Notes
1. For the sake of brevity, when I speak of knowing or believing a proposition expressed by a sentence, I will mean that it is known or believed under the guise of that sentence. Thus, one may know or believe it expressed by one sentence (say, ‘Hesperus is Hesperus’) but not expressed by another sentence (say, ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’).
2. The analogy may suggest a treatment along the lines of Fine (Citation2007). This is no place to discuss such a radical departure from the usual form of compositional semantics; Yli-Vakkuri follows the latter.
3. The technical aspects of the logic were developed in collaboration with Jon Litland (see Litland and Yli-Vakkuri Citation2016).
4. See Williamson (Citation2016) for an analogous possibility concerning knowledge of mathematical axioms.