Black Site: The Cold War and the Shaping of Thailand’s Politics

ABSTRACT

The Cold War alliance between the USA and Thailand is well-known and well-documented. Rather than recounting the details of that alliance, this article examines some important political legacies associated with Thailand’s Cold War alliance with the USA, focusing on the period from the mid-1940s to the mid-1950s. The article examines efforts by the US Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency to establish an anti-communist alliance that then had far-reaching impacts for Thailand’s political institutions. The focus is on three inter-related aspects of the bilateral relationship that, in the name of anti-communism, amounted to the destruction of nascent parliamentary democracy and the embedding of military authoritarianism: the abandonment of wartime ally Pridi Phanomyong; the elimination of his political allies; and the promotion of the military as a leading political force. The outcomes of these aspects of the bilateral relationship continue to reverberate for contemporary Thailand.

KEYWORDS:

• Anti-communism
• Central Intelligence Agency
• Cold War
• Phibun Songkhram
• Pridi Phanomyong
• royalists

Acknowledgments

The research for this article was largely conducted with the support of two visiting fellowships. The first fellowship in 2017 was with the Center for Southeast Asian Studies at Kyoto University and I am most grateful for the collegiality and suggestions provided by both visiting scholars and faculty. The second visiting position was provided by the Forum for Asian Studies and the Department of Political Science at Stockholm University, where I also presented an earlier version of this article at the Workshop on “The Cold War in East and Southeast Asia,” May 25–26, 2018, and sponsored by the Forum. I am appreciative for comments from the participants and I am especially grateful to Eva Hansson, who co-ordinated the Workshop, facilitated my participation and who was an excellent colleague while I was visiting the University of Stockholm. Thanks also to referees and Michael Connors for their suggestions. Of course, the article will have shortcomings and I am responsible for those.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. During the war, the British considered Thailand an enemy state and, for example, opposed efforts to establish a government-in-exile (OH 1969, 1241–1242). Following the war, the British wanted strong measures against Thailand’s military. However, unlike other Axis allies, the Thai military was not brought under the control of the allies, largely due to the USA’s position on Thailand as an occupied state (Surachart 1988, 33).

2. As Goscha (1999, ch. 4) shows, support for the Viet Minh was not limited to Pridi and the Free Thai, with royalists also supporting the struggle against French colonialism.

3. The CIA (1949i; 1949j) also worried that the Bangkok regime’s failure to deal with poverty and disaffection in the region was fuelling pro-communist sentiment.

4. As Hyun (2017) shows, this CIA link to the police also included important ties with the palace. These links became particularly significant in the 1960s as General Sarit promoted the monarchy (see Handley 2006, ch. 7).

5. Bird was later charged with defrauding the US government in Laos but never returned to face charges (see Blumenthal 1975). Bird’s partner in SEA Supply, Paul Helliwell, was an OSS officer who joined the CIA. For his “colourful” CIA career and more on Operation Paper, see Scott (2010).

6. Surachart (1988, 53–55) mentions some US misgivings associated with the 1951 “Radio Coup,” but the State Department decided it would not withhold recognition so long as the king remained head of state. This may have been a convenience but was also important recognition of the king as a political actor.

7. There was also an element of bureaucratic competition for funds and influence. When debates arose over funding, the Embassy in Bangkok was strident in playing the “Red” card. For example, in 1951, lauding an arms delivery, it proclaimed: “… Commie elements in Thai[land] w[ou]ld have made considerable progress but for advent MAAG [Military Assistance Advisory Group] which has caused number of traditional fence-sitters [to] either join non-Commie camp or at least prevent them running over to Commies” (OH 1977, 1612).

8. From OSS actions in North Africa during World War II, throughout his career Donovan repeatedly favoured the formation of guerrilla units to conduct warfare in regional conflict (see Waller 2011, 129–144, 360–373). Of course, as Donovan knew, this Air Force already existed as the CIA-owned CAT, which became Air America (Leeker 2015a, 34).

9. Interestingly, this characterisation of the monarchy’s position adopted royalist language deployed in the 1949 constitution: “Thailand is a democratic state with the King as Head of State” (Thak 1978, 822). While this was removed from the 1952 charter, by the late 1960s the terminology was again being promoted by royalists. It is now a fixture of constitutions and Thai political argot (see Connors 2003, ch. 5; Kasian 2011).