The Seduction of Etymology: Heidegger’s Philosophical Cognates

Abstract

The use of etymology is an essential characteristic of the writing of Martin Heidegger. Believing that ordinary language had lost its power to express certain philosophical ideas, Heidegger often looked to earlier meanings of words or parsed derived words in order to analyze separate morphemes. An appreciation of this approach is central in understanding Heidegger’s work. He also believed that etymologizing was essential in interpreting the works of the writers to whom he felt most akin: Pre-Socratic philosophers such as Anaximander, Heraclitus, and Parmenides. These early Greek thinkers were clearly using language in a new way, and many of their works exist only in fragments. The meanings of particular words and phrases is thus often unclear, and it is possible that etymology could provide some indication of the writer’s intention. Many of Heidegger’s etymologies, however, are far from standard and are used to produce novel and often unusual interpretations. The present paper will review a number of Heidegger’s etymologies (of varying authenticity), the manner in which he arrived at them, and their import in the interpretation of certain texts. The general question will then be taken up concerning the legitimate uses and abuses of etymology in such interpretation.

Keywords:

• historical linguistics
• etymology
• philosophy
• Heidegger
• Pre-Socratics

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 Wrathall (2010) occasionally alludes to the shakiness of Heidegger’s etymologies. Torres Gregory (2016, 105) calls them “provocative”, but in terms of their philosophical rather than linguistic significance.

2 All translations of the Pre-Socratics are from Kirk, Raven, and Schofield (1983).

3 The etymologies presented here are based upon those of Chantraine (1999).

4 Heidegger does not provide sources for his etymologies, but it is true that dictionaries list ‘lie’, especially in the sense of ‘lie asleep’ as a rare meaning of λέγω. It is likely, however, that the native speaker of Greek would have viewed λέγω ‘say’ and λέγω ‘recline’ as two different verbs, especially in view of their differing principal parts. The situation was probably in some respects similar to that of the English verbs lie ‘recline’ and lie ‘prevaricate’. Speakers of English, of course, would see no connection between these two verbs outside perhaps of the punning expression “to lie (i.e., ‘prevaricate’) like a rug”. Certainly no one would conceive of one meaning as derived from the other. In any event, Heidegger’s simple equation of the two (λέγϵιν ist legen) is unsupported.