reintroduced, which only worsened the conflict.³⁹ During the civil war, from the end of the 1980s, Soviet aid was withdrawn from Mozambique, and Frelimo drew back from socialism, instead accepting conditional aid from the IMF and World Bank. Finally, the ending of apartheid cut off Renamo’s main external support, leaving the movement in a position where it was forced to compromise.

In 1994, at the end of the civil war, Frelimo won Mozambique’s first democratic elections, and Renamo formed the main opposition party. By then, Mozambique was the poorest country in the world,⁴⁰ with high levels of unemployment. Public works programmes were put into place in northern provinces in order to replace infrastructure and create jobs, but many jobs were short-term; forced labour was replaced with contingent and short-term work.⁴¹ To some extent, the public works programme may indeed have helped to address regional imbalances,⁴² but Renamo continued to protest about the marginalisation of rural provinces.⁴³ Since that time there has been relative peace within the country, although in recent years, there have been social protests about food and fuel prices and political clashes involving violence and threatening destabilisation.⁴⁴ Renamo were again able to organise within central and rural areas, and mounted a small scale insurgency. A declaration of a cessation of hostilities was signed in August 2014 before the October 2014 general election,⁴⁵ at which both Renamo and the Mozambique Democratic Movement were key opposition parties.

Mozambique’s relationship with its neighbours

As explained above, during the civil war, both Rhodesia and then South Africa sponsored Renamo.⁴⁶ In addition to political engagement, Mozambique’s neighbours have also played an important economic role. Much of the economy centred for many years on trade and transport, with commercial firms from the neighbouring Anglophone states being prominent.⁴⁷ More recently, South Africa has also played an important part in terms of investment in Mozambique. Are these relationships parasitic (with South Africa being the main beneficiary from engagement), or symbiotic (with mutually beneficial outcomes)? On the one hand, it could be argued that South Africa in particular has taken an exploitative stance, focusing on extraction of natural resources and providing limited jobs in return. Local entrepreneurs have felt threatened by South African firms that have tended to use non-Mozambican suppliers,⁴⁸ and the retail trade has become dominated by imports from South Africa and China. Yet, foreign direct investment in Mozambique has played an important part in its GDP growth, and therefore in its international reputation. Mozambique has been praised for its levels of economic growth, with around 7% growth in GDP in 2013,⁴⁹ albeit that little of this growth has filtered down to the poorest. Investment in the extraction of natural resources has included the Mozal aluminium smelter outside of the capital Maputo; others include the Sasol gas line, electricity generation and the Moatize coalfields and associated infrastructure. However, much of the new investment has been job light; for example, in contrast to traditional coal mining, Moatize is open cast and heavily mechanised.

A much heralded success was SAB-Miller’s takeover of the local beer industry and other beverage production, coupled with much needed investment in production and infrastructure. However, since the main ingredient is water, local production of beer and soft drink production has a considerable competitive advantage over many other industries. In contrast, other Mozambican industries, including car parts, textiles and clothing and cashew nut processing have suffered. Hence, there is a question as to whether Mozambique’s economic growth in selective areas is sustainable, broad based and resulting in the generation of “good” jobs?⁵⁰ The Mozal aluminium smelter has prided itself on its HR practices,⁵¹ but with the exception of some survey data which point to an abiding culture of managerial patriarchy,⁵² the nature of HR practices in other firms is relatively unknown.

Investment in Mozambique has not only been from South Africa. In recent years, there has been an increasing level of investment from, and trade with China,⁵³ although this has included the mass importation of semi and unskilled Chinese workers, sales of illegal imports and illegal and unsafe working conditions.⁵⁴ A major development has been significant Chinese financing for dams on the Zambezi, and large-scale land leases, which were initially intended to accommodate large numbers of Chinese peasants in the valley.⁵⁵ A popular outcry led to the Mozambican Government backtracking on the latter plans.

Another key role played by South Africa has been in relation to immigration and more particularly, emigration. South Africa used Mozambican workers in the mines. Under the Estado Novo, the South Africans paid gold for the services of Mozambican miners directly to the Portuguese Government; in turn, the miners were paid in paper. This provided an important source of foreign exchange up until the end of colonialism.⁵⁶ A specific case was the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (Wenela), which obtained a concession from the Niassa Company,⁵⁷ resulting in pressed labour for the gold mines in the early twentieth century.⁵⁸ Although press gangs were soon curtailed by the Portuguese Government owing to their destabilising consequences, Wenela continued to recruit from southern and central Mozambique.⁵⁹ Increasingly, this was done through a system of local agents, who would forward money to peasants to pay taxes, which, in due course, had to be paid back by mine labour.⁶⁰ However, over time, Wenela’s recruiting methods became more benign, with a stronger emphasis being placed on promoting the reputation of mine work.⁶¹ Under late apartheid, the use of Mozambican labour was discouraged; from being a major source of employment for rural Mozambicans (whether voluntary or not), mine migration now plays a much smaller part of the Mozambican economy.

Mozambique’s neighbours have also played a key role in the development of transport-related infrastructure. In the past, road and rail routes were mainly east–west, transporting goods from the interior to sea ports such as Maputo, Beira and Nacala, and to some extent, this is still the case today. This resulted in a lopsided development geared towards the exploitation of primary resources and the transport sector. The country was divided into three broad zones, with a peasant economy in the north (growing cotton, cashew and a range of basic food crops), foreign-owned plantations in the centre and a reserve army of mining labour in the south.⁶² These legacies have made it difficult to forge national identities and a sense of common purpose, as well as making union mobilisation and organising difficult outside of a few major urban centres.

Towards the end of colonial rule, in the 1950s, the Portuguese Government became considerably more ambitious in seeking to develop the business environment and contribute towards broader economic development. For example, it built the Cahora Bassa dam, to provide irrigation for peasant farmers to be exported from Portugal; during the war years, the dam operated under partial capacity, and has never realised its fullest potential.⁶³ As in the past, most foreign investment remains concentrated in Maputo, with banks proving reluctant to grant loans to firms located elsewhere,⁶⁴ and development strategies were focused on transport corridors and industrial development zones.⁶⁵ Some attempts were made in the 1990s to encourage investment in agriculture, including the provision of training to rural farmers, but land was also controversially given to South African farmers and other foreign investors.⁶⁶ More recently, there has been the development of transport corridors and industrial development zones, a key one being the Maputo Development Corridor.⁶⁷ However, this process has reinforced regional disparities.

Liberalisation and privatisation

Following the ending of Mozambique’s socialist engagement with the Soviet Union, the country faced economic difficulties, including heavy indebtedness.⁶⁸ However, from 1993 to 1997, the average GDP growth was eight per cent.⁶⁹ Notwithstanding this figure, Mozambique still had one of the lowest per capita economies,⁷⁰ and the growth was accompanied by widening inequality between town and country,⁷¹ and between a tiny elite and the mass of society.⁷² As a result, the government turned to the IMF and the World Bank for assistance. World Bank conditions were controversial and included reduced state expenditure, lifting protective tariffs and privatisation.⁷³

The social and employment outcomes of privatisation in Africa have been widely debated.⁷⁴ It was carried out more rapidly than in many other countries. Moreover, many firms were purchased either by veterans from the war, or by foreign investors.⁷⁵ In addition, the processes used to privatise industries have been described as corrupt.⁷⁶ It would be wrong to simplistically attribute decreasing levels of employment to liberalisation and privatisation, particularly since in Mozambique the initial phase of privatisation was undertaken while the country was in the grip of civil war. Yet, between 1987 and 2003 many jobs were lost in the areas of cashew production, textiles, beverages, railways and ports, civil aviation and telecommunications.⁷⁷ The impact of privatisation on employment levels was judged by the union federation to be significant. Union membership decreased between 300,000 workers to 90,000 between 2000 and 2005.⁷⁸ Conversely, membership increased after 2005, largely as a result of FDI, to around 250,000.

Trade unions: relationships with government

Unions were representing workers prior to independence in 1975, but since members were required to earn a certain amount, most black workers were not eligible to join. After independence, the new government brought in single party socialism. Firms were nationalised or placed under an administrative commission.⁷⁹ The latter were often assisted by Production Councils composed of both employees and Frelimo activists, with uncooperative managers rejected.⁸⁰ Dynamising groups also emerged. These were either created by the government in order to promote the political party and sustain production, or emerged autonomously, leading worker strikes and takeovers.⁸¹ Later these groups were formed into party cells. By the late 1970s, Frelimo’s socialist government had sought to rein in the Production Councils and Dynamising Groups, and reinstated managers.⁸² In 1983, the workplace level Production Councils were merged into the union federation, Organização dos Trabalhadores de Moçambique (“OTM”, the Organisation of Mozambican Workers), and workers in industry and services were forced to join unions.⁸³

By the early 1990s the OTM had begun to take a more independent role, particularly regarding speaking out against structural adjustment.⁸⁴ At the OTM conference in 1990, the federation passed statutes which made the federation, at least officially, independent of the ruling party. In addition, the trade union freedom act 1991 ensured that union membership was voluntary, and that all salaried or waged workers were entitled to join a union.⁸⁵ Although the union was officially independent, it still supported Frelimo against Renamo in the 1999 elections.⁸⁶ In 1998, and citing concerns about the OTM’s lack of independence from government, three trade unions representing workers in the hotel, construction and transport industries broke away from OTM, constituting the politically independent Confederação Naçional dos Sindicatos Independentes e Livres de Moçambique.⁸⁷ The union federations have remained strong, and have influenced government in relation to the establishment of labour legislation.⁸⁸ However, there remains a lack of enforcement of labour law that should protect workers, particularly in relation to health and safety. Although the legislative framework, established under Portuguese rule and amended more recently through the Labour Laws 1998 and 2007 appears to be quite comprehensive, enforcement is not.⁸⁹ Indeed, the US Government has stated that, “Regulations in the areas of labour, health and safety and the environment are routinely not enforced, or are selectively enforced to generate revenue from fines”.⁹⁰

Part of the reason for the lack of legal enforcement has arguably been the excessive and cumbersome bureaucratic processes left by the Portuguese; another is the low number of Mozambicans in trained positions.⁹¹ A further contributory factor to weak enforcement has been the lack of investigations carried out by the police, the small number of cases prosecuted by the Attorney General’s Office and lack of resolution of the cases that are brought to court.⁹² Informal sector work, moreover, is by its very nature, largely unregulated.

Informal work and the representation of workers

In Mozambique, as in many developing economies, the labour market has a high proportion of informal sector work, in other words, work that does not involve criminal products or services, but is not formalised through the paying of taxes or covered by employment legislation. Some figures point to around only 8% of employment in Mozambique being in the formal sector.⁹³ But due to the historical regional divides, Jones and Tarp suggest that around 5% of rural jobs, compared to 30% of urban jobs are in the formal sector.⁹⁴ Moreover, women form a large proportion of the informal sector.⁹⁵

It is important to note that in Mozambique, perceptions of informal sector workers have changed over time. In the past, these workers were often treated as criminals. However, over time there has been a growing recognition by government and the police that informal sector work can offer a way out of poverty and social stability.⁹⁶ This move towards recognition of the role of the informal economy has enabled the union to more effectively represent these workers. Unions in many countries have struggled to organise informal sector workers, not least because they are often based in rural areas. Although in Mozambique unions have similarly struggled to organise informal sector workers, in 1999, the union federation OTM helped to create ASSOTSI (an association of informal sector employers and workers).⁹⁷ Members of ASSOTSI include: those selling goods in fixed places, “ambulantes” (mobile workers) and those selling large volumes of goods. ASSOTSI has a close relationship with local politicians, actively engaging with them in order to obtain better trading facilities.⁹⁸ The OTM has continued to support ASSOTSI, and helped to broker their interests with national government.⁹⁹

Conclusion: the future for trade unions in Mozambique

This paper has sought to address the central issue of employment security in Mozambique, and in doing so question to what extent the country’s past defines the present and future for workers and their unions, and second, to identify the challenges and opportunities affecting their ability to mobilise workers, influence government and effectively tackle employment security.

The labour movement has faced many challenges, many of which relate to its past and that of the country. These include overcoming the legacies of a long history of forced labour and ineffective regulation, and more lately, a decline in manufacturing and a rise in precarious working, together with a history of political subordination. The union has also faced a decrease in the number of public sector workers as a result of privatisation, and a lack of day to day enforcement of labour legislation that has aimed to protect workers from dismissal and accidents. More recently, political and social unrest related to the legacy of colonialism and regional and ethnic disparities has affected stability. Moreover, organisation of rural workers has been impeded by trade and transport flows remaining primarily east–west, following ancient slave routes,¹⁰⁰ and war-damaged infrastructure,¹⁰¹ making it difficult to forge national identities and common purpose, as well as making day to day organising much more difficult. A continuing challenge is how best to organise informal sector workers, an issue faced by many other countries in the developing world.

How should the labour movement progress? Given the need to influence government in order to advance the rights of workers in powerful international companies and small enterprises, is independence from government practical and ideal? How can rural workers be organised when resources are limited and labour laws are not enforced?¹⁰² Moreover, how can vulnerable workers (in the formal and informal sector) be protected against arbitrary dismissal in the context of political and social unrest? In other words, is union action on employment security a feasible reality? A pessimistic view would predict that the union can only take a reactive stance. However, a more optimistic standpoint would indicate the potential for opportunities built on lasting relationships with national government; the options for engaging internationally with other union bodies (if barriers such as geographical location and language are overcome); and the future possibilities of further expanding work with organisations representing informal sector workers. In an age of great global imbalances and distortions, with few nations being able to sustain large manufacturing sectors other than through extreme cost cutting, unions would face difficult times, even were the challenges posed by Mozambique’s past less severe. In the end, any solutions would have to include a political dimension, which, in turn, would be difficult for a single nation to forge in an interconnected global capitalist ecosystem.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes on contributors

Pauline Dibben is professor of Employment Relations at the University of Sheffield, UK, and adjunct professor at Griffith University, Australia. Her research interests include employment relations in Southern Africa, employment security and disability. She has published widely in these areas.

Geoffrey Wood is professor of International Business at Warwick Business School, the University of Warwick, Honorary Professor of the University of the Witwatersrand, visiting professor at Nelson Mandela University, South Africa and adjunct professor at Griffith University, Australia. His research interests centre on the relationship between national institutional setting, corporate governance, firm finance and firm level work and employment relations. He has authored, co-authored or edited 16 books, and over 120 articles in peer-reviewed journals.

Notes

1. Barrientos, “Labour Chains”.

2. Willems et al., Forces for Change.

3. Beckman and Sachikonye, “Trade Unions and Party Politics in Africa”.

4. Henderson, “Wage-Earners and Political Protest in Colonial Africa”; Schillinger, Trade Unions in Africa: Weak but Feared; Phelan, “Trade Unions and ‘Responsible Participation’”.

5. Wood et al., “The Limits of Transnational Solidarity”.

6. Croucher and Cotton, Global Unions Global Business; Munck, “Unions, Globalization and Internationalism”.

7. Webster et al., Grounding Globalization, 199–202.

8. Pitcher, Transforming Mozambique; Dibben and Wood, “Privatisation and Employment Relations in Africa”.

9. Webster, “New Forms of Work”; Dibben and Nadin, “Community Unionism in Africa”.

10. Acemoglu et al., “Colonial Origins of Comparative Development”.

11. Hyden, No Shortcuts to Progress.

12. Hooker, Civilizations in Africa.

13. Bureau for Commerce and Enterprise, “Cottoning On”.

14. Price, “Economic Growth in Africa”.

15. Acemoglu and Robinson, Why Nations Fail; cf. Bellucci, “Colonial Ideology versus Labour Reality”.

16. Hanlon, Mozambique: Who Calls the Shots?

17. Newitt, A History of Mozambique.

18. Ibid., 71.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.

23. Okoth, A History of Africa.

24. Okoth, A History of Africa; cf. Vail and White, Power and the Praise Poem; Isaacman, Mozambique and Africanization.

25. Hammond, Portugal and Africa, 83; Okoth, A History of Africa.

26. Newitt, A History of Mozambique. Even today, most land in Mozambique is leased from the state, making for weak and contingent owner rights.

27. Vail and White, Power and the Praise Poem.

28. Allina, Slavery by any other Name.

29. Carvalho, “Libras, Escudos”.

30. See O’Laughlin, “Class and the Customary”; Cramer et al., “Lifting the Blinkers”; Allina, Slavery by any other Name.

31. Hanlon, Mozambique: Who Calls the Shots?

32. Munslow, “State Intervention in Agriculture”.

33. O’Laughlin, “Class and the Customary”; Dibben and Williams, “Varieties of Capitalism”; Macamo, “Reflections on Social Change”.

34. Here, Mozambique differs from Portugal’s other African colonies. The majority of Angolans are Portuguese first language speakers, whilst the overwhelming majority in the remaining colonies (Cape Verde, São Tome and Guinea-Bissau) speak either Portuguese or a creole dialect, as do the residents of Annobom, a former Portuguese colony, which is now part of the (predominantly Spanish-speaking) state of Equatorial Guinea.

35. Henriksen, “Marxism and Mozambique”.

36. Hanlon, Peace without Profit; O'Laughlin, “Past and Present Options”; Macamo, “Reflections on Social Change”.

37. Chimanikire, South Africa’s Strategy of Destabilization, International Seminar Series, University of Zimbabwe, 1987; Noormahomed, Health and South African Destabilization.

38. Mozambique News Agency. Two Documents on African Liberation. Supplement to AIM Bulletin No. 94. April, 1984, 4.

39. Hanlon, Mozambique: Growing Economic Divisions; Taela, “Ideas and Foreign Policy”.

40. Bureau for Commerce and Enterprise (Gestão) Bulletin. First Past the Post. BCG Limited, no. 43, November 1994, 1.

41. Domingo. Reabilitação de Estradas Cria Postos de Trabalhão. December 4, 1994, 1; Domingo. Importantes Vias de Comunicação Estão em Reabilitacão. December 4, 1999, 12.

42. Chissano. State of the Nation Address. February 29, 1996.

43. Mozambiquefile. Renamo Amendments all Defeated, no. 250, May 1997, 7–13.

44. Mozambique News Agency, President Guebuza calls for Consolidation of Peace, AIM Report, No. 477, January 7, 2014, 1.

45. Mozambique News Agency, Government and Renamo Declare Cessation of Hostilities, AIM Report, No. 490, September 2, 2014, 1.

46. Chimanikire, South Africa’s Strategy of Destabilization.

47. Indigo Publications. Mozambique: Splitting the Atom. The Indian Ocean Newsletter. No. 783, October 18, 1997, 6.

48. Dibben, Transport for Trade in Mozambique.

49. Mozambique News Agency, Mozambican Growth Remains Robust – IMF, AIM Report, No. 478, January 20, 2014.

50. Jones and Tarp, Jobs and Welfare in Mozambique; Sartorius et al., “Human Resource Management and Cultural Diversity”.

51. BHP Billiton.

52. Webster et al., “International Homogenization in Mozambique”.

53. Mozambique News Agency. China Promotes Investment in Mozambique, AIM Report No. 119, October 8, 1997, 1.

54. African Economic Outlook: Mozambique, 2011. http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/fileadmin/uploads/aeo/Country_Notes/2011/Full/Mozambique.pdf; Mozambique News Agency. Chinese Company Given Fortnight to Correct Irregularities, AIM Report No. 478, January 20, 2014.

55. Horta, The Zambezi Valley.

56. cf. Prothero, “International Migration”.

57. This is also spelt “Nyasa” or “Niasa”.

58. Vail and White, “Tawani, Machambero!”.

59. Ibid.

60. See Prothero, “International Migration”.

61. Katzenellenbogen, South Africa and Southern Mozambique.

62. Munslow, “State Intervention in Agriculture”.

63. Fleshman, “Africa’s Roads to Prosperity”. Ironically, there are recent plans to settle large numbers of Chinese peasants in the same region, following an agreement between the Chinese and Mozambican Governments.

64. Pitcher, Transforming Mozambique.

65. Wood and Dibben, “Ports and Shipping in Mozambique”.

66. Pretoria News. Mozambique Allocates Farms for South Africans. October 8, 1997, 4; SAPEM. Chiefs versus South African Farmers. October 15, 1997, 18.

67. Dibben, “Transport, Trade and Economic Development”.

68. Mozambique Inview, Government Call for Debt Relief. Mediacoop. April 15, 1996, no. 43, 1.

69. UTRE, Privatisation in Mozambique, 2.

70. UTRE, Privatisation in Mozambique.

71. Hoile, Mozambique: Resistance and Freedom.

72. Nhaca, S. A Candid Look at Economic Reform. SAPEM, December/January, 1996/7, 23; cf. Hanlon, Mozambique: Growing Economic Divisions; Roper and Wood, “Business of Politics in Mozambique”.

73. Plank, “Aid, Debt and Sovereignty”; Bureau for Commerce and Enterprise (Gestão). Funding Progress. BCG Limited, no. 45, December 1995, 1; Mozambique Inview. Cashew Industry on Brink of Collapse. Mediacoop. May 1, 1997, no 64, 5.

74. Bayliss and McKinley, Privatising Basic Utilities; Nellis, “Privatization in Africa”; Josiah et al., “Accounting for Privatisation in Africa?”; Mozambiquefile. Disaster in the Privatised Banks. No. 292. November 2000, 4–6.

75. Castel-Branco et al., Privatization and Economic Strategy in Mozambique.

76. Pitcher, Transforming Mozambique; Dibben and Wood, “Privatisation and Employment Relations in Africa”.

77. Artur, Trade Unions in Mozambique Baseline Survey.

78. Webster et al., “International Homogenization in Mozambique”.

79. Hanlon, Peace without Profit; Pitcher, Transforming Mozambique; Haines and Wood, “Election in Mozambique”.

80. Webster et al., “International Homogenization in Mozambique”.

81. Ibid.

82. Ibid.

83. Paavo, “Starting Over”; Pitcher, Party Politics and Economic Reform; Webster et al., “International Homogenization in Mozambique”.

84. Hanlon, Peace without Profit.

85. Paavo, “Starting Over”, 12.

86. Webster and Mosoetsa, Connecting and Disconnecting.

87. World Bank, Mozambique: System of Industrial Relations.

88. Dibben, “Trade Union Change, Development and Renewal”.

89. International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). Mozambique: Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights, 2006. http://www.icftu.org/displaydocument.asp?Index=991223881&Language=EN&Printo.

90. U.S. Department of State, Investment Climate Statement.

91. Harrison, Corruption as Boundary Politics.

92. Mozambiquefile. Prison Conditions “are Inhuman”. No. 291, October 2000, 17–18. Spector et al., Corruption Assessment: Mozambique, 2005.

93. Economist Intelligence Unit , Mozambique at a Glance.

94. Jones and Tarp, Jobs and Welfare in Mozambique.

95. Dibben and Nadin, “Community Unionism in Africa”.

96. Ibid.

97. Ibid.

98. Lindell, “Multiple Sites of Urban Governance”.

99. Dibben and Nadin, “Community Unionism in Africa”.

100. Dibben, “Transport, Trade and Economic Development”.

101. Ibid.; Dibben, “Trade Union Change, Development and Renewal”.

102. Cramer et al., “Lifting the Blinkers”.