The North Korea Problem: Perspectives on the Nuclear Debate, Economic Reforms and Beyond

ABSTRACT

Despite a plethora of research on North Korea, understanding and managing the challenges posed by the country have long been complicated with no simple solution to put an end to this decades-long security and economic predicament on the Korean Peninsula. With the potential for international conflict, attention must be given to the converging messages emerging from the scholarly works reviewed in this article: Glyn Ford, Talking to North Korea: Ending the Nuclear Standoff, Van Jackson, On the Brink: Trump, Kim, and the Threat of Nuclear War and William Overholt’s collection North Korea: Peace? Nuclear War? These works speak to the need to: take seriously the risk of nuclear war; consider the connectedness of the North’s decades-long security and economic reform dilemmas; and to acknowledge that the mistrust that is deeply rooted on all sides must be mitigated to bring peace. These books are published at a critical juncture of increased tensions following a highly publicised but remarkably short-lived effort at a breakthrough on the Korean nuclear issue, Pyongyang’s rapidly evolving security posture and its perennial domestic challenges. Each of these volumes provides valuable insights on these challenges for North Korea and internationally.

KEY WORDS:

• North Korea
• nuclear standoff
• security dilemma
• economic predicament
• byungjin

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. North Korean defectors report workers receiving much more from bonuses and side jobs than from basic wages due to the failure of the public distribution system, which is the crux of the planned economy. Meanwhile, the breakdown of the uniform income structure has resulted in growing inequalities and varying wage structures between factories and workplaces (see JoongAng Daily, October 19, 2018).

2. Pyongyang has gone from an “all for the military” to an “all for the economy” approach with its April 2018 declaration to end the byungjin policy. For further analysis on North Korea’s new strategic line, see Frank (2018).

3. Byungjin might be interpreted as a pragmatic guideline, designed to strengthen national defence and promote economic development. Yet, its scope has been limited by its framing as a policy to facilitate socialist economic construction and nuclear deterrence without much latitude in terms of ideological flexibility.

4. Deng considered that “[a] planned economy is not the definition of socialism, because there is planning even under capitalism; the market economy happens under socialism, too” (Hou 2013, 1). This is in line with his most famous reflection on pragmatism: “it doesn’t matter whether a cat is black or white so long as it catches mice.”

5. Hecker (2011) advocates the Three No’s “in return for one yes – U.S. willingness to seriously address Pyongyang’s fundamental security concerns.”

6. For example, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, also known as the Iran nuclear deal, reached by Iran and the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany) in July 2015, has collapsed after Trump’s withdrawal from the agreement, revealing difficulties of keeping any multilateral agreements alive.

7. This conference was considered a failure on Korea given that it ended without adopting any declarations on the Korean question. What Ford suggests, however, is a multilateral format that would be inclusive of not only the parties directly involved like the two Koreas, China and the USA, but also Europe, through which the EU’s participation in resolving the North Korea problem could be more institutionalised.