Enriching the Theoretical Horizons of Phenomenography, Variation Theory and Learning Studies

Abstract

The aim of this article is to introduce some theoretical frameworks which may develop the research going on within phenomenography and variation theory. Central concepts from the epistemological and cognitive theories of Charles S. Peirce, Niklas Luhmann and Margaret Boden are presented and their implications for phenomenography and variation theory are discussed. Peirce's concept of the semiotic triad clarifies the interrelations of conceptions, their linguistic expressions and their meanings or referents. Luhmann's concepts of primary and secondary distinctions point out an implicit hierarchy of dimensions of variation. Boden's notion of conceptual spaces as grounds for explorative and transformative creativity points to the relevance and value of becoming familiar with the conceptional spaces of the outcomes of phenomenographic studies. Finally, I point to the possibility of including the notion of a “hidden curriculum” of the discipline as an implicit dimension of variation in classroom studies based on variation theory.

Keywords:

• Creativity
• Hidden curriculum of the discipline
• Phenomenography
• Semiotics

Notes

1. However, see Svensson (1997) for a discussion of phenomenography as a programme, a tool and an orientation of research.

2. Boden (2004) does not engage in such philosophical questions, but since her general theoretical framework is that of cognitive science, which usually holds a dualistic view on the relation between subject and object, it is plausible to assume that she shares this basic assumption. Peirce on the other hand criticised Kant's notion of a “thing‐in‐itself” (Habermas, 1995) and his metaphysical or cosmological intention was to conceive of reality as one whole, including human consciousness (Eco, 2000).

3. Actually, there may be more than two. According to Eco, Peirce

• put the entire cognitive process down to hypothetical inference, whereby sensations appear as the interpretation of stimuli; the perceptions as interpretations of sensations; perceptual judgments as the interpretations of perceptions; particular and general propositions as interpretations of perceptual judgments; and scientific theories as interpretations of series of propositions. (2000, p. 97)e

In this inferential or interpretative process, language enters between the second and the third stage, that is, between perceptions and perceptual judgments. This transition also marks the passing from purely experiential and private regions of consciousness to public ones. “By representing something, a sign expresses something general; therefore, it could not find an interpretant that would remain the exclusive possession of an individual mind” (Habermas, 1995, p. 256).

4. The first extract comes from Volume 1, paragraph 339 in Collected papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, edited by Hartshorne, Weiss and Burks (1935/1958), the second from Volume 2, paragraph 228.

5. Compare note 3 above. Conceptions of experience arise at the beginning of the cognitive process (stimuli, sensation, perception and perceptual judgment), whereas conceptions of understanding arise at the end (general propositions and more or less elaborated theories).

6. To be more precise, Aristotle did not consider all movements of material objects as unnatural. A body falling towards the earth would be a natural movement since the earth was seen as its “natural” place of dwelling. Similarly, the rising of heated air was natural since the “natural” place of heat or “fire” was in the heavens.

7. References to history have actually been made in some phenomenographic studies. For instance, conceptions of sight in ancient Greece have been compared to similar conceptions found among schoolchildren today (Andersson & Kärrqvist, 1981). But this has mostly been done in passing, and examples from history of alternative conceptions have not been used intentionally and systematically.