Abstract
Reciprocity is reported in simple experiments even in the absence of reputation or the ability to sanction. This paper reports the results of an experiment (one-shot investment game) designed to shed light on the underlying forces that drive reciprocal behavior. We contend that reciprocity arises because people strive to satisfy feelings of obligation. Our findings indicate that when interactions are anonymous, participants satisfy obligations by repaying exactly what was received, keeping any surplus for themselves. By comparison, when participants face the possibility of having their identity revealed, they reciprocate to a much greater extent (i.e., repayment exceeds the amount received). We suggest that such behavior arises due to impression management concerns.
Notes
1. See, for example, Ackert et al. (2007), Bolton et al. (1998), Cox et al. (2008), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), Engelmann and Strobel (2004), Henrich et al. (2004).
2. The literature relating to social preferences, including reciprocity, is quite large. For a review see Cooper and Kagel (2009).
3. We readily acknowledge that other procedures can be used to trigger impression management motives. Prior experimental research has provided individuals with information about others (e.g., surname, age, sex, ethnicity, group membership, the location of others participating in the experiment, etc.), which serves to heighten the psychological closeness between interacting parties and, in turn, heighten impression management concerns (Schlenker & Pontari, 2000).
4. A copy of the experimental materials is available from the authors upon request.
5. We do not include the initial endowment given to participants in room B in computing the total funds available, which is the convention followed in the standard investment game.
6. At this point, we did not partition the data by the multiplier because participants in room A never learn the multiplier.