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Abstract
The power-sharing agreement in Zimbabwe has ushered in a period of engagement between the diaspora and homeland government, marking a distinct change from the hostility that characterised relations over previous years. This article discusses the politics of this repositioning and the character of the new diasporic organisations formed in the wake of the Global Political Agreement to take forward agendas of development and reconstruction at home. It argues that these new diasporic organisations have tried to create non-partisan platforms for engagement, have an elite social base, and connect responsibilities for development at home with the desire for formal political rights. Despite an apparent convergence of interest around development and reconstruction on the part of an array of diaspora groups, as well as the Zimbabwean and British governments, there are, nonetheless, tensions among these actors that this article seeks to reveal. It argues that a key issue shaping conversations over engagement is the divergence of interest within the diaspora between those with and without security in their states of residence. This divide is likely to become more salient in the context of a large-scale return programme, especially if there is ongoing uncertainty in Zimbabwe and if repatriation is conceived as a final one-way movement rather than as part of an ongoing circulation in which people may choose to maintain transnational lives. This discussion of the Zimbabwean case thus contributes to broader debates over the tensions that characterise policies of ‘diaspora engagement’.
Notes
1. For press coverage, see Dugan (Citation2009) SWRadio Africa (Citation2009), Gonda (Citation2009), Nehanda Radio (2010) and Sibanda (Citation2009). Among those welcoming Tsvangirai were the Zimbabwe Diaspora Development Interface, the Zimbabwe Women's Network, Rebuild Zimbabwe UK Association and the Zimbabwe Association.
2. Home Office, quarterly asylum statistics, available from http://rds.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/immigration-asylum-stats.html
3. The Home Office published a new operational guidance note in March 2009 to supercede RN, but at the time of writing there has not been a formal appeal to the legal status of the RN case. An appeal is currently scheduled for October 2010.
4. This is clear because the overwhelming majority of claims were not made at ‘the border’.
5. In South Africa, there are also new platforms for development, such as the Global Zimbabwe Forum, the Zimbabwe Diaspora Forum, and the Zimbabwe Diaspora Development Chamber. Recently, the diaspora in the United States established the Council for Zimbabwe to achieve humanitarian and development needs.
7. Robert Shooter, DFID representative, address to ZDDI conference, 26 September 2009.
9. Lazarus Muriritirwa, address to ZDDI, 26 September 2009.
10. Emmanuel Munyukwi, CEO Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, address to ZDDI, 26 September 2009.
11. Robert Shooter, DFID representative, ZDDI conference, 26 September 2009.
12. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss transitional justice activities in the diaspora, led by the ZHRNGO Forum in partnership with the Zimbabwe Association.
13. This is not an exhaustive list.
14. Tamasanqa Zhou, ‘Zimbabweans in UK to be consulted on British policy’, 27 May 2010. The Zimbabwean, 27 May 2010.
15. Figures cited in ‘Zimbabweans top list of asylum seekers in UK’, NewZimbabwe.com, 23 March 2010.
16. Those involved included the Council of Zimbabwe Christian Leaders, Nottingham Zimbabwe Community Network, Global Zimbabwe Forum, Zimbabwe Investor, Zimbabwe Diaspora Development Interchange, and Zimbabwe Action Group.