Integrating ‘Return’ with ‘Recovery’: Utilising the Return Process in the Transition to Positive Peace: A Case Study of Sri Lanka

Abstract

Following the defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) on 18 May 2009, Sri Lanka has recently entered a new era of negative peace. For the huge number of displaced persons, predominately of Tamil origin, who are currently trapped in camps in the North, the beneficial effects of peace remain unseen. This paper explores the links between resolving internal displacement and the transition to a positive peace. Under the 2002 Ceasefire Agreement, both the government and the LTTE failed to integrate return with recovery, undermining the wider peacebuilding process and contributing to further violence. In the context of military victory, the paper argues for an integrated approach to return and recovery, which will foster a new social contract between the government and internally displaced persons, utilising the return process in the transition to positive peace.

Key Words:

• negative peace
• positive peace
• peacebuilding
• internally displaced person
• social contract
• Sri Lanka
• Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

Introduction

On 18 May 2009 the Sinhalese-dominated government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) officially ended its 26-year war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) through a successful military victory. Although the military phase of the conflict has ended, for the many thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) who remain trapped in camps in the North, the benefits of peace remain to be seen (OCHA, 2009). In the final months of the war, many IDPs faced brutal exposure to conflict, being used as human shields by the LTTE and as victims of indiscriminate shelling by the Sri Lankan Army (HRW, 2009). In addition, limited access for national and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) led to a number of compromises in humanitarian standards, increasing the level of vulnerability. Given that the majority of these recent IDPs are of Tamil origin, winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of this displaced minority is an essential part of legitimising the post-war order. Although the fighting has ceased, the government is continuing to treat all IDPs as potential security threats. As a result, military personnel are taking a primary role in camp management, limiting freedom of movement and restricting access to humanitarian support. The failure to go beyond this security framework and offer sustainable solutions for IDPs risks fuelling existing grievances and reinforcing the underlying mistrust between the Sri Lankan government and the Tamil minority population. Subsequently, ensuring durable solutions for these displaced persons is fundamental to the achievement of lasting peace.

This article will begin by offering a theoretical framework to the discussion, conceptualising peace in its negative and positive forms. It will then introduce the literature on IDPs, highlighting the ‘sovereign responsibility’ of governments to address the needs of displaced persons under the United Nations ‘Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement’ and the links with long-term recovery. The paper will then turn to the case study of Sri Lanka. In particular, it will highlight the failure of the government to implement a sustainable return process during the 2002 Ceasefire Agreement (CFA), which threatened to destabilise the entire process. In addressing these shortfalls it will therefore offer concrete recommendations for implementing a sustainable return process in the current context. In particular, it will argue that the return of IDPs needs to be incorporated into the wider post-war recovery process, particularly in ensuring physical security, encouraging participation, addressing the underlying causes of conflict and providing links with long-term development. This framework will offer a new approach to resolving displacement, which encourages a new social contract between the government and the displaced.

More concretely, the paper makes use of a number of qualitative interviews conducted in Sri Lanka between March and May 2009 during the final stages of the conflict. Most of the interviews were carried out with major national and international NGOs as well as some local civil society organisations (CSOs). In addition, human rights organisations, the United Nations and government representatives were included in the sample where possible. The author's approach combined qualitative primary data with significant secondary research through the use of the ‘composite approach’ (Barakat et al., 2002), which provides a framework for addressing complex and sensitive phenomenon in a context of limited data availability.

Negative and Positive Peace

The concept of peace is highly subjective and defining it has generally been avoided by academics in the discussion of war and its aftermath (Richmond, 2005; Mac Ginty, 2006). Peace tends to mean different things to different people. In the context of Sri Lanka, the government defines peace according to the territorial unity of the state, whereas the LTTE have fought for a peace in regard to justice, achieved through self-determination (Orjuela, 2008). This paper is primarily concerned with the impact of displacement on the transition from negative to positive peace. Originally coined by Johan Galtung, negative peace is defined simply as the absence of physical armed conflict (Barash and Webel, 2002; Grewal, 2003). Positive peace, on the other hand, is not only concerned with ending direct warfare but also considers the structural factors that reinforce a culture of violence in society (Barash and Webel, 2002). This suggests a more holistic approach to peace, which goes beyond physical security to target the social, economic and political roots of conflict (Mac Ginty, 2006). The achievement of positive peace therefore aims to reintegrate society, transforming conflicts from an expression of violence into the sphere of political debate (Darby and Mac Ginty, 2003; Grewal, 2003). In this way, positive peace presents a more sustainable solution to ending armed conflict.

The transition to positive peace is thought to be achieved through the process of ‘peacebuilding’. Peacebuilding was originally defined as ‘actions to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict’ (Boutrous-Ghali, 1992, no page number). This definition recognises that states emerging from civil war are at their most vulnerable to the threat of renewed violence (Lederach, 2001; Barash and Webel, 2002; Hammerstad, 2005; Ramsbotham et al., 2005). As a result, contemporary peace processes have gone beyond the control of physical violence, to incorporate all aspects of social, political and economic reconstruction (Grewal, 2003; Junne and Verkoren, 2005). Within this definition, several interlinking peacebuilding activities are recognised. These include:

 … disarming the previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation. (Boutrous-Ghali, 1992, no page number, emphasis added)

In reality, this multifaceted approach is criticised for its heavy concentration on international interventions and ‘quick fix’ solutions (Barakat, 2005a, p. 13). This provided a new role for UN agencies in the post-Cold War period, but failed to offer a richer concept of peace that encouraged local ownership and bottom-up development (Barakat, 2005a). As a result, peacebuilding, promoted by the UN, appears to be primarily concerned with restoring the status quo rather than supporting a more transformative process (Grewal, 2003). This undermines the emancipatory nature of positive peacebuilding, and fails to reflect the various needs of each post-war state.

Instead, the achievement of positive peace must be conceptualised as a process, which extends beyond peace agreements, to consider the broader aspects of relief, reconstruction and development (Barakat and Mac Ginty, 2002; Junne and Verkoren, 2005). This proposes an integrated approach that reflects the underlying causes of conflict as well as attempting to overcome the inherent mistrust prevalent in post-conflict societies (Korn, 1999; Barakat, 2005a; Oberschall, 2007). In the short term, post-war recovery requires physical security, to support and legitimise the post-war order (Barakat, 2005a; Jeong, 2005; Mac Ginty, 2006). In the long term, it recognises that post-war recovery ‘is fundamentally a development challenge’ (Barakat, 2005a, p. 12). Moreover, positive peace must be rooted in non-discriminatory participation and local ownership, supported rather than defined by the international community (Barakat, 2005a; Richmond, 2005). Drawing on the literature of civil society and peacebuilding, this approach suggests ‘peace’ is not just about an agreement between high-level negotiators or the assertion of military victors, but has to be supported from the bottom up if it is to be sustainable (Ledererach, 1997, 2001; Junne and Verkoren, 2005). Subsequently, this process, broadly conceptualised as ‘recovery’, is ultimately concerned with re-establishing the relationship ‘between the state and the people … [and] ensuring that all sections of society have a stake in the success of the national project’ (El-Bushra, 2006, p. 247).

The Crisis of Internal Displacement

In the current post-Cold War context, the increasingly civilian nature of conflict, as well as the tightening of international borders by Western states, has led to a huge rise in internal displacement as a major consequence of conflict (Kaldor, 2006). Mass displacement during conflict is usually illustrative of a breakdown in social order and neglect for fundamental human rights and freedoms (Cohen, 1998; Cohen and Deng, 1998b). IDPs are often displaced much closer to the conflict zone and are therefore more vulnerable to violence and a lack of access to humanitarian aid (Kälin, 2007). As a result, the experience of displacement effectively disempowers a huge proportion of the population who are no longer able to protect themselves (Dubernet, 2001). Unlike refugees, IDPs have not crossed an international border, and are therefore not subject to protection under international law (Bennett, 1998; Cohen and Deng, 1998a). Instead, IDPs remain under the sovereign responsibility of their national governments. In civil conflicts (particularly those with an ethnic dimension) many governments fail to uphold their responsibility to protect IDPs, who often consist of minority populations and find themselves treated as the enemy (Cohen and Deng, 1998b; Asomani, 2001). The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) (2009) report reveals that in 36 out of the 52 countries monitored, minority ethnic groups were the main victims of displacement. As a result, IDPs face the dilemma in which, unlike refugees, they are not protected under recognised international law, and yet national governments lack the capacity or political will to address their needs (Bennett, 1998; Cohen and Deng, 1998a).

Reflecting on the needs of an expanding IDP population, the first UN Representative on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons published a set of ‘Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement’ in 1998. Although not legally binding, the principles bring together the aspects of humanitarian and human rights law that are relevant in cases of internal displacement (United Nations, 2009). They represent a series of standards for national governments in preventing displacement, providing adequate assistance during displacement and facilitating the return or resettlement of IDPs after displacement (Deng, 1998). By applying a rights-based approach they reinforce the protection and empowerment of IDPs as twin ideals for addressing internal displacement (van Mierop, 2001). Rather than an international response, the principles are based on the notion of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’, which reinforces the role of governments in protecting all citizens under their territorial jurisdiction (Cohen and Deng, 1998a). This approach aims to strengthen the very foundation of human rights law that connects citizens and their states (Stein, 1994; Loescher, 2008).

Section V of the Guiding Principles, or those that relate to the ‘Return, Resettlement and Reintegration’, highlight the commitment of governments to displaced persons to end their displaced condition. This includes either returning IDPs to their regions of origin or facilitating resettlement in another part of the country (either at the site of displacement or to a new area) (United Nations, 1998). The principles endeavour to return or resettle IDPs in ‘safety and dignity’ (Principle 28.1), and enable the ‘full participation of IDPs in the planning and management of their return’ (Principle 28.2). In terms of reintegration, the principles provide returning IDPs with the ‘right to participate fully and equally in public affairs’ (Principle 29.1) and the right to ‘recover … their property and possessions’ (Principle 29.2). In addition, the 2005‘Framework for National Responsibility for Internal Displacement’ states that ‘responsibility for internal displacement extends to ensuring that IDPs have access to a durable solution to their plight’ (Brookings Institution, 2005, p. 22). This document recognises that IDPs have specific needs in the return process, including access to livelihood opportunities and inclusion in the broader development process.

Recently, the literature on internal displacement has highlighted the links between resolving internal displacement and peace (Brookings Institution, 2007a; Ferris, 2009). As a result, there has been a growing trend within the international community to incorporate the return of IDPs within peace processes (Brookings Institution, 2007a, b; Oberschall, 2007). Ferris (2008) claims that in a review of 25 peace agreements signed after 1998, all but one contained reference to IDP return (Brookings Institution, 2007a; PBSO, 2008). In practice, even where IDPs are specifically written into the peace process, this rarely equates to actual participation (Brookings Institution, 2007a). As a result, the return process continues to be targeted as just one ‘dimension of peacebuilding’, rather than as an opportunity for social, political and economic change (PBSO, 2008, p. 1). This has provided a new role for the international community in supporting internally displaced persons but has failed to utilise fully the return process in the longer term peace and development process. The inability to connect the return process to broader peacebuilding attempts is now explored using a case study of Sri Lanka.

Conflict, Displacement and Peace in Sri Lanka

Civil war in Sri Lanka officially started in 1983, although the roots of conflict stem back to the colonial era. The war is typically framed as an ethno-political conflict between the Sinhalese majority (74%) and the minority Tamil population (18%).1 This is reinforced by territorial and religious affiliations: the Sinhalese are located in the South and identify with Buddhism, whereas Tamils, concentrated in the North and East, are predominately Hindu. Although several different parties have been involved in the conflict, with violence occurring within as well as between ethnic groups (Abeyratne, 2004), in general, the main conflict parties have been the Sinhalese-dominated government, fighting to retain the unity and sovereignty of Sri Lanka, and the LTTE, demanding the establishment of a separate Tamil state in the North and East.

The roots of Sri Lanka's civil conflict stem from colonial times, in which the overrepresentation of Tamils in the British administration fuelled ethnic competition (IDMC, 2008a). Following independence in 1948, the Sri Lankan state went through a process of ‘Sinhelisation’, which affectively marginalised Tamils from the political system (Orjuela, 2009, p. 254). The introduction of a first-past-the-post system favoured the Sinhalese majority and allowed government positions to become dominated by Sinhalese elites (Eller, 1999). By 1972, changes in the constitution prioritised Sinhala as the primary language of the state and saw Buddhism named as the official state religion (Seneviratne and Stavropoulou, 1998). The political isolation of the Tamil minority fuelled a discourse of ethnic grievance, particularly among the youth population (Spencer, 1990). Growing ethnic tensions erupted in 1983 when the LTTE, a Tamil nationalist group, launched a military attack on government forces in the North, as an expression of Tamil grievances (Brun, 2008).

The protracted nature of conflict has further marginalised moderate political voices and generated a culture of militarism across the island. A number of Tamils now refuse to identify with official political structures (Philipson, 1999; IDMC, 2008b). This support for Tamil nationalism has been maintained as a consequence of the heavy losses experienced by Tamil civilians throughout the war (Orjuela, 2009). The majority of the fighting has taken place in the North and East and the exposure of human rights' abuses has reinforced a sense of mistrust between minorities and the government. This is particularly acute among displaced groups, who are overwhelmingly of Tamil origin (Muggah, 2008). In 2006, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM, 2006) claimed that Tamils made up 79% of conflict-affected IDPs, reinforcing their political isolation. As a result, one interviewee claimed that, ‘displacement has become part of the experience of being a Tamil’.2 Furthermore, the government has treated Tamil IDPs as the enemy, forced into highly militarised ‘welfare centres’, in order to undermine the recruitment capacity of the LTTE (Korn, 1999). Displacement has therefore contributed to the disempowerment of Tamil civilians, reducing confidence in the government and compounding the underlying causes of conflict.

Displacement, Return and the Ceasefire Agreement

Since the outbreak of conflict in 1983, the war has developed through a number of violent phases, interrupted intermittently by attempts at peace. Each of these peace talks has attempted to find a balance between the political and territorial claims of majority and minority groups (Guruge, 2006). Fundamentally, in 2002 a CFA was established, forming the first peace attempt to be based on direct negotiations between the government and the LTTE (Höglund and Svensson, 2006). The peace process was based on a two-stage agreement. The first stage prioritised the provision of humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to the North and Eastern regions. The second stage would then address a long-term solution to the conflict around a federal system.

The opening text of the CFA endeavoured to improve ‘the living conditions for all inhabitants affected by conflict’ (CFA, 2002). Under this initial phase of peace, a joint ‘Task Force’ for reconstruction in the North and East was established, which included a Subcommittee on Immediate Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Needs (SIHRN), in which priority was given to the resettlement of displaced persons (CHA, 2006b; Guruge, 2006; IDMC, 2008a). However, by late 2002 the LTTE had expressed concern over the effectiveness of the SIHRN and the lack of visible return and reconstruction occurring in the North and East (Guruge, 2006; Kelegama, 2006). The failure to facilitate IDP resettlement in the North was viewed by the LTTE as a direct violation of the CFA (Balasingham, 2004). The late Anton Balasingham, chief negotiator for the LTTE under the CFA, claimed that one of the key reasons for the LTTE's withdrawal from peace talks was the shortfall in return and reconstruction, which failed to address Tamil grievances (Balasingham, 2004). Significantly, the government's failure to terminate the High Security Zones (HSZs) in the North3 and vacate property adopted by the military restricted the success of the return process (Balasingham, 2004; CHA, 2006c; van Hear and Rajasingham-Senanayake, 2006; Brookings Institution, 2007a).4 This meant that those IDPs who returned after 2002 were unable to reclaim land or property. Furthermore, the LTTE effectively used the controversy over HSZs as political leverage, attempting to weaken the government's military stronghold in the North (Goonetilleke, 2006). Even in the areas outside the HSZ, the LTTE deliberately prevented returns until the government would allow them full control of the process (Rupesinghe, 2006; Orjuela, 2009). This undermined trust-building between the GoSL and the LTTE and generated further frustrations among those IDPs who were forced back into camp-like situations (Rupesinghe, 2006).

Ultimately, the two-phase approach to the CFA, in which decisions on aid and reconstruction were made before discussions regarding power-sharing arrangements, undermined attempts at resolving displacement (Mac Ginty, 2006). According to one humanitarian worker, ‘they signed the CFA and then they started talking. In a way, they did the end bit first’.5 Although the idea of federalism was proposed during peace talks, there were few discussions over how it would be implemented in practice (ICG, 2006). As a result, institutional management for the return and reconstruction process in the North and East never materialised and assistance to displaced persons was undermined by the politics underpinning the process (Goonetilleke, 2006; Rupesinghe, 2006; Sastianln, 2006; World Bank, 2006).

A Return to Conflict in Sri Lanka

The election of Mahinda Rajapakse in Sri Lanka in 2005 effectively signalled the collapse of the CFA. This new government alliance included significant representation from the Sinhalese extremist group JVP, which reinforced Tamil marginalisation from mainstream politics and aggravated existing grievances (Höglund and Svensson, 2006). Under this new administration, the government appeared to turn a blind eye to human rights atrocities, ordering UN agencies and NGOs out of the conflict zone in September 2008 (Mac Ginty, undated). Since then, there have been widespread accusations of extrajudicial killings, torture and disappearances (CPA, 2009). These cases are often left unreported through fear of reprisals for families or victims (CPA, 2009). This, coupled with a ban on journalists in the North, has generated further impunity and lack of impartial accountability (Buerk, 2008). Furthermore, the decision to appoint the Prime Minister's brother as Defence Minister has increased the centralisation of government structures and the development of a system of political patronage in Sri Lanka (Mac Ginty, undated). As a result, the military have been given free reign over decision-making, going to any lengths possible to defeat the LTTE.

The final stages of Sri Lanka's civil war saw Tamil citizens directly caught up in the manifestations of conflict. As the Sri Lankan Army closed in on the Vanni area in the North, the entire population was displaced from their homes, either moving into government camps or forced into the government-held ‘safe zone’ in the North-east.6 Many of these people had already been displaced up to 20 times over the previous two years as they retreated with the LTTE (CPA, 2009).7 As a result, many have faced direct exposure to the conflict, being used as human shields by the LTTE and being targeted by indiscriminate government shelling (HRW, 2009; IDMC, 2009).8 In addition, the lack of access for humanitarian actors led to a number of compromises in humanitarian standards (HRW, 2009).9 Since September 2008 the government had ordered all humanitarian agencies, with the exception of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), to leave the Vanni region (HRW, 2009; CPA, 2009). According to one ICRC representative, the food availability in the safe zone during March and April was just 20% of the need.10 This mistreatment has heightened vulnerability and reduced trust-building between the Sinhalese-led government and the minority Tamil population.

Since the end of the conflict, nearly all of the Northern Tamil population have been moved into camps located just outside the Vanni region. The government is extremely anxious about the potential security threat posed by these IDPs, most of which have lived under the LTTE for the duration of the war.11 As a result, the government has restricted freedom of movement, heightened military control, and further limited humanitarian access. Notably, the camps have been secured with barbed-wire, preventing outsiders from entering and IDPs from leaving (HRW, 2009).12 This has been justified on security grounds, given the potential links between the most recent IDPs and the LTTE (Orjuela, 2009).13 Furthermore, the poor conditions in the camps have been compounded by the limitations in humanitarian access. Even the ICRC has been denied visas for expatriates to work in the North.14 According to the Director of the Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies (CHA) in Sri Lanka, these ‘appalling’ conditions have fuelled further resentment against the government.15 In this way, although the government has ‘numerically defeat[ed] the LTTE … [they] may give birth to further Tamil militancy, which may be worse’.16

Linking the Return Process with Recovery

At the time of research, the main objective of the government was to achieve a military solution to the conflict.17 As a result, there were few plans concerning the long-term recovery process and the transition to positive peace.18 According to the Secretary for the Ministry of Disaster Management and Human Rights, ‘everything is speculation at this point’.19 In terms of resettlement, interviewees claimed that the government had ‘bits and pieces of a solution’,20 but that the strategy for return was generally ‘piecemeal’.21 Overall, there is a need for greater ‘predictability’ regarding the return and post-return period, in order to ensure sustainable solutions.22

As a result, this article argues for the return of IDPs to be integrated into the entire recovery process and attempts at addressing the underlying causes of their plight. Unlike the CFA, this will ensure a bottom-up approach to peacebuilding, which goes beyond peace agreements to consider the broader implications of return. In particular, given that IDPs remain under the sovereign responsibility of the government, repairing the relationship between returnees and the state can foster the necessary political legitimacy to enhance socio-political relations, and reduce conflict vulnerability (Loescher, 2003). Positive peace is primarily concerned with rebuilding the relationship between the state and the people, and ensuring that all citizens have a stake in the recovery process (El-Bushra, 2006). Given that, in the context of Sri Lanka, the majority of IDPs consist of the most marginalised groups in society, re-establishing the relationship between the government and the displaced population is fundamental to this process (Barakat, 2005b). Focusing on the aims of the Guiding Principles, this approach must include attempts to establish the safety and security of returnees and their participation in the process, while simultaneously addressing the underlying causes of their plight and fostering durable solutions. If linked with wider peacebuilding agendas, this approach offers a broad approach to resolving internal displacement, moving away from the top-down nature of the response to promote a new ‘social contract’ between the government and the displaced. Such a process, linking return with recovery within Sri Lanka, is discussed below.

Safe Return

To enhance the relationship between the government and the displaced population in the transition to positive peace, the return process must foster a concrete peace dividend in the North. This requires the achievement of physical security throughout the return process, and into the post-return period. Rather than relying on military personnel, the government must encourage the development of civilian policing structures to monitor security on the ground. Currently, the highly militarised North is generating a culture of fear among IDPs, which is likely to continue into the return period (CPA, 2009). Return must therefore be complemented by the development of a provincial police force (Groundviews, 2009). These structures must include significant Tamil representation, in order to reduce the sense of occupancy and ensure Tamil rights are protected.

Currently, however, the government is making few attempts to restrict its military prowess and domination in the North. Despite the termination of conflict, the Minister of Defence stated that he wanted the size of the army to increase by 50% (Haviland, 2009). Rather than encouraging the longevity of return, the government appears to be using the return process to create support for the state and consolidate its wartime achievements. This undermines the development of a new social contract between the government and the displaced, and has failed to offer an integrated approach to return and post-war recovery (IDMC, 2008b).

Local Participation

Within the current camps, IDPs are receiving very little information regarding the return or reintegration process.23 This is likely to reduce the capacity and willingness of IDPs to return.24 In addition, the military are deliberately preventing community mobilisation within the camps, fearing that this may develop into something more sinister.25 This undermines the ability of IDPs to think for themselves, and encourages a culture of dependency.26 This has reinforced a sense of military occupation and the perception that the government is treating all IDPs as suspects.27 As a result, the current IDPs have been described as a defeated population.28 One humanitarian worker recalling his experience in one of the IDP camps in the North stated that:

They weren't crying out for help or complaining at all. There [sic] were just sitting there. I've never seen people like that. They're [IDPs] not usually like that. It was like they had just given up.29

Moreover, according the Secretary for the Ministry of Disaster Management and Human Rights, current talks regarding resettlement have taken place only in government circles and it is clear that consultation with IDPs is lacking.30 This fails to reflect the needs of IDPs and reinforces a relief mentality, rather than looking to long-term return and reintegration.31 Although many IDPs do eventually want to return, some fear returning immediately and would prefer to stay in camps until the security in return areas is guaranteed.32 Ensuring the sustainability of return is therefore an essential part of providing durable solutions and confidence-building with the state.

The use of information campaigns in IDP camps will ensure that IDPs are aware of their rights and plans for return: ‘people have to be told their rights, so they can demand their rights’.33 Additionally, IDPs must be represented in broader plans for recovery. This can be encouraged through the development of community councils within IDP camps, which will continue into the return phase. These councils will have direct contact with local government agents to ensure the plans for return and recovery are communicated to the local people. These plans can then be used as a basis for NGO programmes, reinforcing the pull factors and the participatory nature of the return process. This will encourage a coordinated response between the government and international actors, while fostering the development of a new civil society in the North.34

Addressing the Causes of Displacement

The links between the experience of displacement and the root causes of conflict in Sri Lanka require a political as well as humanitarian response.35 Return in itself will not resolve the inherent political and territorial grievances of the Tamil people. Subsequently, plans for the return of IDPs must also address the underlying root causes of conflict and therefore ensure that the return process is sustainable.36 Ensuring respect for Tamil political rights, particularly among those most affected by conflict, is essential to addressing the underlying political causes of conflict. The President has assured the international community that he is committed to a political solution that will address Tamil grievances.37 In order to prevent the government simply assimilating Tamil representatives within the political system, devolution needs to filter down to the village level. This could include the development of a village council system, consisting initially of returning IDP community groups and allowing previously disempowered communities to bring their concerns to the provincial council and ensure their full integration into the political system. The development of effective local governance structures is likely to increase the sustainability of return and ensure democratic traditions are upheld.38

Despite this, the President has recently stated that devolution would not become a reality until after his re-election (Ethirajan, 2009). Subsequently, there is a concern that the government will plant a Tamil figurehead in the North, while retaining control at the centre.39 This will ensure support for the party line rather than providing legitimate representation of Tamil political voices.40 Ensuring free and fair elections is therefore critical to the transition to positive peace in the North.41 Although the North is ethnically homogenous, the government must provide the space for new political parties to be established, in order to represent the different Tamil viewpoints.42 Without effective devolution of power and the development of a civil society in the North, it is unlikely that the current peace will hold.

Durable Solutions

According to the ICRC, a large proportion of the Northern region was underdeveloped or destroyed by the war.43 As a result, infrastructure development will be a major challenge in ensuring the sustainability of return. According to the International Federation of the Red Cross, almost every house has been damaged or destroyed.44 By stimulating reconstruction the government can use the development process as a way of winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of the Tamil population.45 This will ensure that IDPs return to dignified conditions, and will reduce widespread grievances against the state.46 Once these plans have been made, they must be supported by the international community to prevent duplication, and to reduce the disparities in the assistance provided. In addition, a system of internal and external monitoring must be established to ensure these needs are fulfilled and expectations are met.

On the micro-level, there is a need to ensure returnees are reintegrated into productive livelihoods, rather than relying on aid handouts.47 On the macro-level, the government is keen to start economic development in the North and has high expectations for economic revival in the post-war period (IDMC, 2008a). Currently, development plans remain primarily state-driven,48 with the government ‘taking full control over development projects’.49 As a result, it is likely that the majority of infrastructure development in the North will be owned by the government, reinforcing a ‘winner takes all’ approach to peace.50 Instead, a joint ‘return and reconstruction’ fund should be developed to ensure that reconstruction benefits the returning Tamil community. Local ownership at the provincial level will provide returnees with direct responsibility over how this money is spent. This will increase transparency and will ensure that the government is held to account in terms of reconstruction. In turn, this will encourage confidence-building between the government and the displaced, offering a new social contract for positive peace.

Using a framework of return and recovery, this paper has explored practical means of implementing a new social contract in post-war Sri Lanka. This includes direct measures for ensuring that return encourages security, fosters participation, addresses the underlying causes of conflict and contributes to development. These four areas must be combined under a symbiotic vision for return and recovery that enhances the relationship between the government and the displaced and ensures that even the most marginalised members of society have a stake in the post-war order. In this way, the government can utilise the return process in the transition from negative to positive peace.

Conclusions

Following the military defeat of the LTTE in May 2009, Sri Lanka has entered a new era of negative peace. Although the victory of the Sri Lankan Army has stimulated widespread support for the Sinhalese-led government in the South, for the huge number of displaced persons primarily of Tamil origin living in camps in the North, the benefits of peace remain to be seen. Subsequently, this paper has argued that resolving internal displacement is central to the achievement of positive peace in the post-conflict era. It has therefore argued for an integrated approach to return and recovery to ensure the development of a new social contract between the government and the displaced. In particular, it has identified four key areas that reinforce the symbiotic nature of return and recovery: physical security, local participation, addressing the root causes of conflict, and realising the links between peace and development. Each of these areas must be promoted under a broad vision for a peaceful society. In the case of Sri Lanka, the failure to link return and recovery during the 2002 ceasefire undermined the stability of the peace and threatened the sustainability of return. In recognition of these shortfalls, the paper has explored the implementation of a new social contract between the government and primarily Tamil IDPs in the recent post-war context. It has claimed that combining return with recovery will enable the government to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of these people and reduce the threat of further Tamil extremism. It has argued that the return process must be implemented with recovery in four key ways: by reducing the militarised nature of the camps; by encouraging IDP involvement through participatory councils and information campaigns; addressing a political solution that focuses on wider Tamil empowerment; and by focusing on sustainable development through the establishment of an integrated trust fund. In this way, the return of marginalised groups will contribute to the broader process of peace and development and the establishment of a new social contract between the military victors and their victims.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Natasha Price

This article is based on the prize-winning entry for the Hodson Prize 2009.

Notes

1. The remaining 8% consists of mainly of Tamil-speaking Muslims.

2. Author interview, Human Rights Advocator, 16 April 2009.

3. While under a ‘state of emergency’ the Government of Sri Lanka is legally permitted to establish HSZs in the interest of security. These rights have often been violated by successive governments in order to maintain control over Tamil areas (Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions, COHRE, 2008).

4. Author interview with a member of the Development Community, 23 April 2009.

5. Author interview with Muslim Aid Representative (international NGO, INGO), 16 April 2009.

6. Author interview with a representative from the International Federation of Red Cross, Sri Lanka, 7 April 2009.

7. Author interview with a representative of the Batticaloa Regional Office, CHA, 4 May 2009.

8. Author interview with the Director of the Psychosocial Unit, CHA, 26 March 2009; author interview with a representative from the International Federation of Red Cross, Sri Lanka, 7 April 2009; author interview with a member of the Donor Community, 22 April 2009.

9. Author interview with the Director of the Rehabilitation Unit, CHA, 26 March 2009; author interview with Jeevan Thiagarajah, Executive Director, CHA, 22 April 2009; author interview with an INGO focusing on Displacement, 29 April 2009.

10. Author interview with a representative of the ICRC, 20 April 2009.

11. Author interview with the director of the Rehabilitation Unit, CHA, 26 March 2009.

12. Author interview with the director of the Rehabilitation Unit, CHA, 26 March 2009; author interview with a representative from Muslim Aid (INGO), 16 April 2009; author interview with a humanitarian worker, 2 May 2009.

13. Author interview with Prof. Rajiva Wijsinghe, Director, Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process/Secretary for the Ministry of Disaster Management and Human Rights, 3 April 2009.

14. Author interview with a representative of the ICRC, 20 April 2009.

15. Author interview with Jeevan Thiagarajah, Executive Director, CHA, follow-up interview, 6 May 2009.

16. Author interview with Jeevan Thiagarajah, Executive Director, CHA, follow-up interview, 6 May 2009.

17. Author interview with a representative of the Human Security Response Programme, CHA, 21 April 2009.

18. Author interview with Prof. Rajiva Wijsinghe, Director, Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process/Secretary for the Ministry of Disaster Management and Human Rights, 3 April 2009; author interview with a representative from the Human Security Response Programme, CHA, 21 April 2009; author interview with a representative from Flict (NGO), 29 April 2009.

19. Author interview with Prof. Rajiva Wijsinghe, Director, Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process/Secretary for the Ministry of Disaster Management and Human Rights, 3 April 2009.

20. Author interview with a Consultant for the Resettlement Authority, GoSL, 3 April 2009.

21. Author interview with Jeevan Thiagarajah, Executive Director, CHA, follow-up interview, 6 May 2009.

22. Author interview with a representative of COHRE, Sri Lanka, 23 April 2009.

23. Author interview with Prof. Rajiva Wijsinghe, Director, Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process/Secretary for the Ministry of Disaster Management and Human Rights, 3 April 2009; author interview with a representative from Muslim Aid (INGO), follow-up interview, 6 May 2009.

24. Author interview with a member of the Development Community, 23 April 2009.

25. Author interview with a member of the Development Community, 23 April 2009.

26. Author interview with the Advocacy Coordinator, CHA (formally humanitarian worker during Tsunami Response), 30 March 2009; author interview with FORUT (INGO), 2 April 2009.

27. Author interview with a representative of the ICRC, 20 April 2009; author interview with an INGO focusing on Displacement, 29 April 2009.

28. Author minutes, Foundation for Co-existence, 54th Human Security Roundtable Meeting, 6 May 2009.

29. Author interview with a Humanitarian Worker, 2 May 2009.

30. Author interview with Prof. Rajiva Wijsinghe, Director, Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process/Secretary for the Ministry of Disaster Management and Human Rights, 3 April 2009.

31. Author interview with FORUT (INGO), 2 April 2009; author interview with Firzan Hashim, Deputy Director, CHA, 19 April 2009.

32. Author interview with Firzan Hashim, Deputy Director, CHA, 19 April 2009; author interview with a representative from, Muslim Aid (INGO), follow-up interview, 6 May 2009.

33. Author interview with the Advocacy Coordinator, CHA (formally humanitarian worker during Tsunami Response), 30 March 2009.

34. Author interview with a member of the Development Community, 23 April 2009.

35. Author interview with the Director of the Rehabilitation Unit, CHA, 26 March 2009.

36. Author interview with Dr Kumar Rupesinghe, Director, Foundation for Co-existence (NGO), 27 April 2009.

37. Copy of Minutes, Foundation for Co-existence, 55th Human Security Roundtable Meeting, 1 June 2009.

38. Author interview with a representative from UNDP, 28 April 2009.

39. Author interview with a representative from Flict (NGO), 29 April 2009.

40. Author interview with a representative of the ICRC, 20 April 2009.

41. Author interview with a representative from Flict (NGO), 29 April 2009.

42. The recent amendments being made to the Parliamentary Elections Bill include strict restrictions on political parties and the development of new ones. This provides the state with greater power over opposition parties and effectively excludes minority parties (Wickremasinghe, 2009). This is unlikely to promote reconciliation between ethnic groups.

43. Author interview with a representative from the ICRC, 20 April 2009.

44. Author interview with a representative from the International Federation of Red Cross, Sri Lanka, 7 April 2009.

45. Author interview with a representative from the ICRC, 20 April 2009.

46. Author interview with a representative from Flict (NGO), 29 April 2009.

47. Author interview with a member of the Development Community, 23 April 2009.

48. Author interview with a representative from Flict (NGO), 29 April 2009.

49. Author interview with a representative from FORUT (INGO), 2 April 2009.

50. Author interview with a representative from the ICRC, 20 April 2009.