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ABSTRACT
This article focuses on the Israeli land regime as reflected in the land allocation activities of the Development Authority (DA) in urban areas between 1950 and 1960, and particularly on how allocation of space influenced the development of a social stratum during this nation-building period. The analytical lens applies two concepts to the empirical data on DA activities during this period: ‘incorporation regime’ and ‘citizen discourse’. The outcome is an understanding of the ‘rules of the game’ supporting selective access to land allocations in given areas. Accessibility was aimed at distinct Jewish groups – wealthy, connected/networked, and veteran citizens, in line with the republican discourse in Israel at the time. The findings provide a deeper understanding of connections among institutional mechanisms, citizenship discourse and land allocation, and their expression both spatially and in terms of the fabric of life that developed within the social, political and land regime contexts.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes
1. Y. Soysal, Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).
2. Y. Peled and G. Shafir, Being Israeli: The Dynamics of Multiple Citizenship (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University Press, 2005).
3. Land allocation is the allocation of land or real estate rights by awarding ownership, tenure, lease rights, and various authorizations of use, including non-enforcement of laws, retroactive authorizations (legalization) and land exchanges.
4. This does not include allocations for public housing (including housing for new immigrants) that were developed within the framework of government construction.
5. G. Forman and A. (S) Kedar, ‘From Arab Land to “Israel Lands”: The Legal Dispossession of the Palestinians Displaced by Israel in the Wake of 1948’, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space Vol.22 (2004), pp.809–30; A. Golan, Wartime Spatial Changes, Former Arab Territories within the State of Israel, 1948–1950 (Beer-Sheva: Ben-Gurion University Press, 2001) (Hebrew), pp.800–900; A. (S) Kedar, ‘Expanding Legal Geographies: A Call for a Critical Comparative Approach in the Expanding Spaces of Law: A Timely Legal Geography’, in I. Braverman, N. Blomley, D. Delaney and A. (S) Kedar (eds.), Buffalo Legal Studies Research Paper Series (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014), pp.95–119.
6. N. Ziv, ‘Between Rental and Ownership: The Public Housing Law and Inter-Generational Wealth Transfer from a Historical Perspective’, Mishpat Umimshal Vol.9 (2006), pp.411–60.
7. For example, see A. Ben Porat, How Israel Turned Capitalist (Haifa: Pardes Publishing House, 2011) (Hebrew), and A. Krampf, The National Origins of the Market Economy – Economic Developmentalism during the Formation of Israeli Capitalism (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2015) (Hebrew).
8. Ibid.
9. A. (S) Kedar, ‘Majority Time, Minority Time: Land, Nationality and Adverse Possession Law in Israel’, Tel Aviv University Law Review (Iyunei Mishpat) Vol.21 (1998), pp.665–746 (Hebrew).
10. Up to now, studies have focused on allocations for agricultural settlement and military and defence needs.
11. Most of the people involved at that time are unfortunately no longer with us. The interviews were conducted with Avraham Haleli, the JNF legal counsel at the time; Eliyahu Babai who worked at the land deed department of the Custodian of Abandoned Property (CAP) from where he transferred to the DA and then to the ILA (where he eventually became deputy director-general); and with Yosef Keisar who worked in the CAP Rural Department, went on to the DA and then to the ILA.
12. D. Horovitz and M. Lissak, Trouble in Utopia: Israel – An Over-Stressed Society (Tel Aviv, 1990) (Hebrew), pp.178–80, quoted in Gutwein, ‘Bourgeois Halutziut – Popular Culture and the Ethos of Israel's “Established Middle Class” – the Lyrics of Naomi Shemer, 1956–1967’, Israel Vol.20 (2012), pp.21–80.
13. H. Rosenfeld and S. Carmi, ‘The Expropriation of Public Means and a State-Produced Middle Class’, Booklets for Research and Criticism Vol.2 (1979), pp.42–83 (Hebrew), quoted in Gutwein, ‘Bourgeois Halutziut’, p.28.
14. A. Ben Porat, Where are the Old Bourgeois? (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1999), pp.156–66.
15. Rosenfeld and Carmi, ’The Expropriation’, pp.50–62. For further details about the process of bourgeoisification, see A. Bareli, ‘Changing Norms within Mapai during the Early 1950s: Political and Organizational Aspects’, Historical Society of Israel Vol.12 (2003), pp.69–104.
16. Z. Rosenhek, ‘Inclusionary and Exclusionary Dynamics in the Israeli Welfare State: State Building and Political Economy’, in H. Herzog, T. Kochavi and S. Selniker (eds.), Generations, Locations, Identities: Contemporary Perspectives on Society and Culture in Israel (Jerusalem: The Van-Leer Jerusalem Institute and Hakibbutz Hameuchad Publishing House, 2007), pp.317–49 (Hebrew).
17. Rosenhek, ‘Inclusionary’. For further details, see also Peled and Shafir, Being Israeli. See also Z. Rosenhek, ‘Policy Paradigms and the Dynamics of the Welfare State: The Israeli Welfare State and the Zionist Colonial Project’, International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy Vol.18 (1998), pp.157–202 (Hebrew), in particular regarding the fields of employment and public housing, as test cases for Israeli welfare policy.
18. Peled and Shafir, Being Israeli.
19. See pp.21–6 for the Neo-Institutional Theory, in Peled and Shafir, Being Israeli.
20. D. Shmueli and M. Ben Gal, ‘Creating Environmental Stakeholder Profiles: A Tool for Dispute Management’, Planning Theory and Practice Vol.7, No.3 (2005), pp.165–75.
21. Peled and Shafir, Being Israeli.
22. Peled and Shafir, Being Israeli, p.20, explain that in order to understand a given incorporation regime, it is necessary to know its major allocation institutions and the citizenship discourses that dominate its political culture. Modifications in this regime occur when there are changes in the interests of various social groups or in the balance of power between them. The change receives an institutional and civic-conceptual expression. The incorporation is ranked – there is no total exclusion or inclusion, but a ranking of participation in a given uniform legal framework. For further elaboration, see also pp.12–20, 26–56 and 390.
23. E. Nir, ‘Pioneers and Pioneering in the State of Israel: Semantic and Historical Aspects, 1948–1956’, Studies in the Revival of Israel Vol.2 (1992) (Hebrew), pp.123–38; quoted in Gutwein, ‘Bourgeois Halutziut’, pp.30–2.
24. Gutwein, ‘Bourgeois Halutziut’, p.31.
25. A. Knafelman, Political corruption in Israel (2010) (Hebrew). Available at: http://www.idi.org.il.
26. According to Peled and Shafir, Being Israeli, pp.88–9, the republican discourse supports corruption: even when pioneering functionaries were caught with their hands in the public purse, they were forgiven because of their work for the benefit of the Jewish nation at large. They quote A. Shapira, The Disappointing Battle: Jewish Labor 1929–1939 (Kibbutz ha-Meuhad Publishing, 1977) (Hebrew), p.33, who relates that in 1950, when Jewish Agency workers were caught embezzling, they were defended by Eshkol, then the Jewish Agency treasurer who said: ‘Thou shalt not muzzle the ox when he treadeth out the corn’. An interesting article for comparison is that of I. Chattha, ‘Competitions for Resources: Partition's Evacuee Property and the Sustenance of Corruption in Pakistan’, Modern Asian Studies Vol.46 (2012), pp.1182–211. DOI:10.1017/S0026749X12000170. It argues that the legacy of Partition forms a common backdrop to varieties of corruption stemming from the redistribution of evacuee property – in this case, the property abandoned by departing Hindus and Sikhs during the mass migrations after Partition. In the case of Pakistan, these practices played a role in the institutionalization of corruption in Pakistan.
27. According to the Committee for the Prevention of Conflicts of Interest (2007), ‘institutional conflict of interest’ can arise when a public official has more than one public position (in two different public offices) and when some of the topics in his care overlap, so that in one position he can influence a topic he is responsible for in his second position.
28. Rosenfeld and Carmi, ‘The Expropriation of Public Means’ (As summarized in U. Ram (ed.), Israeli Society: Critical Perspectives (Tel Aviv: Breirot Publications, 1993) (Hebrew), p.22.
29. Rosenfeld and Carmi, ‘The Expropriation’, pp.48–9.
30. According to Kedar, ‘Majority time’ and Golan, Wartime changes, 800,000–900,000 Arabs lived within the area which would become Israel, of which only 160,000 remained after the establishment of the State of Israel. According to Kedar, the refugees left 4.2–5.8 million dunams, while Golan has the number at 6.5 million dunams in the villages and 46,000 dunams in the cities.
31. Golan, Wartime changes; Forman and Kedar, ‘From Arab land’.
32. Between the time the State of Israel was established and May 1951, the Jewish population in Israel doubled, reaching 1,322,000; M. Lisk, ‘The Immense Immigration during the 1950s – the Melting Pot’, in M. Lisk (ed.), History of the Jewish Community in Israel since the First Aliyah, the State of Israel – the First Decade (Jerusalem: Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities and the Bialik Institute, 2009) (Hebrew), pp.115–17.
33. Minutes of the Knesset Economics Committee, 4 Jan.–19 July 1950, KA (Hebrew).
34. D. Ben-Gurion (18 July 1950), Journal of David Ben-Gurion, BGA (Hebrew).
35. Articles 1, 3 and 6 of the Law. ‘Property Passing into Public Ownership’ could be sold only to the State, to the Jewish National Fund, to an institution approved by the Government as an institution for the settlement of landless Arabs, or to a local authority.
36. Articles 8 of the Law.
37. Y. M. v. DA, 91/58 Haifa District Court (22 May 1958).
38. Minutes of the Knesset Economics Committee, 17 Jan. 1950, KA (Hebrew). See also ‘The Largest “Trust” in the Country was Established’, Ma'ariv, 1 Aug. 1950; and Letter from Ezra Danin (consultant for Arab affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) to Teddy Kolek (Director-General of the Prime Minister's office), 27 Nov. 1952, ISA-gimel 5404/18.
39. For example, the ‘Agricultural Centre’ (see endnote 55).
40. R. Kark, ‘The Early Structural Development of National Land Agencies and Policy in the State of Israel (part 1)’, Karka Vol.36 (1993), pp.31–44 (Hebrew).
41. The JNF was founded in 1901 and was responsible for purchasing lands and reclaiming them. It had a system for collecting money and implementing land policy that was mainly based on allocating land through leasing it. S. Reichmann, From Stakeout to Settlement: Creating the Jewish Settlement Map in Eretz Yisrael, 1918–1948, Sources and Discussion (Jerusalem: Yad Yitzhak Ben Zvi, 1979), pp.28–30 (Hebrew); Y. Holzman-Gazit, ‘Law as a Status Symbol: The Jewish National Fund Law of 1953 and the Struggle of the Fund to Maintain its Status after Israel's Independence’, Tel Aviv University Law Review (Iyuney Mishpat) Vol.26 (2002) (Hebrew), pp.601–44; A. Haleli, the JNF legal counsel at the time, explained the complexity of the JNF's system based on decades of experience, and that the DA used it more than once to achieve its goals (interview from 23 April 2012).
42. A. Aviv, Israeli Society – A Society Undergoing Consolidation (Tel Aviv: the Ministry of Defence, Broadcast University, 1990); Y. Reuveni, Public Administration in Israel (Ramat Gan: Masada, 1974) (Hebrew).
43. A. Metskin, Too Close to the Edge: The Story of Israeli Corruption (Bne Brak: Kibbutz ha-Meuhad Publishing, 2012) (Hebrew).
44. According to E. Sprinzak, Every Man Whatsoever is Right in His Own Eyes: Illegalism in Israeli Society (Tel Aviv: Po'alim Library, Kibbutz Arts, 1987), in Metskin, Too Close to the Edge, pp.29–38, various factors, including bakshish of Ottoman heritage, the ‘Ghetto Culture’ that encouraged community nepotism (protektsiya), illegality as part and parcel of the functioning of the Yishuv (the Jewish community in pre-statehood Palestine) vis-à-vis the British Mandate, political interference in the economy, as well as the lack of a clear distinction between the Histadrut and the political parties, led to the development of corruption side by side with the development of the Hebrew-Zionist political system in Palestine.
45. Peled and Shafir, Being Israeli.
46. Ibid.
47. These were usually temporary agreements that defined frameworks for future agreements that would be reached after the establishment of the DA.
48. The Tel Aviv office was established only in 1952 at the insistence of Avraham Akavia (the DA's second director, who was in office from June 1952 until Aug. 1953), protocol of the GA, 17 July 1952, CZA S41–425,2.
49. DA report, 1 April 1952–31 July 1952, ISA gimel-5404/18.
50. Interview with Eliyahu Babai (8 Jan. 2012) who worked in the joint department and felt, in his words, like a ‘Servant of Two Masters’ and an interview with Yosef Keisar (4 Jan. 2012) who worked at the CAP and transferred to the DA as part of the ‘merger’.
51. Most of the staff of the CAP were transferred to the DA as part of the ‘merger’. The workforce at the CAP was reduced from 879 to 88 and the DA staff increased from 73 to 624. This number was reduced in 1955/56 to about 500 people that made up about 78 per cent of all the workers in the Property Division. At the same time, 95 per cent of the absentee property was transferred to the DA. In 1955, the property from the Custodian of German Property was transferred as well. State lands that were not directly used by the government were transferred as well. See Shatner's letter to the deputy director of the Ministry of Finance, 26 Jan. 1955, ILA-10/4/1.
52. See declaration by Proshansky (director, Technical Department, DA) at the GA, 8 Jan. 1957, ILA-1/1.
53. DA report, Jan.–June 1953, ISA gimel-3093/62.
54. DA report, 1 Jan. 1951–31 Mar. 1952, ISA gimel-3093/61.
55. For example, the Manufacturers Association of Israel, the Central Union for Cooperative Initiative, the Centre for Investment, government and local authority offices relevant to the allocation. Endorsements from ‘Higher Ups’ in the government were also welcome.
56. See, for example, the minutes of the Planning Division coordinating meeting on 25 Mar. 1952, ISA, gimel-2706/8.
57. Occasionally, counter-appraisals to the government appraisals were submitted, A. Cohen, Lands and their value, Vol.4 (1953), p.6.
58. For example, the Committee for Land Allocation for Industry that was active for about five years in which the ministries of Housing, Interior, Commerce and Industry were represented as well as representatives of the Centre for Investment, the Manufacturers Association of Israel, the Central Union for Cooperative Initiative and the head of the relevant local authority. The committee examined the requests and determined the size of the allocated territory, etc. See the DA report from 1 Jan. 1951–31 Mar. 1952, ISA gimel-3093/61 and Prushansky's words at the GA from 8 Jan. 1957, ILA-1/1.
59. See verdict in Yosef Romano vs. the Development Authority, civil appeal 294/57 that concerned brokerage fees and describes part of the purchase process in the DA.
60. The ministerial committee comprised ministers of Justice, Finance, Employment, Interior and Police.
61. See the correspondence regarding the complaint of A. Hertzberg. The case extended for almost two years and was only concluded after a complaint was filed, ISA gimel-2530/5.
62. T. Ahidov, ‘The Dream of Settlement’, Herut (1955), p.3.
63. The official decision was made in the 16 Feb. 1951 GA. It decided that the value determined by the government appraiser would be the basis for negotiation of discounts and conditions. See the words of Yosef Gurion (the first head of the DA), ISA gimel-2706/8.
64. Weitz's claims were heard in the 29 Dec. 1950 GA, ISA gimel-2706/9 and in the 23 Mar. 1951 and 24 July 1951 general assemblies, ISA gimel-2706/8. See also Gurion's words regarding the ‘usual’ JNF discount in the 9 Nov. 1951 GA and the lecture by the Government Appraiser (subsequent to Weitz's request) at the 4 Sep. 1951 GA regarding the methodology for determining appraisals. Weitz, nevertheless, continued to contest and claim that the prices were too high. See his words at the 13 Mar. 1952 and 12 Jun. 1952 general assemblies, CZA S41–425, 2.
65. There were deviations from this policy, as can be seen below. Nevertheless, it usually ‘worked’ despite pressures. For example, the deliberations regarding the appeal of the Tel Aviv Municipality on the decision to transfer only lands available for immediate building to it in the 26 Feb. 1952 GA, ISA gimel-2706/8.
66. Consequently, the final prices were occasionally higher or lower than the official estimate. See, for example, the 8 Jan. 1957 GA deliberations, ILA-1/1.
67. Letter from the Director-General of the Ministry of Finance to the head of the Property Division from 3 Jan. 1955, under the heading ‘secret/urgent’, regarding the State Comptroller's Report, ILA-15/5.
68. See the words of Ariel Sharon (head of the Planning Division) in the 29 Dec. 1950 GA, ISA gimel-2706/9.
69. Discussion from 8 Jan. 1957, ILA-1/1.
70. ILA-1/1.
71. See, for example, the minutes from 29 Dec. 1950, ISA gimel-2706/9 and the discussion in the 9 May 1951 ministerial committee, ISA gimel-5404/16.
72. 2 Mar. 1954, GA, ILA-1/1.
73. CZA S41-425,2. Gurion responded, saying that despite this being the JA's recommendation, he would approach the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the topic.
74. The law is beyond the scope of this paper.
75. Section 3(4) (a) of the DA law.
76. CZA S41-425,2.
77. ISA gimel-2706/7.
78. 8 Feb. 1952, GA, CZA S41–425,2.
79. ISA gimel-2706/8. Shatner, on the other hand, called on the Minister of Finance in a letter from 20 Apr. 1954 to nationalize the JNF, ILA-571/1.
80. For example, the 9 Nov. 1951 GA minutes, CZA S41-425,2.
81. ISA gimel-2706/8. The JNF was asked to pay 32,000 Israeli pounds instead of 50,000 and did not readily agree to this.
82. Moshe Barnea on the website of the Real Estate Appraisers Association in Israel, http://www.landvalue.org.il/index2.php?id=2824&lang=HEB.
83. In the ILA report (1961/62), 3,570,000 dunams were recorded under the JNF, of which it was forced to ‘return’ close to one million dunams.
84. ISA gimel-2706/8. The JNF allotted land to companies according to their political affiliation. Subsequently, it became clear that they did not rush to invest in building.
85. 29 Dec. 1950, GA, ISA gimel-2706/9.
86. ISA gimel-2706/8.
87. It was also noted that the ‘Elite Housing Project’ is composed of houses and this project was apartments. Gurion supported the request, as, in his opinion, they deserved the advantage of a central location, as they had invested 10,000 Israeli pounds in 1950. At that session, a similar request by employees of the Tel Aviv Municipality was mentioned, but it was decided to wait for the results of the arbitration. The requests were eventually approved at the 9 Sep. 1952 GA (CZA S41–425,2), according to the agreement with the JNF (including an arrangement with the government regarding the supply of building materials at official prices, lower than market prices). The request of the employees of the Tel Aviv Municipality was also discussed again, but was only approved on 16 Apr. 1953, corresponding to the arbitration results regarding the ‘Elite Housing Project’, ISA gimel-2706/7.
88. For example, the discussion at the 4 May 1951 GA, ISA gimel-2706/8.
89. M. Naor, ‘The History of Journalism in Israel: The First Decade, 1948–1957’, in S. Aharoni and M. Aharoni (eds.), People and Deeds in Israel, Jubilee Volume (1988) (Hebrew). Available at: http://lib.cet.ac.il.
90. See the 24 July 1951 GA, ISA gimel-2706/8 and subsequently those on 21 Aug. 1951 and 4 Sep. 1951, CZA S41-425,2.
91. M. Meisels, ‘From Elite Housing to Senior Official Housing’, Ma'ariv (14 Feb. 1957), p.2.
92. S. Rosenfeld, ‘The New State Comptroller's Report Exposes Anarchy, Negligence, Clumsiness and Lack of Concern’, Ma'ariv (17 Feb. 1957), p.2.
93. Y. Shemo-eli, ‘Land Robbery in Israel’, Al HaMihmar (16 Jan. 1955), pp.1–2.
94. O. Yiftachel and A. (S) Kedar, ‘Landed Power: The Making of the Israeli Land Regime’, Theory and Criticism Vol.16 (2000) (Hebrew), pp.67–100.
95. According to Ben Porat, How Israel turned capitalist, p.17, the veteran bourgeoisie at the time enjoyed a strong economic standing (although it lacked political backing).
96. The new bourgeois (middle) class was shaped in Israel in the 1950s within the state/public apparatus and included those who joined the private sector who enjoyed wide support from the State. See A. Ben Porat, Where are the Old Bourgeois? (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1999), pp.156–61.
97. E. Benvenisti, ‘Separate but Equal in Residential Land Allocation’, Tel-Aviv University Law Review (Iyunei Mishpat), Vol.21 (1998) (Hebrew), pp.769–98; R. Hananel, ‘Value Changes in Israeli Land Policy: An Analysis of Decision-making in the Israel Lands Council’ (PhD thesis, the Technion, 2006) (Hebrew). Also, the custom to allot gas stations exclusively to IDF veterans (endorsed by the Ministry of Defence and exempt from tenders), which existed until 2002. See the ILA website http://www.mmi.gov.il/hodaotmmiint/show_h.asp?key=403&CodeMaarecet=1.
98. Thus, at the 31 May 1951 ministerial meeting (ISA gimel-5404/16), the sale of a lot in Salame (which was then on the outskirts of Tel Aviv) to a group of disabled veterans for building a cinema, and a lot in Haifa to a cooperative of veterans for developing an entertainment project to be operated by veterans, was approved. On 2 Feb. 1951, the GA approved a request by the Office for War Veterans to transfer a lot in Jerusalem to a person of means for developing a commercial project that would be operated by people injured in the war. On 6 Mar. 1951, the GA approved the lease of a lot in Tsfat to war veterans for developing a cinema as well as a lot in Haifa (together with a person of means), CZA S41-425,2. On 30 Nov. 1951 (ISA gimel-2706/8), land was allotted to disabled veterans for a gas station. On 8 Feb. 1952 (CZA S41-425,2), another gas station was approved advocated by the Division for Rehabilitating Soldiers; on 26 Feb. 1952 (ISA gimel-2706/8), another gas station in Haifa; on 13 Mar. 1952 (CZA S41-425,2), land was approved for veterans in Tirat HaCarmel, and on 15 Dec. 1953 (ISA gimel-2706/7), the custom to allot gas stations only to war veterans was noted.
99. CZA S41-425,2, regarding a request for a plot in Salame for building a house. The request raised doubts as the land was still agricultural and was designated for building dairies. The request was approved in view of Gurion's statement.
100. GA, 8 Feb. 1952, CZA S41-425,2.
101. GA, 24 July 1951, ISA gimel-2706/8.
102. GA, 22 May 1951, ISA gimel-2706/8.
103. GA, 24 July 1951, ISA gimel-2706/8.
104. At the 9 Nov. 1951 GA, despite the rules against transferring a cinema lot to a private person and in order to justify it, the JA recommends doing so for ‘a group of handicapped new immigrants’. Another example is the sale of property in Be'er Sheva (at the 8 Feb. 1952 GA) to individuals at the behest of the mayor, at a time when policy forbade sales to individuals. CZA S41-425,2.
105. ISA gimel-2706/7. The 15 Dec. 1953 GA approved the allotment of a site in Holon for a gas station for private entrepreneurs, despite the fact this was a blatant infringement of the rules. ISA gimel-2706/7. The approval was contingent on the commitment to employ war veterans, to ‘mitigate’ the deviation from the rules.
106. ISA gimel-2706/7. Use of the claim ‘long-standing promise’ or ‘approved before the DA’ paved the way for almost-automatic approval in the GA. On 29 Dec. 1950, at the Assembly's second meeting, six lists of completed transactions were already brought for approval. See the comments of Moshe Porat (then of the CAP) in the minutes of the meeting, ISA gimel-2706/9.
107. GA, 8 Feb. 1952, CZA S41-425,2.
108. See, for example, the minutes of the 29 Dec. 1950 GA regarding German Jews who purchased 840 dunams in Netanya, the Levinson group of Swiss Jews who requested 1000 dunams north of the Yarkon Bridge, the Suslik group of American Jews who requested 100 dunams in addition to the 100 they already owned at this site, ISA gimel-2706/9. GA, 4 Sep. 1951 and 19 Nov. 1951, CZA S41-425,2.
109. For example, the case of Rav Sholom Noach Berezovsky (head of the Bet Avraham yeshiva in Jerusalem) and the request by Rav Shmuel Cahanman for 19.4 dunams to expand the Ponevezh Yeshiva in Bene Berak.
110. Requests from Jewish religious institutions were usually granted even without commitment to pay in dollars. See, for example, the approval of a request for a synagogue in Jerusalem at the 2 Feb. 1951 GA or the approval of a lot for the Porat Yosef Yeshiva in Jerusalem on 8 Feb. 1952 and the approval of a request by Breslev Hassidim on 13 Mar. 1952, CZA S41-425,2.
111. The 29 Dec. 1950 GA decided to afford a 15 per cent discount for allocations to industry, ISA gimel-2706/9.
112. See the minutes from 26 Jan. 1951 and 2 Feb.1951 general assemblies and Gurion's words at the 16 Feb. 1951 session, ISA gimel-2706/8.