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Abstract
Do democratic political regimes facilitate more robust environmental and natural resource regulatory policies? Yes, in many cases. Using detailed cases of natural resource policy making in Thailand, however, we find that neither political parties nor civil society nor state institutions do well in representing diffuse interests, mediating among conflicting ones or defining compromises and securing their acceptance by most key players. Gains in environmental or natural resource policy making have not been dramatically more likely under democratic regimes than under “liberal authoritarian” ones with broad freedoms of speech and association. We argue that Thailand's democratic political system features weak linkages between groups in society and political parties, lacks alternative encompassing or brokering institutions in civil society, and that these features account for a tendency for political democracy to fail to deliver on its policy potential in Thailand.
Notes
1 A mixed authoritarian regime was in place 1977-88, an authoritarian one 1991-92 and 2006-07.
2 The relative lack of interest in macro-economic policy issues in many Third Wave democracies has both demand-side, as well as supply-side, explanations. On the demand side, the large numbers employed in the informal and non-tradable sector are relatively little affected by many legislative or monetary policy initiatives (Pasuk and Baker, 2008: 62-83). On the supply side, with a weakly institutionalised political party system, politicians typically bid for votes through clientelist rather than more universal policy appeals. In Thailand, generally speaking, politicians have not used macro-economic issues to mobilise voters. Former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who came to power in 2001, was an innovator in this regard. More typically, politics has been about local goods or, to a limited extent, local or regional identities.
3 The Commission on Growth and Development's The Growth Report, Strategies for Sustained Growth and Inclusive Development notes that Thailand is one of 13 economies that sustained rates of 7% or more a year for at least 25 years (World Bank, Citation2008).
4 For instance, in 2003 the OCS turned down a clause enabling citizens to play roles in health impact assessments in the National Health Act Draft written by a relatively progressive group of bureaucrats in the Ministry of Public Health (Matichon Weekly, 18 June 2010).
5 The tense relations can be seen in an open letter by the Stop Global Warming Association, a group of academics and NGOs, dated 6 March 2010, which criticised the OCS for its opposition to founding an independent environmental organisation. The letter characterised the Office as a typical old-fashioned bureaucratic agency opposed to citizen participation (see FTA Watch, Citation2010).
6 The main opponents of the 2005 Public Consultation Act included most NGOs, the National Economic and Social Advisory Council, and the research section of the King Pradjadhipok Institute.
7 Many of these people are members of hill tribes, not all of which enjoy Thai citizenship. Criticisms eventually put an end to the policy (see Hares, Citation2009; Walker and Farrelly, 2008).
8 Krisada (interviewed 25 July 2008) argued that these opponents later proved critical to blocking the bill.
9 The military coup of September 2006 received support from intellectuals, media and some NGOs. These were the groups that were against Prime Minister Thaksin. Several NGOs expected to be appointed to the Senate (Giles Ji, 2009; Kengkij and Hewison, Citation2009; Pye and Schaffar, Citation2008).
10 Assuming the budget allows for the necessary outlays, these problems may be overcome within a couple of years (Bangkok Post, 9 April 2006).
11 For decades the king has been interested in a range of water issues, from cloud seeding to dams and irrigation systems. See “The Golden Jubilee Network,” http://kanchanapisek.or.th/projects/index.th.html (downloaded 12 December 2010).
12 The case of the Thai National Health Act might appear an exception to this pattern of failures. Even in this case, however, conflicts that developed between the civil society-based initiative and the Thai Rak Thai political party bottled up the bill for years. It was finally enacted by the appointed National Legislative Assembly in 2007.
13 This might be what we should expect if we assume that cultural pressures put a premium on the avoidance of direct confrontations of interests.
14 He went so far as to seek help from Thai Embassies abroad to ask foreign governments to cut off their funding of Thai NGOs. His reasoning was that because Thais were now well represented by his party, they had no need of NGOs (Connors, Citation2007: 250).