Building a better world? Construction, labour mobility and the pursuit of collective self-reliance in the ‘global South’, 1950–1990

Abstract

With the onset of decolonisation, the newly independent and non-aligned countries forged transnational alliances within the United Nations that have represented the collective interests of the developing world in the realm of economic cooperation and development for more than fifty years. This paper situates Yugoslavia’s global role and its labour force mobility in the South within a broader story about economic and technical cooperation in the non-aligned world, the project of ‘collective self-reliance’, and the endeavour to ‘democratise’ international economic relations. These occurred within a framework of nesting hierarchies, both at the global and at domestic level and were not directed at a radical transformation of the existing ‘transnationalised economy’, but rather at the redefinition of the nature of the economic relations/hierarchies in place and reflected an aspiration to partake in the international division of labour and economic exchange as equal partners. The paper also addresses the specificities of the migrant labour experience that accompanied these projects, with workers internalising some of the postulates of socialist self-management and Yugoslav construction companies acting as vehicles for the export of the self-managing welfare state abroad.

Keywords:

• Yugoslavia
• self-reliance
• non-alignment
• construction
• UNCTAD

Notes

1. For a contemporary account and critique of the use of the term, see Wolf-Phillips (1987). Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal (1968) critiqued ‘the escape into terminology that is thought to be more diplomatic’, i.e. the use of euphemisms such as ‘developing countries’ when actually what is meant is ‘underdeveloped’. For a more recent account, see Solarz (2014).

2. The original signatories of the 15 June 1964 ‘Joint Declaration of the Seventy-seven developing countries’ were: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dahomey, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Republic of Viet-Nam, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen and Yugoslavia. See Ahmia (2015).

3. The orientation of Yugoslav companies towards foreign markets and cooperation with the developing world stemmed from the country’s economic reforms in the 1960s, including openness for foreign investment in the form of joint ventures: up to 49% of equity participation by MNCs/foreign capital was allowed. Between 1967 and 1980 199 joint ventures were signed with partners from the US and the European Economic Community (EEC). In 1968 Yugoslavia established diplomatic and economic relations with the EEC. Also, Yugoslavia began to participate in the work of the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC, later OECD) in 1955 as an observer. In 1961 the OECD invited the Yugoslav authorities to participate as full members in the work of the Economic and Development Review Committee.

4. Archive of Yugoslavia (hereafter AY), Kabinet Pretsednika Republike, I-3-c/8, ‘Razgovor sa poslovnim ljudima /Biznis Internešenel/ Beograd, 8 maja 1968’.

5. Diplomatic Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Serbia (hereafter DAMFA), PA 1966 (UN), F-204/429375/‘Druga konferencija Ujedinjenih Nacija o trgovini i razvoju. Međjuresorska radna grupa za pripreme druge konferencije UN o trgovini i razvoju. Beograd, 17 avgust 1966.’

6. AY, Kabinet Predsednika Republike, I-4-a/1, ‘Završni izveštaj pripremnog sastanka Konferencije’ Šefova Država ili Vlada neangažovanih zemalja, 12 jun 1961’.

7. AY, Kabinet Pretsednika Republike, I-4-a/3, ‘Ekonomska konferencija zemalja u razvoju, Kairo, 9–18 jul 1962; Govor Vladimira Popovića na ekonomskoj konferenciji u Kairu 1962’.

8. DAMFA, PA 1968 (Ethiopia), F-32/47187/‘Etiopija – potsetnik za razgovore, Beograd, 25 januar 1968 godine, IV uprava DSIP-a. Ekonomski odnosi posle II svetskog rata.’

9. DAMFA, PA 1968 (Ethiopia), F-32/47187.

10. The Commission was chaired by Willy Brandt, former Chancellor of West Germany. It began work in December 1977 and the Commission’s members were: Abdlatif Y. Al-Hamad (Kuwait), Rodrigo Botero Montoya (Columbia), Antoine Kipsa Dakoure (Upper Volta), Eduardo Frei Montalva (Chile), Katherine Graham (USA), Edward Heath (UK), Amir H. Jamal (Tanzania), Lakshmi Kant Jha (India), Khatijah Ahmad (Malaysia), Adam Malik (Indonesia), Haruki Mori (Japan), Joe Morris (Canada), Olof Palme (Sweden), Peter G. Peterson (USA), Edgard Pisani (France), Shridath Ramphal (Guyana), Layachi Yaker (Algeria). Ex officio members: Jan Pronk (Netherlands), Goran Ohlin (Sweden), Dragoslav Avramovic (Yugoslavia). Avramović headed a Yugoslav mission to the World Bank in 1949 and later served as Governor of the Yugoslav Central Bank, as an expert at the World Bank and at UNCTAD.

11. AY, 782 Jugoslovenska banka za međunarodnu ekonomsku saradnju [Yugoslav Bank for International Economic Cooperation], ‘Basic Information on the Export Credit & Insurance Fund, Belgrade, November 1977’.

12. DAMFA, PA 1969 (Libya), F-216/45793/‘Izveštaj o radu konzularne službe u 1968 godini, Tripoli, 28.I.1969’.

13. DAMFA, PA 1969 (Libya), F-216/488329/‘Položaj naših gradjana na području Kirenaike posle revolucije od 1. Septembra ove godine, Ambasada SFRJ, Kancelarija u Bengaziju, 14. oktobar 1969’.

14. DAMFA, PA 1969 (Libya), F-216/433380/‘Šifrovani telegram, Tripoli, 16.IX.1969’.

15. DAMFA, PA 1983 (Libya), F-67/413619/‘Ambasada SFRJ Tripoli, 27.3.1983, SSIP-u’.

16. Iraq and Libya were also among the main buyers of Yugoslav military equipment. The Yugoslav arms industry was a major source of revenue for the state, not least because it was one of the few developing countries to produce submarines and military fighter jets. The Galeb light fighter bomber was used for training purposes even by the US Air Force, while the M-84 tank was exported to Kuwait and used during Operation Desert Storm. All Yugoslav military aircraft used Rolls-Royce (Bristol) Viper turbojet engines which were produced under license by the Yugoslav aircraft manufacturer Soko. The break-up of the country also disrupted export deals of the latest generation of G-4 Super Galeb jets to Indonesia, Malesia, Singapore and the US. See, e.g. Vasconcelos (2013) and Chant (2013).

17. AY, Kabinet Pretsednika Republike, I-3-a/69-18, ‘Zabeleška o razgovoru Predsednika SFR Jugoslavije Josipa Broza Tita i pukovnika Muamera el Gadafija, Brioni, 22.VI.1977’; ‘Zabeleška o razgovoru Predsednika SFR Jugoslavije Josipa Broza Tita i pukovnika Muamera el Gadafija, 23.VI.1977, ŠB “Galeb”’.

18. AY, Kabinet Pretsednika Republike, I-3-a/69-18, ‘Podsetnik o nekim problemima ekonomske saradnje sa Libijom’.

19. AY, Kabinet Pretsednika Republike, I-3-b/52, ‘Zabeleška o razgovoru Predsednika Republike Josipa Broza Tita sa Dr. Gamani Koreom, generalnim sekretarom UNCTAD-a, u Beogradu, 8 juna 1977’.

20. AY, Kabinet Pretsednika Republike, I-3-b/52.

21. Yugoslavia’s debt problem was due to a combination both of domestic and international developments: because of its highly decentralised/confederative set-up, with time and especially after the economic reform of 1968 and the 1974 constitutional changes, individual republics and autonomous provinces forged separate links with foreign partners, international borrowing was liberalised and ‘de-etatised’ and many smaller, republics’-based banks and companies could borrow abroad (in particular after the oil crisis and the recycling of ‘petro-dollars’) without the Yugoslav National Bank or the federal government acting as guarantors. For an analytical overview of the Yugoslav debt problem, see Cemović (1985).