Rival Transnational Networks, Domestic Politics and Indonesian Timber

Abstract

Scholars interested in the promotion of “good governance” and those interested in transnational advocacy networks both are concerned with the potential power of external actors to alter domestic political structures. This article analyses the networks promoting neo-liberalisation and democratic practices in Indonesia's forestry sector as rival transnational networks. The analysis finds that the Asian economic crisis and collapse of the Suharto regime provided a political opening for alliances between the two rival networks that helped to bring down the ruling oligarchy in timber, but the power of domestic oligarchs controlling the sector remains strong. In brief, there are limits to the power of both external networks vis-à-vis domestic power relations. Given the financial resources and constraints on non-governmental organisations, they may be unable to alter the deep structures of capitalist accumulation and distribution based in Indonesia's forest resources.

Key Words:

• Good governance
• politics
• transnational networks
• international financial institutions
• non-governmental organisations (NGOs)
• Indonesia

Acknowledgement

This paper was presented in an earlier form at the Conference on “New Directions in Southeast Asian Studies,” 10-11 October 2008, Chapel Hill. The author appreciates the suggestions made by Max Lane, Don Nonini and Kevin Hewison. The willingness of respondents to share their experience and perspectives, either openly or confidentially, is also much appreciated. Any remaining errors are the author's. Research for this paper was supported by an Abe Fellowship from the Japan Foundation's Center for Global Partnership, the Social Science Research Council and the American Council of Learned Societies.

Notes

¹ There is much debate about the relationship between NGOs and civil society and what “civil society” means in a neo-liberalising period (see Feldman, 1997; Shefner, 2007).

² But not Suharto in Indonesia (see Aspinall and Mietzner, 2008; Simpson, 2008).

³ The notion of “illiberal” states may raise confusion about the class (or neutral) character of the state and the ability of some putatively outside actors to “capture” the state. I am grateful to the audience at a presentation of this paper for pressing me on this point.

⁴ Offe and Wiesenthal's (1980) classic analysis of the two logics of collective action – one for capital and another for working class movements – is relevant to this point. In fact, since the new social movements are even more diverse, the unifying logic of capital's action is relative more powerful. The caveat is that capital is also fractured across foreign-domestic and national-regional lines.

⁵ Local networks of power involved in illegal logging are clearly important and do not fit neatly into these four models, in large part because they do not even pretend to promote good forest governance. These local networks also involve local military commands who sometimes act autonomously. I am thankful to a reviewer for raising this point, although it is difficult to address within one paper focused more on the relative power of external or international influences.

⁶ It is important to acknowledge that both NGOs and IFIs are “expert” rather than “popular” actors. I am grateful to Jon Shefner for raising this distinction, although I cannot address it fully here. On the role of expert knowledge, see also Rhee (2006).

⁷ The use of class and fraction here draws on Smith (2008: 244) who builds on Sklair's notion of a transnational capitalist class. Smith identifies a political fraction that would include the World Bank and also a technical fraction that would include forestry policy researchers and consultants.

⁸ Babb and Buira (2007: 73) argue that there has actually been a “mission push” as the World Bank and IMF persist with Washington Consensus-style liberalisation even as economists largely move away from these recommendations. Also, the US government has pushed to add conditions related to money laundering and global terrorism. Interestingly, researchers at the Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) in Indonesia and in the Indonesian Working Group on Forest Finance (IWGFF) have also advocated money laundering laws as a tool to combat illegal and questionable logging practices.

⁹ The author attended the Jakarta session on 6 October 2004.

¹⁰ The Minister committed to eight steps: (1) a moratorium on the conversion of natural forests; (2) closure of debt-laden industries; (3) elimination of illegal forest logging; (4) restructuring of timber-processing industries; (5) recalculation of the value of forest resources; (6) linkage of reforestation programmes with industrial capacity; (7) decentralisation of forestry administration; and (8) formation of a national forestry programme. In November 2000, four more commitments were made by the government on (9) addressing forest fires, (10) revising tenurial rights, (11) making a forest resource inventory, and (12) improving forest management.

¹¹ It is not only private sector data but also governmental data that have severe gaps.

¹² At least until 2009 when the Minister of Industry and Trade Mari Pangestu revoked the authority of BRIK over export licensing.

¹³ Although there is insufficient space here for a full analysis, NGOs are divided on the efficacy of voluntary trade regulatory approaches. Some, large international ones like WWF, WRI and TNC, are attempting to gradually build sustainable trade networks. Others, inside Indonesia and internationally worry that Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) does not address deeper problems of community rights, corruption and the gap between supply and demand in the forestry industry.