Citizens’ perception of Cohesion Policy: from theory to empirical evidence

ABSTRACT

Since the Brexit referendum and the widespread resurgence of nationalisms, the future of the European Union has become an urgent issue. The idea of this paper is that Cohesion Policy might contribute to the process of European identity-building, and the intensity of this contribution depends on how citizens perceive European Union interventions. This study provides original evidence on the impact of certain characteristics of local policy settings on the perception of Cohesion Policy. It finds that citizens’ satisfaction depends on the fulfilment of their perceived needs. This holds independently of the capacity of European Union actions to fulfil the objective needs of the regions.

KEYWORDS:

• Cohesion Policy
• citizens’ perception
• European regions

JEL:

• E61
• O10
• R10

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1. This reflects the utilitarian mechanism through which EU integration leads to a process of communitarian identity-building (Haas, 1958), where the individual identifies in the EU only if s/he gains an advantage from the integration process. Evidence of this mechanism is provided by research on the impact of the Erasmus programme on EU identity-building: students enrolled in the project are more likely than the others to identify with EU values (Mitchell, 2015; Van Mol, 2011).

2. According to the various mechanisms of EU identity-building, the pervasive presence of EU institutions in citizens’ everyday lives is assumed to make them more inclined to identify with the supranational institutions even if they have not gained any personal advantage from EU integration (Haas, 1958; Risse & Grabowsky, 2008). Empirical evidence for this mechanism is provided by several studies, such as that by Risse (2003), who found that the introduction of the euro made citizens feel somewhat more European than before, while Bruter (2003) claimed that exposure to symbols such as the EU flag has a significant effect on cultural identity.

3. This does not imply that being aware of and satisfied with Cohesion Policy is a necessary prerequisite for identification with EU values. A number of other reasons could explain EU identity. However, since the interest of the present paper concerns the study of the mechanisms through which Cohesion Policy is likely to influence EU identity, we assume that the perception of such policies is important, and that their appreciation by citizens reinforces their support for the EU, which is perceived as a useful institution and not just as an abstract political construct.

4. Again, this mechanism recalls the utilitarian approach defined by Risse and Grabowsky (2008).

5. We are aware that, with respect to the relationship between Eurosceptic positions in the local political arena and Cohesion Policy, a stream of literature has focused on the relationship between Euroscepticism and the allocation of funds. Kemmerling and Bodenstein (2006) claimed that EU funds tend to be more generously allocated to regions with Eurosceptic local governments. This result is contradicted by other studies adopting alternative statistical techniques (Bouvet & Dall’Erba, 2010; Dellmuth, 2011). Our contention is that even if regions with high levels of Euroscepticism receive, ceteris paribus, more funding than the others (which is expected, in turn, to increase awareness), this effect is more than counterbalanced by the strong incentive of local governments to misrepresent the role of the EU in promoting regional development.

6. Flash Eurobarometer studies are ad hoc surveys conducted since 1989 on the request of any service of the European Commission.

7. More precisely, regarding the awareness of the existence of EU policy the question (Q1A) was ‘Europe provides financial support in regions and cities. Have you heard about EU co-financed projects to improve the area you live in?’ In the case of the level of satisfaction with Cohesion Policy, the question was: ‘Taking into consideration all the projects you have heard about, would you say that this support had a positive or negative impact on the development in your city or region?’

8. The question (Q4) was: ‘Most European regional funding is concentrated on the poorest regions in order to help them to catch up. In your opinion, is this rather a good or rather a bad thing?’

9. Individuals in the survey are classified according to their NUTS-2 region of residence, apart from some countries (Spain, Italy, Germany, the UK, Spain), for which the information is available at the NUTS-1 level. The empirical measurement of the context conditions is therefore consistent with these two classifications.

10. Following the same reasoning applied to R&D, for instance, the supply of ICT services is usually provided by official statistics, while the potential demand depends on a set of characteristics of the local environment such as presence of firms, human capital and agglomeration (Assimakopoulos, Tsouri, Mavridis, & Moore, 2016). In the tourism field, the supply of accommodation facilities can be matched with a potential demand depending on the density of cultural and natural amenities and the degree of urbanization (Massidda & Etzo, 2012). For full details about the identification of the objective needs across all the policy fields considered, see Capello and Perucca (2018).

11. We could not control for other policies undertaken through either regional or national programmes. From the statistical point of view, in order to capture the effect of different institutional settings and the existence of specific national programmes, we added a set of country dummies in the model specification. In any case, we assumed that the focus of any kind of policy (either regional, national or supranational) on policy fields with no objective needs is less efficient than the same action undertaken in an area where an objective necessity arises. Moreover, the question of the Flash Eurobarometer survey is very specific, making a clear reference to the actions undertaken by EU regional policy. Those respondents who answered that they were aware and had a definite perception of the impact of these interventions are assumed to isolate correctly the actions undertaken under the Cohesion Policy flag from all the others.

12. The choice of the three most financed policy fields is arbitrary and based on the fact that, on average, the first two most financed axes of expenditure cover about 32% of total funding. As a consequence, the actions undertaken in these fields are those more likely to be visible and perceived by the resident population. Nevertheless, findings are consistent with those reported in the present paper if we consider the first three or four most financed policy fields. The results are available from the authors upon request.

13. This is important because several studies have pointed out how the definition of the ex-ante objectives and strategies in the programme's documents are, in some cases, coherent with the actions undertaken (Nilsson et al., 2012).

14. The question was: ‘EU regional policy can support many different sectors. I will read a list of areas to you. Please tell me for each of them, if you consider them among the more important or less important ones for your city or your region?’ The sectors for which the respondent had to report his/her opinion were: transport facilities, energy networks, renewable, clean energy, research and innovation, broadband and internet access, environment, support for small businesses, employment training, education, health and social infrastructure, and tourism and culture. Data come from several Eurobarometer survey studies. For more details, see Capello and Perucca (2018).

15. The classification of parties between Eurosceptic and non-Eurosceptic was based on internet-based research and on the analysis by Treib (2014). Both soft and hard Eurosceptic movements were classified together as anti-EU. The source of the data was the European Election Database managed by the Norwegian Centre for Research Data.

16. The Flash Eurobarometer survey study was conducted in 2010, while in the programming period 2000–06 regions were able to spend communitarian funds until 2008. Countries that did not receive any support in that period (Bulgaria and Romania, which entered the EU in 2007) are not included in the analysis.

Additional information

Funding

In its initial stage, this study received financial support from the European Union's Horizon 2020 Framework Programme research and innovation programme [grant agreement number 693427], COHESIFY project (February 2016–April 2018).