Arts, dance, cultural infrastructure, and city regeneration: Knowledge, audience development, networks, and conventions, and the relocation of a Royal Ballet company from London to Birmingham

Abstract

The development of new cultural infrastructure has long been part of the urban regeneration toolkit. Cultural infrastructure is incorporated into major urban regeneration projects as part of a proactive entrepreneurial approach to planning designed to enhance a city's overall image. The existing literature on cultural industries concentrates on exploring film and contemporary music and ignores dance. The article explores the development of ballet in England from the 1920s and the relocation in 1990 of one of England's Royal Ballet companies from London to Birmingham. These events required investments in hard cultural infrastructure (provision of facilities, e.g. theatres) and soft cultural infrastructure (audience development). The development of new hard cultural infrastructure must be supported by a process of audience development and knowledge brokers. The establishment of ballet in England and the relocation of Sadler's Wells Royal Ballet (SWRB) to Birmingham were contingent on the articulation of networks of individuals, resources and institutions that had the power and resources to facilitate these developments. The analysis highlights the interplay existing between local and national policies and the ways in which the local can mobilize elites and others to shape the artistic and cultural character of a city.

Keywords:

• conventions
• creative class
• cultural infrastructure
• dance
• knowledge
• networks

Introduction

A new regionalism has been identified in the geographical literature (Storper 1998; Wheeler 2002) based around the identification of new creative or talented spaces (Bryson 1997; Florida 2002a, b) whose competitiveness is constructed around local knowledge, dense concentrations of human labour and ‘the new global competition for talent’ (Florida 2005, 3). Such city-regions, according to Scott (2002), 1), ‘constitute distinctive sub-national (i.e. regional) social formations whose local character and dynamics are undergoing major transformations due to the impacts of globalization’ and, more importantly, ‘are foci of significant new experiments in local political mobilization and reorganization’. The difference between this new form of regionalism and older forms is that the localities are increasingly developing their own economic, social and cultural identities and have begun to engage with the global economic system without being completely subservient to the dictates of the central state.

City-regions are distinctive places that engage with national state policy by a process of interpretation, selection and manipulation – distinctive in that each city-region reflects the interactions that occur between a set of local, national and international processes. According to Hamilton et al. (2004), research into metropolitan areas often neglects to explore the dynamic relationship between local and national governments. The constant manipulation by a city-region of the interaction between the local and the national is an attempt to shape the relationship between the processes driving economic restructuring and the provision of an environment that will retain and attract capital investments (buildings, foreign direct investment, etc.) and social investments (education, investments in social capital) (Hamilton et al. 2004). The development of a global economy has partially undermined local advantages that are founded on physical attributes (location, raw materials, etc.) and employment characteristics. For cities located in developed market economies, there will always be alternative locations that are able to undercut production costs. The competitive position of a city is now partially founded on urban cultures, cultural infrastructure and concentrations of creativity and expertise. It is these softer elements and the physical structures that support and encourage cities which need to be created, enhanced and protected. In effect, this type of argument draws upon accounts of places that emphasize the importance of quality of life and environment as important variables in attracting and retaining talented individuals (Beyers & Lindahl 1996; Beyers & Nelson 1999, 2000; Bryson in press). In urban areas this environment consists of the built form (buildings, public art, streetscapes), biodiversity (urban habitats – flora and fauna) (Donovan et al. 2005), economic structure, heritage, and educational (schools and universities) and cultural infrastructure (museums, art galleries, theatres, orchestras, dance companies). Combined, these features can produce attractive places that can support, attract and retain talented individuals.

The work of Florida has highlighted the importance of creativity in economic competitiveness. In this literature, investment in cultural infrastructure underpins regional competitiveness and requires a ‘massive increase in spending – from both the private and public sectors – in the arts, culture, and all forms of innovation and creativity’ (Florida 2005, 250). Nevertheless, the ‘hullabaloo over creativity, the creative economy and so-called creative class’ (Markusen 2005) should be treated with considerable suspicion. There have been substantial and sustained critiques of Florida's argument (Markusen 2005; Peck 2005). Much of the debate revolves around the definition, measurement and politics of the creative class and has much in common with the much older debate regarding the existence of a ‘service class’ (Goldthorpe 1982, 1995; Savage et al. 1988; Savage & Fielding 1989; Hanlon 1996; Bryson et al. 2004). In many respects, the concept of a creative class is a reworked version of the ‘service class’ debate (Urry 1986). Both the service and creative class literatures are undermined by the juxtaposition of class with ‘service work’ or ‘creativity’ as well as measurement difficulties. Thus, it is impossible to identify a creative class that acts as a coherent group that, in turn, acts to maintain and defend its position in the wider society. Florida also assumes that there is a strong relationship between creativity and concentrations of highly educated people. This relationship is suspect, as creativity, talent and skill cannot be defined solely on the basis of formal education. It is not my intention to explore debates that can be traced back to the 1980s, but rather to emphasize the importance of cultural infrastructure in attracting people to and retaining them within city-regions.

The term infrastructure is usually associated with ‘hard’ capital investments in buildings. Combining the term ‘cultural’ with ‘infrastructure’ perhaps overemphasizes the importance of capital rather than revenue investment. This is to make a distinction between ‘hard’ or capital cultural infrastructure and ‘soft’ or revenue cultural infrastructure. The former involves long-term investment in facilities such as theatres, galleries, studios, production centres, museums, and archives, whilst the latter refers to investment in information, knowledge networks, outreach programmes, education, and audience development. This is an extremely important distinction as the long-term success of hard cultural infrastructure investments is dependent upon the effectiveness of investment in soft cultural infrastructure. These investment types have different temporalities; hard capital investments can occur relatively rapidly, are extremely visible and easily evaluated, whilst soft revenue investments occur over long time periods, represent a process of performer and audience development, are relatively invisible, and are difficult to evaluate.

In the United Kingdom, inter-urban competition for footloose private investment, central government resources and cultural institutions or sporting events has been an important element of urban policy. From the late 1980s, British cities have engaged in proactive city marketing strategies and environmental improvement campaigns to attract investment and people. This represents a radical break with traditional planning that took a largely passive and responsive role to urban regeneration. A central component of the new proactive entrepreneurial approach to planning has been the creation of publicly-funded or subsidized flagship developments designed to improve the local environment, attract private-sector investment and enhance a city's reputation as a place to live, work and play (Bryson 2003). Part of this strategy involves the creation or attraction of cultural infrastructure, such as galleries, museums, and dance, drama and music companies. Cultural infrastructure plays an important role in the projection of a city's identity and also in urban regeneration schemes. In Temple Bar, Dublin, cultural buildings were used as key anchors in a GBP 100 million urban renewal programme. The Temple Bar area had suffered from planning blight caused by the proposed development of a major transportation hub. The proposal failed and instead the area was revitalized through the development of a complex collection of cultural activities (film centre, galleries, print studio, gallery of photography, a school of acting, outside cinema) which were integrated into the new physical fabric of Temple Bar. The Temple Bar project was led by culture, the arts and tourism, and was ‘founded more on the recreation of urban possibility, on the idea of not only living in the city, but living well in the city, of a city which has changed, but is alive and may change again’ (McCullough 1996, 29). Temple Bar is a superb example of cultural-led urban regeneration. The cultural elements provided the framework for the scheme and ensured that the new Temple Bar would be integrated into the fabric and life of the city.

Temple Bar is an example of a city-region's attempt to develop both soft and hard cultural infrastructure. The process of developing cultural infrastructure within a city-region is extremely complex and is one that has been neglected by the leading protagonists in the debate over the creative class. According to Markusen (2005, 26),

it is a sorry state of affairs that leading protagonists in the debate over the creative class, above all its coiner Florida, have little feel for the complexity and power of organized efforts to shape the artistic and cultural character of cities including those by elites, public and non-profit leaders, artists and other occupational groups.

The development of new ‘hard’ cultural infrastructure has long been part of the urban regeneration toolkit (Hoffman et al. 2003). It can be used at a number of spatial scales, for example as part of an urban regeneration scheme or as a major investment intended to enhance the overall image of a city. The present paper explores the latter process by examining the relocation of the Sadler's Wells Royal Ballet (SWRB) Company from London to Birmingham and its transformation into Birmingham Royal Ballet (BRB). This relocation was part of a wider strategy to improve Birmingham's image as a place to live and work. The relocation of a major classical dance company to a city that was experiencing deindustrialization and economic decline (Bryson et al. 1996; Bryson 2003) raises a number of important questions that are explored in this paper. First, how was a classical dance tradition (the Royal companies and their audiences) established in England? This is an important question as the origins of British dance only dates back to the 1920s. Second, how was SWRB persuaded to relocate from London, the centre of the United Kingdom's artistic and cultural community, to Birmingham, a city formerly associated with manufacturing rather than cultural industries? This is a very specific question, but it leads to the third question, that has wider applicability to all cities that have attempted to incorporate culture into urban policy: how was a dance audience developed by SWRB in Birmingham?

This paper is based upon a research design that involved three linked phases. First, a series of discussions with those involved with the relocation of SWRB to Birmingham were undertaken. The discussions began in 1999 and many were informal conversations. The research design enabled the story of the relocation to be assembled from a variety of different sources, and for a process of triangulation to occur over a long time period. The author has no direct involvement with BRB, but from March 2003 has been a director of Elmhurst School for Dance in association with BRB. Elmhurst is independent of BRB, but relocated to Birmingham from Surrey in 2004 to establish a formal association with the Company. This involvement with Elmhurst led to opportunities to discuss the evolution of Birmingham's developing dance ecology. The discussions were supplemented by documentary evidence, for example from BRB programmes and accounts that were written during or just after the relocation. Second, the former Chief Executive Officer of BRB, Derek Purnell, was asked to write a short essay (1831 words) describing his recollections of the relocation of SWRB and its transformation into BRB. Purnell was directly involved in the relocation and managed BRB until 2005. His essay raised a number of interesting questions and issues that required further research and Purnell was extremely helpful in providing detailed written responses to subsequent queries. Third, after this article had been reviewed and accepted for publication by this journal Derek Purnell and Tessa King-Farlow, current Chair of the Board of BRB and also someone who had been involved with the relocation, were invited to read and provide critical feedback. Both agreed to undertake this task, and both provided extremely useful comments. This is an unusual research design, but it is one that has enabled the development of a dialogue to occur between the researcher and the researched.

The argument of the paper is developed in three sections. In the first section, an overview is provided of the literature on dance and cultural industries (Adorno 1991). The focus is on exploring the role of knowledge, networks and conventions. This provides a framework for conceptualizing the ways in which cultural industries are localized through the activities of networks of key individuals and investments in soft cultural infrastructure involving strategies designed to develop local audiences. This is followed by an historical overview of the development of dance in the UK. The third section provides an analysis of the relocation of SWRB and its transformation into BRB.

Knowledge, networks and conventions

Knowledge

Ballet is a classic example of a service – it cannot be stored, but experienced only as part of a live performance (Thrift 1997; Bryson et al. 2004, 159–179). Films and videotapes of ballets fail as they are two- rather than three-dimensional representations, whilst attempts to write about a performance often produce banal descriptions of an event that is impossible to describe using a simplistic linear narrative. The problem is the impossibility of describing the relationship between the dancers’ techniques, choreography, the set, and music using a linear text. During their training, dancers and choreographers have to acquire detailed knowledge of techniques and established conventions. Both the production and consumption of dance requires the acquisition of complex tacit and codified knowledge. Like many creative arts, the dance world consists of producers, media critics or interpreters, and audiences (Bryson et al. 2004, 172–174). The audience for classical dance must be encouraged to appreciate the techniques, conventions and narrative structures that have been developed over the last 200 years.

The classical dance audience is conventionally associated with the middle class and it is possible to argue that ‘those in the middle and upper reaches continue to use information about consumption goods to build bridges with like-minded people and close doors to exclude outsiders’ (Featherstone 1994, 405). Such groups function as consumption or taste communities (Bryson et al. 2004, 168–170) and are often associated with the development of virtual communities facilitated by the Internet (van Dijk 1999; Hampton 2004). The relationship between class and the consumption of classical art forms (music, ballet, opera) is being challenged increasingly as different art genres are incorporated into popular culture; for example, the film Billy Elliot encouraged people to attend dance performances for the first time. It is perhaps important to distinguish between ‘serious’ or regular and ‘occasional’ members of a dance audience. The former were labelled by Haskell (1934, 36) as balletomanes and he argued that this term described ‘a person who is sad, very sad, on the first night of a [ballet] season, just because he [sic] realizes that it is only for a season, and that a first night implies a last night’. It is also important to distinguish between different dance genres; some are more accessible to audiences: for example, narratives ballet (Hobson's Choice, Far from the Madding Crowd, La Fille mal gardée), whilst others require some degree of audience development. In the case of live theatre performances, the viewer's knowledge, understanding or appreciation of theoretical conventions coupled with their location within the auditorium is often one of the deciding factors in what they actually see. Arnold Haskell, the English ballet critic, noted that four people watching the same ballet production may see different things: ‘an enchantment to the person in seat No. 1, a mystery to the person in seat No. 2, a display of technical fireworks to seat No. 3, a thoroughly satisfying and connected whole to seat No. 4’ (Haskell 1950, 17).

The concept of an ‘information producing sector’ was developed by Douglas & Isherwood (1980, 182) when they suggested that an elite exists in society that has access to information directly or through institutions that act as brokers. The term ‘elite’ is perhaps unfortunate in this context as it has strong class-based associations. I do not want to develop a class-based analysis, but rather to highlight differences in the ways in which individuals understand and appreciate different art forms, and also to begin to identify some of the processes that are at work. Douglas & Isherwood argue that a relationship exists between income and the proportion of expenditure that goes on acquiring information. Consumers group together to create ‘exclusive inner circles controlling access to a certain kind of information’ (Douglas & Isherwood 1980, 181) and entry into well-paid employment is related to ‘prior entry into the social class that consumes the information set of goods’ (1980, 183). As household incomes rise, so too does the consumption of goods and services that require significant quantities of information. Such exclusive consumption depends on the acquisition of ‘an immensely technical and deep-stacked hierarchy of names which only the devoted connoisseur could master, and which have no intrinsic value’ (Douglas & Isherwood 1980, 190). Clear examples of this type of consumption are heavily branded high-value products (Molotch 2003), the fine arts, opera, ballet, and art. Complete inclusion into these arts rests on the acquisition of detailed knowledge of scores, dance techniques and the schools of painting (DiMaggio & Useem 1978). Becker (1982, 53) notes:

the audience for ballet … probably consists in large part of dancers, dancers-in-training, and people who once studied dance. Look at the audience at any dance event. No equivalent sample of theatre- or concert goers displays such erect carriage, such self-conscious placement of feet and legs, such well-maintained bodies.

For an audience to appreciate complex ballet it must be developed to understand the art form; ballet, like opera, is a partially exclusive rather than inclusive activity. Nevertheless, the same argument can be made for cricket, football or rugby; absence of knowledge of the game makes it difficult, if not impossible, for a spectator to appreciate these sports. Thus, there is an ‘elite’ group of football fans who act in a similar way to Haskell's balletomanes. The development of these activities in any one location is dependent on the creation of consumers who have acquired the necessary information and knowledge to understand and appreciate a particular activity. Such knowledge-intensive forms of consumption, however, are not just about the consumption of culture but are also heavily implicated in the construction of a particular societal cohort that uses art and theatre spaces as places for display as well as for networking opportunities.

This literature provides the first element of a geographical framework for understanding the ways in which creative industries are localized or adopted by local consumers. This element is knowledge; the consumption of complex art forms depends on the ability of consumers to acquire knowledge of the conventions, language and history of a particular art form. For an art form to be adopted nationally and locally a set of institutions or knowledge brokers needs to be established that provides potential consumers with access to the knowledge required to appreciate the cultural phenomenon. Knowledge brokers can take the form of critics, newspaper columns, dedicated publishing houses (for example, Dance Books, UK), magazines, children's books, specialist schools, television programmes, and websites. Without a supporting set of knowledge providers and brokers it would be difficult to establish a regular audience for a cultural activity.

Networks, linkages and relationships

The next element of a framework comes from Storper's (1997) call for new categories of analysis and measurement of contemporary urbanism constructed around the notion of reflexive economic action. The term refers to the possibility that actors (firms, markets, governments, and households) are able to shape the course of economic evolution through reflexive human action. According to Storper (1997, 19), the principle task of a new urban geography is ‘to analyse what actors are doing and how they co-ordinate with each other’ and ‘to identify for each city … the purposeful spheres of reflexive economic action which are localised there’. He provides five examples of this type of analysis, of which two involve cultural industries – the Hollywood entertainment/media complex and the worlds of art, fashion and media. In Paris, the worlds of fashion ‘are tied together by complex networks, routines, unwritten rules and formal institutions’ (Storper 1997, 19). In Storper's (1997, 18) account, urban economies acquire ‘conventions’ and ‘relations’ that function like ‘productive assets’ that are ‘localised and specific’. The same types of local assets are found regionally and nationally.

Thus, Storper's work leads to the second element of the framework – the identification of networks, linkages, relationships, and productive assets. In the terms of the cultural industries, such networks include linkages between dancers, choreographers, theatre owners and managers, dance schools, musicians, and designers. For ballet, the necessary production assets or soft cultural infrastructure are a set of educational institutions or knowledge brokers that train potential audiences (outreach programmes, amateur ballet schools, ballet critics, ballet books, ballet clubs, fan clubs, films, television programmes, and friendship networks) and educational establishments (professional dance schools) for the training of dancers and choreographers. There are already detailed accounts of networks and productive assets associated with cultural industries; for example, Scott (1997, 2000) has explored the ever-shifting production networks of the French film industry and its locational agglomeration in Paris, as well as the Hollywood film industry (Scott 2004). Detailed research into the networks that support the London film industry has also been undertaken (Nachum & Keeble 1999). Nevertheless, the geographical literature on creative industries has been dominated by studies of film, television, music, and advertising; absent from this literature is a detailed consideration of fine art, opera and classical dance.

Conventions

The final element of a framework for conceptualizing cultural industries comes from the work of Howard Becker (1982) on ‘art worlds’. Becker's work was amongst the first to break with conventional treatments of cultural industries by applying a particular people-centred sociological perspective on art rather than an approach that emphasizes the works themselves. Becker (1982, 34–35) develops the concept of an ‘art world’ as a technical term to denote the network of people who,

cooperate repeatedly, even routinely, in similar ways to produce similar works, so that we can think of an art world as an established network of cooperative links among participants. If the same people do not actually act together in every instance, their replacements are also familiar with and proficient in the use of those conventions, so that co-operation can proceed without difficulty. Conventions make collective activity simpler and less costly in time, energy, and other resources.

In this perspective, works of art are not the product of individuals, but rather are joint products ‘of all the people who cooperate via an art world's characteristic conventions to bring works like that into existence’ (Becker 1982, 35, my italics). The emphasis is on relationships, networks and collaboration, as well as reputations. The concept of conventions links to the work of Douglas & Isherwood (1980) as it stresses the importance of knowledge and understanding. Thus, an individual who has seen many productions of the same play, opera or ballet possesses knowledge of the conventions of the artistic form that permits them to ‘collaborate more fully with artists in the joint effort which produces the work each time it is experienced’ (Becker 1982, 48). Becker's art world consists of a division of knowledge between audiences of various kinds (from the professional knowledgeable audience to the amateur), and producers and support personnel. The development of an artistic convention – for example, the English narrative ballet or the American dramatic ballet (Wulff 1998a, 41–44; Reynolds & McCormick 2003, 532–606) – depends on the operation of production networks (producers, and critics) and audiences of individuals connected through a knowledge web that includes subscribing to specialist magazines, joining fan clubs (for example, the Friends of BRB or the Friends of Covent Garden) and participating in online dance forums (for example, www.ballet.co.uk).

One of the most interesting aspects of Becker's work is the similarities that exist with the work of Storper & Salais (1997), and especially their notion of ‘possible worlds of production’. To Storper & Salais (1997, 20), ‘a possible world of production constitutes for economic actors (individuals and firms) the expected coordination of activities in production and exchange, where the expectations are the result of convention, which in turn is rooted in recurrence or precedent’. Note the use of the same language of ‘world’ and ‘convention’ as well as the emphasis on collaborative activity. There is an important difference, however, in that in Becker's art world some of the artefacts may be mass-produced but they are consumed and interpreted individually according to the knowledge acquired by the viewer.

Becker's work has informed both Finnegan's (1992) research into local musicians in Milton Keynes and Wulff's (1998a; 1998b) ethnographic study of ballet. Wulff's work develops Becker's concept of an art world into a transnational art world. In this transnational world, dance is an international language with established ballet centres (Paris, St Petersburg, Copenhagen, London, and New York), international touring, exchanges of dancers and a mobile workforce. National ballet styles or conventions have developed that are distinctive and difficult to acquire (de Valois 1937, 203–220), but dancers are increasingly able to switch between styles. To Wulff, the transnationality of the ballet world does not undermine national culture or the meaning of place, but rather ‘ballet people are constantly negotiating national and transnational cultural processes’ (Wulff 1998a, 33). The transnational ballet world consists of two parts – a set of homogeneous work practices and heterogeneous national employment laws and funding systems (Wulff 1998a, 161). There is an important omission in that it is not just about different legal and funding system, but is also about different supporting institutions, including ballet schools, sources and suppliers of knowledge, magazines, dance societies and clubs, and dance publishers.

The final element of the framework is the concept of ‘conventions’ and ‘art worlds’ and, more specifically, connections between places and people that are implicated in the geographical spread of the conventions of ballet. The conventions of classical ballet can only spread through the movement of people as the knowledge is embodied in individuals rather than in written texts. Choreography was traditionally handed down from dancer to dancer, and it was only in 1928 that the foundations of a system of dance notation were developed by Rudolf Laban, which was eventually codified as Labanotation (Laban & Ullmann 1971). In 1947, Rudolf Benesh began to develop the science of choreology as he realized that ‘the extraordinary fact dawned upon me that dance, unlike other arts and sciences, alone had no notation of its own’ (Benesh & Benesh 1977, 5). Choreology goes someway towards codifying the tacit and embodied or experiential knowledge that are developed by the interactions between a choreographer and the dancers upon which a ballet is originally created. Nevertheless, choreology cannot preserve many of the finer details of classical ballet and even video is unable to provide a full and accurate record; the position of the cameras means that they are only able to capture some of the details (Thrift 1997). An individual ballet still has to be passed between generations by dancers who have been directly involved in an earlier production.

The development of an English classical dance tradition

The three elements that have been identified – knowledge, networks and the conventions of the ballet world – overlap with one another and involve an exchange of information and knowledge between individuals (consumers and producers) and countries. The beginnings of ballet can be traced back to the Italian court dances that spread through the royal courts of Europe (Haskell 1942, 10) and were then preserved in Russia during the latter part of the 19th century and in England and America during the 20th century. The spread is partly implicated in Veblen's (1953) notion of conspicuous consumption, as attending opera and ballet were signs of wealth and status; like the modern shopping mall, the theatre was a place in which to see and be seen. There is also a relationship to be explored between the development of Royal or national ballet and opera companies and the construction of national identity. Associated with the establishment of a national ballet company are the localization of ballet convention(s) and the creation of national dance styles (Wulff 1998a). Art and dance have also been incorporated into geopolitical strategy; Cold War Russia and America invested in arts, including ballet as part of a strategy of cultural diplomacy (Prevots 1998).

The development of an English classical dance tradition can be traced back to the 1920s. This was an important time for European dance as Sergei Diaghilev's Ballets Russes company toured Europe and between 1911 and 1929 made regular visits to London (Beaumont 1940; Lieven 1973). In London, Diaghilev's company and associated publicity machine developed a dance audience to appreciate the conventions of classical ballet (Garafola 1992). It also encouraged the development of supporting infrastructure: for example, critics, dance histories and popular books (Beaumont 1940). In 1923, for example, the first edition of The Dancing Annual (Brynildsen 1923) was published in London, with chapters by Anna Pavlova and an introduction by Lady Diana Duff Cooper, a leading member of London society, and in 1937 Brahms & Simon published a crime novel about the murder of a dancer during the opening night of the London ballet season. The importance of the Ballets Russes cannot be understated as it demonstrated what could be achieved through active collaboration between the arts of music, painting, set design, and dance. Diaghilev's London seasons created a new set of ballet disciples ‘who would think nothing of waiting ten to fifteen hours in the rain for a seat in the gods’ (Garafola 1992, 331, quoting Cecil Beaton). One of the most interesting episodes in Diaghilev's London season was the famous 1921 three-month revival of The Sleeping Princess at the Alhambra Theatre (Haskell 1934, 54–72). During this revival the Alhambra ‘became a kind of ballet club, for night after night you would see the familiar faces of certain enthusiasts come to relive the ballet’ (Beaumont 1940, 207). Diaghilev's death in 1929 left London's newly created dance audience without access to a professional dance company. This gap was filled by the activities of two individuals: a dancer (Ninette de Valois) and a theatre manager (Lilian Baylis), supported by a set of supporting institutions (critics, journalists, societies, clubs).

During 1927 de Valois wrote to Barry Jackson, the manager of the Birmingham Repertory Theatre (Kemp 1943), the leading regional company, proposing to establish a ballet company in the theatre. The offer was rejected (Walker 1998, 70). The letter was followed by one to Lillian Baylis, the director of the Old Vic Theatre (London). In 1927, Baylis employed de Valois to teach ballet and to choreograph dance for plays and opera (Findlater 1975, 204–205). In 1930, Baylis acquired a second theatre (Sadler's Wells) with the intention of introducing economies of scale into her theatrical productions. Productions and artists would be shared between the two theatres. de Valois was given the opportunity of relocating her company to Sadler's Wells and to establish a small professional ballet company. The newly established Vic-Sadler's Wells Opera Ballet (Beaumont 1935) commenced with the engagement of six salaried dancers, with de Valois as director and principal choreographer (de Valois 1992, 101). The new company was to play at both the Old Vic and Sadler's Wells, but de Valois’ ballet school would remain at Sadler's Wells.

The origins of de Valois’ second ballet company can be traced back to World War II. Sadler's Wells Theatre was bombed, forcing the Vic Wells Ballet to tour throughout the UK. It was at this time that the company changed its name to Sadler's Wells Ballet (SWB). In 1946, the company was invited to become the resident ballet company of the Royal Opera House (ROH), Covent Garden, London (Clark 1955). The incorporation of the SWB into the ROH provided the touring company with a permanent home and also removed the company's requirement to tour throughout the UK. The demise of the touring element encouraged de Valois to establish a second touring company called the Sadler's Wells Theatre Ballet based at Sadler's Wells. In 1956, both companies and their School were granted a Royal Charter; the Sadler's Wells Ballet became the Royal Ballet, the Sadler's Wells Theatre Ballet was renamed the Touring Company of The Royal Ballet, and the School became The Royal Ballet School. In 1970, the touring company returned to base itself at the Sadler's Wells Theatre and in 1977 changed its name to the Sadler's Wells Royal Ballet (SWRB).

The development of an English ballet tradition is explained by investments that were made either implicitly or explicitly in soft cultural infrastructure that revolved around knowledge, networks and conventions. British classical dance developed in London and was centred on the Old Vic theatre, the Royal Opera House, Covent Garden, and the Royal Ballet School. The Royal Ballet was also the only classical dance company in England to have a permanent home. The key question is explaining the processes that led to the relocation of SWRB from London and its conversion into BRB. This relocation must be placed in the context of the planning and economic history of Birmingham (Bryson 2003; Bryson & Taylor 2006).

From London to Birmingham: creating Birmingham Royal Ballet

Between 1971 and 1993, just over half a million manufacturing jobs were lost in the West Midlands (Bryson et al. 1996), representing 50% of the total. Manufacturing employment as a share of total employment in Birmingham fell from 64% in 1951 to 44% in 1978. This was a period in which Birmingham experienced massive job losses and high unemployment. The crisis experienced by Birmingham's manufacturing economy was reflected in the city centre. During the 1980s, Birmingham had limited success in attracting investment capital and retail floor space actually diminished with the closure of several department stores. The City Council realized that a coordinated strategy would be required. Part of the city's strategy was to reinvent itself as an international city which contained cultural institutions that would attract tourists and especially business tourism (Bryson 2003). Attracting people to Birmingham was the first stage in encouraging companies to consider establishing business outlets in the city. The city was trying to act strategically to alter Birmingham's external image from that of a declining heavily industrialized city to a successful post-industrial city (Bryson et al. 1996). This strategy operated at a number of different levels, from that of encouraging property investors to refurbish 1960s buildings to persuading SWRB to relocate from London to Birmingham (Woodcock 1991).

The relocation of SWRB to Birmingham was the result of five actors that came together to encourage the Company to relocate from London (Fig. 1). The relocation was partly driven by a shift in government policy towards encouraging a regionalization of art forms in the UK. The policy was sketched out in the House of Commons, but developed and implemented in part by the Arts Council, the agency charged with the allocation of public arts subsidies. SWRB was experiencing a series of constraints on its activities that meant that the Company was receptive and open to change. The ROH was experiencing financial pressures and was searching for ways to reduce its budget. Birmingham City Council and the Hippodrome theatre were trying to alter Birmingham's image by developing dynamic local, but nationally important, cultural industries. The actors represented a combination of people, resources (buildings, finance) and institutions. Some of the actors set the context for the relocation (The Arts Council), whilst others capitalized on established friendship networks to facilitate the relocation of SWRB and also to ensure that the required soft and hard cultural infrastructure investments occurred. Each actor played an important and distinctive role in the relocation.

Fig. 1.  The actors involved in the relocation and transformation of Sadler's Wells Royal Ballet into Birmingham Royal Ballet.

The Arts Council

In July 1945, the Arts Council was established in England to support arts of the highest quality and increase public access to the arts across the country. In July 1945, John Maynard Keynes, the first Chairman of the Arts Council, broadcast on the BBC a statement in which he outlined the purposes and priorities of this new government agency. Keynes made two important points: first, that ‘we of the Arts Council are greatly concerned to decentralize and disperse the dramatic and musical and artistic life of this country, to build up provincial centres’ and, second, ‘it is also our business to make London a great artistic metropolis, a place to visit and wonder at’ (Arts Council of Great Britain 1984, iii). In 1982 a Select Committee of the House of Commons published a comprehensive account of the difficulties facing arts organizations and made a number of major recommendations to the Arts Council. The committee was concerned with the imbalance in arts provision that existed between London and the rest of England (House of Commons 1982). Responding to the report, the Arts Council undertook the first review of its activities, which it published in 1984 under the title The Glory of the Garden (Arts Council 1984). The review made two important recommendations. First, to withdraw government support from some arts organizations; this would enable the reallocation of funding to redress historical funding imbalances which favoured some art forms over others. Second, to develop strategies that would readdress the regional funding imbalance. Specifically, new policies would be designed to concentrate funding on ‘the dozen or so areas within England where the population is most densely concentrated’ (Arts Council 1984, 8).

In their review, the Arts Council stated that English dance was under funded and recommended that additional funding be allocated to raise dancers’ salaries and to improve the presence of dance in the regions. The Council noted that only the Royal Ballet had a permanent home for rehearsal and performance and that the other companies were primarily touring companies that needed to be developed and policies should be created to encourage ‘specific companies to associate themselves in a regular fashion with specific regions’ (Arts Council 1984, 15). The two Royal Ballet companies were considered as central to this new regional arts policy:

The Council will be looking to the Royal Ballet and the Sadler's Wells Royal Ballet to play an enhanced regional role. The Council welcomes the Royal Ballet's current policy of touring in the regions for two or three weeks annually, and it will be discussing with the company a proposal that, as a means of building audience loyalty, it should spend one week in each of three strategic areas every year … The Council will also be encouraging Sadler's Wells Royal Ballet to develop further its annual link with Birmingham. (Arts Council 1984, 16)

The SWRB Company

Prior to the establishment of SWRB, its predecessor, the ‘New Group’, had experienced a nomadic existence; the company did not have a London base or access to permanent rehearsal studies. Initially, there were discussions to relocate the company to Manchester, but these failed as Greater Manchester Council did not provide financial support (Woodcock 1991). Some of the company's principals refused to move to Manchester and The Royal Ballet was concerned that the standards associated with a Royal company would be compromised. The Company had to find a permanent home and it was decided to base the Company at Sadler's Wells theatre and to establish the SWRB. This led to a period of growth and renewal, but it should be remembered that SWRB was still primarily a touring company. The Sadler's Wells base provided access to two rehearsal rooms, a large wardrobe, administrative offices, and a music library. Nevertheless, the Well's stage was smaller than many of the regional theatres on the SWRB's touring circuit and this meant that ‘some of the ballets looked even more cramped in London than on the Road’ (Woodcock 1991, 235).

Under its artistic director, Peter Wright, SWRB grew both in size and reputation. The latter was formed around Wright's productions of the full-length classical ballets (Giselle, Coppelia, Swan Lake, and The Sleeping Beauty) and these became the cornerstones of the SWRB repertory. Wright also had a policy of commissioning works from young choreographers (for example, Graham Lustig, Susan Crow, Vincent Redmon, Michael Corder, and David Bintley) and a ‘heritage’ repertory of ballets was also acquired (Frederick Ashton, Ninette de Valois, Kenneth MacMillan, George Balanchine, Léonide Massine) (Woodcock 1991). By mid-1980 the three programming strands – full-length classics, commissions and ‘heritage’ works – were firmly established as the SWRB's artistic policy. However, maintaining this policy was becoming increasingly difficult. The costs of touring were increasing while the full-length classics, although successful at the box office, placed enormous strains on a company with fewer than 50 dancers and with access to only two adequate rehearsal studios. The preparation of repertory and new work was increasingly compromised and the Sadler's Wells stage was too small to present the larger and more popular classics (Swan Lake, The Sleeping Beauty). All this should be placed against a background of diminishing financial support from the Arts Council (Witts 1998).

SWRB was always considered to be the ‘other Royal company’ (Reynolds & McCormick 2003, 584) or the weaker ‘younger sister’ (Haskell 1952, 6). de Valois had considered it to be a ‘valuable nursery’ (Clarke & Vaughan 1977, 297) or training ground for the Royal Ballet. The development by de Valois of a second Royal company was,

a striking example of Ninette de Valois’ long-term planning. It not only allowed the young choreographer to develop his ideas and the young dancer to get the feel of her [sic] audience and to acquire stagecraft, it also enriched the National Ballet by giving it a repertoire of works not possible otherwise. (Haskell 1952, 5)

SWRB was ‘always aware that talented choreographers and dancers could be lost to the big company’ (Reynolds & McCormick 2003, 584). Under Peter Wright's direction SWRB experienced a renaissance. Nevertheless, the constraints imposed by Sadler's Wells theatre and the size of the Company meant that by the mid-1980s the Company's development had plateaued. The pressures being experienced by the Company meant that it was receptive to change and especially change that would allow the Company to distance itself from the Royal Ballet. The move presented SWRB with the possibility of developing its own identity and ‘with its relocation to Birmingham, the company shed its reputation as a second Royal Ballet. If anything, it emerged as a rival rather than a junior’ (Reynolds & McCormick 2003, 585).

The Royal Opera House

During the late 1980s the relationship between the ROH and the Arts Council deteriorated (Witts 1998). This was a period of financial constraint and a general lack of engagement and support for the arts from the Thatcher government. During this period, The Arts Council's awards to the ROH failed to keep up with inflation. The relationship between the Council and the ROH was increasingly dynamic as the ROH management wanted to improve the quality and creativity of performances, sometimes ignoring budgets. Lord Sainsbury, Chairman of the ROH, and well-known for his association with a major supermarket, considered that the ROH could not be run in the same way as a retail outlet. Balancing the budgets for the ROH was becoming increasingly difficult and SWRB considered that it was often ‘squeezed’ to maintain the programming and production demands of the Royal Ballet and the Royal Opera. The ROH Board was very London-centric in its composition and had limited interest in the touring undertaken by SWRB other than in helping to justify the Arts Council grant.

In the late 1980s the ROH was searching for ways to increase its funding and reduce costs. SWRB's existence was never seriously under threat, but the ROH needed to change. By its very nature, SWRB was better equipped to face the challenge of change than the two other ROH companies (Royal Ballet and Royal Opera).

The Birmingham Hippodrome

During the 1970s the Birmingham Hippodrome theatre experienced a period of decline and under-investment. In 1979, the City of Birmingham purchased the freehold for GBP 50,000 and leased the theatre to the Birmingham Hippodrome Theatre Trust Ltd., a charitable trust managed by Birmingham people (Norris 1999, 50). The Trust's Board was dominated by successful Midland's industrialists, including Francis Graves (Chair), a property surveyor who had played an important role in the development of the city's National Exhibition Centre (Bryson et al. 1996), Tim Morris, managing director of The Birmingham Post and Mail (city newspaper), and representatives from the City Council (Norris 1999, 5). The trust was supported by a development trust, a charity responsible for the Hippodrome's building fabric. In July 1980 the theatre was closed for major alterations that included rebuilding everything behind the proscenium. Over GBP 2.2 million was spent on extensive alterations that included the reflooring and flattening of the stage, the installation of a stage lift, new sound and lighting systems, the widening of the proscenium arch, a new fly tower, a new dressing-room block, and the refurbishment of the auditorium (Foster 2005, 203).

During the 1980s, the Hippodrome had experienced a period of growth and renewal. The Chairs of the Hippodrome Board, David Justham and latterly Tim Morris, had assembled a considerable financial reserve in addition to the funding that was required for major refurbishments and developments. The theatre wanted to continue its successful development and to differentiate itself from other similar venues located in the major English towns. The Royal Opera House, Covent Garden, was considered to be the premier English theatre and its reputation was founded upon that of the Royal companies. The director of the Hippodrome, Richard Johnston, considered that attracting SWRB as resident company to the Hippodrome would provide the required level of differentiation, whilst a company with a Royal association would considerably enhance the reputation of the theatre and the city. Johnson was also aware that Sadler's Wells provided SWRB with access to a small stage, limited rehearsal space and no opportunity for expansion, whilst the Hippodrome had the resources and land required to provide facilities that would match those available at Covent Garden. The Hippodrome was behind the relocation proposal and perhaps more importantly had significant financial reserves to make a valuable contribution to the financial package that was assembled to persuade the ROH Board to support and pursue the relocation. As part of the relocation, the Hippodrome Theatre Trust provided up to GBP 1 million to cover the relocation costs of the Company (Nourse 1990, 5).

Birmingham had begun to play an important role in SWRB's touring season. The Arts Council's (1984) review had encouraged regional theatres to invest and to improve their facilities. In 1984, the Hippodrome's Board responded to The Glory of the Garden report by purchasing the adjacent former Wesleyan Chapel, which had become a nightclub, and using this site to double the size of the stage (Norris 1999, 5). The Hippodrome's improvements led to a closer relationship developing between the Hippodrome and SWRB and effectively the Hippodrome became the Company's second home. This was Birmingham's response to the Arts Council's (1984) new strategy to bring art to the regions and it was also the first time that a close relationship between a regional theatre and a London-controlled dance company was officially acknowledged. In 1984, SWRB based a special projects development officer at the Birmingham Hippodrome, and began co-ordinating an outreach programme of dance projects in secondary schools across the city. Funding was partially provided by the City Council and this initiative contributed towards the development of a dance audience in the West Midlands. This initiative built on the Hippodrome's concern with art education. In 1988, the Hippodrome was the first British touring theatre to establish an education department intended to encourage young people to become actively involved with theatre.

The local community of ballet supporters responded by establishing a fan club under the title ‘the Friends of Sadler's Wells Royal Ballet in the West Midlands’ and a magazine titled Entre-Chat was introduced. These developments began to provide Birmingham with the soft cultural infrastructure required to support the long-term activities of SWRB in Birmingham and the West Midlands. The improvements to the Hippodrome transformed the theatre into one of the most important performing venues outside London. The alterations, combined with the theatre's ownership and management by the city for the city, enabled the Board to achieve ‘what was described as “the major arts coup of the decade”, the Sadler's Wells Royal Ballet moved from London, made its base at the theatre and became the Birmingham Royal Ballet’ (Norris 1999, 5). After SWRB's relocation the Board and Trust continued to improve the theatre with the re-racking of the auditorium to improve the sightlines for appreciating ballet. The relocation of SWRB meant that Birmingham and the Hippodrome became recognized as a major international centre for classical dance (Reynolds & McCormick 2003, 584).

Birmingham City Council

During the late 1980s, the task of regenerating the city of Birmingham was well underway, particularly the City Centre. In the 1980s, Simon Rattle was appointed conductor of The City of Birmingham Symphony Orchestra (CBSO). Rattle and the manager of the CBSO, Ed Smith, transformed the CBSO by persuading Birmingham City Council to provide an annual subsidy as well as arranging the development of a new home for the orchestra, Symphony Hall. Symphony Hall was a pivotal development that led to the regeneration of part of the western side of Birmingham's inner city (Bryson 2003). The CBSO played an important role in revitalizing Birmingham's image as a depressed and declining industrial area and in this context ‘Rattle's puppy charm and political nous was bound to win over a metropolitan authority desperate to rid Birmingham of its Spaghetti Junction Image’ (Witts 1998, 185). Rattle and the CBSO played an important role in enhancing Birmingham's reputation for cultural activities. Rattle's success encouraged the City Council to recognize the benefits and positive impacts that the arts and culture could contribute to urban regeneration.

In March 1987, the City of Birmingham approached SWRB and presented them with a proposal that involved relocating to the city and also the provision of a permanent home. Christopher Nourse, administrative director of SWRB (later BRB), remembered this meeting in the following manner:

It was March 1987 and Sadler's Wells Royal Ballet was performing in Birmingham. Richard Johnson, the Hippodrome's Director, put his head around the Company office door and asked whether Peter Wright and I were free to have a chat with him. Half an hour later, we were back in the office, stunned by the enormity of Birmingham's proposal, excited by the opportunities which on the face of it would be the Company's, fearful of the problems which might arise. In short, Birmingham was inviting Sadler's Wells Royal Ballet to move its home base from London to Birmingham, where the city was prepared to provide us with new purpose-built facilities at the Hippodrome. Moreover they would provide additional revenue funds over and above SWRB's base Arts Council grant – so long as they were also matched by additional funds from the Arts Council – to strengthen SWRB's future artistic development along whatever lines Peter Wright felt it was desirable the Company should follow. What an offer! As if that were not enough, the theatre itself would allocate some of its own funds to cover the actual relocation costs of the Company. ‘The move must provide the best circumstances and conditions for SWRB's future development and well-being – otherwise there is no point in any of us pursuing this’. Richard's words rang in our ears. (Nourse 1990, 5)

Birmingham was trying to overcome external perceptions of the city as a bleak, declining and de-industrializing city. Birmingham City Council's offer to SWRB represented one way in which the city was trying to respond to the opportunities offered by the new proactive entrepreneurial or neoliberal approach to planning that was developing in the UK. This reflects a complex interaction between national policy as articulated by the Arts Council and Birmingham's identification of an opportunity to capitalize on this policy by mobilizing local resources and a network of actors (local politicians and representatives from the local art and business communities). During this process local interests interacted and in some ways manipulated national policy to ensure that Birmingham's reputation and cultural infrastructure were enhanced. The arts-based profile that had been projected by the CBSO meant that within Birmingham City Council there was cross-party political support for the proposed relocation of SWRB. The City Council was trying to play an extremely clever political game by testing the strategy developed by the Arts Council in The Glory of the Garden report (1984). Local funding largely through European initiatives was available, and project ‘champions’ existed in the city. These factors came together at the same time and in the same place. Each party had their own reasons for supporting the relocation and, perhaps more importantly, the people and the funding were in place. The City and the Hippodrome effectively called the Arts Council's bluff. Both were prepared to make significant financial contributions provided the Arts Council did justice to The Glory of the Garden strategy by providing financial support to relocate the Company.

An independent feasibility report was commissioned which analysed the artistic, physical and financial needs of the Company. Importantly, the report also assessed the sustainability of any relocation and recommended that a three-year tripartite funding agreement be drawn up between the Company, the City and the Arts Council. The report was commissioned in 1987 and considered by the ROH Board late in 1988. According to Christopher Nourse (1990, 5),

the respective Boards of Covent Garden and the Hippodrome saw it, liked what they saw, and asked [the consultant] to undertake further investigations and costings. Peter Wright was asked to put together a development plan for the company. He and I sat for hours discussing the endless possibilities.

The final decision to relocate to Birmingham was made in January 1989. The relocation was driven by Birmingham City Council's appreciation of the role art played in urban regeneration and in place-based marketing. An appreciation of local politics played an important role in the relocation. Tim Morris, Chair of the Hippodrome Board, and Jeremy Issacs (Director General of the Royal Opera House) recruited a well-chosen and connected group of Birmingham people to join the BRB Advisory Board. The Hippodrome's Board helped embed the Company within Birmingham's business and cultural communities by introducing key individuals to BRB and by expanding the Company's local network of contacts. Chris Kirk, a member of the Hippodrome Board and Birmingham City Councillor, played a key advocacy role for the Company. Importantly, Jeremy Issacs arranged that both Tim Morris and Chris Kirk were invited to become Governors of the Royal Ballet Board (which controlled the two companies and the school) and to sit on the BRB Advisory Board.

SWRB and the ROH were persuaded to relocate on the basis of the Company's experience of performing at the Hippodrome and the size of the financial package. The Hippodrome covered the Company's relocation costs. The City Council (through European funding) provided the new facilities: the BRB building, the studios, offices, and workshops cost GBP 2.5 million, and GBP 1.5 million was spent on reordering the Hippodrome's offices and backstage facilities. The City also agreed to provide an additional GBP 1 million revenue support to the Company and the Arts Council agreed to match the local funding. This meant that the new BRB would have an additional GBP 2 million spread in instalments over the first three years, over and above the grant from The Arts Council. BRB was also able to enter into long-term sponsorship agreements with local companies such as, for example, the Midland Bank (now HSBC) and Powergen. The foundation stone of the new building was laid by Dame Ninette de Valois on 15 June 1989 and the Company relocated and began rehearsing in its new premises at the beginning of August 1990.

For the SWRB, the relocation was all about developing the Company's artistic policy and acquiring the required resources and facilities. According to Derek Purnell, former Chief Executive Officer of BRB,

By moving away from London the Company was able to shed the ‘second fiddle’ to the Royal Ballet syndrome and establish its own identity, but fundamentally it allowed the Company to increase to 60 dancers, brought the whole Company together under one roof, provided superb rehearsal facilities and supporting offices and workrooms, and a three-year guaranteed funding package/increase – and, of course, a stage which could accommodate the grandest of the Company's productions.

In recognition of the support that the Company received from Birmingham various practical decisions were made. First, there was the change of name. There were concerns about the possible loss of identity with the demise of the Sadler's Wells brand and historical associations. Some considered that adopting ‘Birmingham’ in the title might imply that the Company was provincial and second rate. Adopting BRB as the Company's brand firmly established the Company as belonging to and being based in Birmingham. It made a clear statement that the Company was committed to Birmingham. This commitment was reinforced by a policy decision to use local suppliers as much as possible, to persuade Company members to live in Birmingham and to locate approximately 80% of the Company's educational/outreach and audience development activities in the West Midlands.

Importantly, Peter Wright decided to live in Birmingham and the senior members of the ballet staff and administrative team all relocated. According to Derek Purnell (personal communication 2006),

these relocations helped to set the trend that Birmingham was to be ‘home’ and that the city wasn't as bad as people had originally feared! Company members quickly realised that property was slightly cheaper, therefore most people who moved were able to ‘trade-up’ in terms of property, travel time to work was hugely reduced, the working environment and facilities were excellent and most local Brummies seemed delighted that the Company had moved: excellent attendances at performances, enthusiastic and responsive audiences, new productions (Peter Wright's Nutcracker entered the repertory just 5 months after relocation) and a demand that hugely outstripped supply for education work.

Following the move to Birmingham, the opportunity to develop and strengthen the repertory and artistic policy was fully exploited. This stimulated the dancers, improved standards, engaged audiences, and produced reliably good box office returns. A more varied repertory attracted a more varied and loyal audience. Some people had considered that a ballet company based in Birmingham would experience great difficulties in attracting and retaining the best dancers. No difficulties were experienced as the priority for most dancers is a company's work and repertory rather than its location.

There were some negative consequences associated with the relocation, but these were relatively unimportant. It should be noted that SWRB would have been closed during the 1990s if it had not relocated to Birmingham. Closure would have come due to the financial and management crisis that the ROH experienced during this period (Witts 1998). Nearly 90% of the company relocated (including administrative, technical and dancing staff) and those who remained behind were close to retirement and were given the option of a redundancy package. It would be difficult to argue that the new BRB was a weaker or less creative company when compared to SWRB. According to Derek Purnell (personal communication 2007),

BRB probably took a slight dip between 1993 and 1995 – the period prior to Peter's [Wright] retirement … Of course, David's [Bintley, the new artistic director] arrival also saw the arrival of Sabrina Lenzi [Principal Dancer], Wolfgang Stollwitzer [Guest Principal Dancer] and the promotion of Monica Zamora [Soloist, 1994], so the slight dip was followed by a very strong period … it was ever thus!

The creation of BRB had no impact on the Royal Ballet Sinfonia, the orchestra of BRB, as they did not relocate because the British classical music industry is centred on London and the South East. In 1997, BRB became independent of the ROH and this enhanced the orchestra's opportunities to secure recording contracts, play for visiting companies and to attract better musicians.

Two important negatives can be identified, but both would have impacted on the company if it had remained in London. First, the national press is based in London and this means that all art companies located elsewhere in the country have great difficulties in obtaining media coverage. The London/South East-centric view that exists amongst journalists implies that it is often assumed that any performance or event outside London must be second rate or inferior in some way and thus not worth covering. BRB has tried to solve this problem by providing transport to and from London for national critics and in holding press conferences simultaneously in London and Birmingham. The concentration of art critics in London places pressure on BRB to perform in London in order to retain a presence in the national press. This problem also occurs in other countries, for example the concentration of art journalists in New York (Burnham 1973). Second, the relocation from London and from regular contact with the Royal Ballet and the Royal Ballet School led to some difficulties. Prior to the relocation, SWRB and the Royal Ballet used to co-operate in the recruitment of pupils from the Royal Ballet School. During the decade following the relocation BRB was placed at a disadvantage in the recruitment process partly caused by the geographic distance between London and Birmingham. The relocation of Elmhurst to Birmingham was one way of responding to this difficulty, as BRB's association with Elmhurst allowed the company access to a new pool of talented young dancers.

Conclusions

The relocation of a Royal Ballet Company from London to Birmingham provides an unusual opportunity to explore the interplay between a set of political and social processes. Other examples of such relocations include the relocation of Opera North to Leeds and the BBC's proposed plans to relocate some of its key activities to the north-west of England. The relocation must be situated within the context of the development of a tradition of English classical dance, dance companies and supporting infrastructure. Both the development of the English dance tradition and the relocation can be conceptualized using the framework of knowledge, networks and conventions that is developed in this paper. English (including Birmingham) dance audiences required to be developed through a gradual process of audience development. Diaghilev began this process and his publicity machine stimulated the development of critics, books publishers, English dancers, and audiences. With the support of the Arts Council, de Valois continued this education through the activities of the two Royal companies and the Royal Ballet School.

The relocation of SWRB and its conversion to BRB reflects the identification by Birmingham City Council and the Hippodrome theatre of:

[a] window of opportunity that was probably only open for a very short period of time. Had the ROH Board not taken the decision to go for relocation at that particular time, then the opportunity would have been lost forever. Peter Wright's role was crucial in the early years for had he not taken the lead, very few members of the Company would have taken the gamble and uprooted their homes and lives to Birmingham. SWRB's relocation and conversion into BRB was very much a question of the ‘Right people in the right jobs at the right time … very rare! (D. Purnell, personal communication 2006)

The relocation was founded upon the audience development work that SWRB had undertaken in Birmingham since the 1980s and on the activities of Rattle and the CBSO. A small group of Birmingham citizens with the necessary power, influence and reputations were able to persuade the City Council to enter into negotiations with SWRB and the Royal Opera House. A network of individuals and related funding packages were developed and articulated to persuade the Company to relocate. Money lubricated the process, but success was founded upon the activities of key individuals. Peter Wright and SWRB had developed a relationship with the management of the Hippodrome and this meant that trust had been developed over a number of years. Wright's commitment to Birmingham encouraged key members of SWRB to support the relocation and to leave London to live in Birmingham.

Birmingham had become SWRB's second home, and in this capacity the Company had begun to develop a local audience. Audience development took two forms. First, the establishment of a local educational programme that BRB continued to develop and expand as it moved to Birmingham. Though school-based educational activities BRB is trying to identify and encourage future dancers, but more importantly to educate children to understand and appreciate the conventions of classical dance. Second, BRB developed the Friends of Sadler's Wells Royal Ballet in the West Midlands into the Friends of BRB. The friends’ supporters group enables the Company to develop a closer relationship with its local audience. This provides BRB with a secure audience base as well as opening up future fund-raising opportunities.

In this paper the relocation of SWRB has been explored to highlight the relationships that exist between urban regeneration, city identity and cultural industries. Central to this relationship are the interactions that occur between soft and hard cultural infrastructural investments and, in particular, the tacit and codified knowledge that is acquired by dancers as well as dance audiences. Part of this analysis highlights the interplay that exists between local and national policies and the ways in which the local can mobilize elites, politicians, artists, and others to shape the artistic and cultural character of a city. Such mobilization is problematic as agreement must be negotiated, obtained and maintained from a wide variety of individuals and institutions. The shaping of an urban environment that would be attractive for Florida's creative class is thus highly problematic as it depends on negotiated and often complex agreements between heterogeneous groups of individuals. Ultimately, the creative class is perhaps a mirage; an illusory thing that is difficult, perhaps impossible, to define, measure and evaluate. Nevertheless, understanding the interplay that occurs between hard and soft cultural infrastructural investments is critical for conceptualizing the ways in which the cultural character of cities is being formed as part of a strategy to attract and retain investment and people. The analysis in this paper leads to a series of questions that require further detailed investigation. First, research should explore the ways in which art audiences are developed in particular places and to appreciate specific art forms (art, dance, music). The geographies of audience development and engagement require considerable further research. Second, research should also begin to explore the supporting infrastructure that surrounds cultural industries and perhaps the ‘creative class’. Central to this analysis would be unravelling the knowledge and educational networks that create, develop and support art audiences.

Acknowledgements

I wish to thank Derek Purnell, former Chief Executive Officer of Birmingham Royal Ballet, and Tessa King-Farlow, Chair of Birmingham Royal Ballet's Board of Directors, for their assistance with this paper. I would also like to thank the two reviewers and Grete Rusten and Phil Jones for their constructive comments.