Hume as a trope nominalist

Abstract

In this paper, I argue that Hume's solution to a problem that contemporary metaphysicians call “the problem of universals” would be rather trope-theoretical than some other type of nominalism. The basic idea in different trope theories is that particular properties, i.e., tropes are postulated to account for the fact that there are particular beings resembling each other. I show that Hume's simple sensible perceptions are tropes: simple qualities. Accordingly, their similarities are explained by these tropes themselves and their resemblance. Reading Hume as a trope nominalist sheds light on his account of general ideas, perceptions, relations and nominalism.

Keywords::

• David Hume
• nominalism
• tropes
• metaphysics
• ideas

Notes

^1. In the future, I hope that the trope-theoretical account of Hume's metaphysics can be extended to his account of the composition of bodies and minds, their identity and causation.

^2. Consequently, the paper is not motivated only by understanding the basis of Hume's account of general perceptions. It can also shed light on the issue what his perceptions are, which is too much neglected a topic in Hume scholarship (Ainslie 2008).

^3. Usually, Hume does not speak about properties but of qualities and quantities. However, there are exceptions (e.g., T 1.2.2.4, 1.2.4.21, 1.2.4.26, 1.3.5.3, 1.4.7.7, n.12; SBN 31, 46–7, 49–50, 85, 267–8, 638–9). So it is not unjustified to use it in describing Hume's thinking. Today, a property is sometimes taken to mean an universal but there is a use of it that is neutral on the divide between universals and particulars (Lowe 2006, 70). This use is in the categorial distinction between objects and properties.

^4. I set simple perceptions of bodily feelings and passions aside as they are not properties. Henceforth, I will drop the attribute “sensible”, unless otherwise noted.

^5. Rodriquez-Pereyra (2002, 28) and Maurin (2002, 61), for instance, take it as a problem about truth-making: the task is to find truth-makers for true propositions that indicate that certain particulars have common properties. By contrast, Keinänen has argued (2005, 98–107), following Armstrong (1978, 41), that the problem is about formal ontology: which category system best accounts, by some standards, for the (exact) similarity of the lowest determinates of certain determinables. For example, according to physics, it is an objective fact that every electron (particular object) exactly resembles every other electron in respect of charge (determinable), i.e., having the unit charge –e (lowest determinate). What is the best category system to ground this fact metaphysically?

^6. Ostrich nominalism (Devitt 1997) is close to predicate nominalism but the former denies that there is any metaphysical problem to be explained. So it does not have to be discussed in this paper.

^7. Still this does not rule it out that simple perceptions can have aspects when the latter are not taken to be really distinct from the former.

^8. The qualitative simplicity of simple perceptions is supported by what Hume says about passions that are simple perceptions:

The passions of pride and humility being simple and uniform impressions, 'tis impossible we can ever, by a multitude of words, give a just definition of them, or indeed of any of the passions. (T 2.1.2.1; SBN 277)

'Tis altogether impossible to give any definition of the passions of love and hatred; and that because they produce merely a simple impression, without any mixture or composition. (T 2.2.1.1; SBN 329)

^9. It would also be hard to see how Hume could hold a bundle theory of the mind if the perceptions that compose the mind did not exist.

^10. Cf. “The Word, simple Idea, is an abstract Term comprehending different Individuals that are similar. Yet the point of their Similarity from the very Nature of such Ideas is not distinct nor separable from the rest. Is not this a Proof, among many others, that there may be a similarity without any possible Separation in thought?” (Letter of 16 March 1740 to Hutcheson, Hume 1932, 38–9)

^11. Ainslie also argues that the object view, which is close to my reading, cannot account for force and vivacity. But he overlooks the possibility of a functionalist account: nothwithstanding Hume's phenomenal language, force and vivacity/liveliness refer to the functional role that perceptions play in their system. Unfortunately, I cannot spell out this account here because of the word limit.

^12. This gives additional support for my argument above that the simplicity of simple perceptions does not make them qualitatively complex. Take a blue simple perception. It may be said to be simple as it exactly resembles other simple perceptions. Resemblance is an ungrounded internal relation. Ungrounded relations do not require any ground in their terms (vs. grounded): the mere occurrence of the terms is sufficient for the relation to hold. Hence, the fact that it holds between the blue simple perception and other simple perceptions does not introduce features or aspects to the blue simple perception that would be really distinct from it and serve as the ground for the relation of resemblance.

Additional information

Funding

Writing this paper was made possible by the funding of the Academy of Finland.

Notes on contributors

Jani Hakkarainen

Jani Hakkarainen received his Ph.D. from the University of Tampere, Finland in December 2007. The topic of his dissertation was Hume's scepticism with regard to the senses. During his post-doc years, he has been studying metaphysics, both contemporary and Hume's. Currently, he is a Post-doctoral Fellow in philosophy at the University of Tampere.