Two concepts of practice and theology

Abstract

Practice and practices have been increasingly discussed in theology. In these discussions, practice is often understood in relation to theory. In emergent practice theory, however, practice is understood in terms of social ontology and as an alternative to methodological individualism and methodological holism. Society, including religion, is analysed as nexuses of collective practices. This article makes a distinction between two concepts of practice, one weak and one strong, and discusses these concepts in texts by Kathlyn Tanner and Linda Woodhead. It also discusses how a strong conception of practice may contribute to theology.

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No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 McGuire, Lived Religion and Ammerman, “Lived Religion”.

2 Wigg-Stevenson, Ethnographic Theology.

3 Ammerman, Everyday Religion.

4 Bender and Levitt, Religion on the Edge.

5 Astley, Ordinary Theology.

6 Ammerman, “Lived Religion”.

7 Schatzki, Cetina, and E. Von Savigny, Practice Turn.

8 Schatzki, Social Practices; Rousse, “Two Concepts of Practice” and Nicolini, Practice Theory.

9 Nicolini, Practice Theory.

10 Schön, Reflective Practitioner.

11 Latour, We Have Never.

12 Reckwitz, “Toward a Theory” and Schatzki, “New Societist.”

13 A note on social ontology is necessary. There is no ambition among these authors to work out a fully fleshed-out ontology – the point is to sketch alternatives to existing structuralist and rational-choice paradigms, to homo sociologicus and homo economicus; see Reckwitz “Toward a Theory.” This means that society is neither understood as the sum of sociological structures, nor individual rational choice – but as the nexuses of social practices.

14 Nicolini, Practice Theory, 13–14.

15 Schatzki, “New Societist.”

16 Schatzki, Timespace, 48–51.

17 Ibid., 53.

18 Schatzki, Social Practices, 73.

19 Law et al., “Modes of Syncretism.”

20 Wenger, Communities of Practice.

21 Latour, “We Have Never.”

22 Tanner, “Theological Reflection,” 228.

23 Ibid., 229.

24 Ibid., 229.

25 Ibid., 231. See also Vähäkanga’s article in this volume.

26 Tanner, “Theological Reflection,” 232.

27 Ibid., 234.

28 Ibid., 239.

29 Schatzki, “Practice Theory.”

30 Tanner, “Theological Reflection,” 230.

31 Ibid., 239.

32 Tanner, “Theological Reflection.”

33 Woodhead, “Five Concepts,” 122.

34 Of course, as Woodhead points out, conceptions of religion are not always a result of deliberate choice, but of adjusting to conventions. Her article, however, discusses active and conscious deliberation of different and alternative conceptions.

35 Ibid., 122.

36 Ibid., 138.

37 Ibid., 132.

38 Ibid., 133.

39 Ibid., 134.

40 Ammerman, “Lived Religion,” 89.

41 Schatzki, Timespace.

42 See, for example, Hill, A Sociology of Religion and Luckmann, The Invisible Religion. Contributions more in line with the argument in this article are Asad, Genealogies of Religion and Saler, “Family Resemblance.”

43 In this text, I do not discuss the relationship between religion and neighbouring concepts of spirituality and theology. Briefly, I understand religion as a mode of everyday practice, partly overlapping with spirituality. I understand theology as the academic study of certain aspects of religion, partly overlapping with, e.g., religious studies.

44 Saler, “Family Resemblance.”

45 Barnes, Bloor and Henry, Scientific Knowledge.

46 The connotation is the use of faith in religious studies, for instance Smith, Meaning and End, and the use of meaning-making in psychology of religion, for instance Schnell and Keenan, “Meaning-making.”

47 This point involves complex discussions of ontology, which cannot be addressed in any depth here. By “what may be,” I indicate that a flat ontology opens up for a pluralistic, relational, and processual understanding of reality. A certain phenomenon cannot be reduced to empirical facts, but has to be understood in relation to other phenomena in time and space. For instance, in Timespace, Schatzski argues that a present phenomenon should be understood as being constituted by both its past and present. Phenomena are understood as both being and becoming, as processes in time and space. The understandings of a phenomenon transcend the brute facts and its empirical immanent nature. What “is” always implies “what may be.”

48 Taylor, Theological.

49 Latour, “Thou Shalt Not Take” and Reassembling the Social.

50 Taylor, Sources of the Self and Philosophical Arguments.