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Abstract
Belderbos R. and Somers D. Do technology leaders deter inward R&D investments? Evidence from regional R&D location decisions in Europe, Regional Studies. This paper examines the influence of local technology leaders on the attractiveness of regions for inward research and development (R&D) investments in an analysis of location choices for 196 cross-border R&D investments in EU-15 countries, 2003–08. While the strength of the regional technology cluster attracts inward R&D investments, investors are discouraged by a concentration of technology activities due to the presence of regional technology leaders. This effect occurs primarily if leaders organize their R&D in the region to reduce knowledge outflows to collocated firms – by drawing on intra-firm cross-border knowledge flows and complementary contributions of multiple R&D units.
Belderbos R. and Somers D. 技术领先者是否吓阻了向内的研发投资？欧洲区域研发的区位选择之证据，区域研究。本文在分析欧盟十五个成员国于2003年至2008年间的一百九十六件跨领域研发（R&D）投资的区位选择中，检视地方技术领先者，对于区域吸引向内研发投资的影响。区域技术集群虽然吸引了内向的研发投资，投资者却因区域技术领先者的存在所产生的技术活动集中而受到吓阻。此一影响，主要发生于领先者透过运用企业内的跨境知识流动及多重研发单位的互补性贡献，组织区域中用以降低知识外流的研发活动来配置企业之时。
Belderbos R. et Somers D. Les leaders en matière de technologie, est-ce qu'ils dissuadent les investissements en R et D? Des résultats des décisions d'emplacement régionales quant à la R et D en Europe, Regional Studies. À partir d'une analyse des choix d'emplacement auprès de 196 investissements en recherche et développement transfrontaliers (R et D), cet article examine l'influence des leaders locaux en matière de technologie quant à l'attractivité des régions pour l'investissement étranger en R et D dans les pays EU-15 (à savoir, les 15 pays membres de l’Union européenne à compter du 31 décembre 2003), entre 2003 et 2008. Alors que la puissance du cluster technologique régional attire les investissements étrangers en R et D, les investisseurs sont dissuadés par une concentration des activités technologiques à cause de la présence des leaders régionaux en matière de technologie. Cet effet se produit principalement si les leaders organisent leur R et D dans la région de façon à réduire les sorties de connaissances à destination des entreprises colocalisées – en bénéficiant des flux de connaissances transfrontaliers intra-entreprises et des contributions complémentaires des unités de R et D multiples.
Belderbos R. und Somers D. Wirken Technologieführer abschreckend auf ausländische FuE-Investitionen? Evidenz von den Entscheidungen über regionale FuE-Standorte in Europa, Regional Studies. In diesem Beitrag untersuchen wir mithilfe einer Analyse der Standortwahl für 196 grenzübergreifende Investitionen für Forschung und Entwicklung (FuE) in den EU-15-Ländern im Zeitraum von 2003 bis 2008 den Einfluss von lokalen Technologieführern auf die Attraktivität von Regionen für FuE-Investitionen aus dem Ausland. Während die Stärke des regionalen Technologie-Clusters ausländische FuE-Investitionen anzieht, wirkt eine Konzentration von technologischen Aktivitäten aufgrund der Präsenz regionaler Technologieführer auf Investoren abschreckend. Dieser Effekt tritt vor allem auf, wenn die Technologieführer ihre FuE-Tätigkeit in der Region durch die Nutzung von firmeninternen grenzüberschreitenden Wissensströmen und ergänzenden Beiträgen verschiedener FuE-Einheiten so organisieren, dass die Wissensströme nach außen an andere Firmen am selben Standort verringert werden.
Belderbos R. y Somers D. ¿Disuaden los líderes tecnológicos a las inversiones extranjeras en I+D? Ejemplos de las decisiones de ubicación regional de la I+D en Europa, Regional Studies. A partir de un análisis de decisiones de ubicación para 196 inversiones transfronterizas en I+D en 15 países de la UE entre 2003 y 2008, en este artículo examinamos cómo influyen los líderes tecnológicos locales en el atractivo de las regiones para inversiones extranjeras en investigación y desarrollo (I+D). Si bien la fortaleza de la aglomeración tecnológica regional atrae inversiones extranjeras en I+D, los inversores están desmotivados por una concentración de actividades tecnológicas debida a la presencia de líderes tecnológicos regionales. Este efecto ocurre principalmente si los líderes organizan su I+D en la región para reducir las fugas de conocimiento a empresas asociadas, al basarse en flujos de conocimiento transfronterizos dentro de la empresa y contribuciones complementarias de varias unidades de I+D.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank three anonymous reviewers, Srikanth Paruchuri, Georg Licht and Gary Dushnitsky, and the participants at the 2011 Strategic Management Society in Miami, Florida, the 2012 Innovation Research Workshop at Maastricht University, the 2012 Geography of Innovation Conference in Saint Etienne, the 2012 Academy of International Business conference in Washington, DC, and the 2013 European Strategy, Entrepreneurship & Innovation (SEI) Doctoral Consortium at Imperial College London for comments made on earlier drafts of the paper.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Supplemental data
Supplemental data for this article can be accessed at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00343404.2015.1018881
Notes
1. The analysis is limited to strategies related to R&D organization within the leading firms, as strategies based on legal forms of protections (e.g. employment contracts and non-disclosure agreements) are difficult to identify.
2. Self-citations indicate the extent to which firms build on their own prior technology development efforts in developing new inventions. It is a measure of intra-firm knowledge transfer and represents the extent to which firms retain the value of R&D within internal boundaries (James and Shaver, Citation2014; Trajtenberg et al., Citation1997; Zhao, Citation2006).
3. Some variables (such as R&D Intensity) are not consistently reported by EUROSTAT for a number of countries across years, such that a number of region-years observations are omitted. Greece is missing due to lack of information on a range of regional characteristics, but Greece did not receive R&D investments during the period of observation. Since (apart from Greece) all host countries remain in the data set and the omission of specific years is not systematic, this forced attrition of the sample is unlikely to lead to estimation bias. The models also exclude regions and industry combinations for which no company patents are recorded, as for these regions the key explanatory variables related to technology concentration and internalization cannot be calculated. Regions without any company patents are typically smaller regions in less patent-intensive industries. It has been confirmed that this sample attrition has no appreciable impact on the results by exploring models setting the concentration and internalization variables to zero in case the region has no patented inventions.
4. In a robustness tests development projects are included in the analysis. This produces similar, though less pronounced, empirical results.
5. In case the investing firm is based in the EU-15, the regions in their home country are omitted from the choice set. As the FDI data only cover cross-border investments, R&D investments in the home country are not observed by definition.
6. Table A1 in the Supplementary data online shows the distribution of R&D projects over industries.
7. Patents owned by individuals, universities, hospitals and governmental non-profit organizations are excluded.
8. Due to the truncation of patents in the most recent years and for consistency, the window of forward citations is limited to two years.
9. Definitions and summary statistics of the variables are provided in Table A2 in the Supplementary data online. The correlation table is available from the authors upon request.
10. As the statistical program used (the mixlogit command in STATA) only allows 20 random variables, non-random coefficients are assumed for two variables. The authors have chosen two control variables with insignificant random parameters and for which preference heterogeneity ex-ante was less likely as fixed: Previous R&D and Airport traffic. Alternative settings for non-random coefficients produced consistent results.