Beyond Copenhagen: The Political Economy of Securitising “Outside Influences” in Bali

ABSTRACT

Securitisation theory has contributed greatly to critical security studies. However, the Copenhagen School’s focus on discursive analysis fails to answer the “so what” question of why issues are securitised and for whose benefit. This article contends that more nuanced explanations can be provided by taking seriously the political economy context within which the process of securitisation is embedded. The article has two aims. First, it contributes to further refining securitisation theory by embedding Balzacq’s pragmatic act – which implies that securitising actors gain the assent of an audience based on a shared view of vulnerabilities – within a broad social conflict analysis. This latter can explain the socio-political struggles that create popular support for securitisation, and what social groups benefit from it. Second, it contributes to explanations of Bali’s contemporary political economy by operationalising the refined approach to explain how struggles over the spoils of tourism have created a receptive audience among a cross-class section of Balinese for the securitisation of “outside influences” – a euphemism for migrants, non-local investors and Western cultural influences. Securitisation has resulted in conservative elite groups marginalising progressive voices; “traditional” institutions being favoured in accessing state resources; and in a policing landscape in which migrants are harassed and exploited.

KEYWORDS:

• Securitisation
• social conflict theory
• political economy
• ajeg Bali
• Indonesia

Acknowledgements

I am indebted to Marzita Ardiantina for her support and help while researching in Bali. I am grateful for the support received from the staff at the Asia Research Centre at Murdoch University while writing this article when completing a post-doctoral fellowship. In particular, I am grateful for the comments on an early draft provided by Ian Wilson. The comments by the journal’s reviewers and Kevin Hewison’s editing are appreciated.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. Securitisation theory has been largely applied in Western democracies. Only recently has it been applied beyond Europe, but still in democracies (though not always well functioning ones).

2. The case study is based on insights the author gathered from 2004 and over a period of six years, during which he resided in Bali. It also benefitted from 85 interviews gathered over a four-month fieldwork from October 2013. These include 53 interviews with Balinese, 17 with Indonesian non-Balinese and 15 with expatriate residents. Among the Balinese, four were of high caste (ksatria, brahmana), 15 were wealthy individuals of low caste (sudras and wesia), and the rest were low-income earners of low castes. The Indonesian non-Balinese varied from business tycoons to scavengers. Nine female Balinese were interviewed, as well as 11 non-Balinese Indonesians and six female expatriates. The age of the sources varied from early 20s to late 60s. Among those interviewed were 18 security actors (members of vigilante groups, police officers, community policing officers and private security guards) and 18 experts (scholars, activists and religious and traditional leaders). The rest worked in the tourism sector or in the linked industries. Interviews averaged one hour in length. Some of those interviewed required anonymity.

3. Bali Central Statistics Agency. Accessed July 5, 2016. http://bali.bps.go.id/linkTableDinamis/view/id/4.

4. ForBali (Balinese Forum against Reclamation, http://www.forbali.org/id/) is a civil society-led movement. It includes environmental activists, artists and concerned citizens and is supported by traditional leaders that have declared Benoa Bay a sacred area (The Jakarta Post, April 27, 2016). The development plan by PT Tirta Wahana Bali International wants to build villas, apartments, luxury hotels, a Disneyland-style theme park and even a Formula One racing circuit on some 838 hectares of land to be reclaimed from Benoa Bay. The project is supported locally by Made Mangku Pastika, governor of Bali since 2008, and financially by Tomy Winata, a tycoon who rose to prominence during the Soeharto regime. ForBali opposes the project because it would cause environmental disaster, add hotels and bring more mass tourism to the island. The group’s position is shared by some of the political elite in Bali (Tribun Bali, March 25, 2016). Pastika has striven to frame his support in a manner that does not reject ajeg Bali. He has argued that the project would alleviate the pressure on arable land, bring jobs and revenue for the provincial to fund an increasing number of pro-people programmes (Kompas, August 6, 2013). He has also diverted responsibility from local government by stressing that the plan is under the authority of the central government. A 2014 presidential regulation gave permission for the reclamation project to go ahead after the status of Benoa Bay was changed from a green-belt water conservation area to a commercial zone. A similar dispute emerged in the regency of Buleleng where tourism projects in the Buyan and Tamblingan lakes area, promoted by a politico-business alliance of local, national and international actors, was opposed by grassroots organisations (see Strauß 2015).

5. Most of the Balinese interviewed argued that Pastika only instrumentally aligned himself with ajeg Bali to gain votes in 2008 and 2013. This thesis, shared by this author, does not weaken, but indeed strengthens the argument that ajeg Bali is a structuring force in the local political arena.

6. The data in this paragraph have been drawn from the Centre for Political Studies. Accessed July 8, 2016. http://www.puskapol.ui.ac.id/.

7. The cost to renew varies. The average, however, seems to be about IDR 100,000 for non-Balinese and IDR 15,000 for Balinese.

8. Scholars have explained similar dynamics during the Soeharto era (see Aditjondro 1995; Warren 1998, 2000).

Additional information

Funding

Support for this research was provided by the International Postgraduate Research Scholarship and the Australia Postgraduate Award during my PhD studies, and the Australian Research Council Discovery Project grant DP130102273 during my Postdoctoral Fellowship.