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Abstract
The concept of human terrain has become a prominent element of U.S. military strategy. It is a means to capture the cultural–geographical qualities of an enemy or target population. An early effort to map human terrain is found in the Joint Army–Navy Intelligence Study (JANIS) of Korea (1945). We argue that the JANIS report on Korea was paradigmatic for the U.S. military's contemporary geographical work and offers insights into the cultural politics of human terrain mapping. This explains why the JANIS text is cited by the National Geospatial-Intelligence College (NGC) today as an historical model. This article not only offers a window into the history of geography counterinsurgent but also shows that geography has been entwined with empire.
人文地形的概念，已成为美国军事策略的重要元素。人文地形是捕捉敌方或目标人口的文化—地理质量之方法。韩国（1945）陆海军联合情报研究（JANIS）中，发现了描绘人文地形的早期努力。我们主张，JANIS对韩国的报导，是美国军队当代地理工作的范例，并为人文地形测绘的文化政治提供了洞见。这也解释了为何JANIS的文本，会在今日被国家地理空间情报学院（NGC）引用作为历史模型。本文不仅提供了理解地理反叛乱的历史视野，亦同时显示，地理与帝国有着紧密的结合。
El concepto de terreno humano se ha convertido en un elemento prominente en la estrategia militar de los EE.UU. Es un medio para captar las cualidades geográfico–culturales de un enemigo o de una población objetivo. Uno de los primeros intentos de cartografiar el terreno humano se encuentra en el Estudio de Inteligencia Conjunto Ejército-Armada (JANIS) sobre Corea (1945). Nuestra apreciación es que el informe JANIS sobre Corea fue paradigmático en el trabajo geográfico contemporáneo de las fuerzas armadas norteamericanas, además de presentar enfoques notables en la política cultural del mapeo del terreno humano. Esto nos explica por qué el texto JANIS es hoy citado por la Universidad Nacional de Inteligencia Geoespacial (NGC) como un modelo histórico. Este artículo no solo abre una ventana a la historia de la geografía de contrainsurgencia sino que también muestra que la geografía ha estado enredada con lo imperial.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Will Jones, Kendra McSweeney, anonymous referees, and UBC's Peter Wall Institute that provided funds for archival research.
Notes
1 According to the U.S. Army HTS Web site:
[HTS] developed from the deteriorating situation in Iraq and Afghanistan during 2005–2006. … Combat commanders did not have a good understanding of the cultural and social implications of military operations in urban environments. The result of conducting operations without local sociocultural knowledge produced negative affects among the local populations. … [I]n 2006 the U.S. Department of Defense validated the urgent need for sociocultural support (human terrain concept) to combat commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan and funding was provided through the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) as part of their organizational goals. … In early 2006, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command G-2, supported by JIEDDO, responded to the operational need by developing a concept to provide social science support to military commanders in the form of Human Terrain Teams (HTTs). HTTs, composed of individuals with social science academic backgrounds, would deploy with tactical units to assist in bringing about knowledge of the local population into a coherent framework. … Two HTTs were assigned in Afghanistan (February 2007) and three HTTs to Iraq between 2007 and 2008, directly supported by a Reachback Research Center (RRC) and a subject matter expertise network (from the academic and military community) in the United States (http://humanterrainsystem.army.mil/history.html).
2 The outcry surrounding the Bowman expeditions and growing activity of the U.S. military in human geography has generated a prominent public discussion about the relationship between the U.S. military and the AAG (see, e.g., Sheppard Citation2013; Wainwright 2013b).
3 See more about the HTS on the Web site of the U.S. Army Human Terrain System at http://humanterrainsystem.army.mil/.
4 Even the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has established a Cultural Mapping program (CMAP), led by a geographer (see http://www.erdc.usace.army.mil/Media/FactSheets/FactSheetArticleView/tabid/9254/Article/476690/cultural-mapping.aspx).
5 From the fact sheet of the National Geospatial-Intelligence College (https://www1.nga.mil/MediaRoom/Press%20Kit/Documents/Factsheets/NCE_College.pdf).
6 On the history of human terrain, see González (Citation2009).
7 Jerome Dobson (Citation2013), founder of the Bowman Expeditions, described himself as a true “believe[r] in the power of geographic knowledge for doing good” and defended his team for their “abiding dedication to the indigenous people of Oaxaca and our neutrality in all things political.”
8 Office of Strategic Services: America's First Intelligence Agency (http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/oss/art02.htm).
9 A useful history of the Joint Intelligence Committee is Valero (Citation2007).
10 Memo: Proposed outline for Joint Strategic Monographs, William L. Langer to all section heads, 27 July 1942, RG 226, Box 1, Folder 3, The National Archives and Records Administration (NARA); Memo: Proposed outline for Joint Strategic Monographs, George Brightman to Richard Hartshorne, 13 August 1942, RG 226, Box 1, Folder 3, NARA.
11 Memo: War and Navy Departments and OSS, 1 July 1943, RG 226, Entry 1, Box 1, Folder 2, NARA.
12 Memo: War and Navy Departments and OSS, 1 July 1943, RG 226, Entry 1, Box 1, Folder 2, III-1, NARA.
13 The Naval Intelligence Handbooks were written primarily by British geographers, with H. C. Derby taking on a significant editorial role. Some were used as texts in regional geographical courses in the United Kingdom until the 1960s (see Clout Citation2003; Clout and Gosme Citation2003).
14 Kirk H. Stone to Richard Hartshorne, 13 July 1943, RG 226 Box 1, Folder 20, NARA.
15 Edward Ullman to Donald Hudson, 7 November 1950, Ullman Papers, Box 8, Folder 23, University of Washington, Seattle, WA.
16 Memo: E. A. Ackerman to Lt. E. L. Ullman, “Report on examination of past JANIS publications and present recommended research procedures,” June 1944, Box 14B, no file name, Ackerman, Edward A. Papers 1930–1973, American Heritage Center, University of Wyoming at Laramie, WY.
17 Memo: E. A. Ackerman to Lt. E. L. Ullman, “Report on examination of past JANIS publications and present recommended research procedures,” page 2. June 1944, Box 14B, no file name, Ackerman, Edward A. Papers 1930–1973, American Heritage Center, University of Wyoming at Laramie, WY.
18 Edward L. Ullman to Edward Ackerman, 2 January, 1946, Ullman Papers, Box 1, Folder 17, University of Washington, Seattle, WA.
19 Edward L. Ullman to Edward Ackerman, 2 January, 1946, Ullman Papers, Box 1, Folder 17, University of Washington, Seattle, WA.
20 Armstrong (Citation2003) claimed “the occupation of Korea was an afterthought of U.S. military planners. … [Thus] The most prominent aspect of the U.S. attitude in the initial year or two of occupation … was neglect” (73).
21 The intelligence categories of the JANIS Korea report follow the 1943 Outline.
22 Palka (Citation1995) explained: “Because human activities can drastically alter physical landscapes, continual assessment is required of both the physical and human geography of the region. This reasoning gave birth to the Joint Army and Navy Intelligence Studies that were essentially the regional geographies of selected theaters” (203).
23 The report only briefly mentioned pro-Soviet sentiment among Koreans in the large cities and northern border regions (X-19).
24 Kurt Campbell (Citation2013), a former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, wondered how “this Asian hybrid of Hobbes and Orwell [is] even possible in 21st century northeast Asia, the veritable cockpit of the global economy?”
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Seung-Ook Lee
SEUNG-OOK LEE is a Visiting Professor in the School of Humanities & Social Sciences at Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Daejeon, 305-701, South Korea. E-mail: [email protected]. His research focuses on political economy of Northeast Asia, geopolitics of development, and politics of urban and regional development.
Trevor Barnes
TREVOR BARNES is a Professor in the Department of Geography at the University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada V6T 1Z2. E-mail: [email protected]. His research interests are in economic geography and the history of geographical thought.
Joel Wainwright
JOEL WAINWRIGHT is an Associate Professor in the Department of Geography at The Ohio State University, Columbus OH 43210. E-mail: [email protected]. Wainwright studies political economy, social theory, and environmental change.