A crude marriage: Iraq, Turkey, and the Kirkuk–Ceyhan oil pipeline

ABSTRACT

Since the discovery of oil at Kirkuk in northern Iraq, oil has shaped relations between Iraq and Turkey, as the former needed markets and export routes to the Mediterranean and the latter reliable sources of supply. This article examines the origins of the Kirkuk–Ceyhan oil pipeline from northern Iraq to the Turkish Mediterranean coast, charting the period of Iraqi–Turkish economic rapprochement in the 1960s to the construction of the pipeline in the 1970s. It also seeks to add to our collective understanding of why transnational oil pipelines in the Middle East succeed or fail by examining the pipeline's operational record.

Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for comments on an earlier version and his academic mentor, David S. Painter.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. Ceyhan is located in the Gulf of Iskenderun, which straddles today's Turkish provinces of Adana and Hatay, and is home to oil export terminals that can load seaborne oil tankers that are as large as 300,000 deadweight metric tons (dwt) and can ship Iraqi oil all over the world. Most sources refer to the terminus of the pipeline as Ceyhan, but others say Yumurtalık or Iskenderun, all of which are on the Gulf of Iskenderun. All measurements that were given as metric tons per year were converted to barrels per day for ease of comparison by using CME Group's calculator, available at http://www.cmegroup.com/tools-information/calc_crude.html.

2. M. Daoudy, ‘Eau et pouvoir: la relation stratégique Irak/Turquie’, Géostratégiques Vol.7 (April 2005), p.103; P. Robins, Turkey and the Middle East (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1991), p.100; H.F. Barkey, ‘Turkey and Iraq: The Making of a Partnership’, Turkish Studies Vol.12, No.4 (December 2011), pp.663–74; W.M. Hale, Turkey, the US and Iraq (London: Saqi, 2007); and A. Sever, ‘’Power Led’ Outside Intervention in Kurdish Politics in Iraq and Turkey in the Early 1970s’, Middle Eastern Studies Vol.49, No.2 (2013), pp.263–79. Sever describes how the Kurdish dispute in Iraq brought Turkey and Iraq closer, but makes only a cursory mention of oil on p.275: ‘…being one of the countries badly affected by the 1973 oil crisis, it was imperative [that Turkey] be on good terms with Arab countries like Iraq. In the first half of the 1970s, Turkey signed important oil transportation treaties with Iraq’.

3. A. Liel, Turkey in the Middle East: Oil, Islam, and Politics (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001), pp.3–6.

4. P. Stevens, ‘Pipelines or Pipe Dreams? Lessons from the History of Arab Transit Pipelines’, Middle East Journal Vol.54, No.2 (Spring 2000), pp.224–41.

5. P. Stevens, ‘Transit Troubles: Pipelines as a Source of Conflict’, A Chatham House Report (Chatham House, 2009). The other three criteria, which do not apply to the Iraq–Turkey case, are: (1) the threat of invasion from the oil-producing country, (2) finding a common jurisdiction between the transit country and producing country, and (3) the existence of alternative routes or methods of exports for the producing country. Northern Iraqi oil technically had other export routes, but they were not viable.

6. After the First World War, the Turkish Petroleum Company, a consortium of British, French, and Dutch companies, gained the concession to Iraq's oil, but it was reorganized in 1928 to include American companies and renamed the IPC in 1929. La Compagnie Française des Pétroles (CFP, later Total), Royal Dutch/Shell (Shell), and Anglo-Persian (later BP) each held a 23.75 per cent share; an American consortium, including Jersey Standard (later Exxon), the Standard Oil Company of New York (SOCONY, later Mobil), Gulf Oil, Atlantic Refining (later Arco), and the Pan-American Petroleum and Transport Company also held 23.75 per cent; and Calouste Gulbenkian, an independent businessman, held the remaining 5 per cent.

7. E. Penrose and E.F. Penrose, Iraq: International Relations and National Development (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978), pp.72–4, 137–44; and T. Mitchell, Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil (London: Verso, 2011); and J.M. Blair, Control of Oil (London: Macmillan, 1976).

8. Before the postwar period, Iraqi production only exceeded 80,000 bpd from 1936 to 1939, reaching a high of 92,400 in 1937. Any amount of oil production over the 80,000-bpd threshold was transported by rail or truck, which was more expensive than pipeline. Delays in construction pushed the completion of the IPC Pipelines to 1934 and other problems hindered performance in the 1930s. See W. Adams, J.W. Brock, and J.M. Blair, ‘Retarding the Development of Iraq's Oil Resources: An Episode in Oleaginous Diplomacy, 1927–1939’, Journal of Economic Issues, Vol.27, No.1 (1993); E.P. Fitzgerald, ‘Business Diplomacy: Walter Teagle, Jersey Standard, and the Anglo-French Pipeline Conflict in the Middle East, 1930–1931’, Business History Review Vol.67, No.2 (1993); and Penrose and Penrose, Iraq, p.73.

9. Penrose and Penrose, Iraq, p.148.

10. OPEC, Annual Statistical Bulletin, 2004. The bulk of the increase came from 180,000 bpd in 1951 to 581,000 bpd in 1953, during the British boycott of Iranian oil.

11. U.S. Department of State, National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 59, Central Decimal Files (hereafter cited as DSCF), 890G.6363, T84/404, 20 February 1930, Paris to State, French Viewpoint as to Direction and Terminus of Proposed Pipeline for Transport of Mesopotamian Oil. The US Vice Consul in Paris, David H. Slawson wrote: ‘the harbour at Alexandretta would lend itself admirably to the installation of a petroleum port’.

12. Yergin, The Prize, p.480.

13. DSCF, 883A.2553/1-1456, 14 January 1956, Beirut to State 780, Confidential; and DSCF, 887.2553/5-2956, 29 May 1956, Memorandum of Conversation, Confidential, IPC Talks with Lebanon, Willie Morris, British Embassy in Washington, and John F. Shaw, NE.

14. DSCF, 880.2553/8-156, 1 August 1956, State to Baghdad 679, Secret; DSCF, 880.2553/8-856, 8 August 1956, Damascus to State 327, Confidential; DSCF, 880.2553/8-756, 7 August 1956, Baghdad to State 164, Secret, US Ambassador Waldemar Gallman; and DSCF, 880.2553/8-1156, 11 August 1956, Ankara to State 358, Secret, US Ambassador to Turkey, Avra Warren; and B.H. Wall, Growth in a Changing Environment: A History of the Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) 1950–1972 and Exxon Corporation 1972–1975 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1988), p.551.

15. DSCF, 880.2553, Aug. 11, 1956, Ankara to State 358.

16. DSCF, 880.2553, Aug. 7, 1956, Baghdad to State 164; and DSCF, Aug. 8, 1956, Damascus to State 327.

17. U.S. Department of State, The Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume 12, Near East; Iran; Iraq (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), Document 200. (Hereafter cited as FRUS followed by year, volume number, document number.)

18. J. Bamberg, British Petroleum and Global Oil, 1950–1975: The Challenge of Nationalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p.294; and S. Howarth, A Century in Oil: the “Shell” Transport and Trading Company, 1897–1997 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1997), pp.290–1.

19. FRUS, 1958–1960, 12, 19.

20. FRUS, 1955–1957, 12, 254; DSCF, 883.2553, 4 April 1957, State to Baghdad 1742; and DSCF, 8 April 1957, Baghdad to State 1677; and DSCF, 880.2553, 22 May 1957, State to Baghdad 3038.

21. N.J. Citino, From Arab Nationalism to OPEC (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2010), p.131.

22. DSCF 880.2553, 16 April 1958, Damascus to State 421.

23. B. Shwadran, The Middle East, Oil, and the Great Powers (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1973), p.270.

24. Yergin, The Prize, pp.514–23.

25. S. Saul, ‘Masterly Inactivity as Brinkmanship: The Iraq Petroleum Company's Route to Nationalization, 1958–1972’, The International History Review, Vol.29, No.4 (2007), pp.746–92.

26. FRUS, 1955–1957, 16, 554; and DSCF, 880.2553/11-356, 3 November 1956, Memorandum of Conversation, Entry of Three French Tankers into Sidon to Pick Up Tapline Oil.

27. Shwadran, The Middle East, pp.489–91.

28. The National Archives of the United Kingdom, British Foreign Office (hereafter cited as FO) 371/127203, 1 April 1957, Ankara to Ministry of Power; British Petroleum Archives (hereafter cited as BPA), 60605, 30 Nov. 1959, J.E.G. Boxshall to G.L. Lawlor, Refining in Turkey. The ATAŞ refinery was owned by SOCONY (56 per cent), Shell (27 per cent), and BP (17 per cent). The California Texas Oil Company (CALTEX) held a 49 per cent share in the IPRAŞ refinery, but the Turkish government controlled the majority 51 per cent.

29. Shwadran, The Middle East, pp.491–3.

30. J.E. Miller, United States and the Making of Modern Greece (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2008), Chapter 4.

31. Central Records of the French Foreign Ministry (hereafter cited as FFM), 35-17-6-113, 21 March 1965, Ankara to Quai d'Orsay (Quai) 496.

32. FFM, 35-23-14-133, 21 February 1966, Ankara to Quai 245/EU, La Turquie: Politique extérieure: relations avec Israël et les pays arabes; A. Mango, ‘Turkey in the Middle East’, Journal of Contemporary History, The Middle East 3/3 (July 1968), pp.235–6.

33. FRUS, 1964–1968, 34, 197; DSCF, 21 Dec. 1966, Baghdad to State, A-1169, PET 15-2 SYR; and DSCF, 23 January 1967, Baghdad to State, 1304, PET 6 IRAQ; Saul, ‘Masterly Inactivity’, p.774.

34. DSCF, 14 Dec. 1966, Baghdad to State, A-1111, PET 15-2 SYR; FFM, 35-23-14-133, 27 Feb. 1967, Ankara to Quai 261/EU; Shwadran, The Middle East, p.492.

35. DSCF, 24 June 1967, Ankara to State 6352, PET 17 SYR-TUR; DSCF, 27 June 1967, Ankara to State 6389, Syria–Iraq Agree Provide Oil, PET 6 TUR; and FRUS, 1964–1968, 34, 253.

36. BPA, 40286, 14 July 1967, D.A. Riddle, BP Istanbul, to T.C.E. Campbell-Preston, BP London.

37. Iraq and Turkey also reached a tentative agreement to explore jointly for oil in Iraq, which was never realized. DSCF, 24 July 1967, Ankara to State 355, Question of Legal Issue Over Possible Turkey/Iraq Petroleum Agreement, PET 4 IRAQ-TUR.

38. In 1966, 515,000 bpd of oil was transported to Europe around the Cape of Good Hope, bypassing the Canal, but 2.6 million bpd went around Africa in 1967 and 4.426 million in 1968. See United States Department of the Interior, Office of Oil and Gas, The Middle East Petroleum Emergency of 1967 (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), p.1; and N. Mostert, Supership (London: Book Club Associates, 1975), pp.65–73.

39. Today, Iraq can accommodate supertankers, but its lack of space in the Persian Gulf limits the number of such large vessels that can take on oil at one time. This problem became evident in early 2015, when bad weather delayed exports, tankers sat idle in the Persian Gulf waiting to fill up, and after seven days, production halted altogether due to its lack of storage capacity. MEES 58/13, 27 March 2015.

40. DSCF, 3 January 1968, Beirut to State A-563, PET 4 IRAQ-TUR.

41. DSCF, 11 January 1968, Ankara to State A-365, PET 18-1 IRAQ-TUR.

42. DSCF, 9 April 1968, Beirut to State A-914, PET 17-1 IRAQ.

43. DSCF, 3 June 1969, Ankara to State A-218, PET 2 TUR.

44. V.S. Ediger and I. Berk, ‘Crude Oil Import Policy of Turkey: Historical Analysis of Determinants and Implications since 1968’, Energy Policy Vol.39 (2011), p.2138.

45. The National Archives of the United Kingdom, British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (hereafter cited as FCO), 67/228, 23 June 1969, Ankara to FCO, Confidential, Visit to Turkey of Iranian Prime Minister 10–15 June, 1969; BPA, 40744, 17 March 1970, A.C. Lorimer, BP Istanbul to G.C. Butcher, BP London; FCO, 67/413, 28 May 1970, Ankara to London 505, Confidential, Turkey–Iran Pipeline; DSCF, 27 July 1970, Ankara to State 4715, Confidential, PET 18-1 IRAN-TUR, Iran–Turkey Pipeline; and DSCF, 19 March 1971, Cairo to State 604, PET 18-1 UAR.

46. DSCF, 11 February 1970, Ankara to State A-71, PET 18-1 IRAN-TUR.

47. Penrose and Penrose, Iraq, p.442; and FCO, 17/1536, 22 Jan. 1971, Baghdad to FCO.

48. Turkey also formed the Regional Cooperation for Development with Iran and Pakistan in 1964, as an organization independent of CENTO and more focused on economic development. Turkey has been seeking to enlist Iran in building an oil pipeline through Turkey since 1967, but Iran abandoned these talks in 1971.

49. Middle East Economic Survey (hereafter cited as MEES), 14/49 (1 Oct. 1971); and Penrose and Penrose, Iraq, p.441.

50. Saul, ‘Masterly Inactivity’, pp.788–9.

51. DSCF, 6 June 1972, Ankara to State, 4014, PET 15-2 IRAQ; and FFM 35-23-14, 12 July 1972, Pierre Cerles (French Ambassador, Iraq) to Maurice Schumann (French Minister of Foreign Affairs).

52. Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi Archives (hereafter cited as ENIA), BA.I.6/169/159D, 28 June 1972, 7 July 1972, and 24 August 1972, John Benda, Mesta Limited Company, Ankara, to P. Landolfi, Rome.

53. ENIA, BA.I.6/172/15F1, 7 September 1972, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (IMFA) to ENI Rome; and FCO 8/1904, 24 October 1972, Embassy Ankara to Oil Department, Turkey: Oil Supplies.

54. MEES, 10/37 (15 July 1966), pp.1–3.

55. DSCF, 13 July 1967, Beirut to State A-29, PET 6 IRAQ.

56. ENIA, BA.I.6/170/15A1 9 July 1970, SOCEA to Technoexpert.

57. ENIA BA.I.6/172/15F1, 3 March 1971, ENI/FIAT/FINSIDER to Turkish Foreign Minister, Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil.

58. Penrose and Penrose, Iraq, p.449, Fn. 10.

59. ENIA, BA.I.6/174/15AF, 5 May 1972, Memorandum, Oggetto: oleodotto Iraq-Turchia – Missione ad Ankara 26-28/4/72, in Iraq. Snamprogetti, Studio de fattibilità sull'oleodotto Iraq-Turchia (Kirkuk-Iskenderun).

60. ENIA, I.II.5/94/3521, 25 June 1972, Minutes of Meetings – 23–24 June 1972, Baghdad, Paesi – Iraq.

61. ENIA, BA.I.6/172/15F1, 21 July 1972, Iraq. Promemoria e telex relativi a visite di delegazioni della Inoc in Italia e di delegazioni italiane, governative e di società del Gruppo, nel paese.

62. ENIA, BA.I.6/174/15AF, 1 August 1972, INOC to Snam Progetti, cc: TPAO.

63. ENIA BA.I.6/174/15AE, 24 October 1972, Minutes of Meetings, Iraq. Saipem, Snamprogetti. Documentazione diversa; and ENIA, BA.I.6/174/15AE, 17 November 1972, P. Landolfi to ENI President R. Girotti.

64. FCO, 8/2102, 3 August 1973, British Ambassador to Turkey A. Elgar to G.P. Lockton, Oil Dept.; and MEES, 16/10 (29 December 1972).

65. FRUS, 1969–1976, E-4, 307.

66. G. Golan, Soviet Policies in the Middle East: From World War II to Gorbachev (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p.167.

67. D. Styan, France and Iraq: Oil, Arms, and French Policy Making in the Middle East (London: I.B. Taurus, 2006), pp.97–9.

68. Penrose and Penrose, Iraq, p.444.

69. Turkish Republican Archives, Group 30, Subgroup 18/1/2, Box 304, File 69, Document 14, 17 Aug. 1973; TRA, Group 30, Subgroup 18/1/2, Box 304, File 72, Document 17, 4 September 1973, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti ile Irak Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti Arasında Ham Petrol Boru Hattı Anlaşması; and FCO 96/123, 8 January 1974, Ankara to London, Turkish–Iraqi Oil Pipeline Agreement. TPAO would act as Turkey's representative in the construction of the pipeline, but it would establish a subsidiary joint-stock company to ensure the timely implementation of the work. See also FCO, 8/2102, 3 August 1973, Ankara to Oil Dept., Turkey: Iraq Oil and Natural Gas Pipelines; MEES 16/43 (17 August 1973); MEES 16/45 (31 August 1973); The Financial Times, August 29, 1973; ENIA BA.I.6/175/15BA, 28 August 1973, 29 August 1973, and 20 September 1973, Various Press Reports, Iraq. Articoli ed estratti da stampa locale e internazionale sull'oleodotto Iraq-Turchia; Liel, Turkey, p.53.

70. FCO, 96/123, 21 January 1974, Middle East, British Interests Section, Baghdad to FCO; and FCO, 9/2128, 25 April 1974, British Exports Credit Guarantee (ECGD) Dept., Export Guarantees Committee, Iraq–Turkey Crude Oil Pipeline.

71. Liel, Turkey, pp.59–64.

72. FCO, 9/2128, 8 July 1974, A. Elgar to Energy Dept.; and MEES 17/36 (28 June 1974), p.4.

73. FRUS, 1969–1976, 27, 234 and 236; FCO, 8/2102, 25 September 1973, D.M. Jaffray, Exports Credits Guarantee Dept. (ECGD) to Treasury; and ENIA, I.II.5/94/3521, 20 October 1973, Letter from President of ENI Rafael Girotti to S. Hammadi.

74. Penrose and Penrose, Iraq, pp.507–8.

75. L. Chabry, ‘La mise en service de l'oleoduc Irak-Turquie et la mésentente syro-irakienne’, Maghreb, Machrek Vol.77 (1977), pp.16–8.

76. FCO 9/2115, 27 May 1974 and 4 June 1974, Ankara to FCO, Turkish/Syrian and Turkish/Iraqi Relations: Water Supplies. Part of the blame for Iraq's water supplies must also fall on Syria, through which the Euphrates flowed and which stored water at its own Tabqa dam.

77. FRUS, 1969–1976, 27, 244–9.

78. Sever, ‘Outside Intervention’, p.274.

79. FCO, 9/2128, 8 July 1974, A. Elgar to Energy Dept.; MEES 17/36 (28 June 1974), p.4, Turkish Parliament Committee Approves Iraq–Turkey Crude Oil Pipeline Agreement; and ENIA BA.I.6/174/15AF, 24 June 1974, TPAO to ENI, Iraq–Turkey Oil Pipeline, Iraq. Snamprogetti, Studio de fattibilità sull'oleodotto Iraq-Turchia (Kirkuk-Iskenderun).

80. Liel, Turkey, pp.55–8.

81. FRUS, 1969–1976, 30, 13–15.

82. M. Aydin, ‘Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Historical Framework and Traditional Inputs’, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.35, No.4 (1999), pp.169–70.

83. E. Meierding, ‘Do Countries Fight Over Oil?’, in T. Van de Graaf et al. (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of International Political Economy of Energy (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), p.448.

84. FCO, 9/2128, 2 July 1974, J.R. Leeland Ankara to FCO, Turkish/Iraqi Relations; and 9/2128, 8 July 1974, A. Elgar to Energy Dept; FFM, 35-23-14, 1 July 1974, Ankara to Quai 754; 5 July 1974, Ankara to Quai 848-52; 8 July 1974, Baghdad to Quai 764/765, Relations Irako-Turques.

85. Liel, Turkey, p.55–6.

86. DSCF, 5 July 1974, Ankara to State 4946, Primin Ecevit Speaks out on Foreign Policy Issues.

87. DSCF, 19 July 1974, Ankara to State 5700, Primin Ecevit Speaks to Press.

88. A recent volume of essays on Greek–Turkish relations provides fresh insights into the conflict over Cyprus, but contains no mention of oil or energy. See A. Aktar, N. Kizilyurek and U. Ozkirimli (eds.), Nationalism in the Troubled Triangle: Cyprus, Greece and Turkey (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

89. FCO, 9/2128, 22 July 1974, Ankara to FCO, and 23 July 1974, Ankara to FCO; and MEES, 17/45 (30 August 1974), p.7.

90. ENIA, BA.I.6/174/15AF, 6 September 1973, ENI-FIAT-FINSIDER to IMFA.

91. ENIA, BA.I.6/174/15AF, 3 October 1974, Italian Embassy, Ankara to IMFA 2324.

92. MEES, 18/6 (29 November 1974), p.4.

93. MEES 18/7 (6 December 1974), pp.7–8.

94. MEES, 18/25 (11 April 1975), p.6.

95. MEES, 20/12 (10 January 1977), p.5.

96. MEES, 20/24 (4 April 1977), pp.1–2, and MEES, 20/27 (25 April 1977), pp.6–7.

97. Liel, Turkey, pp.40, 76–77, 79–95.

98. FRUS, 1969–1976, 37, 221. This figure was 30 per cent in 1973.

99. Yergin, The Prize, pp.699–711, 746–51, 758–61.

100. M. Aydin and D. Aras, ‘Political Conditionality of Economic Relations Between Paternalist States: Turkey's Interaction with Iran, Iraq and Syria’, Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol.27, No.1/2 (Winter/Spring 2005), pp.21–43.

101. Liel, Turkey, pp.5–6 and 119–20.

102. FRUS, 1969–1976, 37, 282, 284 and 289.

103. G. Luciani, ‘The Mediterranean and the Energy Picture’, in G. Luciani (ed.), The Mediterranean Region: Economic Interdependence and the Future of Society (London: St. Martin's Press, 1984), p.18.

104. MEES 28/2 (22 October 1984), 29/7 (25 November 1985) and 30/39 (6 July 1987).

105. MEES, 30/29 (27 April 1987), 30/43 (10 August 1987) and 31/28 (18 April 1988).

106. MEES, 33/1 (10 October 1988).

107. Ediger and Berk, ‘Crude Oil’, p.2138.

108. Author's calculations based on data from BP Statistical Review of World Energy (2016); International Energy Agency, Statistics (2017); United States Energy Information Administration, ‘International Energy Statistics (2017); and Ediger and Berk, ‘Crude Oil’, p.2138.

109. MEES, 45/48 (2 December 2002).

110. According to the Iraqi Oil Ministry, the incidents of pipeline sabotage were twice as high in 2013 as from 2004 to 2006. See R. Kandiyoti, Pipelines: Flowing Oil and Crude Politics (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2012), pp.79–81; and MEES 57/42, 17 October 2014, ‘Iraq's New PM Acts to Root Out Corruption’.

111. M. Ross, The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), Chapter 5.

112. See J.D. Colgan, Petro-Aggression: When Oil Causes War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

113. K. Kirisci and G.M. Winrow, The Kurdish Question and Turkey: An Example of a Trans-state Ethnic Conflict (London: Frank Cass, 1997), pp.108–10, 127.

114. FCO, 9/2128, 21 July 1974, Baghdad to ECGD.

115. FCO, 8/2308, 17 September 1974, Tehran to London.

116. K. Kirisci and G.M. Winrow, The Kurdish Question and Turkey: An Example of a Trans-state Ethnic Conflict (London: Frank Cass, 1997), pp.108–10, 127.

117. Liel, Turkey, p.51, Fn. 7.

118. Middle East Economic Survey (MEES) 58/10, ‘For KRG All Roads Lead To Turkey’, 6 March 2015.

119. U.S. Energy Information Administration, ‘Country Analysis Brief: Iraq’, April 2016, p.9.

120. Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs website (accessed July 2016).

121. Turkish Statistical Institute, ‘Exports by Country and Year’ (accessed April 2015). For background on Ankara–Erbil relations, see C.B. Fidan, ‘Turkish Business in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq’, Turkish Policy Quarterly, March 7, 2016; and M. Ottaway and D. Ottaway, ‘How the Kurds Got Their Way: Economic Cooperation and the Middle East's New Borders’, Foreign Affairs 93/3 (June/July 2014).

122. Bloomberg, ‘Genel to Produce Kurds’ Gas as Turkey Said to Ready Pipeline’, 13 November 2014; and K.A. Ansary, ‘Cash-Strapped Iraqi Kurds to Start Gas Exports to Turkey in 2016’, Bloomberg, 13 January 2016.

Additional information

Funding

This project was supported by a fellowship from the American Academic Research Institute in Iraq (TAARII) and a Piepho award from the Georgetown University Department of History.