Conflict resolution and regional co-operation: The role of the Gulf Co-operation Council 1970–2002

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size

Notes

This study was presented at the first World Congress for Middle Eastern Studies (WOCMES) in Mainz in Sept. 2002. Developments beyond that date do not form part of this analysis.

1. At the 22nd Meeting of Heads of State in Muscat in Dec. 2001 the Republic of Yemen, which had been campaigning for full membership for many years, became loosely associated with the GCC.

2. The ‘Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf ’, a communist-style organization was founded in Dhofar in south-western Oman in 1968.

3. At a meeting in Tripoli on 4 Dec. 1977, Syria, Algeria, Libya, the People's Republic of Yemen, and the Palestine Liberation Front (PLO) formed this action group against any form of negotiations with Israel.

4. For these efforts pre-dating the GCC see Frauke Heard-Bey, Die arabischen Golfstaaten im Zeichen der islamischen Revolution. Innen-außen- und sicherheitspolitische Zusammenarbeit im Golf Rat, Arbeitspapiere zur Internationale Politik 25 (Bonn: Europa Verlag, 1983), pp.166ff.

5. Ten years earlier, when Britain was in the process of leaving the Gulf, the USA shunned commitments to security arrangements in the Gulf, but was eager to see Iran taking on a leading role in that region.

6. See Keesing's Record of World Events, 1981, p.30830, and Heard-Bey, Die arabischen Golfstaaten, pp.173ff.

7. See an article in the official English language paper in the UAE, Emirates News, 10 March 1981, which is typical of even more strongly worded comments here and in the Arabic press of the region.

8. Although Saudi Arabia was hoping to get its own AWACS, this government along with Kuwait and other GCC members declined the American offer of military protection for their oil exports. See John Creighton, Oil on Troubled Waters. Gulf Wars 1980–91 (London: Echoes, 1992), p.35.

9. APS-Diplomat (Arab Press Service, Cyprus), July 1981, p.37 and Heard-Bey, Die arabischen Golfstaaten, p.180.

10. See various newspaper reports noted ibid. p.188.

11. According to MEES (Middle East Economic Survey) of 28 May 1984, Kuwait was declared a war zone for the purpose of insurance by Lloyds of London.

12. 62 tankers were hit during 1984; in 1985 it was 50 tankers.

13. See The Guardian, 2 June 1984.

14. Creighton, Oil, pp.94f.

15. The two neighbours had still not signed a peace treaty, when on the 14th anniversary of the end of hostilities the Iraqi President Saddam Hussain called for the restoration of normal relations and to bury the past. See Khaleej Times, 9 Aug. 2002.

16. See Emirates News, 5 May 1990.

17. Emirates News, 27 July 1990.

18. See MEES, 4 June 1990.

19. See MEES, 23 July 1990.

20. See Khaleej Times, 25 July 1990.

21. Khaleej Times, 2 Aug. 1990.

22. Khaleej Times, 30 July 1990.

23. Emirates News, 23 Aug. 1990.

24. At a conference of GCC Defence Ministers in Riyadh in Dec. the head of the military committee of the GCC Secretariat gave a briefing on the defence condition of the region; see Emirates News, 5 Dec. 1990.

25. Khaleej Times, 23 Dec. 1990.

26. Abdullah Bishara, Secretary General of the GCC; see Khaleej Times, 26 Dec. 1990.

27. A panel for post-war security did meet in February: see Emirates News, 22 Feb. 1991.

28. See MEES, Vol.34, No.23, 11 March 1991.

29. In an interview he said that many of the Gulf States were ‘…very reluctant to have us around before Iraq invaded Kuwait…in many ways the war clearly changed attitudes in the Gulf…a significantly enhanced willingness to co-operate on security arrangements and joint ventures with the United States and US forces’. See Emirates News, 11 May 1991.

30. See Gulf News, 16 Oct. 2000.

31. See Gulf News, 16 Nov. 2000. This system became operational in Nov. 2001 as ‘Hizam Al Ta'awun’. See Gulf News, 8 Nov. 2001.

32. See Frauke Heard-Bey, From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates. A Society in Transition (London: Longman, 1982). 3rd edn. (Dubai: Motivate, 2004), pp.338f and 364ff.

33. See Gulf News, 13 July 1993.

34. See Gulf News, 18 Dec. 1994. This was still the Bahraini position, even after it had requested an extension of time until Nov. 1996 to submit written arguments to the ICJ ‘…so that complete chance is given for mediation efforts by…King Fahd’. See Gulf News, 25 Jan. 1996.

35. See Emirates News, 16 Feb. 1995.

36. See Gulf News, 17 Feb. 1995 and Gulf News, 24 Feb. 1995.

37. See Gulf News, 17 July 1996. But the atmosphere had already been soured by remarks made by the Qatari Foreign Minister during a visit to Bahrain on 2 July. The Bahraini Crown Prince was eager to give the impression that Bahrain considered the GCC to be the body which should have the task of settling disputes among member states. See Gulf News, 3 July 1996.

38. See Gulf News, 7 Dec. 1996. Bahrain's boycott of the summit was an embarrassment. This news item was carefully worded, and only mentioned in the text of the UAE's daily papers.

39. See Gulf News, 14 Jan. 1997. The strained relations between the two countries were not helped by the defection of a Bahraini air force pilot, a member of the ruling family, to Qatar in a helicopter in Jan.

40. One reason was that Bahrain boycotted the meeting scheduled for 29 Jan. 1997 in Jeddah because it objected to a clause in the draft agreement, allowing Qatar to pursue its case at the ICJ.

41. See Emirates News, 3 March 1997.

42. See Gulf News, 23 Feb. 1999. The Court took note of the concordant views of Qatar and Bahrain on the treatment of these documents.

43. See Gulf News, 29 Nov. 1998.

44. See Gulf News, 29 April and 1 May 1999.

45. See Gulf News, 8 July 1999.

46. See Gulf News, 30 Dec. 1999.

47. See Gulf News, 22 Feb. 2000.

48. See Khaleej Times, 17 March 2001. The ruling was largely based on the fact that both Qatar and Bahrain had in 1939 given their consent for Britain to resolve the Hawar dispute.

49. See Emirates News and Gulf News, 2 Oct. 1992.

50. See Gulf News, 7 Oct. 1992 and 15 Oct. 1992.

51. Another step out of line was a meeting between the Qatari Foreign Minister and Shimon Peres in New York. See Emirates News, 17 Oct. 1993. Later in the months there were rumours that Qatar was preparing a gas deal with Israel; see Gulf News, 29 Oct. 1993. In 1995 the first visit by the Israeli Foreign Minister was called off when this news leaked out at a time when the Peace Process between Israel and the Palestinians was not going well; see Emirates News, 18 April 1995. In May 1996 Israel was about to open a trade office in Qatar, it's second in the Gulf after Muscat; see Emirates News, 28 May 1996. Later Qatar was ambivalent over this step and was ready to shut down its trade office in Israel; see Gulf News, 31 March 1997. In Nov. 1998 Israel participated in a defence fair in Doha; see Gulf News, 8 Nov. 1998.

52. See Emirates News 27 November 1992 with the headline: ‘Qatar reviews GCC link’.

53. See Gulf News, 7 Dec. 1994.

54. See Gulf News, 22 March 2001.

55. See Gulf News, 10 Dec. 1995. The Qatari Foreign Minister said, ‘…ministers have to choose between Hujailan and Qatar’.

56. Shaikh Khalifah bin Hamed Al Thani later spent many months in Abu Dhabi as the guest of the Ruler of Abu Dhabi.

57. See Emirates News, 15 March 1996.

58. See Emirates News, 26 Feb. 1996.

59. See Gulf News, 6 March 1996 and Emirates News, 17 March 1996.

60. See Heard-Bey, Die arabischen Golfstaaten, p.199.

61. See Gulf News, 29 Nov. 1999. The bone of contention was the amount of customs to be levied in future. Saudi Arabia wanted to keep it at least as high as 8%, while the UAE, led by Dubai, wanted customs to be as low as possible to encourage trade. See also more details in a report on the 50th meeting of GCC Finance Ministers in Riyadh; Gulf News, 9 May 1999.

62. See Gulf News, 31 March 2002. The paper published some of the text of this agreement. Implementation of the common market had already been put back from 2005 to 2007, while the single currency was planned for 2010. But all these targets were once again in jeopardy at the end of 2004 because of a rift between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. In Sept. 2004 Bahrain had signed a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the United States. Saudi Arabia and other GCC partners maintain that such agreements contravene the agreements governing the common economy within the GCC. However, other GCC states are also engaged in negotiations over FTAs.

63. Dubai has begun to offer real estate to expatriates, and throughout 2005 property worth billions has been sold, much of it to citizens of the GCC countries, but also to Asian, European and American investors. In Abu Dhabi electricity and water utilities are now open to foreign corporate shareholders.

64. See Heard-Bey, From Trucial States, 1st edn. pp.382ff. and 3rd edn. pp.392ff.

65. Bahrain and Oman retained a great deal of British administrative and some legal substance, while Abu Dhabi was influenced by Egyptian legal and administrative advisers; Qatar tended towards the French–Egyptian system and Saudi Arabia was considered a law unto itself.

66. See Dryland Consultants, GCC Population Data Book (Dubai: 1995).

67. See Frauke Heard-Bey, The United Arab Emirates: Transition in a Federal State. Occasional Papers No.20 (London: Centre for Near and Middle Eastern Studies, SOAS, 2001), pp.26ff.

68. Since Sept. 2002, when this study was presented at the WOCMES Congress in Mainz, the invasion of Iraq has deeply influenced the GCC societies' relationship with America. Governments, too, may also not want to keep the door so wide open for the American military presence in the region in the future.