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Original Articles

Gates or No Gates? A Cross-European Enquiry into the Driving Forces behind Gated Communities

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Pages 293-308 | Received 01 Oct 2009, Published online: 09 Oct 2010
 

Abstract

Cséfalvay Z. and Webster C. Gates or no gates? A cross-European enquiry into the driving forces behind gated communities, Regional Studies. This paper addresses one of the biggest gaps in research on gated communities: why is the phenomenon so strong in some countries, but absent in others? After reviewing the mainstream explanations, it outlines an alternative thesis based on theories of public choice and fiscal federalism. To test the relevance of the theory, European countries are divided into two groups – those with a considerable number of gated communities and those with very few or none – and they are compared on fifteen indicators. The results indicate that beyond the visible manifestation of gates and walls, there are deeper institutional driving forces.

Cséfalvay Z. et Webster C. Avec ou sans portail? Une enquête paneuropéenne des forces motrices à l'origine du développement des quartiers résidentiels surveillés, Regional Studies. Cet article cherche à aborder l'une des plus grandes lacunes dans la recherche sur les quartiers résidentiels surveillés: à savoir, pourquoi ce phénomène est-il tellement évident dans certains pays, mais brille par son absence dans d'autres? Suite à une revue des principales explications, on esquisse une autre thèse qui met plutôt l'accent sur les théories du choix politique et du fédéralisme fiscal. Pour tester la pertinence de la théorie, on divise les pays européens en deux groupes – ceux qui sont dotés d'un grand nombre de quartiers résidentiels surveillés et ceux qui n'en ont que très peu ou aucuns – et on les compare à quinze indicateurs. Les résultats laissent voir qu'il existe des forces motrices institutionnelles encore plus profondes qui vont au-delà de la présence évidente des portails et des murs.

Quartiers résidentiels surveillés Fédéralisme fiscal Choix politique Europe

Cséfalvay Z. und Webster C. Geschlossen oder nicht? Eine europaweite Untersuchung der Antriebskräfte hinter geschlossenen Wohnanlagen, Regional Studies. In diesem Beitrag wird eine der wichtigsten offenen Fragen in der Forschung über geschlossene Wohnanlagen untersucht: Warum ist dieses Phänomen in einigen Ländern so stark ausgeprägt, aber in anderen gänzlich abwesend? Nach einer Untersuchung der gängigen Erklärungen stellen wir eine alternative These auf der Grundlage der Theorien über öffentliche Auswahl und fiskalen Föderalismus auf. Zur Überprüfung der Relevanz dieser Theorie werden die europäischen Staaten in zwei Gruppen untergliedert: Staaten mit einer erheblichen Anzahl von geschlossenen Wohnanlagen und Staaten mit sehr wenigen oder keinen solchen Wohnanlagen. Der Vergleich erfolgt mit Hilfe von 15 Indikatoren. Aus den Ergebnissen geht hervor, dass sich hinter den sichtbaren Anzeichen von Toren und Mauern tiefere institutionelle Antriebskräfte verbergen.

Geschlossene Wohnanlagen Fiskaler Föderalismus Öffentliche Auswahl Europa

Cséfalvay Z. y Webster C. ¿Con verjas o sin verjas? Una encuesta transeuropea sobre los desencadenantes de las urbanizaciones privadas, Regional Studies. En este artículo abordamos una de las lagunas más importantes en la investigación de urbanizaciones privadas: ¿por qué este fenómeno es tan fuerte en algunos países y sin embargo no existe en otros? Tras analizar las explicaciones generales, describimos una tesis alternativa basada en las teorías de la opción pública y el federalismo fiscal. Para comprobar la relevancia de esta teoría, dividimos los países europeos en dos grupos: los que tienen un gran número de urbanizaciones privadas y los que tienen pocas o ninguna. Luego las comparamos según quince indicadores. Los resultados indican que más allá de la manifestación visible de verjas y muros, existen desencadenantes institucionales más profundos.

Urbanizaciones privadas Federalismo fiscal Opción pública Europa

JEL classifications:

Acknowledgements

The research undertaken leading to the results presented herein received funding from the European Community's Seventh Framework Programme (Grant Number FP7/2007-2013) under Grant Agreement Number 219867. The authors would like to offer their thanks for funding. The authors are also grateful to Zoltán Kmetty for his help and insightful comments during the statistical analysis.

Notes

In the Netherlands and Romania, gated residential developments have also been reported, but their scale is insignificant and they therefore have not been included in the group of countries with gated communities. In the Netherlands, these developments are considered only as ‘enclosed residential domains’ (ERDs). As Hamers and Tennekes Citation(2009) point out:

the physical design of most Dutch ERDs does not aim so much to exclude the ‘other’ as to facilitate the avoidance the ‘other’, they are hence marked merely by ‘soft edges’.

(p. 13)

In Romania, gated communities with tough entry control were noticed at the beginning of the decade (Rufat, Citation2003), although research evidence indicates that gated enclaves have not become an urban phenomenon of significant importance in the major cities of that country (Negura, Citation2009).

Sources of data: Eurostat New Cronos © European Communities, 2 July 2009, Source Eurostat delivered by ESDS International, (Mimas) University of Manchester, Manchester: ECO(gdp), 2007, (nama_aux_gph); DEP(age), 2007, (demo_pjanind); SOC(gin), 2006, (ilc_di12); SOC(ine), 2006, (ilc_ov2); POP(den), 2004, (reg_d3dens); POP(for), 2007, (migr_st_popctz); CRI(vio), 2005, (crim_gen); CRI(bur), 2005, (crim_gen). European Commission (Eurostat) (2009): ECO(red), 2007, Table Tot_G: Total taxes (including SSC) as % of GDP, p. 251; TAX(rat), 2007, Table B.3_T: Taxes received by administrative level as % of total taxation: local government, p. 285; and TAX(ind), 2007, Table B.1_G: Taxes received by administrative level as % of GDP: central government, p. 280; and Table B.3_G: Taxes received by administrative level as % of GDP: local government, p. 284. Eurostat (2009): HOU(pri), 2007; HOU(dat), 2007. International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2009): DEC(rat), diverse years 2001–2007; and DEC(ind), diverse years 2001–2007.

The financing of local municipalities represents in every country a very complex system where their effective taxing power depends on a number of diverse factors, such as setting rates and reliefs on autonomous taxes, sharing taxes with central government, and receiving earmarked and non-earmarked grants (Blöchlinger and King, Citation2006; Bach et al., Citation2009). Because of the limitation on the data available to the present study, the taxing power of the local government was, in a simple way, substituted with the indicator of local governments' share of the total tax revenues of a country's government.

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