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ABSTRACT
Before Malaysia’s 2013 general election, one of the few remaining dominant coalitions in the world was aware it would struggle to retain power. A fledgling opposition coalition had inspired public confidence of its capacity to competently rule while public discontent with the ruling party was rife due to the ubiquity of patronage that had prevented the responsible implementation of policies. However, regime change did not occur. How does the protracted rule of Malaysia’s Barisan Nasional coalition, and the hegemonic party in it, the United Malays National Organisation, relate to debates over authoritarian durability, during a period when dominant parties struggle to sustain power? Malaysian elections have been free enough that the opposition has been able to obtain and retain control of state governments, so why has Barisan Nasional not lost power? This article reviews the 2013 election examining three issues: the significance of coalition politics; how policies have shaped voting trends; and the growing monetisation of politics. These perspectives provide insights into the institutional structure of coalitions and their conduct of politics, including clientelistic practices, forms of mobilisation and governance and the outcomes of policies introduced to address socio-economic inequities and drive economic growth.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1. MCA and MIC have active party machineries, but their membership base is small compared to UMNO. During elections, BN parties, with the exception of those based in Sarawak, depend heavily on UMNO’s well-funded party machinery to secure support, particularly in non-urban areas. As MCA and MIC’s influence declined, UMNO increasingly turned to Chinese- and Indian-based business chambers, educational institutions and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to reach out to non-Malays.
2. PBB, predominantly ethnic Dayak-based, was led by Abdul Taib Mahmud, Sarawak’s chief minister from 1981 to 2014. Under Taib’s leadership, BN component parties in Sarawak have consistently garnered significant support, a core factor for UMNO’s durability.
3. Mustafa and Zaharom (Citation1998) provide a cogent analysis of ownership and control of the media.
4. The key studies include those by Pempel (Citation1990), Geddes (Citation1999), Magaloni (Citation2006), Greene (2007) and Friedman and Wong (Citation2008). For Malaysia, see Case (Citation2009) and Lee (Citation2015).
5. The New York Times (February 8, 2015) provided an important exposé of the funding of BN’s election campaign in the opposition-controlled state of Penang, with funds generated by well-connected businessman, Jho Low.
6. Since the 1980s, BN leaders have been inspired by neo-liberalism. Neo-liberals advocate limiting state intervention in the economy and stress that the maximum use of the market is essential to economic well-being. They reject the idea that fiscal policies, taxation and spending are conducive to economic growth (see Harvey Citation2005).
7. Affirmative action was the key policy response to the 1969 race riots, an event attributed to inter-ethnic wealth and income disparities that had emerged during British colonial rule. Of Malaysia’s 29.6 million multi-ethnic population in 2014, Bumiputeras accounted for 65%, Chinese 26%, Indians 8% and the rest comprised other ethnic groups. The term “Bumiputera” refers to Malays and indigenous communities.
8. This figure is cited by Khor (Citation2015, 98), quoting a prominent Anwar ally, Kamaruddin Jaafar, who had joined PAS.
9. This was a major reform as SMEs constitute about 99.2% of all business establishments and contribute about 32% of real gross domestic product (GDP). Situated in the Malay heartland are the underdeveloped Bumiputera-majority states of Kelantan, Terengganu, Kedah and Perlis.
10. Abdullah also encountered problems getting the ulama in government to support his concept of Islam Hadhari (see Fauzi and Takiyuddin Citation2014a).
11. A similar view was expressed by an UMNO federal minister (Interview, Terengganu, April 24, 2013).
12. Abdullah’s son, Kamaluddin, was then associated with the publicly listed Scomi Group, a global service provider in the oil and gas industry which had been privy to state rents (The Edge, May 27, 2013). Abdullah’s brother, Ibrahim, owns a food-based enterprise that had secured a lucrative contract from Malaysia Airlines, the national airline. His son-in-law, Khairy, was disclosed as a shareholder of a quoted investment firm, ECM Libra, with equity holdings amounting to millions of ringgit.
13. BN regained control of Perak following defections from the opposition.
14. These mega-billion ringgit scandals involved the Port Klang Free Zone (PKFZ), Sime Darby and National Feedlot Corporation, enterprises in which the government had a majority stake.
15. George Kent, a firm owned by Najib’s ally Tan Kay Hock, was awarded the RM1 billion Ampang Line LRT extension project (Focus, May 18, 2013). Syed Mokhtar Al-Bukhary, aligned with Mahathir, had received privatised projects such as Penang Port and Proton Holdings, which runs Malaysia’s car project. Syed has interests in numerous other sectors including gas distribution, the rice and sugar trade, power production, water treatment, banking and education. Najib’s closest ally, Jho Low, is associated with the controversial 1Malaysia Development (1MDB), a sovereign wealth fund under the prime minister’s direct control. A major award to 1MBD was the 200ha Sungai Besi Air Base relocation project valued at RM2.1 billion. This air base is indirectly owned by a government investment holding company Lembaga Tabung Angkatan Tentara (LTAT) which manages the saving funds of armed forces personnel (Focus, May 4, 2013). LTAT is controlled by Najib’s associate, Lodin Kamaruddin, who was implicated in a controversial scandal surrounding the acquisition of defence equipment.
16. BN and PR’s manifestos had 13 common points, including on core matters such as education, housing and tax reforms (The Edge, April 15, 2013).
17. PAS won only one of nine state seats it contested in Perlis and nine of 23 state seats where its candidates were placed in Kedah, a poor performance for a party heading the state government.
18. Poor farmers we met were concerned about their inadequate access to loans to acquire land to help increase productivity. They critiqued the poor volume of investments in infrastructure projects to improve water, electricity and transportation services. They spoke of the need for good education for their children that would lead to intergenerational mobility. Such progress, they felt, would increase economic opportunity as their children, now with sound education, would introduce innovative techniques to improve production. Their problems highlighted their predicament with PR and BN. These concerns also drew attention to two crucial questions: how could long-term implementation of affirmative action targeted at them have failed so dismally; and were not such utility services basic for a highly industrialised country?
19. However, the value of Felda Global Ventures’ shares soon fell, even though reportedly propped up by GLCs. For a review of the controversy surrounding Felda Global Ventures see Khor (Citation2015).
20. Johor DAP leader Boo Cheng Hau admitted that PR’s intent to appoint a PAS member as chief minister was potentially a fundamental strategic blunder. Boo had advised DAP leaders at the federal level of the naiveté of adopting this strategy (Interview, Johor Bahru, April 22, 2013). In the event, Salahuddin lost the parliamentary and state seats he ran in. His state seat was in the constituency of Gelang Patah, won by DAP stalwart Lim Kit Siang by a huge margin, confirming this electorate’s discomfort with PAS’s presence in Johor.
21. In Kota Marudu, BN secured 2,000 fewer votes than the combined number of votes of the two other candidates. In Tenom, BN obtained 9,771 votes while the other candidates obtained a total of 10,523. In Keningau, BN obtained 15,818 votes while the other two candidates had a total of 19,725 (Malaysiakini, May 6, 2013).
22. There was no state-level election in Sarawak during this general election.
23. One project heavily criticised by Penang-based NGOs was the construction of the RM6.3 billion Penang Link Tunnel, to be undertaken by a consortium of local and foreign firms (Focus, May 4, 2013).
24. During our visit to one BN office in Sabah on May 2, 2013, the members disclosed how they had divided the constituency into three categories: white, black and grey electorate. They focused solely on the “grey” electorate as the “white” constituency was hardcore BN while the “black” were solidly behind the opposition. This machinery was tasked with finding ways and means to obtain the support of the “grey” constituency. PR alleged that one tactic involved giving these people cash, with the promise of more if BN won the seat. The opposition had to assign people to guard these “grey” constituencies the night before the election to ensure they were not bought (Interview, May 2, 2013).
25. UMNO grassroots leaders were privy to major contracts. In Perak, the federal government awarded a 23-year concession to build and lease back Universiti Teknoloji Mara’s 70-acre campus in the town of Tapah to a company called UniTapah, a 51:49 joint venture between the publicly listed Crest Builder Holdings and a private firm, Detik Utuh, majority owned by an UMNO MP, Tajuddin Abdul Rahman. This concession is reportedly worth RM1.3 billion, five times the cost of constructing the campus at RM285.89 million (The Edge, May 6, 2013).
26. Public protests by BERSIH (Coalition for Clean and Fair Elections), the NGO coalition formed to campaign for clean and fair elections, drew unprecedented massive support. BERSIH’s rally in Kuala Lumpur in 2012 was the largest in Malaysian history, endorsed by more than 80 NGOs, with similar rallies in major cities in Malaysia and around the world.
27. It appeared to us that serious divisions had also emerged within PAS over the propagation of hudud. PAS President Abdul Hadi Awang (Interview, April 26, 2013), stressed that enacting hudud was imperative for a party professing to be Islamic. He strongly believed that Malaysians would appreciate hudud’s value if they understood its tenets. In our interview a day earlier with a younger PAS leader, he categorically refused to talk about hudud though, as he put it, we could discuss any other matter.