Discursive Effects of “Quality” Talk During a Quality Audit in Swedish Municipal Adult Education

ABSTRACT

In transnational policy, directives on how to improve “quality” through auditing flourish. However, more research is needed about how these quality audits affect school personnel in local contexts. This paper has scrutinised the discursive effects of how “quality” is construed in school personnel's comments during a quality audit conducted by the Swedish Schools Inspectorate. By drawing on Bacchi's (2009) WPR approach, such constructs were analysed and interrogated. The results indicate that “quality” is construed as an absence of “warning flags”, and thus as compliance with standards. In effect, statements about quality seem to become problem-oriented. Moreover, “quality” is talked about as a responsibility, and in effect the concept becomes invisible. It is also suggested that “quality” is construed as something that both enables and obstructs different kinds of discussion and discernments. It silences what it is possible to say and calls into question the organisation of the adult education system.

KEYWORDS:

• Adult education
• educational policy
• quality
• Swedish Schools Inspectorate
• WPR approach

Introduction

The quest for more and better “quality” in an educational system that always “lacks” it can be compared to the never-ending quest for the holy grail. In transnational policy that focuses audits, such directives and guidelines on how to obtain and improve “quality” flourish. What most of these narratives seem to have in common is that “quality” is prescribed as a solution to educational “problems” (Mufic & Fejes, 2020). However, such a solution includes implicit presuppositions about what an educational “problem” is. Hence, where is the “quality” lacking and how should this be remedied? Subsequently, questions about the accountability of “quality” are often raised. Educational systems appear to lack not only “quality” but also transparency, knowledge and routines about how to audit and account for it (Roberts, 2018). Moreover, the concept of “quality”, that often is described as empty and opaque (Dahler-Larsen, 2019) seems to be filled with different meanings in different educational contexts.

One such context is when the Swedish Schools Inspectorate (SSI), that is commissioned by the state to audit the quality of education, (Carlbaum, 2016) carries out their inspections in Swedish Municipal Adult Aducation (MAE). In recent debates, however it has been the “quality” – or rather, the “lack of quality” – of Swedish municipal adult education (MAE) that has been in focus. One example of this is a quotation from the Director General: “The significance of adult education also focuses on how important it is to maintain good quality. The SSI is increasingly working to audit quality in MAE.” (SSI, 2019b) As the quotation indicates, the SSI is increasingly directing its focus towards adult education, as there have been complaints and several audits that came to the conclusion that quality in MAE is lacking (SSI, 2019a). At the same time, critical voices have been raised about how the pursuit of “quality” affects teachers, principals, and students (Bergh, 2015; Dahler-Larsen, 2019; Williams & Sheridan, 2006; Wittek & Kvernbekk, 2011).

By drawing on data from a quality audit that the SSI carried out in 2018–2019 focusing on the flexibility and the individualisation of MAE, the aim of this article is to scrutinise the discursive effects of how “quality” is construed in the SSI’s quality audit interviews with MAE school personnel. In other words, the interviews that takes place during a quality audit can be seen as an example of how quality is construed in a certain context. Moreover, the SSI audits quality different in MAE compared to the rest of the school system (except for pre-schools) as it is the local authority that is audited and not the individual school (Mufic & Fejes, 2020). Consequently, as many municipalities have outsourced their MAE courses to external educational providers, they need to develop their own systems for following up and maintaining quality in their adult education system. In this specific context, quality audits that are carried out in MAE by the SSI have effects for how quality is construed throughout the adult education system. And as there is a lack of research into the local effects of audits (Braun et al., 2011), the SSI’s audit of the Swedish MAE case provides an illustrative contribution to the field with its focus on what school personnel say about what happens within a system that is constantly searching for “quality”.

Previous Research on Quality and Quality Audits

Even though the demand and the need for more and better quality are stressed in transnational policy that focuses audits, the quality discourse is both questioned and criticised (Pechmann & Haase, 2021; Williams & Sheridan, 2006; Wittek & Kvernbekk, 2011). Previous research also raises awareness of the concern that complex educational issues, such as quality, cannot be solved or improved by measurement and audit performances (Barnes & Cross, 2018; Dahler-Larsen, 2019). It is also emphasised that quality has attained a “common sense” status, and that “paradoxical expectations land on a local level” (Bergh, 2015, p. 590) as quality measurement practices shape and establish what quality means in specific contexts (Dahler-Larsen, 2019). In line with the elusive definitions of quality in adult education policy, Power (1997) points out that the strength of auditing lies in the “vagueness of the idea” (p. 54). He argues that “[t]he idea of audit shapes public conceptions of the problem for which it is a solution … ” (Power, 1997, p. 7). Thus, auditing becomes a way to steer and control, as it shapes people’s conceptions of specific issues in specific ways.

Previous research that has focused quality in audits has concluded that inspection governs education in a “potentially influential way” that should be given more attention (Carlbaum et al., 2014, p. 5). Moreover, Rönnberg (2014a) has focused broadly on audits and different audit tools as well as its discursive aspects. But even though there is a wealth of literature that critically examines audit processes (see e.g., Braun et al., 2011; Carlbaum, 2016; Liasidou & Symeou, 2018; Lindgren, 2015), only some attention has been paid to contextual aspects of quality audits in MAE. Moreover, research on audit practices in Sweden has not engaged with the concept of quality extensively, as it has largely focused on regular supervision (Lindgren, 2015; Rönnberg, 2014b; Segerholm & Hult, 2018). And as pointed out before, SSI is auditing quality in MAE in a different way compared to elementary and upper secondary school. Hence, MAE is a comprehensive educational system where over 50% of all students attend courses that are delivered by external providers (Muhrman & Andersson, 2021). And moreover, as municipalities are being audited on how they quality audit themselves as well as the external providers, issues of quality are being raised. Consequently, as this article sheds light on how quality is construed as well as the discursive effects of it in such a context, it provides a contribution to the research field, to practitioners and to policymakers.

Swedish Municipal Adult Education

MAE was introduced by the Government in Sweden in 1968 as a part of major educational reforms that took place in the 1960s. This reform made it possible for adults to engage in formal, state governed adult education. In contemporary policy, MAE is often proposed as a “second chance” (Ministry of Education, 2018:71) for students who have not completed their compulsory and/or upper secondary schooling, as it is free, and these students have a legal right to participate. In the 1990s, the adult education system underwent extensive changes as the entire education system in Sweden was decentralised. Subsequently, the responsibility for MAE was shifted from the state to the local municipality. The prerequisites for conducting adult education vary considerably, as Sweden has 290 different municipalities that differ in terms of size, population and resources. Moreover, all municipalities can choose how they want to organise their MAE, ranging from delivering courses themselves or signing contracts with external providers to deliver courses (Holmqvist et al., 2020). They can also choose to combine these different options.

Regardless of how the municipality decides to organise MAE, the municipality is still accountable to the state for the overall quality of the education. This is why the agreements that precede procurement documents play an important role, as they specify who is responsible for what when it comes to the education and its quality. MAE differs from the rest of the school system, except for pre-schools, in terms of how it is organised and then audited by the SSI. In the regular education system, the SSI audits both the municipality and the school. When it comes to adult education, the SSI only audits the responsible municipality. Thus, the municipality has to find ways to audit and to hold the schools that deliver courses accountable on their behalf.

The Swedish Schools Inspectorate

There are five different school authorities with different responsibilities in Sweden. The authority tasked with auditing schools is the SSI, which was established in 2008 as a new strategy to improve equivalence (Rönnberg, 2014b). The specific details and the extent of the SSI’s commission are detailed in the Education Act (2010:800) and in various national policy documents. To carry out its mission, to ensure “every student’s right to quality education and equal opportunities to reach the goals of education” (Carlbaum, 2016, p. 137; SSI, 2020c), the SSI audits education in Sweden. The SSI also grants permission to independent schools to deal with complaints from students. The education can be inspected in two different ways within MAE, through either regular supervision or a quality audit. The aim of regular supervision is to make sure that all schools follow the laws, rules and curricula (SSI, 2020a). What distinguishes these audits is that they have an enhanced legal character and additional opportunities to issue fines. The aim of the quality audit is to focus on different quality aspects of education, drawing on national goals and guidelines, proven experience and previous research findings (SSI, 2020b). This kind of audit is used to identify success factors and well-functioning elements, as well as contributing to development.

A Post-structural, “Problem-oriented” Approach to Policy Analysis

To scrutinise how “quality” is construed in the SSI’s quality interviews of school personnel and their discursive effects, Bacchi’s (2009) “What’s the problem represented to be?” (WPR) approach is introduced. This post-structural, Foucault-influenced application, which is used to critically analyse policy, rests on three key premises. First, that “we are governed through problematisations” (p. xxi), as there are specific kinds of “thinking”, hence, logics or rationales that underpin governing practices and thus policymaking, which shapes “problems” in a specific way. Second, that these problematisations should be studied instead of only focusing the “problem” (p. xxi). That is not to say that problems that exist in the real world such as health and social issues are not worth focusing on, but rather that these problematisations need to be carefully interrogated as they often contain implicit understandings of who is responsible for them. Third, that these problematisations need to be problematised by an interrogation of the “premises and effects” that such problem representations contain (p. xxi). Hence, it is suggested within the WPR approach that policy produces “problems” as specific sorts of problems, rather than just addressing them. In sum, the focus of the approach is the “way in which problematisations are central to governing processes” (Bacchi, 2009, p. xii).

Scrutinising Discursive Effects of Problem Representations

In this article, the focus is on the discursive effects of “things said” during the SSI’s MAE quality audit interviews (Bacchi & Goodwin, 2016). By asking “What effects are produced by this representation of the ‘problem’?”¹ (Bacchi, 2009, p. 2), it has been possible to scrutinise the political implications of the proposals that problematisations contain. According to Bacchi (2009, p. 15), discursive effects can be described as “the limits imposed on what can be thought and said” and the “playing out” of these limitations in people’s lives (Bacchi & Goodwin, 2016, p. 23). Hence, by scrutinising the discursive effects of presupossitions and silences in what school personnel say, a space for questioning and also interrupting these limitations can be opened up. Put differently, the analysis highlights the effects that certain aspects of the problem representation have on peoples’ lives, and suggests how they can be rethought and reconsidered by questioning what seems to be taken for granted. To guide the analysis, four of Bacchi’s (2009) sub-questions were used: “What is likely to change with this representation of the problem?”, “What is likely to stay the same?”, “Who is likely to benefit/be harmed from this representation of the problem?” and “How does the attribution of responsibility for the ‘problem’ affect those so targeted and the perceptions of the rest of the community about who is to blame?”. These sub-questions were used to identify and interrogate silences, attributions of responsibility, and limiting and enabling effects in the selected material. Hence, by focusing on how school personnel “problematize what they are, what they do, and the world in which they live” (Foucault, 1986, p. 10), it was possible to study the discursive effects of the problem representations in the interviews.

Within the WPR approach, texts are understood in a broad sense, which means that both interview transcripts and “mechanisms of government” – such as a quality audit – can be included in an analysis (Bacchi & Goodwin, 2016, p. 18). As long as the material is prescriptive and constructed as a “form of proposal”, it can be used to allow for reflection and interrogation on the forms of governing and its effects. Hence, as a “guide to conduct” (Foucault, 1986, p. 12), it will be possible to scrutinise what is targeted to change in the proposal and thus also what the “problem” is represented to be (Bacchi & Goodwin, 2016).

Selection of Material and the Analysis Process

This article focuses on the SSI’s quality audit of MAE during 2018–2019. The audit targeted the municipalities’ and the principals’ responsibility for creating the right conditions for teachers to be able to organise individualised, flexible education for students. The audit resulted in a report published in 2019 (SSI, 2019a). The audit consisted of interviews with students, educational and career advisers, teachers, principals and responsible authorities from 30 different municipalities in Sweden, and included self-directed, authorised and procured education. Of the 30 municipalities included in the audit, this article draws on data collected from interviews with teachers, principals and responsible authorities from six different municipalities, which differs in terms of size and how they organise adult education. The interviews were audio recorded and transcribed verbatim. Altogether, the 20 different interviews that underpin the empirical analysis of this article consisted of more than 522 transcribed pages.

After the material was transcribed, Bacchi’s (2009) questions were used to guide the coding process that took place in NVIVO. In this part of the process, Bacchi’s questions served as themes and the quotes were selected in relation. After the quotes had been selected, they were critically analysed in line with each subquestion and the overarching question of what kind of effects the different quotes produced. Finally, the analysis was divided into three sections where each of the section answers one or two of the sub questions.

Analysis

The analysis consists of three different parts that focus the discursive effects of how “quality” is construed during the SSI’s quality audit of MAE.

‘ … if there are no alarming aspects, then it will not be something that we prioritise'

The first part of the analysis draws on two of Bacchi’s (2009) sub-questions: “What is likely to change with this representation of the problem?” and “What is likely to stay the same?”. We now turn to our first quotation, taken from an interview in which a representative of the responsible authority explains why she thinks the quality work in MAE has not been prioritised in the same way as in the rest of the education system.

When I came here, I thought a lot about why it really is not [prioritised]. Because we actually have pretty solid quality work for our other schools [compulsory and upper secondary schools]. So, we have worked a lot with the quality work and how it is carried out. And why has MAE not been involved in the same way? And I sometimes think that it is because people find it difficult to grasp. I think politicians have a hard time grasping it. There is a complexity in some way, and based on the fact that it is not a mandatory activity. We are of course obliged to offer things, and we have an obligation to go into certain areas. But as a student, you are not compelled to participate. (Responsible Authority, Municipality 1.)

Put differently, “quality” is construed in terms of lack of management, as it is not as solid as in “other schools”, i.e., other forms of education. Moreover, the chain of command seems to be unclear according to the principal, as it is not said why this area has not been prioritised. In effect, as the “lack” of quality work is expressed, it contains an implicit demand for better quality work. Hence, a change is proposed. We now turn to the second quotation, where the Head of Operations at Private Provider 1 talks about the agreement and how it could be used by the municipalities:

When it comes to just follow-up, I might think that the agreement doesn’t say much about how they [the responsible authority] think, except that they should follow up the organisation and so on. For example, it comes back to this: quality reports must be submitted and quality aspects include target group, goals and what goals the students achieve and how we work around different areas. But I think, at least when I went through the agreement from Municipality 2, it’s still not this way, it’s more like we are the ones who get to describe, not so many demands. I would say … 

Both these quotations seem to signal that the quality work is not prioritised as high as it should be, and they both propose that changes should be made. In this specific quotation, “quality” is construed as something implicit that must be made explicit as demands in an agreement, and then followed up in a quality report. Alongside the quality report, another document is introduced as a way to define target quality, namely the agreement that the municipality uses to procure education from private providers. The municipality can highlight different “quality demands” or “aspects” in the agreement. However, according to the Head of Operations, many municipalities do not take the opportunity to formulate any “quality demands” for private providers. It is therefore unclear who is responsible for quality, as it seems to be left to the private provider to define quality aspects themselves, according to the Head of Operations. The third quotation provides an example of what the responsible authority in Municipality 2 says about “quality”:

RA:

I think that some things are actually within the principal’s own remit, and it’s a bit like that when we do our analyses. First, the school does its analyses and then they flag up to me which development areas include alarming aspects, and if there are no alarming aspects, then it will not be something that we prioritise. But they monitor it with their quality review all the time, and then there will be details that I cannot access if I haven’t received … 

SI:

If no one says anything, it goes unnoticed?

RA:

Yes, in a way.

In this quotation, “quality” is construed in terms of something that passes by unnoticed if nothing alarming happens. Thus, “quality” seems to be construed as compliance with standards (Dahler-Larsen, 2019), and some aspects are made invisible. Hence, there are no explicit quality demands, just as the Head of Operations pointed out in the previous quotation. When “quality” is construed as compliance with standards, there are no quality grades. Subsequently, “quality” is referred to as a binary choice, hence either “quality” or “not quality”. If the responsible authority does not receive any alarming reports, it seems to be taken for granted that the education meets the grade, or is of good “quality”. The discussion of “quality” is similar in our fourth quotation, taken from another interview with the responsible authority in Municipality 3:

So, our picture is that the students are very happy with [the private provider]. It’s not the case that we have a massive criticism of Private Provider 2, that it doesn’t work. But still, it’s our responsibility that … And the study and career advisers are the ones who have the most contact with the students and Private Provider 2 as well. And it’s not like they have said that there’s something alarming. But it’s clear, and maybe an inspection like this can make you think a little more: How do we act as responsible authority? And that’s one of the things we found when we started talking about following up on quality. (Responsible Authority, Municipality 3.)

In contrast to the previous quotation, a change is proposed as the responsible authority in Municipality 3 starts to question how a responsible authority should act. Both of the responsible authorities appear to use similar vocabulary when they refer to “quality”, even though they are working in different municipalities. Hence, “quality” is construed as the absence of “massive criticism” and “something alarming” or “warning flags”. Another thing that both quotations have in common is that the quality work is something that takes place within the chain of command, even though it seems unclear where the responsibility for this lies. In Municipality 2 it is the principal that raises the warning flag, while in Municipality 3 it is the educational and career advisers who have the most contact with students. The “problem” seems to travel upwards within the chain of command, but nothing is said about how to develop currently functioning areas further. In sum, what seems likely to stay the same is what how quality work is described as being problem-oriented. What is likely to change is that “quality” becomes invisible, as there are no specific quality demands within the organisation and because currently functioning areas will not be prioritised.

‘They announce that they ensure quality … '

The second part of the analysis focuses on another of Bacchi’s (2009) sub-questions: “How does the attribution of responsibility for the ‘problem’ affect those targeted and the perceptions of the rest of the community about who is to blame?” A representative of the responsible authority from Municipality 1 talks about how to ensure that the organisation maintains “quality”:

SI:

How does the responsible authority ensure that the teachers, and now we’re talking about the Private Provider 1 school, have sufficient competence to be able to adapt the teaching to the individual?

RA:

We do not ensure it other than just trusting the private provider.

SI:

Mm, so you have chosen a private provider?

RA:

Yes.

SI:

That’s what it is?

RA:

Yes.

SI:

Do you get an account, or do you get something … ?

RA:

Don’t know, I don’t know.

SI:

No. I have also asked the principal about it, but it … 

RA:

No, I haven’t asked for it, and I don’t know if the principal asks for it either. And somehow, they [Private Provider 1] have … they announce that they ensure quality and say that they should maintain quality and commit based on that aspect then. But whether they do it or not? I don’t know if we have any control function in that way.

In this case, “quality” seems to be construed in two different ways. On the one hand, it is construed as written text in the agreement where the private provider commits to maintain “quality”. On the other hand, the responsible authority says that it really does not know whether the private provider maintains and ensures “quality” in the way that it says it does. The concept of “trust” appears to indicate that the responsible authority assumes that the private provider does what it undertakes to do in the agreement, simply because the municipality has no control function or follow-up plan. Hence, “trusting” seems to be a way to construe “quality” through the attribution of responsibility from the organisation to the private provider. As the responsibility for quality seems to shift, and as the municipality has no control function, it becomes unclear whether the municipality actually gets the “quality” it pays for. In other words, the responsibility for “quality” also seems to be construed as a “promise” rather than something that is “ensured”, as nobody asks for it and it is assumed that somebody else will take responsibility for it. This assumption can also be exemplified with a quotation from another interview with a principal in Municipality 4.

SI:

Do you have knowledge of time, resources available for competence development for these teachers because they … 

P:

… at Private Provider 1?

SI:

Yes.

P:

No … 

SI:

Or have you place demands for it in any way?

P:

No, we probably haven’t done that … I can’t say that we have.

SI:

There is nothing you have demanded or followed up?

P:

No, so we can see that their quality report is there [in a system] so that we can access it and we can also see the results for different periods then. And there they report different areas like this, but more than that I cannot say … 

In line with the previous quotation, this municipality has also not engaged actively with making quality demands or following up on “quality” in the outsourced education. In this quotation, it also seems to be taken for granted that knowledge about “quality” can be obtained by making demands and then following up on them. Moreover, the “problem” with the unchecked “quality” that the school inspector proposes seems to be handled in a similar way in both municipalities. Hence, as the school Inspector asks whether the municipality has made any demands, the responsibility for this area is attributed to the responsible authority. However, the municipal authority seems to attribute the responsibility for quality to the private provider, as referred to its quality reports. Since every party seems to attribute the responsibility for “quality” elsewhere, the concept seems to get lost in the chain of command. As “quality” is construed as something that needs to be demanded and followed up on, it becomes invisible in this system as the responsibility seems to be unclear. In a quotation from another interview with a principal from Municipality 2, we get another perspective on the same issue:

Then there are students who say that it is easy to get grades and so on. But I cannot really say what the quality is like. I cannot vouch for it because I don’t know. […] I wish that we could have more distance teaching under our own management, but I barely have room for those teachers at our premises. But I think we could do better ourselves, to be able to keep track of the quality! But with the existing personnel, we are not able to manage it in the service distribution. So, that’s why I think it feels good that these individuals who work or cannot come to school have the opportunity to study remotely. […] I really want to know more about it [the NTI school]! But I have not had time to … But it is probably more that you should feel safe with it. I could just as easily have it in my organisation, meaning that you know that it is so good that it maintains quality. (Principal, Municipality 2.)

This quotation mirrors the previous one, as the principal says that she cannot tell “what the quality is like”. In this comment, it seems to be taken for granted that a more active engagement and presence is a way to ascertain and ensure that “good quality” is maintained in the organisation. Thus, instead of focusing time and energy on keeping track of what private providers do, it seems to be assumed that it will be easier to keep track of it in-house. What distinguishes this quotation from the previous one is that the word “trust” is absent. Instead, “not knowing” seems to underpin the notion that the principal cannot “feel safe” about the outsourced education. The “quality” of the education under the municipality’s own management is assumed to be “known” and thus easy to maintain and keep track of, while the “quality” of the outsourced education is assumed to be “unknown” and therefore not safe. In sum, the effect seems to be that the attribution for responsibility and the blame for “quality” seem to be displaced, from the private provider to the organisation in this case.

‘It is the student who ends up in a tight spot!'

The third and final part of the analysis draws on Bacchi’s (2009) sub-question “Who is likely to benefit/be harmed from this representation of the ‘problem’?”. We now turn to the impact the agreement seems to have on what can be said about “quality” in this specific context.

The agreement and the tender documents can have a governing function in a good way, and then they can [have a governing function] in a bad way. It depends on what you look at. Many such procurements are very price controlled today in MAE, and some municipalities are better or worse at thinking about quality. And as soon as it comes to the quality perspective, they pinpoint quite good things. (Head of Operations, Private Provider 1.)

On the one hand, the agreement seems to enable “quality” as some of the municipalities are good at pinpointing these perspectives. On the other hand, however, the agreement also seems to obstruct “quality” as the procurements are often controlled by price to a significant extent. There also seems to be an implied attribution of responsibility in this quotation, as it is the municipalities that are “better or worse at thinking about quality”. Hence, the municipality’s ability to pinpoint “quality things” seems to affect private providers’ discretion. In another quotation from a principal from Municipality 5, we get a more detailed view of how the agreement can be formulated.

And to be authorised, it’s important that you achieve certain quality requirements. You have to have a classroom, it sounds funny. You have to have qualified teachers, at least. Yes, we only have qualified teachers on the whole. But that you have someone who can set the grades. And there should be a principal on site and things like that. […] We can have a barn out in the countryside and then we shove 100 SFI students in there and then the teachers get to teach 30 hours a week. Yes, but then it goes well together [financially]. Now I exaggerate, but in essence it’s like that, huh? But if you want some kind of quality, you have groups of 20 students and then there should be reasonable working conditions. Then there is no activity in the world that goes together with these economic conditions. But you don’t want to pay attention to that from a certain political standpoint so … (Principal, Municipality 5.)

In this quotation, the agreement seems to obstruct or even block “quality”, rather than enabling it. Hence, in line with the previous quotation, the economic circumstances that underpin the agreement seem to affect both the school personnel’s discretion and the “teaching quality” From the principal’s point of view, the “quality requirements” seems to be the most fundamental aspects, such as a classroom and a teacher. This is in line with the quotations from the second part of the analysis, where quality was construed as compliance with standards. Hence, the concept seems to be stripped of its other meanings as something “excellent” or “first rate”. Additionally, the principal is talking about two different kinds of “quality”: the basic “quality requirements” in the agreement and “real teaching quality”, which is said to require different economic circumstances. Another example of where discretion is limited because of the agreement comes from a group of teachers who work at Private Provider 1.

T1:

The opinion is very much that the municipalities, so it is political, those who are negative about independent schools oppose it, or the contracts are written in such a way that it becomes very tight. And it affects the students. You kind of tighten up on the framework of our scope for action, which only punishes the students.

SI:

What kind of scope for action are you thinking about?

T1:

But for example, extension of times, how you want different individual adaptions to be fixed. These are things where you feel like you are being tied up. Some municipalities want to, of course, impose fines on grading. It should be set five days after the end of the course, which means that these students who had something left, or if something happened in their life during the last week, or there was repetition of this little thing, in some municipalities you can continue to work with the student then. You have built a relationship and you have continued confidence because you only need a few more days to get this grade that can make an incredible difference [for the student]. In some municipalities you do it, and you can drag it out a little more if you fix it in the end. But in other municipalities, the agreement says no! I’s F [Fail]!

This interview offers another example of how teachers say that their discretion is limited by the agreement. As a consequence, they claim that “it is the student who ends up in a tight spot” (T3, Private Provider 1). Both the teachers and the principal from Municipality 5 connect the way the agreement is written with political rationalities that they seem to hold responsible. Moreover, the teachers at Private Provider 1 question the adult education system and the contracts. Even though they want to be able to extend courses, the private provider risks economic punishment if it does not follow the rules stipulated in the contract. Hence, the flexibility of the system and the student perspective seem to be equated with the economic circumstances in the agreement. Moreover, the “quality” of the education seems to differ as the agreements are written in different ways in different municipalities, according to the teachers and the Head of Operations at Private Provider 1. In effect, the equality of the educational system is called into question as the students are treated differently depending on which municipality they live in. If we turn to Municipality 5, we can see another example of how the agreement affects students.

T3:

Then, you wish that you could … 

T1:

… tell the student, that we, and we do sometimes, that we extend your course. But then we get to know from the main administration, to extend a course, well then it must happen within that time. I think that the student can be affected financially, by the Swedish Board of Student Finance, if you extend and so on … 

SI:

But I’m still thinking about planning!

T1:

But I think then that if a student says that I’ll be able to do this in ten weeks. And then I quickly discover that the student doesn’t, because he or she needs more time! Then I talk to the student and see how we can still solve it. And one solution is to extend a course. But I’m then affected by everything that surrounds it. Administrative rules. I can’t extend a course for a student within a certain time, or the course is ongoing, and we extend and then it’s over. So, we try to do it anyway, but we get a little slap on the wrist if we are too accommodating. If we are too flexible in our planning with the student, then we can get a slap on the wrist for it!

In this quotation, teachers seem to be punished when they act against the system in the student’s best interests. In this case, the teachers actually break the rules and “get a little slap on the wrist”. Hence, the acting space for this group of teachers seems a little less tight as there is no talk of economic punishment. The teachers also seem to construe themselves as being in opposition to the administrative rules as they resist them. However, the school inspector that asks the questions wants to return to the original question about how the teachers plan their teaching. Hence, in this context, there seems to be no scope to talk about how the “administrative” rules affect the teaching and, by extension, the students. It is the “quality” of the planning that is up for discussion, not the way the education system affects it.

What all the teachers and the principal seem to have in common is that they see themselves as the ones who think about what is best for the students and/or educational “quality”. Hence, they seem to problematise not only what they say and do, but also the educational system itself and what is valued within this system. In sum, “quality” seems to be construed in terms of ambiguity, which affects who is likely to benefit or be harmed from this representation of the “problem”. On the one hand, it makes it possible to talk about teaching and education, and to offer perspectives on what it could be. On the other hand, however, it also sets limits for what can be said, thought and done about teaching and education, as the bigger questions about the organisation of MAE seem to be silenced and overlooked. Teachers actively try to resist, even though they “get scolded” (T2, Municipality 5) for it.

Discussion

In this article, discursive effects of how “quality” is construed have been scrutinised. First, the analysis illustrates how “quality” is construed as an absence of “warning flags”, and thus as compliance with standards. What is said about quality seems to be problem-oriented. Second, “quality” seems to be construed as a responsibility, and – as it seems unclear who is or should be responsible for it – the concept is made invisible. Third and finally, it is suggested that “quality” is construed as something that both enables and obstructs different kinds of discussion and discernments; it silences and obstructs what can be said and the possibility to question the organisation of the adult education system.

We now turn to the first finding, that “quality” is construed as compliance with standards and thus seems to become problem-oriented and ultimately silenced. Hence, when “quality” is talked about as compliance with standards, any deviation or unexplained variance from the standard becomes a “problem” that requires attention and eventually also action (Dahler-Larsen, 2019). Moreover, the concepts that are used in relation to “quality”, such as “monitored all the time”, “alarming” and “warning flags”, bring to mind a factory where education is produced with “quality” at assembly lines, constantly closely monitored and reported. This is in line with what Dahler-Larsen (2019, p. 69) describes as a method for the “lazy evaluator”, as there seems to be no need for long and complex evaluations as the “not normal”, or the “warnings flags” that are raised are enough to call for action. Issues that raise warning flags are construed as specific kinds of “quality problems”, and when these “problems” are solved it seems to be taken for granted that there is “quality” in the education. However, when “quality” is construed in this way, more subjective definitions of the concept appear to be unnecessary (Reeves & Bednar, 1994). Hence, other versions or thoughts about what “quality” could be or means are silenced. There is also no guarantee that “quality” will increase just because the “problems” are solved, as what appears to be a rise in standards could be deceptive as standardisation is more easily audited and controlled (Stake, 2004). Hence, the standards become “goals in themselves”, as they are often underpinned by ambiguity and unclarity (Dahler-Larsen, 2019, p. 72). Thus, it is crucial to question what underpins the assumption that “if no one says anything, it goes unnoticed”, as the concept of “quality” seems to be silenced as soon as it is equated with compliance (Bacchi, 2009).

Moreover, any deviation from the standards also places an “explanatory burden on those who are responsible for the quality” (Dahler-Larsen, 2019, p. 69), which bring us to the second finding of the article: “quality” seems to be construed as a responsibility (Bacchi, 2009). Even though it seems to be clear in policy who is responsible, the comments about the “quality responsibility” are more ambiguous in what school personnel say (Roberts, 2018). There also seems to be a degree of uncertainty about what “quality” is, and how it should be followed up, in what the principals and the responsible authorities say. This uncertainty and the comments about “not knowing” and wanting to “feel safe” could also be a reflection of what to do and how to act when there is a discrepancy between practice and quality demands in policy. As Dahler-Larsen (2019) points out, widespread uncertainty and the exercise of power might work together as reflexivity is not necessarily the same as freedom, but is rather a product of many opposing demands and scarce resources.

Hence, even though responsible authorities and principals are held accountable for “quality” in policy (Mufic & Fejes, 2020), as a way to set “quality control in motion” (Kauko et al., 2018, p. 195), nothing is said about the consequences of this. Thus, in practice, there seems to be some uncertainty about how to address “quality”, and the responsibility for this seems to get lost in the chain of command. There would appear to be a lack of tools and language for achieving versions of “quality” other than the one that is easily accessible in a quality report. The way that principals and responsible authorities talk about “trust” can also be linked to what Øvretveit (2005) describes as slow resistance, which can be manifested through practitioners’ hesitation to take part in quality configurations. In this case, “trust” seems to be proposed as a “solution” to the “problem” of how to ensure that the private provider upholds and maintains “quality”. Hence, by “trusting” the private provider, the responsibility for the “problem” is renounced even though the municipality seems to lack both the tools and the time to follow up on what they delegate. Is the “problem” then really solved, or is it just displaced (Bacchi, 2009)?

We now turn to the third and final finding, that what is said about “quality” seems to obstruct what can be said about – and the opportunity to question – how MAE is organised. This can be exemplified with the principal’s criticism of the “quality demands” in the agreement, where he questions whether access to premises and teachers really are “quality indicators”. In this case, the agreement could be seen as an example of how a quality criterion travels from one context to another and is then talked about as “quality” (Pollock et al., 2018). Put differently, it is an example of how the use of “quality” in a specific context structures social order in a specific way. Another example of the effects of how “quality” is talked about is the way that “good practice” is construed in way school personnel say. As both the principal and several of the teachers point out, they do “something more” than just setting grades, providing premises that the agreement describes as “quality”. Hence, as Dahler-Larsen (2019, p. 93) points out, “no criteria exhaust the meaning of good practice”.

However, there seems to be a risk that the effect of the quality discourse will equate “quality” with the fulfilment of quality criteria. Consequently, the concepts of both “quality” and “good practice” seem to be stripped from other possible definitions, as they can no longer be aligned “with the total configuration of the situation into which it is situated” (Dahler-Larsen, 2019, p. 93). As “quality” is formalised in an agreement, some sort of reduction must take place and this construing of desirable quality indicators then sets the tone for what can be said and thought about the concept in practice (Bacchi, 2009). Hence, as the teachers say that they actively try to oppose regulations that are stipulated in the agreement because they believe that the rules harm the students, the question becomes one of whose “quality” it actually is. This question brings all three of the different findings together, as there seems to be a risk that the quality work will no longer be a goal to strive for; rather that checkpoints that should simply be achieved and warning flags should be lowered, driven by a fear of being punished for failures.

In sum, this article has provided an analysis of the discursive effects in what school personnel say about “quality”. As such, it makes a contribution to the field by giving practical examples of what happens to people under quality measurement. However, there is still need for further research that engages with the effects of “quality” in different educational practices at local levels.

Acknowledgements

I want to thank Andreas Fejes and Song-ee Ahn from Linköping University as well as the anonymous reviewers for their helpful and valuable comments.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 As Bacchi (2009) points out, it is not necessary to strictly follow all six of the questions in every analysis, as they overlap and intertwine.