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ABSTRACT
Previous research has devoted extensive attention to the ways in which participatory initiatives—whether “successful” or “failed”—can be good for democracy. Participation, it is argued, can generate social capital and educate citizens in democratic practices. However, much research on participation has selected on the dependent variable, looking at cases that have produced empowerment and claims on the state to understand outcomes. Using ethnographic and interview data collected with struggling organizations in Caracas, Venezuela, over the course of three years, I examine the long-term effects of these organizations on community relationships. I show that participatory experiments can increase mistrust and distrust between neighbors; divert claims away from state institutions and transfer frustration and blame onto the community; and delegitimize participatory politics for both participants and nonparticipants.
Notes
1. Though later research has qualified this argument, researchers have continued to focus on when and how participation in voluntary association can produce trust (Sciolla Citation2003; Wollebaek and Selle Citation2002). See Portes and Sensenbrenner (Citation1993) for critiques of the concept and the dominant use of the concept of social capital.
2. Though these terms are often used interchangeably, here I will use them to refer to overlapping but distinct characteristics of community relations. By distrust I mean the belief that someone cannot be relied upon. Mistrust will refer to suspicion and lack of trust in others.
3. All names of communities, streets, community councils, and individuals have been changed and any identifying characteristics of people and places generalized.
4. Though starting in 2014 this support began to wane due to an economic crisis.
5. I interviewed four council members who were consistently participating in the council (all women), seven neighborhood residents who had never participated in the group (three women and four men), and five neighborhood residents (one man and four women) who had participated infrequently in the council. Interviews lasted between 45 minutes and 2 hours.
6. A large amount of research on participation in Latin America has documented the rights that previously marginalized groups have won since the left turn in the region (see, e.g., Barrett, Chavez, and Rodríguez Garavito Citation2008; Mertes and Bello Citation2004; Stahler-Sholk, Vanden, and Kuecker Citation2007; Abers Citation1998; Lander Citation2007; Machado Citation2009; Ellner Citation2009; Azzellini Citation2010; Motta Citation2010; Carter Citation2010; Aguirre and Cooper Citation2010; Gustafson Citation2010; Postero Citation2010).There is also a vast literature on participation in Latin America as one input into the left turn, which I do not have space to engage with here.
7. Due to limited space I cannot address the debate over whether or not the communal councils serve as radically democratic sites or are part of an authoritarian political project (but see De La Torre Citation2009; Ellner Citation2009; García Guadilla Citation2008; Hetland Citation2014; López Maya Citation2011; Vargas Citation2010).
8. The government’s support for these initiatives resulted from a number of factors, including citizens’ distrust of representative democratic mechanisms (Njaim, Combellas, and Alvarez Citation1998) and their calls for popular empowerment (Hellinger Citation2004; Wilpert Citation2007); the breakdown of the institutionalized party system (McCoy and Myers 2004); and tensions between government and previously existing civil society by legislating new participatory bodies.
9. This law was updated in 2009, with a reorganization of how council funding was handled, and language was added explicitly linking the councils to twenty-first-century socialism.
10. Cartas de residencia are documents that evidence your residence in a neighborhood and are needed to apply for utilities, government programs, bank accounts, and so on.
11. These include the Ministry of Popular Power for Communes and Social Movements, the state oil company PDVSA, and FUNDACOMUNAL (the Foundation for the Development and Promotion of Popular Power, Fundación para el Desarrollo y Promoción del Poder Comunal).
12. See http://www.minci.gob.ve/2012/09/ley-organica-de-los-consejos-comunales/ for a copy of the Organic Law of the Communal Councils.
13. In some cases, oligarchical tendencies result in a small group accruing power and dominating organizations (Michels [1911] Citation1968; see also Bourdieu Citation1991); Weber Citation1968. In others cases, a small cadre is left running the group because others have stopped participating. This might be due to a free-rider problem (Olson Citation1971) or because less powerful members of a community are expected to shoulder community work (seeLind Citation2002; Richards Citation2004, on the gendered distribution of labor in community organizations).
14. Without regular elections a council becomes “vencido.” In other words, its registration with the state becomes invalid.
15. Neutral here does not mean that community residents began participating as blank slates, with no history among them or interests of their own. Instead, I use the term neutral to refer to participation that is not predominantly structured by factions within the community, as it was in the case of Las Flores.
16. One of the council committees is charged specifically with auditing council finances to guard against corruption. This finance committee is supposed to be composed of five spokespeople. By the time I came to know participants, there was only one spokesperson from this committee who still participated. Low participation thus made transparency difficult to achieve, especially when people did not show up to accountability meetings. The finances for the stair project were overseen by Cristina and Adan, however, who had been founding members of the council and played a part in all of the committees when the council was first organized.
17. The current political context in Venezuela is a key factor structuring participation in the country. However, in my data analysis political affiliation and polarization did not arise as an important factor in explaining community residents’ perceptions of the councils. Both residents who identified as supportive of the government and the opposition spread rumors. And the neighbors I interviewed who were the opposition explicitly stated that their political affiliation was not a part of their decision not to participate. Though they could have been lying, both opposition and government supporters tend to be very vocal regarding their political affiliation. Thus, it would have been very likely that they would have taken this opportunity in the interview to discredit the councils based on their connection to the government, but they did not.
18. A focus on these traditions also obscures the rich history of autonomous organizing, self-sufficiency, and alternative democratic experiments—particularly deep in places like Catia Ciccariello-Maher Citation2013); (Velasco Citation2015—that are also part of Venezuela’s historical legacy.
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Rebecca Hanson
Rebecca Hanson holds a joint appointment with the Department of Sociology and Criminology and the Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Florida. Her research interests include participatory democracy, policing, crime and citizen security, human rights, and qualitative methods. Her scholarly publications can be read in Journal of Latin American Studies; Crime, Law, and Social Change; and Sociological Forum.