Palestine and the modern Commonwealth: past engagements and future membership?

ABSTRACT

All Commonwealth summit communiqués from the late 1960s through to the mid-1990s maintained a focus on the Palestinian conflict and highlighted approaches that could lead to its just resolution. Whilst pressure peaked in the late 1970s and 1980s, the most significant issue – potential Palestinian membership – arose only in 1997. A decision was deferred and Palestine has not been mentioned in summit communiqués since. Continued disengagement has dovetailed with a time-shrunken summit and resource-depleted Commonwealth Secretariat. Nevertheless, the Commonwealth can and should re-engage by providing a realistic roadmap (including Secretariat support) for Palestinian membership that benchmarks internal standards but is not dependent on Israeli or similar factors outside the Palestinian Authority’s direct control.

KEYWORDS:

• CHOGM
• human rights
• Israel
• membership
• Palestine
• self-determination

Introduction

Palestine, as stated by the 1997 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) when welcoming but not immediately taking forward Palestine’s interest in membership, has a strong ‘historical association with the Commonwealth’ (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2007, p. 18). Alongside Israel and Jordan (which was effectively governed separately as Transjordan), its entire territory once comprised the Mandate of Palestine, which was established by the League of Nations in the aftermath of the First World War and administered by the United Kingdom. An association by Mandate with an original Commonwealth member state forms the historical link for many Commonwealth members including Samoa, the host of this year’s CHOGM.¹ Following the establishment of a truly modern multilateral Commonwealth with the formation of the Commonwealth Secretariat in 1965, the Palestinian conflict was included in the communiqués of all Commonwealth summits from the late 1960s through to the mid-1990s. It follows that it found a place on the formal Commonwealth agenda for longer, but also over much the same period, as South African apartheid² – that leitmotif of Commonwealth causes and one that has spawned a significant literature including a recent authoritative book (Mole, 2023). However, despite this long engagement and with the notable exception of Kattan (2015) putting the case in this journal for Palestinian membership, there has been no extended academic analysis of the modern Commonwealth’s relationship with Palestine.

This lacuna is understandable. First, even if some of the issues and perspectives overlapped, the Commonwealth treated the Palestinian conflict entirely differently from that in South Africa in that no pan-Commonwealth initiative was even attempted in the former case (and, it would appear from currently available records, was only ever suggested once and by one member government alone). Second, despite the Palestinian conflict remaining unresolved and ultimately becoming ever more serious, the Commonwealth has entirely disengaged from it for over a quarter of a century. This reflects not just the widely perceived hopelessness and de-prioritisation of the Palestinian conflict but more specifically the reduced capacity of a time-shrunken CHOGM and resource- and credibility-strapped Commonwealth Secretariat to engage on international issues.

Notwithstanding the limitations, it is nevertheless worthwhile to explore the engagement of the modern Commonwealth with Palestine. First, tracking the various statements in Commonwealth communiqués has significance in itself as, whatever their constraints, they do constitute concrete collective outputs from a sizeable portion of world society. Indeed, Dale (1982, p. 466) goes as far as to argue that:

The proceedings of a Heads of Government Meeting do not result in mere recommendations. Since the Meeting decides by consensus, and the participants are what they are, it results in decisions to put into effect. These decisions range, in degrees, from action to attitude.

Second, an analysis of the underlying discussions from the late 1960s through to the late 1990s can elucidate how a very diverse group of countries confronted the Palestinian conflict and helped shape a common Commonwealth standpoint, however tenuous it may be. Third, this experience can provide the grounding for the Commonwealth of today positively intervening at this moment of heightened crisis. As well as addressing the drastic humanitarian situation and the need to establish the basis for political negotiations between Palestine and Israel, the forthcoming CHOGM should offer Palestine membership of the Commonwealth on terms that are not dependent on Israel or other outside factors. Conditions related to internal democracy, human rights and the rule of law must apply if Commonwealth credibility on these topics is to be restored, and the Palestinian Authority should be offered the active support of the Commonwealth Secretariat in meeting these standards.

Alongside news reports, published accounts and secondary literature, the analysis below draws on all relevant Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting/CHOGM communiqués and crucially also their underlying minutes and memoranda. Unfortunately, as a result of the thirty-year rule applied to Commonwealth archives, the latter have only been released up to the 1993 CHOGM. Nevertheless, for the period of the 1990s (and, to a very limited extent, also beyond) news reporting and published accounts are available and are drawn upon in lieu of official sources. The immediately following section frames the discussion by introducing the Palestinian conflict and outlining its general trajectory between 1967 and 1997, the period during which modern Commonwealth communiqués explicitly confronted it. The next section examines the content of those communiqués whilst the one that follows explores the extent to which the Palestinian conflict was, in fact, discussed at Commonwealth summits and the nature of that discussion. The last two main sections engage in a broader analysis of the modern Commonwealth’s engagement and then disengagement with the Palestinian conflict and argue for the Commonwealth to establish a clear, realistic and supported roadmap for Palestinian membership in the organisation. The article closes with some brief conclusions.

The Palestinian conflict and an overview of its trajectory: 1967–1997³

Although a commitment to a Jewish national homeland in Palestine dates to the British Government’s 1917 Balfour Declaration, which was written into the League of Nations’ Mandate instructions for that territory at the end of the First World War, the long-term future of that territory only came to be conclusively addressed following the Second World War and in the aftermath of the Holocaust. which killed one-third of the worldwide Jewish population. In November 1947, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly Resolution 181 proposed partitioning Palestine outside Transjordan (which had achieved independence in 1946) between a Jewish and an Arab State, with Jerusalem being governed separately as an international city. The Arab world categorically rejected this and the resulting war in 1948 left Israel with a much wider swathe of territory than had initially been proposed. Transjordan gained control of East Jerusalem and the rest of the West Bank, which it annexed as the renamed state of Jordan in 1950, whilst Egypt took possession of the Gaza Strip. Many hundreds of thousands of Arab Palestinians were left as refugees and, notwithstanding UN General Assembly Resolution 194 in December 1948, were denied the right of return. A state of war continued to exist between Israel and the entire Arab world, with huge implications both for Israel’s security and for hundreds of thousands of Jews in the Arab region (most of whom left to settle in Israel). The Suez conflict between Egypt and Israel in 1956–1957 (also involving the UK and France in 1956) did not result in any fundamental shift of territory but did result in a UN Emergency Force being stationed on the Egyptian side of the Israel–Egypt 1949 armistice line.

In May 1967, an increase in border raids and build-up of Arab troops culminated in Egypt asking the UN forces to withdraw. In the following month, Israel attacked various Arab positions and during the resulting Six-Day War it captured all of the West Bank and Gaza, the entire Sinai Peninsula and also the Syrian Golan Heights. The resulting UN Security Council Resolution 242 in November 1967 called for Israeli withdrawal leading to an end to belligerency (so-called ‘land for peace’), for a just solution to the refugee problem and, finally, for a UN-sponsored peace process. The latter was unsuccessful and on Yom Kippur in October 1973 a combined Arab force led by Egypt and Syria attacked Israeli positions, which were ultimately bolstered by substantial US aid. Disengagement following this crisis did not result in significant territorial adjustments but did lead to greater diplomatic contact between Israel and the Arab world, including through a Geneva Conference that convened in 1973 but was never revived. In the following year the Arab League declared the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), which had been founded in 1964 and which refused to accept UN Resolution 242, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, although Jordan – which had expelled PLO guerillas from its territory in 1970–1971 – offered only its grudging acquiescence.

Israeli–Egyptian contacts continued to increase and culminated in the September 1978 Camp David Accords, which saw an end to belligerency between these two states, Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai and plans for Palestinian autonomy in Gaza and the West Bank. The Accords were denounced by the PLO and Egypt was expelled from the Arab League for the next decade. By this time, the number of Jewish settlers in the West Bank and Gaza (which, according to Dowty (2023, p. 212), had only been around 4,000 in 1977) had begun to increase massively and in 1980 Israel also annexed East Jerusalem as its own national territory. Following their expulsion from Jordan, PLO guerillas continued to target Israeli territory from Lebanon and became firmly entrenched in an anti-Maronite coalition during the civil war that started there in 1975. Attacks from Lebanon on the Galilee prompted an Israeli military invasion of Lebanon in 1982, which, under Defence Minister Ariel Sharon, was much more far-reaching than originally sanctioned by the Israeli cabinet and prompted massive opposition even within Israel itself. Although a peace agreement was not ultimately ratified, staged military withdrawals from most of Lebanon followed in 1982 and then in 1983 and 1985.

From the mid-1980s the PLO, which had been forced to relocate from Lebanon to Algeria after the Israeli invasion, moved towards a rapprochement with Jordan and acceptance of Israel’s existence. Egypt was readmitted to the Arab League at the latter’s summit in Jordan in November 1987 and the following month saw the outbreak of a general armed struggle (or intifada) amongst Palestinians in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza, which was met with severe Israeli countermeasures and the beginning of the emergence of Hamas as a religious-inspired militant grouping. In July 1988 Jordan withdrew both its claims over the West Bank and Jordanian citizenship and related support to Palestinians resident there. In November 1988 the PLO leader Yasser Arafat condemned ‘all forms of terrorism’ and the PLO itself issued the Palestinian Declaration of Independence, which concomitantly recognised Israel’s right to exist and the other core elements of UN Resolution 242. Fifty-five States, including many developing Commonwealth countries, immediately recognised Palestine as a sovereign State and direct talks between the United States and the PLO also became possible. In 1990–91, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the PLO’s strong support for Iraq in the Gulf War saw the PLO lose substantial international and financial support. October 1991 also saw the convening of a Peace Conference bringing together Israel and Arab countries, with indirect participation of the Palestinians through a joint delegation with Jordan.

Following the election in June 1992 of a Labor Government in Israel under Yitzak Rabin, direct talks between Israel and the PLO became possible and in September 1993 both agreed to a Declaration of Principles (Oslo I) comprising mutual recognition, non-violence and an interim five-year period of partial autonomy (initially under the PLO itself) for most of Gaza and some areas of the West Bank. Further agreements in 1994 saw the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority (hereinafter Palestinian Authority) and a peace agreement between Israel and Jordan. However, throughout this period Israeli settlement construction continued and opposition to the agreements, including armed and terrorist activity, grew amongst both Israeli Jews and Palestinians. In September 1995 a major Interim Agreement (Oslo II) expanded the areas of Palestinian autonomy and set out a process for final status talks. However, in November 1995 Yitzak Rabin was assassinated by an Israeli Jewish terrorist and the Israeli general election of May 1996 saw Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu replace Labor’s Shimon Peres as Prime Minister. Israeli Jewish settlement activity began to accelerate and tensions with the Palestinian Authority increased. Meanwhile, in January 1996 the first Palestinian national elections (which were boycotted by Hamas) saw Yasser Arafat overwhelmingly elected as President of the Palestinian Authority and his PLO Fatah faction gain 50 out of 88 of its Legislative Council seats. Finally, in April 1996 the PLO passed an addendum, which indirectly nullified those parts of its founding National Covenant that were inconsistent with non-violence and the recognition of Israel.

The Palestinian conflict in modern Commonwealth summit communiqués

As stated in this article’s introduction, the modern multilateral Commonwealth dates from mid-1965 when the Commonwealth Secretariat, including the post of Commonwealth Secretary-General, was set up inter alia to take over the servicing of summits (and other high-level political meetings) from the British Government. During 1966 and throughout the rest of the 1960s the summit meetings continued to be styled Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meetings (CPMMs) and, with the exception of an emergency summit in Lagos that only discussed the response to Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI), continued to be held in London and chaired by the British Prime Minister as the country host. However, from 1971 the summits were restyled as CHOGMs and began to be held on a (roughly) biennial basis hosted by a different member state each time. As seen in Table 1 below, neither of the communiqués of the first summits serviced by the new Secretariat in 1966 mentioned the Palestinian conflict at all. This mirrored the conflict’s treatment in previous CPMM communiqués during relative periods of stasis. Indeed, other than a passing mention of ‘discuss[ing] the problems of … the Middle East’ in the 1960 CPMM (Commonwealth Secretariat, 1987, p. 61), the last communiqué entry concerning the Middle East had been in June 1957 (Commonwealth Secretariat, 1987, p. 56), which was shortly after the end of the Suez conflict.

Contrasting with this silence and in clear response to the 1967 Six-Day War and its aftermath, the January 1969 CPMM communiqué included a lengthy paragraph exploring ‘events in the Middle East’ (Commonwealth Secretariat, 1987, p. 138). This regional framing was maintained in subsequent summit communiqués, although from 1975 onwards Palestine/Palestinians were mentioned directly and, with the exception of some wider consideration of the crisis in Lebanon in the 1980s, the focus in all of these entries was in fact solely on the Palestinian conflict. Coverage was then maintained in all summit communiqués until 1997, re-peaking in the late 1970s and even more so from 1983 onwards, before becoming more muted in the 1990s. Broadly speaking, these peaks and troughs can be seen as reactive to the periods of crisis and relative stability recounted in the previous section. In contrast, CHOGM communiqués after 1997 have entirely ignored Palestine.

Table 1. Coverage of the Palestinian conflict in modern Commonwealth summit communiqués

Days/Month/Year	Summit Host	Words
10–12/01/1966	Nigeria	0
06–15/09/1966	UK	0
07–15/01/1969	UK	159
14–22/01/1971	Singapore	17
02–10/08/1973	Canada	68
29/04–06/05/1975	Jamaica	93
08–15/06/1977	UK	145
01–07/09/1979	Zambia	149
30/09–07/10/1981	Australia	130
23–29/11/1983	India	193*
16–22/10/1985	Bahamas	144*
13–17/10/1987	Canada	222*
18–24/10/1989	Malaysia	261*
16–21/10/1991	Zimbabwe	74
21–25/10/1993	Cyprus	88
10–13/11/1995	New Zealand	36
24–27/10/1997	UK	56

*Plus additional text specific to Lebanon.

Turning to matters of substance, the 1969 communiqué entry on the Six-Day War and its aftermath set the broad tone for the Commonwealth interventions during the following three decades. It made clear that the ‘events’ were ‘in violation of the United Nations Charter and the Security Council resolutions’, argued that a ‘durable peace’ was a ‘matter of urgency’ and could be achieved in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 242, urged ‘fullest co-operation’ with UN peace efforts and emphasised the role not only of the permanent members of the Security Council but also of States including those within the Commonwealth ‘who have an interest in the re-opening of the Suez Canal’ (Commonwealth Secretariat, 1987, p. 138). Whilst the 1971 communiqué entry was non-substantive, the next in 1973 (on the eve of the Yom Kippur war) went further by arguing that ‘the deteriorating situation’ was both ‘a most serious threat to world peace’ and ‘was directly attributable to the lack of progress in the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242’ (Commonwealth Secretariat, 1987, p. 162).

As well as continuing to emphasise the serious or grave nature of the situation, later communiqués turned explicitly to the position of the Palestinians. The 1975 communiqué emphasised the necessity for ‘authentic and legitimate representatives of the Palestinian people’ to participate in the forthcoming peace negotiations (Commonwealth Secretariat, 1987, p. 173) and the 1977 communiqué additionally stated that ‘[m]ost Heads of Government recognised that the Palestine Liberation Organisation is the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people’ (Commonwealth Secretariat, 1987, p. 190). For an organisation committed to making progress via consensus, it was unusual but not unprecedented to include such a definitive statement agreed only by ‘most’.⁴ This communiqué further stated that ‘no real progress towards peace in the area is possible’ until ‘the right of the Palestinian people to their own homeland is recognised’ (Commonwealth Secretariat, 1987, p. 190). References to both the PLO and a homeland were reiterated in the communiqués of 1979 (Commonwealth Secretariat, 1987, p. 209), 1981 (Commonwealth Secretariat, 1987, p. 228), 1983 (Commonwealth Secretariat, 1987, p. 253), 1985 (Commonwealth Secretariat, 1987, p. 277) and 1987 (Commonwealth Secretariat, 1997, p. 20), with homeland rights described as ‘inalienable’ from 1981 and the need for the PLO to be involved in peace negotiations on an equal footing stressed from 1983.

Coming during the lead-up to the Lebanon war and its subsequent occupation, the 1981 communiqué emphasised ‘the right of all states in the region to live in peace within secure borders’ (Commonwealth Secretariat, 1987, p. 228) and the 1983 communiqué reiterated this and also stressed the need for ‘Israel’s withdrawal from territories occupied since 1967’ (Commonwealth Secretariat, 1987, p. 253). Both understandings were repeated in the communiqués issued throughout the rest of the 1980s. The 1987 communiqué contained the first direct mention of concern ‘at the [internal] situation in the territories occupied by Israel’ (Commonwealth Secretariat, 1997, p. 20), a matter that was returned to strongly in the 1989 communiqué in the context of ‘alarm at the constant increase in the number of dead and wounded’ following the outbreak of the first intifada. This entry ‘appealed urgently to the Israeli authorities to exercise utmost restraint in the Occupied Territories, to implement Resolutions 605, 607 and 608 of the [UN] Security Council,⁵ and to respect the provisions of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War’ (Commonwealth Secretariat, 1997, p. 56).

The other elements of the communiqué entries in the 1980s were directly responsive to specific developments and initiatives, for example, expressing hope (in 1985) that ‘the Jordanian–Palestinian agreement of February 1985 would assist progress towards a framework for a durable peace’ (Commonwealth Secretariat, 1987, p. 277). With the important exception of 1997, this straightforwardly reactive approach became overwhelming in the 1990s. Thus, the 1991 communiqué largely limited itself to welcoming the ‘convening of the Middle East Peace Conference on 30 October 1991’ (Commonwealth Secretariat, 1997, p. 94), the 1993 communiqué to welcoming the signing of the Declaration of Principles by Israel and the PLO as ‘an historic contribution to advancing reconciliation, peace and security in the region’ (Commonwealth Secretariat, 1997, p. 127) and the 1995 communiqué to condemning the tragic assassination of Yitzak Rabin and expressing the hope ‘that this would not affect the peace process in the Middle East, which has [Heads of Governments’] full support’ (Commonwealth Secretariat, 1997, p. 165). Finally, the 1997 communiqué welcomed ‘the interest expressed by the Palestinian Authority in Commonwealth membership’ and acknowledged ‘Palestine’s historical association with the Commonwealth’. Nevertheless, recognising that ‘under the Oslo Accords, Palestine may attain state sovereignty in 1999’, it decided that ‘the case for membership’ would be determined when ‘this was so’ (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2007, p. 18). Since this meeting, there has been no mention of Palestine in any Commonwealth summit communiqué.

The Palestinian conflict in modern Commonwealth summit discussions

An examination of CPMM/CHOGM minutes and memoranda, which are currently only accessible up to 1993, can shine further light on the extent and nature of Commonwealth summit engagement on Palestine. Although much of the communiqué text was left to officials and there has never been a plenary session at a modern Commonwealth summit solely dedicated to Palestine or even to the Middle East, these records nevertheless demonstrate that Heads of Government did significantly engage on this topic from 1969 onwards. Discussion took place during more general debates on the international political situation as well as, in several instances, during agreement of the applicable communiqué entry itself. However, although these communiqué entries continued to be extensive throughout the 1980s, relevant deliberation declined from 1983 onwards. Indeed, with a minor exception in 1989, there was no substantive discussion on the communiqué entry concerning Palestine at any time between 1985 and 1993. Especially given the limited nature of the communiqué entry in 1995 (see above), it seems almost certain that discussion was similarly limited at the 1995 CHOGM. In contrast, unofficial public accounts including the output from a witness seminar held in 2018 (Onslow and Kandiah, Eds, 2018) demonstrate that the CHOGM’s discussions in 1997 on Palestine’s potential membership were both quite extensive and important. Finally, given the complete lack of mention of the Palestinian conflict in post-1997 CHOGM communiqués, it seems unlikely that Palestine has been significantly discussed at Commonwealth summits during the past quarter of a century. Nevertheless, it should be noted that in December 2006 it was reported that a special committee of officials had been set up to consider various expressions of interest in membership including from Palestine and, it would appear, also Israel (Jewish Journal, 2006). The 2007 CHOGM communiqué later included a general discussion of Commonwealth membership criteria (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2016, pp. 22–23) and the 2009 CHOGM communiqué welcomed Rwanda as a new member (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2016, p. 55). It is possible that Palestine was tangentially discussed at these two meetings but further consideration of this would be speculative.

Summits up to 1993

Both the 1969 and 1971 summits featured early and quite extensive discussion of the Palestinian conflict in a wider Middle East context. Moreover, at the 1971 meeting Jamaica made the unique suggestion that ‘a Commonwealth initiative’ attempt mediation in the Middle East (Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, 1971, p. 17).⁶ However, reflecting positions that were retained at all subsequent summits, most States instead called directly for implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 242 and many explicitly emphasised the need for withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied territories. At this time, several also gave voice to the plight of the Palestinian refugees. Pakistan championed these approaches including during the communiqué negotiations. In 1969, it objected that treatment of the 1967 Six-Day War ‘aggression’ was ‘oblique’ compared with that of 1968 in Czechoslovkia, ‘despite the fact there been no less violation of territorial integrity’ (Meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, 1969, p. 235). Subsequent discussion led to the affirmation of the principles of State non-interference, sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence being separated out from the subsequent consideration of Czechoslovkia, which Pakistan accepted as a resolution ‘with reservations but in the interests of progress’ (Meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, 1969, p. 236). At the 1971 summit, Pakistan objected more generally to the ‘unnecessarily and unjustifiably truncated’ communiqué, which it said had ‘not fully reflected the discussion on political matters’ (and had failed to deal with economic matters at all). At the suggestion of Singapore as chair, it was agreed to place all of Pakistan’s concerns on record but, in light of ‘practical reality’, to issue the abbreviated communiqué (Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, 1971, p. 228). By 1973, in protest at the recognition (and subsequent Commonwealth membership) granted to Bangladesh, Pakistan had left the Commonwealth (it was only to return in 1989). Although Bangladesh itself remained recurrently vocal, Pakistan was replaced at the vanguard of the Palestinian cause by Dom Mintoff, who from June 1971 to December 1984 was Labour Prime Minister of Malta, a country that had previously been explicitly neutral on the Palestinian issue. At the 1973 meeting, Mintoff argued (in opposition to the UK and ultimately without success) that ‘a fuller Communiqué was required to reflect all the divergent views on issues such as … problems of the Middle East’ (Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, 1973, p. 148), whilst in 1975 he argued (also in the face of UK opposition) that the lack of reference to the PLO in the draft Middle East paragraph rendered it ‘almost meaningless’ (Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, 1975, p. 178). However, after an intervention by Tanzania – a State that similarly recognised the PLO – it was agreed to leave this unchanged (Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, 1975, p. 179). In 1977, and notwithstanding initial formal reservations by the UK and Canada (Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, 1997, p. 178),⁷ a concerted and largely successful effort was made to recognise the PLO as the Palestinians’ sole legitimate representative. Once it was made clear such recognition only covered ‘most’ Commonwealth governments, the UK and Canada accepted this proposal, which was moved by Jamaica, Malta and Sierra Leone. In contrast, Barbados ‘wondered whether to take the opinion of the majority in the use of a word with such potential overtones was not very near to voting’ and unsuccessfully urged substituting ‘recognised’ with merely ‘accepted’ (or even ‘expressed a view’) (Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, 1997, p. 189). The language of recognition would remain present until 1983 and from 1983 through to 1987 the communiqués would go on to reference the need for the PLO to be involved on an equal footing in peace negotiations.

Turning next to the 1980s, Malta’s suggestion that the 1981 CHOGM plenary explicitly include a sub-item on ‘Palestine and the Middle East’ was not accepted (Commonwealth Secretary-General, 1981, p. 315). Nevertheless, during discussion on the applicable paragraph, Sierra Leone raised the suggestion that the communiqué’s reference to ‘the central question of Palestine’ be augmented with ‘including Jerusalem’. However, despite the compromise text of ‘the central question of Palestine and Jerusalem’ proposed by Canada (supported by Kenya), the UK and Australia successfully opposed any explicit mention after Ghana, a country that had severed relations with Israel, argued that the paragraph’s broader reference to ‘relevant United Nations resolutions’ addressed the point anyway (Commonwealth Heads’ of Government Meeting, 1981, p. 247). Meanwhile, during the discussion of the communiqué in 1983, Australia was successful in ensuring that reference to the ‘question of Palestine’ was amended to ‘the Palestinian issue’ (Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, 1983, p. 202), although the concrete commitments set out in the paragraph remained unchanged. Despite lengthening coverage of the Palestinian conflict in summit communiqués throughout the rest of the 1980s (see Table 1), the summit plenaries gave less attention to it and all the applicable communiqué paragraphs were adopted without comment during the final plenaries.

In the early 1990s both the communiqué text and the plenary discussion became sparse. Nevertheless, during consideration of the applicable communiqué paragraph in 1991, Malaysia did successfully ensure that ‘concern at the dangerous tensions arising from the unresolved problems of the Middle East’ (Commonwealth Secretariat, 1997, p. 94) referenced ‘especially’ rather than merely ‘including’ the Palestinian issue as had initially been proposed (Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, 1991, pp. 164–165).

The 1997 summit

As previously mentioned, due to the thirty-year rule, no access to official CHOGM minutes or memoranda is possible for either 1995 or 1997. Given the sparse mention of Palestine in the 1995 communiqué, the former gap is almost certainly inconsequential. In contrast, as the 1997 meeting considered Palestine’s interest in joining the organisation, an absence of relevant information here would be very unfortunate.⁸ However, reflecting the salience of this development including in the lead-up to the CHOGM (Cockburn, 1997, Crawshaw, 1997), various authoritative publications have subsequently disclosed not only how this issue was framed but also the nature of the ensuing discussions. In his 2004 autobiography, Emeka Anyaoku, the Commonwealth Secretary-General between 1990 and 2000, stated that in early 1997 he received notice of an interest in membership from Palestine and also Yemen. As regards the former, he then approached the Israeli Ambassador in London ‘in order to sound him out on the possibility of Israel [also] applying’, the proposal being that both Israel and Palestine would join ‘once the Peace Process was successfully completed with the international recognition of the State of Palestine’ (Anyaoku, 2004, p. 272). Anyaoku further stated that he subsequently raised the idea of both Palestine and Israel joining at the leaders’ ‘restricted discussion’ during the 1997 CHOGM retreat (Anyaoku, 2004, p. 272). A fairly full revelation of these discussions was forthcoming in a 2018 witness seminar on the 1997 CHOGM, the relevant participants being those who in 1997 were: the Deputy Conference Secretary at the Commonwealth Secretariat (Amitav Banerji), the Director of Africa and the Commonwealth at the UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Sir Richard Dales), the Director of the Commonwealth Secretary-General’s private office (Stuart Mole) and the Principal Private Secretary to the UK Prime Minister (Sir John Holmes). Dales recalled that the South African President, Nelson Mandela, led the charge to admit Palestine immediately (and displayed ‘extreme annoyance’ when this was unsuccessful) but that ‘the UK and its allies fended off the new applications’ (Onslow and Kandiah, 2018, p. 22). (However, somewhat tempering this, Holmes questioned whether the British view was ‘quite as monolithic’, stressing that both Palestine and Yemen had a ‘historical link’ and concluding that ‘[i]t was slightly controversial in both cases but they were there’(Onslow and Kandiah, 2018, pp. 54–55). Mole stated that ‘although Palestine was not a state’ there was ‘strong minority opinion’ favouring immediate admission (Onslow and Kandiah, 2018, p. 52). Banerji confirmed that ‘Palestine had a lot of support’ but stated that the ‘strong support for Palestine among some non-aligned and Islamic member states’ was countered by claims that ‘Israel has as much of a historical right to come in and Israel is a democracy’ and this resulted in a lack of progress as ‘you immediately saw the prospect of future Commonwealth summits bedevilled by confrontation and contention between Palestine and Israel’. Nevertheless, echoing Mole’s understanding that Palestine’s interest was ‘laid on the table’ rather than being rejected, Banerji stated that ‘the matter was simply kept under review until Palestine assumed statehood, which, of course, has still not happened’ (Onslow and Kandiah, 2018, p. 53).

From engagement to disengagement

As shown above, from 1969 to 1997 the Commonwealth through its summit helped maintain a focus on the Palestinian conflict and the need for its just resolution. Especially from the mid-1970s through to the end of the 1980s, communiqué text stressed the wide support for the PLO as the Palestinians’ legitimate representative, recognition of the right of the Palestinians to a national homeland, the necessity for an Israeli withdrawal and the requirement for Israel to protect the rights of civilian Palestinians in the interim. Care should be taken not to exaggerate the extent of these interventions. Most of the statements made were both reactive and reiterated internationally agreed positions adopted elsewhere. Crucial questions, notably whether UN Resolution 242’s demand for ‘Israel’s withdrawal from territories occupied since 1967’ unequivocally required (as its French-language version indicated) Israel’s complete evacuation of all post-1967 territory, were not explicitly resolved. It is nevertheless significant that such a focus on Palestinian rights proved possible not only in view of the widely divergent ideological, religious and ethnic make-up of the various Commonwealth states but, more particularly, given the serious limitations inherent in the Commonwealth’s consensus-based decision-making.

This focus was in tension with the poor internal rights record of many Commonwealth states⁹ and the widely shared and strong stress on non-interference in that regard, even in the limited form of public comment. Nevertheless, whilst most refrained from adopting an entirely one-sided viewpoint, the great majority of Commonwealth states strongly empathised with the Palestinians’ struggle for self-determination in the face of what was increasingly seen as a form of colonialism driven by unjust ethnic prioritisation. Such struggles became increasingly central to the modern Commonwealth’s identity until at least the end of the 1980s, as demonstrated by the emphasis in the ground-breaking 1971 Declaration of Commonwealth Principles on opposing ‘all forms of colonial domination and racial oppression’ and furthering ‘the principles of self-determination and non-racialism’ (Commonwealth Secretariat, 1987, p. 157). Particularly clear support was forthcoming from those with a strong post-colonial identity, including Dom Mintoff’s Malta, and those that were predominantly Islamic, including Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sierra Leone. Whilst striving for and often achieving full Commonwealth consensus, states were also willing to insist that the position of ‘most’ Governments was made clear when the former proved impossible. A more explicitly even-handed approach to the conflict came to the fore in the communiqué text during the 1990s. Nevertheless, revelations from the discussions at the 1997 CHOGM on Palestine’s interest in membership make clear that many Commonwealth states were still keen to support Palestine within that process including by granting it a place within the organisation immediately. Ultimately, however, it was agreed to suspend consideration of this issue until Palestine achieved ‘state sovereignty’ (Commonwealth Secretariat, 1997, p. 18).

During the more than a quarter of a century that has followed, the Commonwealth has effectively entirely disengaged on Palestine. It may be suggested that this is simply reflective of a more general stance adopted by many other international organisations. In the first decade or so following 1997, when it appeared at least plausible that the Oslo peace process retained a realistic chance of an ultimately successful conclusion, this may be correct. However, from the late 2000s, when such hopes clearly faded and the spectre of the permanent rise of extremist forces including Hamas became apparent, a number of international organisations began to re-engage strongly with the Palestinian Authority. In particular, and as detailed by Kattan (2015, pp. 299–300), in 2008 Palestine became a member of the Group of 77, in 2011 it became a member of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), in 2012 it joined the Vatican as a non-member Observer State of the United Nations General Assembly (Dowty, 2023, p. 178) and in 2014 it both became an Observer State of the Assembly of State Parties to the International Criminal Court and began acceding to international treaties. Moreover, since the mid-2000s over 45 more countries have recognised Palestine as a State, which include 12 from within the Commonwealth (see Permanent Observer Mission of The State of Palestine to the United Nations, n.d. and Dakers, 2024).

Explanation for the Commonwealth’s continued and essentially complete lack of engagement as a collectivity must, therefore, be sought elsewhere. Limitations clearly flow from the Commonwealth’s consensus-based decision-making and its diverse membership including countries such as Australia, Canada and the UK, which have often shown a reluctance to support even a moderate Palestinian viewpoint. Nevertheless, this did not prevent significant Commonwealth engagement on the Palestinian conflict from the end of the 1960s through to the mid-1990s. Many governments, including not only those in the West but even in the Arab world itself, have de-prioritised a conflict that looks ‘more and more irresolvable’ (Phillips, 2024, p. 89). However, a crucial and more Commonwealth-specific factor is that during the earlier period (as the date ranges in Table 1 reveal) CHOGMs always covered a full working week (and sometimes were substantially longer). Multilateral Commonwealth coordination was also facilitated by a small but generally expanding Commonwealth Secretariat whose overall record was held to ‘surely be a very positive one’ (Doxey, 1989, p. 146). As a result, the Commonwealth provided a unique space for broad consultation on developments affecting countries not only within but also outside its parameters. Indeed, whilst never assuming the same sort of focus as the Palestinian conflict (let alone South African apartheid, which was clearly a sui generis case), CHOGM communiqués from 1969 to 1995 touched on non-Commonwealth states and territories from every major world region including Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia, Burundi, China, Cuba, Guinea, Vietnam, Haiti, Indonesia, Kampuchea/Cambodia and New Caledonia (Commonwealth Secretariat, 1987, 1997). However, from 1995 the length of Commonwealth summits was reduced to four days (see Table 1) and from 2005 it came down further to just three (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2007). The size of the Commonwealth Secretariat also began to shrink. These changes coincided with a considerably more selective CHOGM and indeed a more limited Commonwealth agenda in general. Indeed, CHOGM communiqués from the 2002 through to 2015 have avoided tackling any issue primarily affecting a state or territory that is not a member (or, in one case, a former member)¹⁰ of the Commonwealth (see Commonwealth Secretariat, 2007, 2016). These trends have accelerated over the last decade, fuelled by a dramatic decline in the resourcing of the Secretariat (Murphy, 2020) and a further reduction of CHOGM duration to just two days (Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, 2018, 2022). Far more so than most comparable international organisations, the Commonwealth’s including CHOGM’s capacity to seriously engage on Palestine, as with other international issues, has been seriously eroded. On top of these factors, Hamas’s appalling terrorist attacks and hostage taking on 7 October 2023 and the ongoing devastating war in Gaza, as well as violence on the West Bank, have rendered the Palestinian conflict even more uncertain and complex.

Notwithstanding all the above, it does not follow that purely political engagement on Palestine should be seen as hopeless or that the Commonwealth has no possible, even if small, role to play. To the contrary, the events from early October 2023 onwards and the devastations they have brought in their wake make strong political engagement an imperative. This point is clearly recognised by Commonwealth countries in the Global South, most notably South Africa, but in principle it is also acknowledged by countries like the UK, which have generally been reticent to take a stand. Thus, the UK’s Foreign Secretary David Cameron has urged an immediate end to fighting leading to ‘a permanent, sustainable cease-fire’ and stated that the UK is open to recognising a Palestinian State during future negotiations between Israel and Palestine rather than only if and when a final settlement has been reached (Associated Press, 2024). Furthermore, membership questions have remained a core issue on the CHOGM agenda even from the 2000s and it is notable that the Palestinian Authority has never formally withdrawn its interest in joining the organisation. This, therefore, could provide an opening for the Commonwealth to finally re-engage on Palestine including at the forthcoming CHOGM in Samoa this October.

A roadmap to Palestinian membership

The 2024 CHOGM in Samoa should undoubtedly address what should be done to ameliorate the tragic humanitarian situation in Gaza and establish the basis for political negotiations between Israel and Palestine. However, its most concrete and specific task would be to explicitly address how Palestine could finally become a Commonwealth member. The criteria for Commonwealth membership were last formally set down in paragraph 87 of the 2007 CHOGM communiqué. Beyond the natural concomitants of membership itself such as accepting inter-Commonwealth ‘norms and conventions’, they provide that applicants (i) must be a ‘country’ and ‘should, as general rule, have had a historical constitutional association with an existing Commonwealth member’, (ii) ‘should accept and comply with Commonwealth fundamental values, principles and priorities’ and (iii) ‘must demonstrate commitment to: democracy and democratic processes, including free and fair elections and representative legislatures; the rule of law and independence of the judiciary; good governance, including a well-trained public service and transparent public accounts; and protection of human rights, freedom of expression and equality of opportunity’ (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2016, pp. 22–23). A positive case for Palestinian membership, which cites these same criteria, has already been laid out by Kattan (2015) in this journal.¹¹ It is unquestionable that Palestine has a relevant historical association and Kattan’s convincing case for identifying Palestine as a country has only strengthened since. This latter criterion may be taken to be cognate to the CHOGM’s emphasis on ‘state sovereignty’ in 1997 (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2007, p. 18). Thirty-three of the then 54 members (61%) were found by Kattan (2015, p. 300) to have recognised Palestine as a State and this figure has now risen to 39 out of 56 (70%).¹² Whilst this does not constitute universal recognition, other members including the UK and also Australia (Crowe and Knott, 2024) have stated they are in principle open to taking this step,¹³ which, in any case, would not be a necessary concomitant to recognising Palestine as a country for Commonwealth purposes. Moreover, notwithstanding the Commonwealth’s unique working style, the Commonwealth’s first Secretary-General Arnold Smith was right to emphasise that ‘consensus does not mean unanimity’ (Smith, 1981, p. 44). More problematic is Kattan’s finding that Palestine complies with Commonwealth fundamental values, principles and priorities (iii) and that any lack of compliance with democracy, the rule of law and human rights (iv) might be justified by the exigencies of the Israeli occupation or should otherwise be overlooked. Turning to the latter first, the respected NGO Freedom House (2024) presents a worrying picture of the West Bank – the only territory within which the Palestinian Authority exercises any state-like control – which is given an overall score of 22/100 and a rating of ‘not free’. From its start, this report does rightly emphasise that the most serious problems result from Israeli action:

Israel’s military occupation of the West Bank entails onerous physical barriers and constraints on movement, demolition of homes and other physical infrastructure, restrictions on political rights and civil liberties, and expanding Jewish settlements that are widely considered to constitute a violation of international law. Jewish settlers … enjoy relative impunity for violence against Palestinians.

However, the report also finds that the Palestinian Authority ‘governs in an authoritarian manner, engaging in repression against journalists and activists who present critical views on its rule’, under a presidential mandate that expired in 2009 and without a legislature (the last elections for which were held in 2006). These failures cannot be blamed entirely on the Israeli occupation and, if the Commonwealth is to retain any credibility, should also not be overlooked. This is especially so in light of the ignominy of Commonwealth leaders allowing two manifestly non-democratic countries (Gabon and Togo) to join at the Rwanda CHOGM (2022), followed the very next year by Gabon’s partial suspension after the military, with a groundswell of popular support, stepped in following a patently flawed election to end 56 years of corrupt familial rule (see Gruenbaum, 2023). Likewise, although, as suggested above, core aspects of the Palestinian struggle including self-determination itself do chime strongly with Commonwealth values, principles and priorities, these also encompass the very same democracy and rights imperatives analysed earlier. This is made particularly clear in the consolidating Charter of the Commonwealth whose first two ‘core values and principles’ are democracy and human rights and which also enunciate related pledges including freedom of expression, the separations of powers, the rule of law and good governance amongst its 11 further commitments (Commonwealth Heads of Government, 2012).

CHOGM in 2024 should explicitly reiterate its welcome of potential Palestinian membership and set out a realistic pathway to this that is in no way dependent on Israel’s actions or other factors, including the degree of State recognition, which are outside the direct control of the Palestinian Authority. At the same time, and as regards the operation of the Palestinian Authority itself, they should specify minimum standards related to democracy, human rights and the rule of law, which would need to be met prior to an application’s acceptance, and offer active Commonwealth Secretariat assistance for their achievement. As substantial support would fall outside the Secretariat’s normal budget or even that of its Fund for Technical Cooperation, a special fund would likely need to be established with a similar structure to that which applied to Mozambique during the 1970s and 1980s (before it ultimately joined the Commonwealth in the 1990s) (see Akrinrinade, 1992). To borrow the words of the UK’s Foreign Secretary, such an approach could help ‘give the Palestinian people a horizon towards a better future’, which is ‘absolutely vital for the long-term peace and security of the region’ (Associated Press, 2023). In so doing, it could also bring new relevance to the Commonwealth and its Secretariat, which it unfortunately currently largely lacks.

Conclusion

From the late 1960s and the mid-1990s, all modern Commonwealth summit communiqués maintained a focus on the Palestinian conflict and helped highlight approaches that could lead to its amelioration and ultimate just resolution. Pressure for such a focus was forthcoming both from predominantly Islamic States and those with a strong post-colonial identity. As well as during the initial aftermath of the Six-Day War in 1967, the issue garnered most attention in the late 1970s and 1980s. However, it was in 1997 that the most significant question arose, namely, potential Palestinian membership in the Commonwealth itself. Whilst welcoming this possibility, Commonwealth leaders deferred a decision. The complete and continued silence in the more than quarter century following has dovetailed with the diminished nature of both the CHOGM and the Commonwealth Secretariat. Nevertheless, membership questions remain vital to both. The forthcoming CHOGM could therefore make a positive intervention in the current crisis by returning to the Palestinian issue and providing a realistic roadmap for Palestinian membership that is not dependent on Israel or similar factors outside the Palestinian Authority’s direct control. Restoration of the Commonwealth’s credibility on democracy, human rights and the rule of law requires that some internally focused conditionality applicable to these factors should remain, and the Commonwealth Secretariat should be empowered and funded to offer the Palestinian Authority direct assistance in meeting such standards in the very difficult circumstances which clearly exist.

Acknowledgment

The author would like especially to thank Hilary McEwan in the Communications Division of the Commonwealth Secretariat for her help and assistance in accessing the Commonwealth archives. All opinions expressed and any errors are the author’s alone.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. Samoa was briefly German Samoa (1900–1914) and then was administered by New Zealand as a Mandate until 1961. Other members whose primary historical connection with the Commonwealth is through a Mandate include Cameroon, Tanzania, Papua New Guinea, Namibia and Nauru.

2. After being effectively forced to withdraw from membership in 1960, South Africa and its condemned policy of apartheid remerged in Commonwealth communiqués in 1965 (Commonwealth Secretariat, 1987, p. 97). It remained on, and often dominated, the Commonwealth agenda until South Africa held the first nationwide multiracial elections (and rejoined the Commonwealth) in 1994.

3. This factual summary is drawn primarily from Dowty (2023) and Shindler (2013).

4. The September 1966 communiqué had stated that ‘most members thought it necessary that the United Nations should now revoke the mandate of South Africa in respect of South-West Africa [now Namibia]’ (Commonwealth Secretariat, 1987, p. 128), whilst the 1969 communiqué stated as a ‘view of the majority’ that ‘the People’s Republic of China had a right and a duty to participate in full in all the world’s efforts towards peace’ (Commonwealth Secretariat, 1987, p. 138).

5. Resolution 605 (22 December 1987) and 607 (5 January 1988) set out measures for the safety and protection of Palestinian citizens including adherence to the Geneva Convention, whilst 608 (14 January 1988) specifically called for Israel to cease deporting Palestinian civilians.

6. This suggestion, which was not taken up, clearly echoed a previous 1965 initiative establishing a Commonwealth mission on Vietnam, which ultimately was entirely unsuccessful in mediating in that conflict. See Commonwealth Secretariat (1987), pp. 103–105, 127.

7. New Zealand’s initial reservation on recognising the Palestinian people’s right to ‘their own homeland’ was also noted.

8. Given that it is disclosed below that at least the principal discussion took place during the restricted summit retreat, it is likely that the official record will anyway be incomplete. Thus, the minutes agreeing the paragraph condemning Uganda for human rights violations at the 1977 meeting simply states ‘[p]reviously agreed and adopted in restricted session’ (Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, 1997, p. 193).

9. Most infamously highlighted in the case of Idi Amin’s Uganda, whose ‘massive violation of basic human rights’ was very belatedly condemned in the 1977 CHOGM communiqué (Commonwealth Secretariat, 1987, p. 192).

10. Zimbabwe was mentioned in the 2009 CHOGM communiqué even though it had left the organisation in 2003, but only briefly and principally in the context of a hoped for return of that country to the organisation (which has not happened) (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2016, p. 57).

11. Kattan also re-raises the question of Israel’s potential membership. However, it is not clear that Israel has formally expressed and maintained such an interest or indeed whether it would find membership conducive. In any case, as Kattan states, any application would need to be conditional on the same values, priorities and principles as apply to Palestine. In particular, and as Kattan indicates, this should necessitate that Israeli abides by international law vis-à-vis the Palestinian conflict, completely freezes settlement activity including in East Jerusalem and works towards a peace treaty with the State of Palestine.

12. This rise was caused by Saint Kitts and Nevis and Saint Lucia recognising Palestine in 2015 and 2019 respectively, by Gabon Togo who granted recognition as far back as 1988 joining the Commonwealth in 2022 and by Barbados, Jamaica, The Bahamas and Trinidad and Tobago likewise recognising Palestine in the spring of 2024. The world proportion is higher yet at 139 out of 193 UN States (72%). It should also be noted that almost half of Commonwealth members had granted Palestine such recognition even by the time of the 1997 CHOGM. See Permanent Observer Mission of The State of Palestine to the United Nations (n.d.) and Dakers (2024).

13. In indicating this, even these States appear to accept that Palestine does display the fundamental attributes of Statehood including, at the least, a territory, a permanent population and a public power or authority.