Rethinking the Robe River dispute 1986-7 – de-unionisation in Australia’s Pilbara iron ore industry in the early neoliberal period

ABSTRACT

The Robe River dispute of 1986-7 was the anti-union New Right’s first attempt to defeat union power at a large workforce in Australia. This occurred during an industrial relations period of ‘cooperation’ between unions, employers and government under Australia’s social contract – the Accord. The dispute was also the first successful attack of its kind in Western Australia’s highly strike-prone Pilbara iron ore industry. Despite its subsequent victory, Robe River management was in a weak position during the dispute, and successful industrial action was a viable prospect. Unionists at the Robe River company were the most militant in the industry. Yet after a six-month dispute, union power was no longer. This article argues union officials’ strategy of avoiding industrial action at all costs led to defeat. This strategy was adopted in the context of firstly, the social contract promising peace between unions and employers, secondly, the Pilbara industrial relations environment of strong localised grassroots networks of union power, conflict with metropolitan-based union officials, and worker encroachment on managerial prerogative, and thirdly, the contingent conservatism of the trade union bureaucracy. Union power in the Pilbara had underlying political weaknesses, meaning that an alternative strategy to that adopted by the union bureaucracy did not win out.

KEYWORDS:

• Union strategy
• neoliberalism
• social contract
• iron ore industry
• Robe River
• Pilbara
• Australia

Acknowledgments

The author acknowledges the contribution of an Australian Government Research Training Program Scholarship in supporting this research, specifically an Australian Postgraduate Award and a Curtin Research Scholarship for a PhD at Curtin University, Western Australia. The study received human research ethics approval from the Curtin University Human Research Ethics Committee (EC00262), Approval Number #HRE2017-0072.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. Thanks to Rick Kuhn for commenting on a draft of this article. Thanks also to Scott Fitzgerald and Bobbie Oliver, my PhD supervisors, who commented on the thesis chapter on which this article was based.

2. By ‘union bureaucracy’ I mean full-time union officials, such as organisers, and state and national secretaries. I briefly outline the theory of the union bureaucracy (Bollard, 2010; Bramble, 1993, 2005; Darlington & Upchurch, 2012; Tierney, 2017) at the end of the ‘Introduction’ section.

3. Thanks to Professor Ray Fells who made available all of his archives on industrial relations in the Pilbara, including newspaper clippings from the West Australian on the Robe River dispute.

4. Thanks to Liz Ross for providing clippings from the Australian Financial Review and other notes and archives. Herself a labour historian working outside the academy, Liz also commented on the entire draft of the PhD from which this article originated, and has encouraged my scholarship over many years.

5. With thanks to Graeme Haynes for these, as well as the many hours of interviews and encouragement offered.

6. With thanks to Professor Bradon Ellem, Professor Ray Fells, and the Perth branch of the Australian Society for the study of Labour History for making available interview transcripts and recordings not accessible through the State Library of Western Australia. Bradon has been extremely generous in his support for this project, despite our differing perspectives on the dispute.

7. The organisation then known as the Australian Manufacturing Workers and Shipwrights’ Union has had multiple mergers and name changes (and changes back again) over the years. For simplicity, I refer to that union as the Australian Manufacturing Workers’ Union (AMWU) throughout this article, as the union has since 1995 been known.

8. For example, the average Pilbara iron ore worker struck for just over 11 days in 1973 (Lovett, 1980). The figures I have for the Pilbara are taken from two different sources – one source for strike days and another for number of workers. This makes the data somewhat unreliable, especially as the same data source significantly understates the number of iron ore workers compared to Lovett.

9. For a range of views on this and other aspects of the Accord see Gregson et al., 2020.

10. West Australian, 28 August 1986. This article was in the Professor Ray Fells’ compilation of clippings. There is no headline or by-line contained.

11. Coal mine workers employed by Peko Wallsend company at Pelton, Ellalong and Gretley colleries [in New South Wales] wish to indicate to you our support in your struggle. We are also experiencing similar problems with the company in the coal industry. Please convey to your members our pledge of solidarity in the struggle and convey to them our preparedness to take the appropriate action in their support if required.

Barry Swan, General Secretary Miners Federation on behalf of the above coal workers (Coal Mine Workers of Pelton, Ellalong and Gretley Colleries, 1986).

12. West Australian, 28 August 1986. This article was in the Professor Ray Fells’ compilation of clippings. There is no headline or by-line contained.

13. West Australian. The West reported that 30 workers voted against, however, Barrow suggests 58.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the Australian Government and Curtin University.

Notes on contributors

Alexis Vassiley

Alexis Vassiley is a Research Associate in the Centre for Work and Wellbeing, Edith Cowan University. His PhD in Curtin University’s School of Management was on the rise and fall of trade unionism in the Pilbara iron ore industry. He has previously published on labour history, and union strategy in contemporary higher education. His research aims to generate insights from labour history relevant to union renewal today. Alexis is on the Editorial Board of Labour History (Australia) as an editorial Trainee.