Buddhist Majoritarian Nationalism in Thailand: Ideological Contestation, Narratives, and Activism

Abstract

This article examines the narratives that underpin the activism of Buddhist nationalist movements in Thailand. In arguing that these movements represent an emerging strand of Thai nationalism – Buddhist majoritarian nationalism – the focus is on three discursive components that shape the contours of the movements’ narratives. The first component regards a two-prong threat against Buddhism: political elites subservient to the Muslim minority and the latter’s growing influence. Second, averting these threats necessitates a new form of national consciousness that places Buddhism and Buddhists as the country’s majority at the centre of national identity. Third, this ideological position accompanies the movements’ aspiration to further conflate religion and polity. This argument is situated in the historical inter-relationship of the state, nationalism, and Buddhism, while tracing how recent political upheavals, including political polarisation, influence the movements’ organisational development and discourses. The latter has been mainly promulgated online, but at times have inspired offline protest activism. The Thai movements display various commonalities with their counterparts in Sri Lanka and Myanmar, but their ability to challenge royal nationalism and influence explicitly religious policies remains to be seen.

Key Words:

• Thailand
• Buddhism
• nationalism
• social movement
• narratives
• mobilisation

Acknowledgements

I wish to thank Eakthip Faungfoung, my former student at Thammasat University’s Political Science Faculty, for her excellent research assistance; Pakawadee Suphanjitwana and Duanghathai Buranajaroenkij for connecting me with their networks in the north and northeast; Charlotte Heyl and Andreas Ulfen of the German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA) for their constructive comments that helped shape the direction of this article; Aim Sinpeng and the Sydney Southeast Asia Centre for hosting an online panel in 2020 in which I presented the draft article; and anonymous reviewers whose feedback sharpened the article’s argument.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1 The secularisation of nationalism in western Europe has been a subject of academic dispute. Wilson (1966), for instance, argues that western European secularisation of nation-states was an exception, rather than a norm. In fact, Berger (1973, 111–114) posits that the very nature of Christianity (its organisation, its focus on pluralism) was the trigger for the secularisation in Europe.

2 LINE is the most popular chat messenger in Thailand. A research assistant gained private access via one of our contact persons. For her safety, details about this contact person and related sensitive information are kept confidential.

3 Ironically, this demand came against the backdrop of rising budgets for official Buddhist agencies in the 1990s. See Larsson (2019, 580).

4 These palace insiders are not named in this article for fear of the lese majeste law.

5 However, analysts argue that the relationship between Thaksin and the Dhammakaya Temple was never clear cut as the authorities would have assumed. The crackdown on the temple under the military rule probably brought the two forces together symbolically. As a Dhammakaya senior monk states, the temple sympathised with red shirts only because they were attacked by the same people (see Dubus 2017, 60).

6 More carefully, a report by the Asia Foundation suggests that both Muslims and Buddhists equally left the conflict-affected south for other parts of Thailand, while the number of Buddhists emigrating across Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat in 2010 was lower than the figure in 2000, prior to the recurring insurgency (see Burke, Tweedie, and Ora-orn 2013).

7 The name of this scholar is kept confidential.

8 This rumour spread in 2019. It was based on the fact that the Islamic Bank included the Student Loan Fund as one of its services. The Islamic conversion Buddhists claimed to be the condition for the loan was false (see Manager Online, November 26, 2019).

9 The news about the demolition of “forest temples” unsettled many Buddhist activists. Such acts were interpreted as evidence for declining state patronage of Buddhism. According to the National Federation of Buddhism, more than 4,000 temples across different localities were demolished after the 2014 coup. In many of these cases, monks residing in these temples were charged with forest encroachment and land transgression. In a news search, at least two lawsuits were filed against the Dhammakaya Temple whose provincial offshoots are allegedly located in the forests of Loei and Nong Khai provinces.

10 In November 1979, Muslims throughout the world celebrated the beginning of the fifteenth century of the Islamic calendar (hijariah), which was expected to be the “century of Islamic Resurgence.” By entering the new century, “Muslims would return to Islam, a religion and a way of life which is believed would increase Muslims’ prestige and humanity.” This coincided with political changes in the 1970s in predominantly Muslim countries. Islamic opposition movements from Egypt to Turkey and Afghanistan became the ruling governments. Meanwhile, in Libya and Pakistan, Islamic laws were adopted.

11 In 2017, there were 34 provincial Islamic councils across Thailand (Royal Gazette 2018).

12 There is no evidence that pig farms are banned in the mentioned location. This concern about economic loss caused by incoming Muslims and a stereotype about the latter’s dietary requirements may underpin this rumour. A similar concern was heard in the northeast province of Khon Kaen.

13 Under King Narai, Ayutthaya was a regional trading centre. Persian Shi’ite Muslims were an important group whose wealth contributed to “the enrichment of the royal treasury” (Ishii 1994, 454). A rumour that King Narai converted to Islam possibly stems from his sponsorship of the construction of a mosque (Ishii 1994).