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Abstract
This article reconsiders the traditional claim that the setbacks which the US and British naval forces faced during the opening stages of the war against Japan in 1941–2 were the result of poor strategic planning. It illustrates how, during the decades leading up to the outbreak of the Pacific War, naval staffs drew up a detailed course of action which paid due attention to many of the moves that needed to be undertaken to defeat the Imperial Japanese Navy, including the establishment of a clear line of communication to the western Pacific region, the development of advanced bases, and the imposition of a maritime blockade to undermine Japan's war effort. The main cause for the failure to provide an adequate defence against the Japanese onslaught was the various obstacles which the US and British governments faced in allocating sufficient money towards naval expansion during the interwar period, which meant that by the time hostilities broke out in December 1941, neither power was able to deploy an adequate force to safeguard their interests in Asia.
Notes
1 Murfett, ‘ “Are We Ready?” ’, 214–42.
2 Haggie, Britannia at Bay, 211; Murfett, ‘Living in the Past’, 97; Hamill, The Strategic Illusion, 310; Louis, British Strategy, 211–12; Grenfell, Main Fleet to Singapore, 210–13; Gow, ‘The Royal Navy and Japan’, 109–26.
3 Tuleja, Statesmen and Admirals, 29–31; Lowenthal, Leadership and Indecision, 107–8, 117–20, 171–82; Brune, American National Security Policy, 59–60.
4 Morton, Strategy and Command, 30.
5 Morton, ‘War Plan Orange’, 231. Orange was the colour code used to denote Japanese forces. Also see Tuleja, Statesmen and Admirals, 33–4; Spector, Eagle Against the Sun, 55–9.
6 Heinrichs, ‘The Role of the US Navy’, 219–23
7 Kennedy, British Naval Mastery, 322–47; Roskill, Naval Policy; Baugh, ‘Confusions and Restraints’, 101–19; also see Peden, British Rearmament; Shay, British Rearmament; Ferris, Men, Money and Diplomacy, 187.
8 Bell, The Royal Navy, 59–98
9 Miller, War Plan Orange, 1–6; also see Cohen, ‘The Strategy of Innocence?’, 441–2, 462; Friedman, US Maritime Strategy, 213, 235; also see Baer, Sea Power, 127; Weigley, The American Way of War, 246–7; James, ‘American and Japanese Strategies’, 710–12.
10 Aldrich, Intelligence and the War against Japan; Best, British Intelligence; Ford, Britain's Secret War, Ford, The Elusive Enemy; Mahnken, Uncovering Ways of War.
11 Morton, Strategy and Command, 27.
12 Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, 187–8, 194–201, 205–12, 238–9.
13 Ozawa, ‘Development of the Japanese Navy’, 73.
14 The National Archives, Kew (TNA), ADM 116/3124 M.00351/23, Director of Plans, Revision of Naval War Memorandum, 12 December 1922 (hereafter, War Memorandum, 1922)
15 United States National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland (NARA 2), RG 225, Records of the Joint Board, JB 325, War Plans Division, Roll 9, Serial No.280, Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan – Orange: Estimate of the Situation, 11 January 1929 (hereafter, Orange: Estimate of the Situation, 1929). All documents referred to hereafter, unless otherwise stated, were consulted at NARA 2.
16 Miller, War Plan Orange, 33–36
17 RG 38, Strategic Plans Division Records, Miscellaneous Subject File, Box 64, Commander-in-Chief US Fleet, US Joint Asiatic Force Operating Plan Orange, 1 July 1934
18 Bell, The Royal Navy, 67
19 War Memorandum, 1922
20 Vlahos, ‘The Naval War College’, 29–30.
21 Miller, War Plan Orange, 54–5.
22 RG 225, Records of the Joint Board, JB 325, War Plans Division, Roll 9, Serial No.207, Memorandum for Chief of Staff, Synopsis of Joint Army and Navy Estimates of the Orange Situation, 7 July 1923 (hereafter, Estimates of Orange Situation, 1923).
23 Neidpath, The Singapore Naval Base, 28–31.
24 TNA, ADM 1/8666/151 M.0702/24, First Lord of Admiralty, International Agreement foreshadowed in government statement on suspension of Singapore base, 30 Apr. 1924, Enclosure: Notes by the Naval Staff.
25 Ranft, The Beatty Papers, 344.
26 Orange: Estimate of the Situation, 1929.
27 RG 225, Records of the Joint Board, JB 305, roll 6, serial 574, Memorandum by navy members of the Joint Planning Committee, on military position in the Far East, 6 Feb. 1936.
28 Miller, War Plan Orange, 186–90, 199–201.
29 RG 38, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Strategic Plans Division, box 15, WPL–13, Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan Orange, 31 Jan. 1931.
30 RG 225, JB 325, Joint Board, War Plans Division, roll 10, JB 325, serial no. 618, Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan Orange, 1938 (hereafter, Basic War Plan Orange, 1938)
31 TNA, ADM 116/3125 M.00370/24, Director of Plans, War Memorandum (Eastern), 29 Jul. 1924
32 TNA, ADM 116/3118 M.00480/32, Plans Division, War Memorandum (Eastern), Jan. 1932 (hereafter, War Memorandum, 1932)
33 Bell, ‘Our Most Exposed Outpost’
34 TNA, ADM 116/3475 M.00518/33, Plans Division, War Memorandum (Eastern), October 1933 (hereafter, War Memorandum, 1933)
35 Estimates of Orange Situation, 1923.
36 RG 38, Strategic Plans Division Records, Miscellaneous Subject File, box 37, Course at the Army War College, 1924–5, Enclosure: Draft of Joint Army and Navy War Plan, Orange, and Study of Strategic Estimate, Orange–Blue.
37 National Maritime Museum, London (NMM), BTY/8/5 Board of Admiralty, Empire Naval Policy and Cooperation, part 1: General Considerations, 2 Dec. 1920.
38 War Memorandum, 1933.
39 Orange: Estimate of the Situation, 1929.
40 Miller, War Plan Orange, 162–4.
41 United States Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, RG 4, Publications, box 75, Operations Problem I–1936–SR, Blue Solution by Member of Staff.
42 Basic War Plan Orange, 1938.
43 War Memorandum, 1932.
44 TNA, CAB 53/31 COS 590, Far East Appreciation, 1937: Report by COS, May 1937.
45 TNA, ADM 116/4393 M.00625/37, Naval War Memorandum (Eastern), October 1938.
46 RG 225, JB 325, Joint Board, War Plans Division, roll 11, JB 325, serial no. 642–1, Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow no. 1, 27 Jul. 1939.
47 Ibid., serial no. 642–2, Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow no. 2, Jul. 1940.
48 Howard, Continental Commitment, 102–3; Gibbs, Grand Strategy, 336–41; for a more recent account, see Maiolo, Royal Navy and Nazi Germany.
49 TNA, CAB 80/16 COS (40) 592, The Situation in the Far East in the Event of Japanese Intervention against us, report by COS, 15 Aug. 1940; also see Kirby, War Against Japan, 33; Marder, Old Friends, 85.
50 Lowenthal, Leadership and Indecision, 411–19.
51 Morton, Strategy and Command, 81–4.
52 Utley, Going to War, 113–14.
53 Leutze, Bargaining for Supremacy, 206.
54 TNA, CAB 79/5 COS (40) 383rd meeting, 8 Nov. 1940.
55 Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning, 34–6.
56 Watson, Chief of Staff, 397–98; Kirby, War Against Japan, 63; Leutze, Bargaining for Supremacy, 225–7, 231.
57 Morton, Strategy and Command, 88–9.
58 RG 225, JB 325, Joint Board, War Plans Division, roll 11, JB 325, serial no. 642–5, Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow no. 5, Apr. 1941; also see Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning, 43–4.
59 Lowenthal, Leadership and Indecision, 694.
60 RG 38, Office of the CNO, Strategic Plans Division Records, Miscellaneous Subject File, box 52, Joint Board Estimate of United States Overall Production Requirements, 11 Sep. 1941
61 TNA, CAB 81/99 JIC (41) 11 Sea, Land and Air Forces Which Japan Might Make Available for Attack on Malaya: Report by JIC, 6 Jan. 1941; CAB 81/105 JIC (41) 449 Possible Japanese Action: Report by JIC, 28 Nov. 1941.
62 Simpson, ‘Harold Raynsford Stark’, 126–128; Dallek, Roosevelt, 242.
63 Dallek, Roosevelt, 304–5; Baer, Sea Power, 173.
64 TNA, CAB 69/2 Cabinet Defence Committee (Operations) 65th meeting, 17 Oct. 1941.
65 Hayes, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 427–8; Ross, American War Plans, 69.
66 RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Geographic File, 1942–45, box 129, CCS 417, Combined Staff Planners, Overall plan for the defeat of Japan, 2 Dec.1943.
Additional information
Douglas Ford has taught military history and war studies at Aberystwyth, Salford, and Birmingham universities, and he is the author of three books and over a dozen articles on the US and British conduct of the Second World War in the Asia–Pacific theatres.