https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2190-3837
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ABSTRACT
Broadband policy has been booming with the support of European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIFs). However, its performance and impact remain contentious, since primary evidence is lacking. The paper studies the first Italian plan for financing broadband-deprived areas through the ESIFs, characterized by multilevel governance. It is found that its overly centralized design suffered from serious policy faults, which hampered regional efforts. Funding mismatches and other institutional obstacles disadvantaged the northern and central regions; however, because the latter enjoyed higher institutional quality, they managed to leapfrog the (more supported) southern ones. The digital agendas’ performance is shaped by the institutional quality–multilevel governance mix.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
For acknowledgments and disclaimers, see Table A1 in Appendix A in the supplemental data online.
DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1. In EU rural areas, disruptions in availability, quality and affordability have been documented for most public services (Clifton et al., Citation2016).
2. The acronym ‘ESIFs’ characterizes the ‘new’ EU regional policy (EU Regulation No. 1303/2013), further integrating Cohesion Policy and the second pillar of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The latter supports the development of rural areas (those with lower density and accessibility conditions, and primary sector activities). With respect to the first pillar of the CAP (concerning the common organization of the EU agricultural markets, financed by EU resources), the second is more flexible, being nationally co-financed.
3. The two terms partly overlap. While government quality concerns normative functions, administrative capacity mainly refers to the execution tasks of the public administration.
4. Foray (Citation2009) recalls that technology is fluid, builds on implicit knowledge and features diverging stakeholders’ agendas. Hence, asymmetries of information and coordination failures plague innovation policy, causing frequent government failures.
5. On the disappointing state of the indicators and evaluations of the Italian ERDF, see Ciffolilli et al. (2013, p. 20) in Table A3 in Appendix A in the supplemental data online.
6. Of course, still today the above limitations seem far from being solved (ECA, Citation2018b).
7. Matteucci (Citation2015) attempts to assess regional digital agendas with this output indicator.
8. This may happen because of policy design faults: SA norms may render intervention in ‘grey’ areas too difficult, or public consultations may mis-measure the status of the access networks (Matteucci, Citation2019).
10. Since the 1988 reform of Structural Funds, regional policy has been transformed by the implementation of these principles and the paradigm of MLG. For an interdisciplinary survey, see Hooghe and Marks (Citation2003). For applications to the EU regional policy, see Piattoni and Polverari (Citation2016).
11. The Italian policy-maker defined its minimal downloading speed as 2 Mbps. Although the focus was on (wired) ADSL, occasionally wireless solutions (such as WiMAX or mobile) were also employed.
12. And those of the national development policy, less important for the plan.
13. Infratel Spa is a private corporation, fully dependent on and 100% owned by MISE, created in 2003 to act as a specialized body managing telecoms projects.
14. Assessorati are the sectoral branches composing the regional government, which responds to an elected regional council. Each Assessorato, chaired by a politician, supervises the bureaucrats and technicians working in the sectoral departments of the regional PA. Digital agendas, EAFRD and ERDF are entrusted to one or more Assessorati/departments.
15. The regional branches of the Ministry of Cultural Heritage and Activities. Due to the rich Italian cultural heritage, public works (including broadband) often need preliminary clearance by the regional Sovrintendenza.
16. RDPs and ROPs are two main acts constituting the decentralized layer of the EU regional policy.
17. Since they managed to survey the universe concerned – not just a sample.
18. It is an in-house corporation, controlled by the region Emilia-Romagna, undertaking projects related to telecoms and digital agendas.
19. It correlates with the sole (similar) indicator officially chosen for monitoring the digital agenda infrastructural target of 2014–20 Cohesion Policy.
20. The questionnaires (three types, one for each interviewee) were pre-tested and adapted across the stages of the empirical analysis.
21. Content analysis of the open-response answers and probes was carried out.
22. In a small number of cases, due to the sensitiveness of the interviews, written responses were sent as a proof of statements. They were later checked and expanded by phone with the contact person.
23. Invited to the interview was the public officer bearing the highest rank and responsibility for the plan design/implementation, and with access to the largest share of information, unless other factors required additional interviews. In the Marche region the plan administration was delegated to the Digital Agenda Department; consequently, the EAFRD managing authority was also interviewed (see Table A4 in Appendix A in the supplemental data online).
24. The five ‘special Statute’ regions were dropped due to their higher degree of political and administrative autonomy.
25. Only one region did not respond to the invitation: Molise. From previous literature, it is known that it generally ranks low for regional policy performance.
26. Besides the two target variables.
27. The respondents read the questionnaire (normative) definition; afterwards, their open answers operationalized the twin variables.
28. Table A5 in Appendix A in the supplemental data online reports on the Italian telecoms monopoly.
29. Before 2009, small-scale projects carried out in the southern regions had performed badly (see Corte dei Conti, 2007, in Table A3 in Appendix A in the supplemental data online).
30. In December 2012, only a tiny share (€150 million) was reassigned by the new Monti government.
31. Some regions could employ pre-existing lines of funding, their own or ones coming from the national regional policy funds.
32. Including the funds of the national regional policy (‘FSC’, formerly ‘FAS’), the eight southern regions received 82% of the total funds (EU plus national) (see Camera dei Deputati, 2018, in Table A3 in Appendix A in the supplemental data online).
33. Through measure SA.34199 in Table A3 in Appendix A in the supplemental data online. NGA networks offer faster download speeds (≥ 30 Mbps) by rolling out fibre optic segments closer to the user. Thereby, NGA construction complements works done for standard broadband.
34. The EQI index of Charron et al. (Citation2014) builds on self-assessed data surveyed at the NUTS-2 level. Differently, the IQI index of Nifo and Vecchione (Citation2014) builds on objective official statistics: it operationalizes the Worldwide Governance Indicators (World Bank) with NUTS-3 variables.
35. For reasons of space, some desk analysis evidence (such as understaffing) and the answers to questions Q1, Q3 and Q4 are not tabled, but summarized by the main findings. It can be conjectured that understaffing might have been somehow aggravated by the coeval suspension of the PA personnel turnover, mandated by national law as an austerity measure.
36. Achieving the authorization of an autonomous SA measure requires superior capacities from the proponent, especially before the first Broadband Guidelines (2009), when no soft law guidance was available.
37. A similar policy fault has been avoided in the new national NGA plan. In February 2016, the Italian government designed an equalization mechanism compensating the lower funds endowments of the north and centre.
39. See note 35.
40. The countrywide funds coordination was also ensured by relations with the ministerial Departments for Cohesion, replaced in 2014 by the newly created Agency for Cohesion.
41. Northern business associations frequently complained that the connectivity needs of the industrial districts located in white areas were disregarded by Infratel. Consequently, some northern regions financed second-best wireless solutions (e.g., wi-fi) with other funds.
42. Infratel-led public consultations are a crucial instrument with which to design non-distortive SA measures (Matteucci, Citation2019).
43. Composed of dozens of regional ROPs and RDPs (each duplicating the same ESIFs procedure).
44. Similarly, the main policy implication of Gori et al. (Citation2017, p. 822) that ‘public works should be placed in the hands of procuring authorities endowed with adequate specialization’ is a necessary but not sufficient condition for high performance in digital agendas.