Hume on presentation and philosophy

Abstract

Most philosophers agree that an argument's presentation is relevant to its philosophical merit. This paper explains why David Hume considered presentation philosophically important. On Hume's epistemology, presentation is closely connected with two principal aims of philosophical arguments: persuasion and epistemic justification. Hume's views imply that presentation is a factor determining an argument's persuasiveness and that, by philosophical standards of justification, presentation is also a factor determining the extent to which an argument's conclusion is justified.

Keywords::

• Hume
• presentation
• argument
• belief
• justification
• metaphilosophy

Acknowledgements

Thanks to Lorne Falkenstein for much helpful advice on several drafts of this paper. I am also indebted to Amy Schmitter, Aaron Garrett, Kristoffer Conner, participants of the 39th Annual Hume Society Conference, and the referees and editors of this journal for constructive comments and discussion.

Notes

^1. To Gilbert Elliot of Minto, March or April 1751 (Letters, v.1, 158).

^2.Essays and Treatises on Philosophical Subjects, 56.

^3. See, e.g., Box (1990, 59–61).

^4. Hume recognizes that philosophical arguments may also have other aims, such as ‘naturalness’ and ‘agreeableness’ (T 1.4.7.10; SBN 270). I focus on persuasion and justification because I see them as traditional philosophical aims and, consequently, if presentation is crucial for achieving them, then presentation is crucial for philosophy both on the Humean and the traditional view of philosophy.

^5. The principal theories of epistemic justification (e.g., foundationalism, coherentism, internalism, and externalism) explain justifiability as a property of belief (see, e.g., Bonjour [2002, 193–237] for an outline of these theories).

^6. I am adopting Falkenstein's interpretation of Hume's account of general rules (1997, 47–49).

^7. Throughout the paper I assert that the justification of a belief depends on the epistemic reliability of the belief's cause. If one interprets “epistemic reliability” to refer to how reliably a mechanism produces justified belief, then the preceding assertion circularly characterizes justified belief by the frequency with which the belief's cause tends to produce justified beliefs. Because “epistemic reliability” refers to how reliably a mechanism produces true belief, the characterization is not circular: a belief is justified to the extent that its cause tends to produce beliefs that are subsequently confirmed by experience.

^8. Jones attributes to Hume Cicero's position that a mind is healthy when all its faculties function properly and are democratically represented (1982, 154–155).

^9. Box interprets the calm aesthetic emotions to “get the reader's attention, arouse his interest, involve and keep him avid in the hunt” (1990, 65).

^10. Where an argument employs an unreliable inference, a reliable presentation helps us to recognize the inference as such. Although in doing so the presentation reduces the argument's persuasiveness, it is nonetheless an epistemic asset in that it prevents us from forming a belief that is likely false. As such, it increases the argument's justification even if the argument is for the most part unjustified.

^11. Immerwahr argues that one of Hume's stylistic principles is to promote readers' calm emotions (1992, 305–307).

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada through a Joseph-Armand Bombardier CGS Master's scholarship.

Notes on contributors

Maité Cruz Tleugabulova

Maité Cruz Tleugabulova is a PhD student in the Department of Philosophy at Boston University. Her research interests include eighteenth-century philosophy, epistemology, and aesthetics.