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Abstract
Internal displacement in Sri Lanka exists in the context of a protracted condition of insecurity produced by intractable war and polarization of society along ethno-political lines. People remain exposed to risks and threats to their security over prolonged periods of time and the mobilization of inter- and intra-ethnic tensions exacerbates the breakdown of trust and protection at community level. Humanitarian agencies seeking to assist displaced civilians are compelled to grapple with challenges about how to engage in the most skilful and effective way in a risky and difficult environment. Drawing on field interviews in Trincomalee District, the article examines humanitarian agency approaches to protection in this politically challenging context. It is divided into six sections – international policy discussion on protracted internal displacement situations; the intractability of war in Sri Lanka; humanitarian approaches to protection; the political contours of the conflict in Trincomalee; the specific protection challenges confronting humanitarian agencies as they work in this highly politicized and militarized arena; and finally, the lessons and creative strategies crafted by agencies to negotiate these challenges.
Acknowledgements
We are grateful for the generosity and assistance provided to us in Trincomalee by Austcare's partners in the field. We wish to extend our appreciation to respondents in agencies working on the ground who kindly gave us their time and reflections. This research was supported by an Australian Research Council funded project between Griffith University, the Australian National University, and the humanitarian NGO Austcare.
Notes
1. Sir John Holmes, UN Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, described the gunning down on 6 August 2006 of 17 Action Contre la Faime (ACF) employees in Muttur town, Trincomalee District, as the ‘single worst crime committed against humanitarian workers in recent history’ (IRIN Citation2007).
2. The results of this research are reproduced with the publishers’ permission from ‘Conflict-induced internal displacement: Challenges and dilemmas of protection for humanitarian agencies in Trincomalee’, in Protracted Displacement in Asia: No Place to Call Home (Ashgate, Aldershot, 2008), pp. 107–131. Copyright © 2008, and are published in the research report Protracted Conflict: Protection Challenges for Humanitarian Agencies, Austcare 2008, available at: http://www.austcare200X.org.au/media/56973/arcsrilankabp-lowres.pdf (accessed April 2008).
3. UNHCR. Internally Displaced Person (IDPs) Working Group Workplan and Supporting Documents, Colombo, May 2006. Unpublished.
4. The ‘egg model’ spans three interdependent, complementary spheres of action (Slim & Bonwick Citation2005, 42), responsive (immediate or urgent activities aimed to stop, prevent or alleviate the immediate and/or worst effects of abuses); remedial (restorative action to assist people to recover while they live with the effects of abuse); and environment-building (supporting political, social, cultural, and institutional norms that prevent or limit violations or abuse).
5. The conflict zone in Sri Lanka is customarily divided into the three areas: the Vanni – mostly controlled by the LTTE; Jaffna, and the border areas south of Vanni – areas which the government has regained and which it calls ‘cleared’ areas; and the contested areas of Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Ampara in the East which have been declared ‘cleared’ by the government since July 2007.
6. A reason for the unique ethnic composition was the state-sponsored irrigation and Sinhalese settlement schemes that began in the 1940s (Peebles Citation1990), a process that radically altered the political demographics of Trincomalee. Previously, the east coast was a region composed of two historically interlinked, but contentious communities, the Tamils and the Muslims, both of which are Tamil-speaking and have a long history of conflict and co-existence (McGilvray Citation1999, Citation2001).
7. In 2007, the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Puligal (TMVP) was formed as the political arm of the ‘Karuna’ faction. The group is ‘now led by the ex-Colonel Karuna's former deputy, Pillayan, continues to rule Batticaloa and other parts of the east through terror and crime, with tacit police, military and Colombo approval. Still seen by the government and military as useful to block a Tiger re-emergence in the east, its reign of abductions, child recruitment, robberies and repression of dissent is extensively documented.’ (ICG Citation2008, 12).
8. In order to protect the confidentiality and security of interviewees, we have not attributed quotes and statements directly to individuals or their organizations.
9. The ICRC's mission – defined in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their 1977 Additional Protocols and in the 1986 Statutes of the International Movement of the Red Cross and Red Crescent – is ‘to protect the lives and dignity of victims of war and internal violence and to provide them with assistance’ and ‘to prevent human suffering by promoting and strengthening humanitarian law and universal humanitarian principles.’ Protection is therefore of primary concern to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). However, ICRC is under no obligation to coordinate with other agencies.
10. New, duplicate identification cards in Sinhala language have been issued to returnees from formerly LTTE-administered areas, labelling people with ‘red letters’. Mobile phone coverage is blocked in the return areas of Eachchilampattu, further impinging on agencies’ security, and constraining involvement in and approaches to the area. The Sri Lankan Army has established camps in return areas to create ‘buffer zones’.
11. This has been seen, for instance, in a reticence to be associated with building alternative housing for returnees whose homes are occupied by the army. Whilst working towards humanitarian goals (such as the need to provide shelter), this action has the potential to assist in the consolidation of military objectives.
12. The TMVP is widely regarded as a proxy to the government. The strengthening of TMVP has created political and criminal obstacles for agencies to negotiate. The TMVP are considered less disciplined than the LTTE and are viewed by some as a criminal group rather than a political movement.