Anthropology Pure and Profane: The Politics of Applied Research in Aboriginal Australia

Abstract

Is there a view that academic anthropology operates or belongs in a ‘sacred’ space that is distinguishable from applied research occupying a less pure, intellectually inferior and more morally profane domain? Certainly, in my experience of some thirty plus years of work in Australian Aboriginal studies, such a distinction has at times been both promoted and contested vigorously. I outline my reading of the recent debate focusing particularly on writings from those concerned about the moral and political standing of applied anthropology. I also address the proposition that applied work is intellectually inadequate, particularly in being incapable of analysis of cultural change. Prompted by the critiques of applied anthropology, I reflect upon my own research career's blending of both academic and applied work. The paper addresses some case material enabling presentation of my perspective on the positive contribution of engagement beyond the academy in Australian Aboriginal anthropology.

Keywords:

• Applied Anthropology
• Indigenous
• Australia
• Native Title
• Law

Notes

This paper is a revised version of a presentation prepared for the session ‘Public and private engagements: Anthropology beyond the sacred grove’, convened by Colin Filer, David Martin and James Weiner at the European Society for Oceanists conference, University of St Andrews, July 2010. I am indebted to the session convenors' framing of a number of questions which have become central to this paper. Thanks to Wendy Asche, Katie Glaskin, Emma Kowal, David Martin, Peter Sutton and the anonymous reviewers for comments.

As this is put on the Society for Humanistic Anthropology website, http://sochumanthro.org/ (accessed 20 July 2011).

Andrew Lattas has also expressed considerable criticism on the e-mail list of the Australian Anthropological Society (AASnet), arguing for a discipline that remains the intellectual critic of ‘the state’, rather than engaging with legal cases and policy development outside the academy.

Several colleagues have questioned whether the terminology of a ‘business’ relationship is accurate. Some have suggested that those committed to forms of advocacy in anthropology will regard this characterisation as indicating a normalising of an exploitative relationship between researchers and their subjects. My view is that the notion of ‘business’ accommodates the kind of exchange I see as central in most anthropological research with Indigenous groups. Furthermore, doing intimate ‘business’ with people hardly precludes seeking to advance their interests, or receiving valued knowledge from them. Indeed, I suspect that shirking the obvious nature of such exchanges risks mystification and masking of the often mutually beneficial strategizing among both parties to the research relationship.

Agreement between the Waanyi, Mingginda, Gkuthaarn and Kukatj Peoples and the State of Qld and Century Zinc Ltd, an agreement under the Right to Negotiate provisions of the Native Title Act, 1993 in relation to the Century Zinc Project (13 February 1997).

Peter Norman Vale (Western Australian Police) v Lenny Hopiga and John Hopiga. Broome Magistrate's Court, hearing 22 and 23 November, 2010. On 19 April 2011, the pair were found guilty of the charges, fined and ordered to pay costs.

Austin-Broos (2010) stresses the significance of marginalisation, arguing that Martin's work insufficiently addresses the issue of ‘structural’ violence. My own reading of Martin's paper differs from hers; however, her point that structural drivers of violence in settings such as Aboriginal Australia are connected with unemployment, ill health and poverty, is very much consistent with my opinion given in the case under discussion.

Renteln (2005: 60–2) outlines a case where Berreman, an anthropologist, similarly challenged a ‘cultural defense’ to charges of labour and sexual slavery in America. Berreman argued against the proposition that an Indian migrant importing low caste girls from India was a matter of ‘culture’, suggesting it was better understood as driven by ‘economic circumstances’.

The fact that the Magistrate's decision did not, in the end, engage directly with the anthropological arguments is worthy of further discussion. However, this outcome does not detract from the significance of the anthropological issues elicited at great length by the legal representatives for both the defence and prosecution.