Disagreement, design, and Thomas Reid

Abstract

This paper argues that Reid's first principle of design can be more widely accepted then one might suppose, due to the fact that it specifies no marks of design. Also it is explicated that the relation of the principle, on the one hand, and properly basic design beliefs on the other, is a relation of presupposition. It is furthermore suggested that Reid's discussion of what can be done in case of disagreement about first principles points to a position that is relevant to the current debates in the Epistemology of Disagreement literature and that merits further elaboration.

Keywords::

• Thomas Reid
• disagreement
• design
• first principles
• epistemology

Notes

^1. Throughout the paper, EIP is the acronym for Reid'sEssays on the Intellectual Powers of Man. I am using the Brookes edition.

^2. Van Woudenberg (2013).

^3. The variety of marks of design has been in-depth discussed by Ratzsch (2001).

^4. An example of the unproductiveness of ridicule in philosophy is Dennett in Dennett and Plantinga (2011).

^5. Consensus gentium considerations are now receiving renewed attention in current social epistemology. See e.g. Kelly (2011).

^6. It is also possible to widen the notion of ‘belief’ so as to not only comprise explicit full belief, but also dispositional and implicit belief. This expanded notion of ‘belief’ will, of course, not stand in such a stark opposition to ‘taking for granted’ (which can be deemed identical to ‘implicit belief’).

^7. Ratzsch (2003) argued on other grounds for the same point.

^8. Since not all of the biases affect belief in alleged first principles, I will single out only those that can.

^9. See Feldman and Warfield (2010).

^10. For comments on an earlier draft many thanks to Terence Cuneo, John Turri, and also to Patric Rysiew, Rebecca Copenhaver, Keith Lehrer, Todd Buras, Lorne Falkenstein, Esther Kroeker, and Laurent Jaffro as well as to the participants of the 19^th International Philosophical Colloquium in Evian 2013, especially Georg Bertram, Robin Celikates, and David Lauer. It is gratefully acknowledged that work on this paper was made possible by a grant from the Templeton World Charity Foundation.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

René van Woudenberg

Rene van Woudenberg is a professor of Epistemology and Metaphysics at VU University, Amsterdam. He is the director of the Abraham Kuyper Center for Science and Religion at VU University and of the “Science Beyond Scientism” project, sponsored by the Templeton World Charity Foundation.