ABSTRACT
Whereas a substantial empirical literature has investigated scale economies in local government, by contrast little effort has been directed at economies of scope. To address this gap in the literature, this paper empirically examines economies of scope in 308 Portuguese local governments and the extent to which it explains differential council performance. We employ a new methodology using geometric distance functions, an augmented Hicks–Moorsteen index, and partial frontiers for (in)efficiency assessment in local government. The results demonstrate that most councils that ‘externalize’ service provision face diseconomies of scope, which increase in proportion to the externalization of service provision.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors thank to two anonymous referees who kindly, and significantly, improved this paper’s quality, clarity and structure owing to their beneficial comments. The contents of the paper are the authors’ own responsibility. The usual disclaimer applies.
DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
ORCID
Diogo Ferreira http://orcid.org/0000-0001-5418-9337
Brian Dollery http://orcid.org/0000-0003-2760-865X
Rui Marques http://orcid.org/0000-0003-0344-5200