https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9323-7730
![Sample our Politics & International Relations journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5947/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Politics-International-Relations.jpg"})
ABSTRACT
New Zealand and Singapore are both capable small states with notably different security and defence concerns. The relative level of commitment that Singapore provides to its military forces in comparison to New Zealand is not only a reflection of the tremendous economic, social and technological development that has occurred in the city state since its independence, but is also due the different perceptions, discretion and motivation that each state has regarding the role and utility of their military instruments. The differences in their military capabilities also reflect how each has responded to their particular circumstances as small states. New Zealand has, to a large extent, worked within the constraints expected of small states while Singapore has striven to overcome them. However, the military capabilities of both states are significantly influenced by their characteristics as small states, and these form the basis of the challenges that they are likely to face going forward. This article examines key factors and elements underpinning why New Zealand and Singapore have developed markedly different military forces in the period from 1965 to 2022 in order to understand the extent to which their characteristics as small states have influenced their respective approaches to force development.
Acknowledgments
The author previously served in the New Zealand Defence Force. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not reflect the views of the New Zealand Defence Force or New Zealand government.
The author would like to thank the independent reviewers of earlier drafts of this article for their valuable comments and suggestions.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1. The Nordic or Scandinavian states are frequently used for such comparisons, with Håkan Edström, Dennis Gyllensporre and Jacob Westberg’s (Citation2019) study of Nordic military strategies being a notable example. Bernard Loo has also recently edited a study of small state strategy and defence policy based on Singapore and Southeast Asia (B. F. W. Loo Citation2022c).
2. Comparative studies include Shang-su Wu’s (Citation2016) study of Taiwan and Singapore, and Ahmed Hashim’s (Citation2020) study of Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Singapore.
3. This includes consideration how small states may apply the Revolution in Military Affairs or conduct military innovation (Bitzinger Citation2021; B. Loo Citation2009; Raska Citation2016).
4. This is shown through T.X. Hammes’ (Citation2019) discussion of the potential use of emerging military technology by small states in Europe and Magnus Petersson’s (Citation2021) consideration of the use of autonomous systems in Scandinavian military forces.
5. The basis of this challenge is shown in Terry Deibel’s (Citation2007, 172) discussion of the military as a form of mobilised power as such power lacks fungibility once established but it can take a long time to develop military capabilities. As a result, it often takes longer to develop the appropriate military force than it takes for threats and requirements to manifest.
6. A recent example of New Zealand in this respect is Anne-Marie Brady’s (Citation2019) edited book on New Zealand as a small state. Pertinent examples for Singapore referenced in this article include Shang-su Wu (Citation2016), Ahmed Hashim (Citation2020), and Richard Bitzinger (Citation2021).
7. The World Bank Group (Citation2023a) stated Singapore’s GDP in 2021 as USD $396.99 billion and New Zealand’s as USD $249.89 billion.
8. The information for the NZDF’s force structure is drawn from The Military Balance 2022 (International Institute of Strategic Studies Citation2022, 295-296).
9. The NZDF has recently introduced four P8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft to replace the fleet of six P3K2 Orions and is replacing its C130H Hercules transport aircraft with newer C130J models.
10. The information for the SAF’s personnel figures, structures and major equipment is drawn from The Military Balance 2022 (International Institute of Strategic Studies Citation2022, 303-306).
11. The Digital and Intelligence Service (DIS) was established as part of the transformation to the Next Generation SAF to provide a defence capability tailored to the digital and information domains. Establishing the DIS as a separate service will allow it to raise, train and sustain its own personnel and organisational structures (MINDEF Singapore Citation2022b, Citation2022d).
12. These include the current acquisition of fifth generation F35 combat aircraft and Invincible class submarines. Singapore is also developing the capabilities to employ a range of remotely controlled or autonomous systems with its current and developing military capabilities.
13. The information shown in Tables 1-3 has been drawn from the Military Balance for the respective years (International Institute for Strategic Studies Citation1971, 49-51; Citation1997, 189-190, 192-193; Citation2022, 295-296, 303-306). The Tables provide a summation of the range of information presented to enable a general comparison between the military forces of New Zealand and Singapore in each of the years. The information shown is selective and does not show each state’s full military capabilities at the time or the qualitative differences between them.
14. Examples of this include the dissolution of the short range tactical air transport and air combat fleets in the late 1990s/early 2000s in order to reapportion funds within the wider force (New Zealand Government Citation1997, 50; 2001, 10). A current example of the effects of budgetary pressures on force development is the deferment of the planned acquisition of a Southern Ocean Patrol Vessel due to the fiscal impact of COVID 19 (Manch Citation2022; New Zealand Ministry of Defence Citation2023).
15. These priorities and capability requirements are described in Chapters 5 and 6 of the Strategic Defence Policy Statement 2018 (New Zealand Government Citation2018).
16. The New Zealand Defence Industry Association was established in 1993 as a coordinating body to connect industry with the defence sector in New Zealand. The current membership comprises a range of domestic and international companies that conduct business with the defence and security sector in New Zealand (including foreign suppliers of major equipment). However, although New Zealand based companies have participated in defence projects in the past (such as contributing to ship construction or upgrading aircraft), there is not an integrated or consistent defence industrial sector in the country.
17. New Zealand’s 2021 Defence Assessment states the importance of Defence’s participation in Five Eyes as, “[t]his is a critical grouping for New Zealand of countries that share fundamental values and interests. New Zealand Defence derives enormous benefit from this partnership, including in terms of access to defence capabilities, information technologies and military developments that would otherwise be unachievable.” (New Zealand Ministry of Defence Citation2021, 12) The previous Strategic Defence Policy Statement also emphasised the benefit of operating and exercising alongside the Five Eyes partners, the requirement for the NZDF to be able to operate effectively with them, and the implications that this would have for Defence capability choices (New Zealand Government Citation2018, 14, 29, 37).
18. The establishment of the Digital and Intelligence Service is also presented as part of the SAF’s transformation to the next generation (MINDEF Singapore Citation2022c) and shows an ongoing commitment to identify and respond to emerging security issues.
19. Singapore has consistently apportioned the greatest amount of its government expenditure to defence. However, this has changed during the COVID 19 pandemic as the largest category of total government expenditure during 2020-2022 was the health, although it forecasts that defence will be the largest category in 2023. (Singapore Ministry of Finance Citation2023, 47).
20. The 2021 Defence Assessment emphasised an even greater focus on operations in the Pacific (New Zealand Ministry of Defence Citation2021, 4, 30), although that has yet to be presented as official defence policy (noting that New Zealand is currently conducting a defence policy review).
21. SIPRI figures show that Singapore’s defence spending (measured in current USD) first overtook that of New Zealand in 1976 and was 3.28 times the size of New Zealand’s defence expenditure in 2021 (USD $11.12 billion to USD $3.39 billion (SIPRI Citation2022). However, this difference in the level of commitment to defence spending is much greater than the difference in economic size noted earlier, with Singapore having a GDP 1.59 times the size of New Zealand.
22. These variables are used by Håkan Edström, Dennis Gyllensporre and Jacob Westberg in their study of military strategies in small states (Citation2019, 16-18, 23-30), and related as unit-level characteristics of middle powers, great powers and small states in Håkan Edström and Jacob Westberg’s subsequent examination of defense strategies of middle powers (Citation2020, 174). Bernard Loo (Citation2022a, 11-12) also describes the influence of geopolitics and geostrategy in defence policy and strategy, particularly with regard to the example of Singapore.
23. This is indicated by New Zealand’s current military expenditure which in 2021 was 52nd in current US dollars out of the 154 states that SIPRI provides figures for (SIPRI Citation2022), although most of the 14 states that it does not provide figures for are likely to have greater defence expenditures than New Zealand.
24. Singapore’s military expenditure for 2021 is 24th in current US dollars out of the 154 states that SIPRI provides figures for (SIPRI Citation2022).
25. Bernard Loo provides Singapore’s acquisition of limited numbers of F-35Bs to replace the current fleet of F-16s as an example of this (B. F. W. Loo Citation2022b, 65).
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Vernon Noel Bennett
Vernon Bennett is a retired military officer and works within Sector Programmes at Engineering New Zealand. He completed his PhD through the Victoria University of Wellington. This article develops upon the themes presented in his Doctoral thesis (Military force structures in small states: providing for relevant and credible military capability). His research interests include small state theory and military theory within international relations.