Australia’s 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper: Deconstruction and Critique

ABSTRACT

The 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper identifies major themes and recommends preferred strategies in Australia’s engagement with the world. These themes and strategies relate to geopolitics, economics and the ‘new international agenda’; there is also a more specific focus on Australia’s Pacific island neighbours and Timor-Leste. There is a strong emphasis on perceived Australian national interests throughout the document. The geopolitical discussion is primarily ‘realist’; economically the document is pro-globalisation; the discussion of the ‘new international agenda’ involves an Australian-oriented pragmatism; there is an assertion of Australian leadership in the South Pacific. With some minor criticism, Labor has accepted the general direction advocated in the White Paper. The document is thus indicative of the likely future direction of Australian foreign policy. Lack of US response indicates declining US engagement with Australia and the Asia-Pacific or Indo-Pacific region. China, as the other major power highly significant for Australia, has been low-key in its criticisms.

KEYWORDS:

• Australia
• Indo-Pacific
• Asia-Pacific
• United States
• China
• South Pacific

Notes

1. An example is the way in which Israel is featured as a significant international partner in the discussion of Australia’s global partnerships (p. 81). This might simply reflect pro-Israel thinking in the Coalition, but pro-Israel groups are very influential in Australian politics.

2. Page references without an author being indicated are to the White Paper (Australian Government, 2017).

3. The projection for Australia in 2030 is USD1.7 trillion; Indonesia is on USD5.5 trillion, Japan on USD5.9 trillion, India on USD20.9 trillion, and the European Union on USD23.3 trillion. The figures are adjusted on a parity purchasing power basis. However, note the argument that a more realistic comparison is on the basis of market exchange whereby, in the case of comparing China with the US, one converts Chinese renminbi into US dollars at the market exchange rate (making China’s current GDP about half that of the US). See Robertson (2017).

4. On the problem of the overall dynamic in US–China relations, see Allison (2017).

5. See the assessment of the Turnbull government’s climate change policy review by Bagshaw (2018).

6. Australia’s foreign aid declined in real terms by about one-third between 2012–2013 and 2016–2017, representing 0.22% of gross national income (GNI) in the latter period. Australia’s highest aid-to-GNI ratio was 0.48% in 1967–68. See Davies (2017).

7. Most recently in Chapter 3 of Hameiri et al. (2017), focusing on Solomon Islands and written primarily by Shahar Hameiri.

8. See further Wallis (2017); Herr and Bergin (2011).

9. On Labor’s approach to foreign aid, see further Wong (2017a).

10. Wong (2017b) presents Labor’s position on Australia–US relations.