“Land Grabbing” in an Autocracy and a Multi-Party Democracy: China and India Compared

ABSTRACT

Both China and India have witnessed extensive land expropriation by the state from farmers for use in industrialisation and urbanisation projects. Land conflicts have ensued from these developments. This article poses two questions: (i) Why do we see a similar escalation of land dispossession in both countries, despite their distinctively dissimilar political systems, one being a one-party authoritarian regime, the other being a multi-party democracy?; and (ii) How does the different regime type affect the politics of dispossession? Despite their diverse political institutions, government officials have been given similar incentives to chase growth by developing land, but the institutions create diverging environments for aggrieved citizens to mobilise for collective action. While it is unsurprising that the interests of the poor and weak are not protected in an autocracy, democracy provides no automatic safety valve in defending marginalised citizens either.

KEYWORDS:

• autocracy
• democracy
• China
• India
• Land grabs

Acknowledgements

The author wishes to express gratitude to Kevin Hewison, two anonymous reviewers, Tania Li, Preeti Sampat and Jill Carr-Harris for helpful comments on earlier drafts and Prashant Rayaproplu for excellent research assistance. She would also like to thank many scholars and activists in India and China who have taken the time to share their perspectives and stories. Earlier versions of the article were presented at Harvard University, The Australian National University Crawford School of Public Policy, Fudan University, and the workshop on Chinese Politics and Society at Shanghai Jiaotong University. Remaining errors are those of the author.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. A few interviewees in India, including a former minister of rural development and scholars studying land politics and rural issues, have underlined this reason behind land resistance in India.

2. In the context of investment attraction, sub-national governments refer to state governments in India, and provincial, county, and municipal governments in China, which have the prerogative to determine investment incentives and devote resources accordingly.

3. While there was considerable regional variation in land ownership concentration in the late Qing and Republican periods, it was recognised that landlords with large tracts of land and hired labourers were mostly concentrated in the provinces of Jiangsu and Zhejiang in the Yangtze River Delta and Guangdong in the Pearl River Delta (see Esherick 1981).

4. Land conveyance fees were reclassified as a form of budgetary revenue in 2007 by the central government in an attempt to improve transparency in its collection.

5. Tao and colleagues (2010) argue municipal governments have combined the dual strategies of providing subsidised land to manufacturers through negotiations and high-priced land to private developers through auctions in order to maximise their current and future revenue streams. Because of the stiff competition for industrial investment, municipal governments lure investors by providing cheap land, but once the industries are set up, they do not only stimulate local economic growth but also contribute direct and indirect taxes to government coffers.

6. There is a heterodox view that in the early 1980s during Indira Gandhi’s second term in office, the government had shifted to a pro-business orientation (Kohli 2006). While not a market reform as it did not allow for new market entrants, the policies benefited existing businesses by keeping them protected from competition, especially foreign competition (Rodrik and Subramanian 2005).

7. Failing to achieve a “veto target,” such as no breakout of large-scale protests, means an overall failing assessment for the official, even if s/he scores high on other criteria, making them necessary but insufficient conditions for party promotion. “Soft targets” are non-quantifiable and non-binding targets, such as health care provision, and cultural and social development, which matter significantly less for promotion.

8. Ong (2012) shows in extensive detail how collection of tax revenue features prominently in the “hard target” category of local cadre evaluation across different localities. “Hard target” items have a determining effect on political promotion of local political leaders.

9. The author is indebted to Preeti Sampat for highlighting this important point.