Abstract
This paper examines how family friendly policies affect mothers' wages. Standard economic theory predicts that workers who desire family friendly policies would accept lower wages, all else equal. However, in the US labor market, the workers who have access to these policies tend to be in the higher-prestige and higher-earning occupations. This study examines the effects on wages of having had access to maternity leave and the ability to control one's schedule, using the Survey of Income and Program Participation. The present-day wages of mothers who were working prior to the birth of their first child and received pay during their maternity leave are 9 percent higher compared to other mothers, controlling for other personal and job-related characteristics. Mothers who report working their current schedule because it helps them address their caring responsibilities—child care, elder care, or care for a sick family member—do not suffer a wage penalty as a result.
Acknowledgments
This project was made possible by support from the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Annie E. Casey Foundation. This paper has benefited from the comments of Randy Albelda, Dean Baker, Sarah Gammage, Patrick McElwee, and John Schmitt, as well as conversations with Wendy Chun-Hoon, and Vicky Lovell. Sky Andrecheck, Wei Wei, and Joseph Wright provided valuable research assistance.