From ‘Cold’ to ‘Hot’ War: Allied Strategic and Military Interests in the Middle East after the Second World War

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Notes

1. On Stalin's speech, and the American policy of ‘containment’, inspired by George Kennan, see J.L. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American Security Policy (New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982); idem, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941–1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972).

2. In 1946, the size of the Red Army's regular forces was estimated at some four and a half million men, with some 15,500 combat aircraft; it was thought to have the potential to mobilize a force of 10.5 million Soviet and satellite troops within 30 days, and 15 million within 150 days; in contrast, the American armed forces were reduced within a year from some 12 million in June 1945, to just 3 million in June 1946, and to 1.5 million by June 1947; see Strategic Study for Turkey, codenamed Griddle, JWPC 467/1, 15 Aug. 1946, 381 Turkey, NA; also J.F. Schnabel, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Vol.1, 1945–1947 (Wilmington: Michael Glazier Inc., 1979), p.238.

3. Report by Director of Plans, 4 Nov. 1948, in JP (48) 130, in Defe 6/7. PRO; also M.J. Cohen, Fighting World War Three from the Middle East: Allied Contingency Plans, 1945–1954 (London: Frank Cass, 1997), pp.35–6, 46, 174–5, 179.

4. Note by Group Captain M.R. MacArthur to Director of Plans, RAF, 25 March 1946, in Air 9/267, PRO. See Cohen, Fighting World War Three, p.75.

5. Gen. Arnold first expressed this view in a private memo to Secretary of the Air Force Stuart Symington, dated 2 Dec. 1948; the Symington papers, correspondence file, box 1, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO (HST). In 1949, he reproduced the memo in his memoirs, Global Mission (New York: Harper & Bros., 1949), p.615.

6. One scholar has estimated that during the first years after the Second World War, the American nuclear arsenal increased from 9 atomic bombs in 1946, to just 13 in 1947, 50 by 1948, and 170 by 1949; communication from Dr Steven Ross, and Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Nov.–Dec. 1994), p.59. Yet General Carl Spaatz, commander of the American Air Force (USAAF) from Feb. 1946 to April 1948, recalled later that only about a dozen atomic bombs had in fact been operational during his tour of duty – see D.A. Rosenberg, ‘American Atomic Strategy and the Hydrogen Bomb Decision’, Journal of American History, Vol.66, No.1 (June 1979), pp.62–87.

7. For instance, the B50, which went into production in 1945, was basically the B29, with improved engines and an improved take-off capability. See Cohen, Fighting World War Three, pp.13–18.

8. Ibid.

9. MacArthur Note to Director of Plans.

10. On the post-war crises in Iran and Turkey, and their history, see B. Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey and Greece (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980).

11. Schnabel, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, pp.150–51, and Cohen, Fighting World War Three, p.2.

12. Cohen, Fighting World War Three, p.38.

13. The Canal Base was the largest military complex in the world at the time, comprising some 16 army, and 11 air bases.

14. See Cohen, Fighting World War Three, pp.38–9, 162.

15. Ibid., p.176.

16. There were hardly any metalled high roads in the Middle East that were passable also in winter. There was only one railroad, by-passing Turkey, that connected the Soviet Union with the Cairo–Suez area. Ibid., p.19.

17. CP (50) 283, 27 Nov. 1950, Cab 129/43, PRO.

18. P. Darby, British Defence Policy East of Suez, 1947–1968 (London: Oxford University Press for the RIIA, 1973), pp.15–16; also Cohen, Fighting World War Three, p.84.

19. Darby, British Defence Policy.

20. See Cohen, Fighting World War Three, pp.169–70, 174–80.

21. On the debate between the State Department and the Joint Chiefs on the issue of giving the British military support in the Middle East, see ibid., pp.245–53.

22. On NSC-68, see ibid., pp.26–7; see also T.H. Etzold and J.L. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982).

23. See Caffery to Secretary of State Dean Acheson, 22 and 25 Nov. 1950, in Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), Vol.V, pp.322–3. On Caffery, see W.R. Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945–1951 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p.716.

24. McGhee to Acheson, 27 Dec. 1950, FRUS, Vol.V, pp.4–6.

25. Ibid.

26. The idea of setting up a Middle East Command had been raised first by the British at the annual Pentagon talks, in October 1949, see Cohen, Fighting World War Three, chapter 8; also P.L. Hahn, The United States, Great Britain and Egypt, 1945–1956 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), pp.109–30.

27. The State Department minutes of the meeting on 31 January 1951 are in FRUS, Vol.V, pp.27–40; see also Cohen, Fighting World War Three, pp.250–53; D.R. Devereux, The Formulation of British Defence Policy Towards the Middle East, 1948–56 (London: MacMillan, 1990), p.49, and Hahn, The United States, Great Britain and Egypt, p.111.

28. Cohen, ibid.

29. FRUS, 1951, Vol.V, p.33.

30. Ibid., p.38.

31. Ibid.

32. Attlee's cabinet memorandum of 1 Sept. 1945, in CP (45) 144, in Cab 129/1, PRO, reproduced in R. Hyam (ed.), British Documents on the End of Empire: The Labour Government and the End of Empire, 1945–1951, series A, Vol.2 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office (HMSO), 1992), part III, pp.207–8.

33. Attlee memorandum on ‘Defence in the Mediterranean, Middle East and Indian Ocean’, DO (46) 27, 2 March 1946, in Cab 131/2, PRO, reproduced in Hyam, British Documents on the End of Empire, pp.213–14.

34. Richard J. Aldrich and John Zametica, ‘The Rise and Decline of a Strategic Concept: the Middle East, 1945–51', in Richard J. Aldrich (ed.), British Intelligence, Strategy and the Cold War, 1945–51 (London/New York: Routledge, 1992), p.244.

35. DO (46) 80, British Strategic Requirements in the Middle East, 18 June 1946, in Cab 13/13, PRO, quoted in ibid.

36. For details and the respective distances to Soviet strategic targets from Cairo and East Anglia, see Cohen, Fighting World War Three, pp.52, 132–3.

37. On the Chief's shock, see Fieldmarshal Alanbrooke's diary, 3 Sept. 1945, quoted in R. Smith and J. Zametica, ‘The Cold Warrior: Clement Attlee Reconsidered, 1945–47’, International Affairs, Vol.61, No.2 (Spring 1985), p.243; also J. Kent, ‘The Egyptian Base and the Defence of the Middle East, 1945–54’, in R. Holland (ed.), Emergencies and Disorders in the European Empires after 1945 (London: Frank Cass, 1994); the debate is reviewed criticially in Cohen, Fighting World War Three, pp.69–88.

38. COS (47) 6^th meeting, 7 Jan. 1947, in Defe 32/1, Secretary's Standard File, PRO.

39. Bevin to Attlee, 9 Jan. 1947, ME/47/4, PRO; quoted in Cohen, Fighting World War Three, p.81.

40. Memorandum on Egyptian airfields, 8 March 1949, P & O, 49–50, 686 TS (8 March 1949) box 264, RG 319 (Army Staff), NA, cited in Cohen, Fighting World War Three, pp.134–5.

41. P and O, 49-50, box 263, 600.1, TS case 8, 21 Sept. 1949, RG 319, NA.

42. See General Hollis (Secretary to COS) to Ministry of Defence, 30 Sept. 1948, in COS (48) 138^th meeting, in Defe 4/16, PRO; and 381 Case 121/83, P & O 381 TS, 7 Oct., RG 319 (Army Staff) 46–8, NA., cited in Cohen, Fighting World War Three, pp.133–4.

43. On the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations, see Hahn, The United States, Great Britain and Egypt; and Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East.

44. See Cohen, Fighting World War Three, pp.132ff.

45. Henderson memorandum, ‘Works in the United Kingdom and Middle East Required for the United States Air Force’, annex to DO (49) 37, 9 May, 1949, in Cab 131/7, PRO.

46. Shinwell memorandum, 10 March 1950, DO (50) 17, in Cab 131/9, PRO, quoted in Cohen, Fighting World War Three, p.139.

47. See Cohen, Fighting World War Three, pp.136, 139.

48. On Churchill's Great Power delusions, see D. Reynolds, In Command of History: Churchill Fighting and Writing the Second World War (London: Penguin Books, 2005).

49. Note by Secretary of State for Air, 14 June 1952, DO (52) 25, in Cab 131/12, PRO, quoted in Cohen, Fighting World War Three, pp.140–41.

50. Cf. Hahn, The United States, Great Britain and Egypt, p.109.

51. Minute by the British Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, 14 May 1952, reporting on a meeting with American Air Force Generals Griswold and McConnell, in Air 20/7448, PRO. At the time, the British Air Staff estimated that the work still remaining to be done at Abu Sueir would cost a further £700,000 – just slightly above the outstanding American share.

52. Air Ministry to HQ, Middle East Forces, 13 Jan. 1953, Chief of Air Staff to Secretary of State for Air, July 1953, both in Air 20/7448; also Secretary of State for Air to Prime Minister Churchill, 18 Feb. 1953, in Prem 11/483, and brief on Abu Sueir, March 1953, in Air 20/7435, PRO; also Cohen, Fighting World War Three, p.141.

53. See M.J. Cohen, The Origins and Evolution of the Arab–Zionist Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), p.42.

54. Annex to JP (46) 100, 23 May 1946, Cab 84/81, and DO (46) 80, 18 June 1946, Cab 131/3, PRO.

55. COS memorandum presented to the Defence Committee, ‘The Strategic Position of the British Commonwealth’, DO (46) 47, 2 April 1946, Cab 131/2, PRO.

56. Brigadier William L. Ritchie to General Carl A. Spaatz, 28 April 1947, Carl Spaatz papers, box 28, Library of Congress, Washington DC.

57. Annex to JP (47) 1, 5 Jan. 1947, in Defe 6/2, PRO.

58. Ibid., and annex to JP (46) 100, and DO (46) 80.

59. COS Principal Administrative Officers' report, CSA (46) 91, 9 Sept. 1946, Air 20/2461, PRO, cited in M.J. Cohen, Palestine and the Great Powers, 1945–1948 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982), p.38.

60. Annex to JP (47) 1, 5 Jan. 1947, PRO/

61. Ibid., and Chiefs of Staff meeting, 7 Jan. 1947, in E463, FO 371/61763, PRO.

62. For details of Sandown, see COS (48) 144, 1 July 1948, Defe 5/11, PRO.

63. See Cohen, Fighting World War Three, pp.163–7.

64. JP (49), 11 July 1949, in Defe 4/23, PRO.

65. War Office note on Sandown, COS (48) 123, 16 Oct. 1948, Defe 5/8, PRO.

66. Policy Planning paper, PPS/19, 19 Jan. 1948, FRUS, Vol.V, Part 2 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1982), pp.536–47; and JCS 1684/28, 1 April 1949, CCS 092 Pal (5-3-46), sect. 7, and RG 330 (Secretary of Defense) box 22, CD 6-2-47, 16 May 1949, National Archives (NA).

67. Report by Philip Jessup to US Secretary of State, 25 July 1950, on meeting between Air Marshal Lord Tedder, Chief of the British Air Staff, and General Omar Bradley, chairman of the JCS, held in Washington DC, FRUS, Vol.V (1950), p.189.

68. ‘The Role of Israeli Forces in War’, JP (51) 56, 9 July 1951, Defe 6/16, PRO.

69. George McGhee to Philip Jessup, 19 Oct. 1950, FRUS, Vol.V (1950), pp.217–20; also JP (51) 56, ibid, and COS (51) 114^th meeting, 11 July 1951, Defe 4/45; PRO. On the Israeli Air Force, see I. Steigman, Operation ‘Kadesh’: The IAF from 1950–1956 (Tel Aviv: Israeli Ministry of Defence, 1986) (in Hebrew).

70. On Israel's foreign policy, see U. Bialer, Between East and West: Israel's Foreign Policy Orientation, 1948–1956 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

71. Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) estimate, (770) 50, in JP (50) 48, 19 May 1950, Defe 6/13, PRO; also memo by Richard Ford (US chargé in Tel Aviv), 12 Oct. 1950, TA Embassy, 1950–52, 321.9. box 5, RG 84, Foreign Service Posts, NA.

72. Bialer, Between East and West, pp.235–6, and Ben-Gurion diary entry, 27 Jan. 1951, Ben Gurion Archives (BGA).

73. Annex to JP (51) 21, 9 Feb. 1951, Defe 6/16, and DO (51) 8, 13 Feb., Cab 131/11, PRO.

74. Ibid.

75. Ibid, and Defence Committee meeting, 16 Feb. 1951, DO (51) 2d, Cab 13/10, PRO.

76. The following is based on Cohen, Fighting World War Three, pp.210–24. The British records of the Robertson mission are in Gen Robertson to Foreign Office, 21 Feb. 1951, E1201, FO 371/91240, also in COS (51) 153, 21 March 1951, Defe 5/29, PRO; and the Israeli records in file 2457, Central Zionist Archives (CZA), and Ben-Gurion's diary entry, 19 Feb. 1951, BGA.

77. Robertson reports, ibid.

78. On the American commitment to the Middle East, see Cohen, Fighting World War Three, pp.44, 169–70, 174–7, 180–81.

79. Ben-Gurion diary, 27 Jan. 1951, BGA.

80. On Ben-Gurion's Commonwealth proposal, see Cohen, Fighting World War Three, pp.216–17; also Bialer, Between East and West, pp.238–9.

81. Talks between British and Israeli Foreign Secretaries, Anthony Eden and Moshe Sharett, 23 Nov. 1951, FO 371/91716, PRO.

82. COS (52) 170, 18 March 1952, Defe 5/38, PRO.

83. Ben-Gurion to Makleff, 1 Oct. 1952, BGA.

84. On the staff talks, cf Cohen, Fighting World War Three, pp.228–38. At the time of writing, the British records of the staff talks were closed, therefore my description is based on the Israeli record, in file 532/73/174, IDF archive.

85. Telegram of 13 Oct. 1952, 784A. 5/10-1352, NA.

86. Defence Coordinating Committee (DCC) (53) 46, 23 March 1953, Defe 11/87, PRO.

87. Churchill to Sir William Strang, April 1953, Prem 11/465, PRO.

88. Defence Coordinating Committee (DCC), 23 March 1953, Defe 11/87, PRO; and Foreign Office minute of P.S. Falla, 19 Feb. 1954, VR1195/1G, FO 371/111118, PRO.

89. Eden cabinet memorandum, 7 Jan. 1954, C (54) 6, Cab 129/65, PRO.

90. On Dulles' tour and conclusions, see Cohen, Fighting World War Three, pp.314–18.

91. On the thermo-nuclear factor in British considerations to evacuate the Canal Base, see ibid., pp.301–2.

92. See ibid., chapter 10; On the Northern Tier strategy, and the formation and fall of the Baghdad Pact, see M.J. Cohen, Strategy and Politics in the Middle East, 1954–60, Defending the Northern Tier (London: Frank Cass, 2005).