Authoritarian practices in new democracies

Abstract

Despite the rapid spread of democracy in the developing world over the past 25 years, there has been increasing evidence that a significant number of democratic leaders have been adopting authoritarian practices. Such practices include: utilizing devices to bypass legislatures and/or restrict the ability of opposition parties to operate; restricting the political and civil rights of their people; and politicizing the judiciary in their countries. Yet, questions directed at exploring why this happens are only beginning to be addressed. This article seeks to explain why democratic leaders in developing countries use these sorts of authoritarian practices. This article develops a model that suggests that external economic constraints emanating from the global economy compel elected leaders to adopt certain authoritarian practices in order to overcome the limitations they face as a result of these constraints. Specifically, the constraints imposed by capital mobility and conditional lending by the international financial institutions are what force many leaders in developing countries to use authoritarian practices. This study utilizes a comparative approach using two cases, Argentina, and the Philippines. For both countries, the study analyzes a specific incident and offers an explanation regarding why authoritarian practices were employed by the country's leadership.