ABSTRACT
Increasing strategic competition between the United States (US) and China creates challenges for small liberal democracies like New Zealand because competing powers place competing demands on foreign policy preferences. This article asks how ‘the less powerful states’ are responding to US-China great power competition and employs a liberal analysis of state preferences to ascertain that response. It finds that great power demands are mediated by national identity, interests and institutional settings that shape the formation of state preferences in a small liberal democracy. It concludes the cognitive dissonance brought on by competing powers vying to shape New Zealand preferences has forced a more acute competition between domestic interest groups leading to a clearer articulation of New Zealand foreign policy preferences. This has edged the country away from the comfortable strategic ambiguity that characterised much of its post-Cold War era and questions whether New Zealand can maintain an independent foreign policy or will be dragged into a broader strategic competition.
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Notes
1. There is a lot of debate about whether China can be defined as a hegemonic challenger. Much of the debate is created by the connotations applied to such a term. China’s own foreign policy and identity is anchored in a ‘counter-hegemonic discourse’ where ‘hegemony’ is afforded very negative connotations. On the basis of the above definition, however, China is significantly stronger than other states in material power (particularly economic power), is aware of this power and willing to use it under the more assertive leadership of Xi Jinping as well as being active in building and sustaining international institutions such as the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank and Belt and Road Initiative.
2. For a potential Biden Administration view, see Bader (Citation2020).
3. Due to the constraints of space, only liberal explanations for New Zealand foreign policy are evaluated and neorealist theory is not considered.
4. ‘Joint Communication on Establishing a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the People’s Republic of China and New Zealand’ (Chinese), 20 November 2014, available at http://www.chinaembassy.org.nz/chn/zgxw/t1213213.htm.
5. ‘Strategic Defence Policy Statement 2018ʹ, New Zealand Ministry of Defence, 6 July 2018, available at https://www.defence.govt.nz/publications/publication/strategic-defence-policy-statement-2018, points 79 and 80 on p.17.
6. The Letter is available on the official website of the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights as ‘A/HRC/41/G/11ʹ, 23 July 2019. Available at https://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?c=39&su=49.
7. See point 42 of: ‘Joint statement: Prime Ministers Jacinda Ardern and Scott Morrison’, Beehive.govt.nz, 31 May 2021, available at https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/joint-statement-prime-ministers-jacinda-ardern-and-scott-morrison.
8. Full Text: Xi Jinping’s keynote speech at the World Economic Forum’, The State Council Information Office, The People’s Republic of China, 6 April 2017, available at http://www.china.org.cn/node_7247529/content_40569136.htm.
9. ‘GCSB statement’, Government Communications Security Bureau, 28 November 2018, available at https://www.gcsb.govt.nz/news/gcsb-statement/.
10. ‘Cyber campaign attributed to China’, Government Communications Security Bureau, 21 December 2018, available at https://www.gcsb.govt.nz/news/cyber-campaign-attributed-to-china/.
11. Fonterra chief executive Miles Hurrell, Sealord, Meat Industry Association, Zespri chairman Bruce Cameron, Export NZ, Beef + Lamb, the Food and Grocery Council and several business advocacy groups.
12. For Europe see: ‘EU-China – A strategic outlook’, European Commission and HR/VP contribution to the European Council, 12 March 2019, available at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/publications/eu-china-strategic-outlook-commission-contribution-european-council-21-22-march-2019_en; ‘Partner and Systemic Competitor – How Do We Deal with China’s State-Controlled Economy?’ BDI, 10 January 2019, available at https://english.bdi.eu/publication/news/china-partner-and-systemic-competitor/.
13. Section 301-China, Investigation: Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation’, Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2017/18, available at https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/enforcement/section-301-investigations/section-301-china/investigation.
14. See, for example, ‘Fonterra’s recent retreat from farming in China: ‘Fonterra sells Chinese farms for half a billion dollars’, Radio New Zealand, 5 October 2020, available at https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/business/427613/fonterra-sells-chinese-farms-for-half-a-billion-dollars.
15. ‘Remarks on the Indo-Pacific – Ben King, Deputy Secretary for Americas and Asia’, New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 23 October 2018, available at https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/media-and-resources/ministry-statements-and-speeches/remarks-on-indo-pacific-ben-king/.
16. ‘ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific’, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 23 June 2019, available at https://asean.org/storage/2019/06/ASEAN-Outlook-on-the-Indo-Pacific_FINAL_22062019.pdf.
17. The Indo-Pacific is already the third of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s seven strategic goals. See: ‘Strategic Intentions’, New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2020, available at https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/about-us/our-strategic-direction/
18. See: Zhang (Citation2020) and Zhou (Citation2020).
19. ‘United States of America’, New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, available at https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/countries-and-regions/north-america/united-states-of-america
20. ‘Changes to “catch-all” export controls for goods and technology destined for a military end-use’, New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 18 September 2020, available at https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/media-and-resources/news/changes-to-catch-all-export-controls-for-goods-and-technology-for-military-use
21. ‘New Zealand Defence Doctrine’, New Zealand Defence Force, November 2017, available at https://www.nzdf.mil.nz/assets/Publications/NZDDP-D-4th-ed.pdf
22. ‘Changes to the Overseas Investment Act’, Land Information New Zealand, 16 June 2020, available at https://www.linz.govt.nz/overseas-investment/changes-overseas-investment-act#notification
23. ‘Opening Doors to China: New Zealand’s 2015 Vision’, New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2012, available at https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/nz-inc-strategies/china-strategy/.
24. See for example Peters’ speeches in Australia and the United States: ‘“Shifting the dial”: Eyes Wide Open, Pacific Reset’, Lowy Institute, 1 March 2018, available at https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/winston-peters-new-zealand-pacific; ‘Pacific Partnerships – Georgetown address, Washington DC’, Beehive.govt.nz, available at https://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/pacific-partnerships-georgetown-address-washington-dc.
25. ‘Protective Security Requirements, ‘Protection against Foreign Interference’, newzealand.govt.nz, 23 March 2021, available at https://protectivesecurity.govt.nz/campaigns/protection-against-foreign-interference/
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Jason Young
Jason Young is Director of the New Zealand Contemporary China Research Centre and Associate Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Victoria University of Wellington. He studied Chinese at Fu Jen University and Tunghai University in Taipei and Taichung and is a graduate of the University of Otago and Victoria University of Wellington. Jason’s research focuses on China’s domestic politics and foreign policy and New Zealand-China relations. He is author of China’s Hukou System (Palgrave 2013), the second edition of Politics in Pacific Asia (with Xiaoming Huang) and a number of journal articles and chapters in English and Chinese.