ABSTRACT
Why do presidents make promises while in office and why do they fulfill some of them? We postulate 5 hypotheses to account for the fulfillment of promises made by sitting presidents and test them on an emerging presidential democracy in Latin America. With information on the 951 pledges made by presidents of Chile in annual state of nation addresses (1990–2017), we show that presidents fulfill fewer promises made in their last year, and when they have lower approval, but their seat share support in the legislature does not impact promise fulfillment. Presidents fulfill more promises when the economic conditions are adverse, and in areas where their political parties have issue ownership. Promises from the throne respond to a different logic than campaign promises. Presidents care about the promises they make and seek to fulfill some of them, but they also make unfulfillable promises to please their hardcore base.
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No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
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Vicente Faúndez Caicedo
Vicente Faúndez Caicedo is an associate researcher at the Electoral Political Observatory at Universidad Diego Portales and a public affairs consultant. He holds a B.A. in political science and has published in the Journal of Legislative Studies, Política y Gobierno. [email protected]
Patricio Navia
Patricio Navia is a Professor of Political Science at Universidad Diego Portales in Chile and a Clinical Professor of Liberal Studies at New York University. He has previously published in Comparative Political Studies, Democratization, Political Psychology, Journal of Democracy, Legislative Studies Quarterly, Journal of Legislative Studies and Parliamentary Affairs.E-mail: [email protected].