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Abstract
China, Russia, Iran and North Korea are deepening their security cooperation and, as a result, pose a growing challenge to the United States and its allies. These countries see the United States and its allies as a threat, have aggressive aims, and believe that the Western liberal order detracts from their stability and hinders their regional objectives. Although the depth of their relations is not as robust as that enjoyed by their Western rivals, their growing cooperation is a significant development in the global balance of power and has major implications for the West. US and allied planners must recognise that they cannot focus on only one adversary, such as China, and that a crisis in one part of the world is increasingly less likely to stay isolated, as each power may receive weapons, economic support and other assistance from others during a crisis.
Notes
1 See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, ‘President Xi Jinping Holds Smallgroup Talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin at Zhongnanhai’, 17 May 2024, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zxxx_662805/202405/t20240517_11306328.html; and Max Seddon, Joe Leahy and Wenjie Ding, ‘Putin to Visit China as Beijing Plays Key Role in Supporting Russia’, Financial Times, 14 May 2024.
2 President of Russia, ‘Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the International Relations Entering a New Era and the Global Sustainable Development’, 4 February 2022, http://www.en.kremlin.ru/supplement/5770.
3 See, for example, Daniel R. DePetris, ‘There Is No Axis of Autocracies’, Newsweek, 18 November 2022; and Daniel Larison, ‘Hawks Pushing for “Axis of Evil” Reunion Tour’, Responsible Statecraft, 22 March 2024, https://responsiblestatecraft.org/axis-of-evil/.
4 Clara Fong and Lindsay Maizland, ‘China and Russia: Exploring Ties Between Two Authoritarian Powers’, Council on Foreign Relations, 20 March 2024, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-russia-relationship-xi-putin-taiwan-ukraine.
5 Michelle Ye Hee Lee and Pei-Lin Wu, ‘Putin Hails Russia’s Ties with China as “Stabilizing” Force in the World’, Washington Post, 16 May 2024.
6 Lucas Winter, Jemima Baar and Jason Warner, ‘The Axis Off-kilter: Why an Iran–Russia–China “Axis” Is Shakier than Meets the Eye’, War on the Rocks, 19 April 2024, https://warontherocks.com/2024/04/the-axis-off-kilter-whyan-iran-russia-china-axis-is-shakierthan-meets-the-eye/.
7 See, for example, Emma Ashford, Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson and Stephen Wertheim, ‘Europe Must Step Up’, Foreign Affairs, 22 May 2023; Elbridge Colby, ‘America Must Face Reality and Prioritise China over Europe’, Financial Times, 23 May 2024; Elbridge A. Colby and Alexander Velez-Green, ‘To Avert War with China, the US Must Prioritize Taiwan over Ukraine’, Washington Post, 18 May 2023; and Alex Velez-Green, ‘The Rise of Republican National Security Prioritizers’, Heritage Foundation, 28 September 2023, https://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/the-rise-republican-national-securityprioritizers. The broader debate on Asia versus Europe, or China versus Russia, also often includes debates about supporting Taiwan or Ukraine.
8 See Ruonan Liu and Songpo Yang, ‘China and the Liberal International Order: A Pragmatic and Dynamic Approach’, International Affairs, vol. 99, no. 4, July 2023, pp. 1,383–1,400; and Andrew Radin and Clint Reach, ‘Russian Views of the International Order’, RAND Corporation, 18 May 2017, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1826.html.
9 Philip Zelikow, ‘Confronting Another Axis? History, Humility, and Wishful Thinking’, Texas National Security Review, vol. 7, no. 3, Summer 2024, https://tnsr.org/2024/05/confronting-another-axis-historyhumility-and-wishful-thinking/.
10 President of Russia, ‘Meeting with Young Entrepreneurs, Engineers, and Scientists’, transcript of remarks by Vladimir Putin, 9 June 2022, https://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/68606.
11 See Christy Lee, ‘Despite Faltering Economy, China Unlikely to Disrupt Aid to North Korea’, VOA News, 8 August 2023, https://www.voanews.com/a/despite-faltering-economychina-unlikely-to-disrupt-aid-tonorth-korea/7217382.html; and ‘Why China Is Unlikely to Restrain Iran’, The Economist, 25 April 2024, https://www.economist.com/china/2024/04/25/why-china-is-unlikely-to-restrain-iran.
12 See Office of the Director of National Intelligence, ‘Support Provided by the People’s Republic of China to Russia’, July 2023, https://democrats-intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/odni_report_on_chinese_support_to_russia.pdf.
13 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, ‘Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community’, 5 February 2024, p. 8 (emphasis added), https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2024_intelligence_community_annual_threat_assessment.pdf.
14 See, for example, Steve Holland and Susan Heavey, ‘US Says China Is Boosting Russia’s War Machine in Ukraine’, Reuters, 15 April 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/us-says-china-is-boosting-russiaswar-machine-ukraine-2024-04-12/;and Ministry of Foreign Affairs the People’s Republic of China, ‘Qin Gang: China Resolutely Opposes Unilateral Sanctions’, 10 May 2023, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zxxx_662805/202305/t20230510_11074402.html.
15 Quoted in Andrew Macaskill, ‘UK Defence Minister Says China Working to Supply Lethal Aid to Russia’, Reuters, 23 May 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/uk-defenceminister-says-china-working-supplylethal-aid-russia-2024-05-22/.
16 See, for example, Karen Gilchrist, ‘How Surging Trade with China Is Boosting Russia’s War’, CNBC, 28 September 2023, https://www.cnbc.com/2023/09/28/how-surging-tradewith-china-is-boosting-russias-war.html; Sam Cranny-Evans and Thomas Withington, ‘Russian Comms in Ukraine: A World of Hertz’, RUSI, 9 March 2022, https://rusi.org/exploreour-research/publications/commentary/russian-comms-ukraine-world-hertz; Holland and Heavey, ‘US Says China Is Boosting Russia’s War Machine in Ukraine’; Roman Kolodii, Giangiuseppe Pili and Jack Crawford, ‘Hi-tech, High Risk? Russo-Chinese Cooperation on Emerging Technologies’, RUSI, 1 March 2024, https://www.rusi.org/exploreour-research/publications/commentary/hi-tech-high-risk-russo-chinesecooperation-emerging-technologies; Paul Mozur, Aaron Krolik and Keith Bradsher, ‘As War in Ukraine Grinds On, China Helps Refill Russian Drone Supplies’, New York Times, 21 March 2023; Office of the Director of National Intelligence, ‘Support Provided by the People’s Republic of China to Russia’; Austin Ramzy and Jason Douglas, ‘Booming Trade with China Helps Boost Russia’s War Effort’, Wall Street Journal, 21 August 2023; Nathaniel Sher, ‘Behind the Scenes: China’s Increasing Role in Russia’s Defense Industry’, Carnegie Politika, 6 May 2024, https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2024/05/behindthe-scenes-chinas-increasing-role-inrussias-defense-industry?lang=en; and US Department of the Treasury, ‘U.S. Continues to Degrade Russia’s Military-industrial Base and Target Third-country Support with Nearly 300 New Sanctions’, 1 May 2024, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2318.
17 See Sher, ‘Behind the Scenes’; and US Department of the Treasury, ‘U.S. Continues to Degrade Russia’s Military-industrial Base and Target Third-country Support with Nearly 300 New Sanctions’.
18 See Holland and Heavey, ‘US Says China Is Boosting Russia’s War Machine in Ukraine’.
19 See US Department of the Treasury, ‘U.S. Continues to Degrade Russia’s Military-industrial Base and Target Third-country Support with Nearly 300 New Sanctions’.
20 See, for example, Aamer Madhani, ‘US Intelligence Finding Shows China Surging Equipment Sales to Russia to Help War Effort in Ukraine’, Associated Press, 19 April 2024, https://apnews.com/article/unitedstates-china-russia-ukraine-war-265df843be030b7183c95b6f3afca8ec; and Kelly Ng and Yi Ma, ‘How Is China Supporting Russia After It Was Sanctioned for Ukraine War’, BBC, 17 May 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/60571253.
21 Author interviews with US government officials, 2024; and Office of the Director of National Intelligence, ‘Support Provided by the People’s Republic of China to Russia’. Several Chinese-based companies, such as Poly Technologies, Fujian Baofeng Electronic Company, China Taly Aviation Technologies Corporation, Juhang Aviation Technology Shenzhen, Finder Technology Limited, Tulun International Holding Limited and many others have likely exported items used for military purposes to Russia. US Department of the Treasury, ‘U.S. Continues to Degrade Russia’s Military-industrial Base and Target Third-country Support with Nearly 300 New Sanctions’. Although vital to Russia, some of the Chinese material, such as chips, are of low quality compared with more advanced chips from the United States, Europe, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.
22 See Brian Hart et al., ‘How Deep Are China–Russia Military Ties?’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 4 August 2022, https://chinapower.csis.org/china-russia-military-cooperationarms-sales-exercises/.
23 See, for example, Seong Hyeon Choi, ‘China Cuts Arms Imports to Rely More on Its Own Weapons Tech but Russia Still Biggest Overseas Supplier: SIPRI’, South China Morning Post, 11 March 2024; National Air and Space Intelligence Center, Competing in Space, 2nd ed. (Washington DC: US Air Force, December 2023); and Kevin Pollpeter et al., China–Russia Space Cooperation: The Strategic, Military, Diplomatic, and Economic Implications of a Growing Relationship (Montgomery, AL: China Aerospace Studies Institute, 2023).
24 Danny Citrinowicz, ‘Iran Is on Its Way to Replacing Russia as a Leading Arms Exporter’, Atlantic Council, 2 February 2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/iran-drone-uavs-russia/; Defense Intelligence Agency, ‘DIA Releases Updated Report on Russia’s Use of Lethal Iranian Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in Ukraine’, 24 August 2023, https://www.dia.mil/News-Features/Articles/Article-View/Article/3504948/dia-releases-updatedreport-on-russias-use-of-lethaliranian-unmanned-aerial-ve/; Michael Gordon, ‘Russia Moves Forward with Plans to Buy Iranian Ballistic Missiles’, Wall Street Journal, 4 January 2024; and Parisa Hafezi et al., ‘Exclusive: Iran Sends Russia Hundreds of Ballistic Missiles’, Reuters, 21 February 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/iran-sends-russia-hundreds-ballisticmissiles-sources-say-2024-02-21/.
25 See Dalton Bennett and Mary Ilyushina, ‘Inside the Russian Effort to Build 6,000 Attack Drones with Iran’s Help’, Washington Post, 17 August 2023.
26 See Defense Intelligence Agency, ‘DIA Releases Updated Report on Russia’s Use of Lethal Iranian Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in Ukraine’; Deborah Haynes, ‘“Explosive” New Attack Drone Developed by Iran for Russia’s War in Ukraine’, Sky News, 10 January 2024, https://news.sky.com/story/explosive-new-attack-dronedeveloped-by-iran-for-russias-war-inukraine-13045093; and ‘Iran Develops New High Tech Attack Drone for Russia’, Jerusalem Post, 10 January 2024.
27 See Paul Iddon, ‘Iran Might Receive Its First Su-35 Flanker Fighters from Russia Next Week’, Forbes, 20 April 2024; ‘The Iran–Russia Military Axis’, Wall Street Journal, 3 November 2023; ‘Russia Says It’s Working on Major New Agreement with Iran’, Reuters, 12 December 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-says-its-working-major-newagreement-with-iran-2023-12-12/; and Natasha Turak, ‘Iran Has the Largest Ballistic Missile Arsenal in the Middle East’, CNBC, 23 February 2024, https://www.cnbc.com/2024/02/23/iran-reportedly-sends-hundreds-ofballistic-missiles-to-russia.html.
28 See Conflict Armament Research, North Korean Missile Relies on Recent Electronic Components (London: Conflict Armament Research, February 2024), https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/0814c6868bbd45a98b15693a31bd0e7f; Defense Intelligence Agency, North Korea: Enabling Russian Missile Strikes Against Ukraine (Washington DC: Defense Intelligence Agency, 2024), https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Documents/News/Military_Power_Publications/DPRK_Russia_NK_Enabling_Russian_Missile_Strikes_Against_Ukraine.pdf; Micah McCartney, ‘Russia Could Soon Receive More Weapons from North Korea, Analysts Say’, Newsweek, 12 March 2024; and Choe Sang-Hun, ‘North Korea Launches Rocket with Its First Spy Satellite’, New York Times, 21 November 2023.
29 See David Sanger, ‘Putin Once Tried to Curb North Korea’s Nuclear Program. That’s Now Over’, New York Times, 19 June 2024.
30 See Defense Intelligence Agency, ‘North Korea: Enabling Russian Missile Strikes Against Ukraine’, p. 1; and John Feng, ‘Half of Russia’s North Korea-made Artillery Shells Don’t Work: Ukraine’, Newsweek, 27 February 2024.
31 See Victor Cha and Ellen Kim, ‘A Renewed Axis: Growing Military Cooperation Between North Korea and Russia’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 6 September 2023, https://beyondparallel.csis.org/arenewed-axis-growing-military-cooperation-between-north-korea-and-russia/.
32 Ibid.
33 See Defense Intelligence Agency, ‘North Korea: Enabling Russian Missile Strikes Against Ukraine’, p. 1.
34 See Sang-Hun, ‘North Korea Launches Rocket with Its First Spy Satellite’.
35 See Natasha Bertrand, ‘Report: North Korean Missile Fired by Russia Against Ukraine Contained US and European Components’, CNN, 20 February 2024, https://www.cnn.com/2024/02/20/politics/north-korean-missile-russiaukraine-components/index.html; Sam Fossum and Kevin Liptak, ‘Russia and North Korea “Actively Advancing” in Arms Deal Negotiations, Says US’, CNN, 31 August 2023, https://www.cnn.com/2023/08/30/europe/russia-northkorea-advancing-arms-deal-intl/index.html; and Edward Wong and Julian Barnes, ‘Kim Jong-un and Putin Plan to Meet in Russia to Discuss Weapons’, New York Times, 4 September 2023.
36 See Warren P. Strobel and Michael R. Gordon, ‘How Putin Rebuilt Russia’s War Machine with Help from U.S. Adversaries’, Wall Street Journal, 19 June 2024.
37 Quoted in Paul Sonne, ‘Putin Threatens to Arm North Korea, Escalating Tension over Ukraine’, New York Times, 20 June 2024.
38 See Clara Fong and Eleanor Albert, ‘The China–North Korea Relationship’, Council on Foreign Relations, 7 March 2024, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-north-korea-relationship.
39 See United States Institute of Peace, ‘Iran and China: Military Ties’, 28 June 2023, https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2023/jun/28/iran-china-military-ties.
40 See President of Russia, ‘Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the International Relations Entering a New Era and the Global Sustainable Development’.
41 See ‘China Tells Iran Cooperation Will Last After Attack on Israel’, Bloomberg News, 15 April 2024, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-04-16/china-tells-iran-cooperation-will-last-after-attack-on-israel.
42 See, for example, Kourosh Ziabari, ‘Why Iran Won’t Cross China on the Uighurs’, Asia Times, 21 February 2021.
43 See Thomas Kohlmann, ‘Why Iran and Russia Can Dodge Western Sanctions’, DW.com, 26 April 2024, https://www.dw.com/en/why-iran-and-russia-candodge-western-sanctions/a-68928255.
44 Ng and Ma, ‘How Is China Supporting Russia After It Was Sanctioned for Ukraine War’.
45 Author interview with senior European military officials, 19 March 2024.
46 See Ricardo Barrios and Andrew S. Bowen, ‘China–Russia Relations’, Congressional Research Service, 13 September 2023, p. 1, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12100.
47 See Farnaz Fassihi and Steven Lee Myers, ‘China, with $400 Billion Iran Deal, Could Deepen Influence in Mideast’, New York Times, 29 March 2021; and ‘Iran and China Sign 25-year Cooperation Agreement’, Reuters, 29 March 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN2BJ0HG/.
48 See Kim Tong-Hyung and Aniruddha Ghosal, ‘Russia and North Korea Sign Partnership Deal that Appears to Be the Strongest Since the Cold War’, Associated Press, 19 June 2024, https://apnews.com/article/vladimir-putin-kim-jong-un-russianorth-korea-summit-ukrainea6b8d2c12de7ee2ab6716d4747c9850e.
49 See Lingling Wei, Ann M. Simmons and Timothy W. Martin, ‘Behind Putin Visit, Unease in Beijing over His Potential Next Stop: North Korea’, Wall Street Journal, 19 May 2024.
50 The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation was formed in 1996 by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Uzbekistan joined in 2001, India and Pakistan in 2017, and Iran in 2023.
51 See Christy Lee, ‘Analysts: Russia–North Korea Military Ties Pose Dilemma for China’, VOA News, 1 February 2024, https://www.voanews.com/a/analysts-russia-north-korea-militaryties-pose-dilemma-for-china/7467749.html; and Wei, Simmons and Martin, ‘Behind Putin Visit, Unease in Beijing over His Potential Next Stop’.
52 See Bruce W. Bennett, ‘North Korea and China Aren’t the Allies You Think They Are’, RAND Corporation, 26 September 2023, https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2023/09/north-korea-and-china-arent-theallies-you-think-they.html.
53 See ‘China Maintains Stance on Disputed Gulf Islands Despite Iran’s Anger’, Reuters, 3 June 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/china-maintains-stance-disputed-gulfislands-despite-irans-anger-2024-06-03/; ‘Iran Summons Russian Envoy over Statement on Persian Gulf Disputed Islands’, Reuters, 24 December 2023, https://www.voanews.com/a/iran-summons-russian-envoy-overstatement-on-persian-gulf-disputedislands-/7410524.html; and Tala Taslimi, ‘Iran Grows Wary of Russia Amid Moscow’s Support for UAE in Island Spat’, Nikkei Asia, 23 July 2023, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Iran-growswary-of-Russia-amid-Moscow-ssupport-for-UAE-in-island-spat.
54 Islamic Republic of Iran Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Chinese Ambassador Summoned to Iran Foreign Ministry’, 2 June 2024, https://en.mfa.ir/portal/newsview/746841/Chinese-ambassador-summoned-to-Iran-Foreign-Ministry.
55 See Mark Ashby et al., Defense Acquisition in Russia and China (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2021); and Cortney Weinbaum et al., Assessing Systemic Strengths and Vulnerabilities of China’s Defense Industrial Base (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2022).
56 World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS), ‘China Trade’, accessed 14 June 2024, https://wits.worldbank.org/countrysnapshot/en/CHN.
57 Eurostat, ‘China–EU – International Trade in Goods Statistics’, February 2024, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=China-EU_-_international_trade_in_goods_statistics.
58 See Anne Stevenson-Yang, ‘China’s Dead-end Economy Is Bad News for Everyone’, New York Times, 11 May 2024.
59 See Caitlin Talmadge, ‘Closing Time: Assessing the Iranian Threat to the Strait of Hormuz’, International Security, vol. 33, no. 1, Summer 2008, pp. 82–117.
60 See April Brady, ‘Russia Completes S-300 Delivery to Iran’, Arms Control Today, December 2016, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2016-11/news-briefs/russia-completes-s-300-delivery-iran; and A.J. Douglas, ‘Get Serious About Countering China’s Mine Warfare Advantage’, US Naval Institute Proceedings, June 2023, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/june/get-serious-about-counteringchinas-mine-warfare-advantage.
61 The Legion of Doom is a team of supervillains in the DC comics universe. Usually led by arch-fiend Lex Luthor, the legion opposes the Justice League and the Superfriends. For more details, see ‘Legion of Doom’, https://comicvine.gamespot.com/legion-of-doom/4060-43922/.
62 Velez-Green, ‘The Rise of Republican National Security Prioritizers’.
63 See Jim Mitre, ‘A Eulogy for the Twowar Construct’, Washington Quarterly, vol. 41, no. 4, Winter 2019, pp. 7–30.
64 See Karin Smit Jacobs, Chinese Strategic Interests in European Ports (Brussels: European Parliamentary Research Service, February 2023), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2023/739367/EPRS_ATA(2023)739367_EN.pdf.
65 See, for example, Joe Gould, ‘Pentagon Legislation Aims to End Dependence on China for Rare Earth Minerals’, Defense News, 18 May 2020, https://www.defensenews.com/congress/2020/05/18/pentagonlegislation-aims-to-end-dependenceon-china-for-rare-earth-minerals/; and Norbert Neumann, ‘Securing the Rare Earth Supply Chain Is Crucial for Defence’, Airforce Technology, 23 March 2022, https://www.airforce-technology.com/analysis/securing-the-rare-earth-supply-chainis-crucial-for-defence/.
66 See US Department of Defense, Securing Defense-critical Supply Chains (Washington DC: US Department of Defense, February 2022), p. 19.
67 See Statista, ‘Volume of Global Casting Production from 2018 to 2020, by Country’, 26 April 2022, https://www.statista.com/statistics/237526/castingproduction-worldwide-by-country/.
68 See US Department of Defense, Securing Defense-critical Supply Chains, p. 27.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Daniel Byman
Daniel Byman is a Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and a professor at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service.
Seth G. Jones
Seth G. Jones is a Senior Vice President and Director of the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, as well as the author, most recently, of Three Dangerous Men: Russia, China, Iran, and the Rise of Irregular Warfare (W. W. Norton & Co., 2021).